Index

STATEMENT OF

RADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN
DIRECTOR, SURFACE WARFARE DIVISION

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Representative Sisisky, distinguished members of the Military Procurement Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss littoral warfare and the Surface Navy's preparedness to meet the threats associated with this environment. In my remarks, I first would like to lay out for you the strategic and tactical realities of littoral operations for the Surface Navy in the 21st century and describe in broad terms our strategy for transforming and developing our surface combatants to enable littoral operations.

But before I do that, and recognizing that you represent the military procurement subcommittee, I want to stress that none of the systems, programs, or strategies which I will discuss today, mean much if we don’t continue to invest in our most important "system" – our people. And by "investment" I’m talking about investments across the board – from leadership development and mentoring to monetary investments, such as the current initiatives to offer Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) and revamp REDUX.

Surface Navy Operations in the Littoral

For the Navy, focusing on the littoral was first articulated in 1992 with the publication of the Navy's new maritime strategy ...From the Sea. It was further refined in 1994 in Forward ... from the Sea and reaffirmed by our current leadership in 1997 in the Navy's Operational Concept. In the Surface Navy, this "refocusing" swept in what we term "a measured revolution," and focused on the first of CNO’s "four stars" guiding the Navy’s future course – operational primacy. Appropriately, our resources and requirements were realigned to enhance those things which allow the Navy to influence events ashore, directly and decisively from the sea. The focus of our near term efforts is to make evolutionary changes in our current force structure and to meld the fundamental precepts of the Navy's Operational Concept and the Marine Corp's Operational Maneuver from the Sea. This "meld" is well underway and I will discuss later the timing and investment to realize this initiative. I will add that this process has been greatly facilitated by our refocusing to the littoral and land campaign, a strategy which is in step with the major tenets of Joint Vision 2010.

Fortunately, our great naval heritage has been blessed with visionary naval leaders such as RADM Wayne Meyer, affectionately referred to as the "Father of Aegis." Most importantly he possessed the ability to articulate his vision. Of course he did not accomplish this without the assistance of many others – others like you and your predecessors on this subcommittee who had the wisdom and courage to support Admiral Meyer’s vision and see it to fruition: Today’s Aegis cruiser and destroyer fleet.

As a former Battlegroup Commander who operated in the Gulf last year as part of joint and coalition forces, I can attest to the fact that operating in the littoral, often in shallow waters in close proximity to merchant and civilian shipping, with sensors masked by land masses and urban environs, poses an enormously complex warfighting challenge. Taking from that experience, and now in my position as the Director of Surface Warfare for the Chief of Naval Operations, I am concerned with the threat from sea mines, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) to our forces. Furthermore, given the littoral's compressed battlespace and reduced engagement timelines, I am concerned over the greatly diminished response times required of ship's commanders, on the order of seconds rather than minutes.

But for today's purposes, and in accordance with guidance from the committee, I will address the following littoral threats: sea mines, torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). I will frame these in the context of the Surface Navy in terms of the Surface Navy's missions of Maritime Dominance, Theater Air Dominance and Land Attack in fulfilling our role in support of an expeditonary operation.

 

Maritime Dominance

Maritime Dominance is the seagoing component of dominant maneuver. It is the precondition necessary for conducting land attack and theater air dominance operations, both of which ultimately will be required for successful expeditionary warfare operations. By maritime dominance, I mean control over the breadth, depth and height of the maritime portion of the battlespace. This control requires the ability to defeat coastal defenses and dominate a foe in the littoral battlespace - at sea, on the ground and in the airspace - extending from a significant distance offshore to hundreds of miles inland. Unless command of the seas and airspace is gained and maintained, deployed and follow-on forces will be at risk.

Maritime Dominance is composed of four fundamental elements: Undersea Warfare, Surface Warfare, Expeditionary Warfare and Combat Logistics. Our "roadmap" to Maritime Dominance in these areas involves a move away from platform-centric warfare toward network-centric warfare. Admittedly, while we still have much work to do in defining the scope and details of network-centric warfare, we recognize that the days of "stovepiped" systems and single-mission platforms are a thing of the past. Network-Centric Warfare will allow our combatants to combine their strengths through real-time data links, such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and improve and maintain their required situational awareness of the battlespace. Network-centricity will also ensure our combatants are "plugged in" to the joint command and control network, ensuring their access to long-range sensor suites and other theater and national systems. Bottom line: network centric warfare gives our surface combatants, operating indepependently or with a battlegroup, the ability to attack and defend throughout the battlespace, with the right weapon, at the right time, on the right target.

 

Force Protection: Maritime

The key to improving tactical reaction time is efficient integration of sensors, weapon systems, and command and control elements into a coherent system. The goal is to speed up the process of threat detection, evaluation and weapons assignment through computer automation. Reducing this processing time buys back tactical reaction time. The Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) will accomplish this function in support of maritime force protection in aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious ships, similar to the process the Aegis Weapons System provides for combatants.

We selected an evolutionary strategy, which will culminate in fielding integrated combat system (ICS) capabilities for each ship class. Tailored packages of high-technology improvements to combat systems will reduce manpower and maintenance requirements. This approach allows for gradual improvement of both survivability and fleet combat effectiveness within budget constraints, while simultaneously reducing current life-cycle costs. Based on an open system architecture and modularity in design, the upgrade ability is maximized. This Push In/Pull Out (PIPO) approach will allow for rapid improvement of ship self-defense systems and support a flexible variety of sensor and weapon mixes. However, to maximize the overall capabilities of the force in countering a continuously evolving threat, the acquisition of new systems must keep pace with available funding and computer technology advances.

The roots of this evolutionary approach to ship self-defense can be found in the 1995 review of the Ship Self-Defense Capstone Warfighting Requirements by the then-Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense (PEO TAD) and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The review determined it was best to establish ship self-defense requirements on a ship class basis, by analyzing class missions and employment doctrine. This result allowed for the initial reduction in the variety of ship self-defense elements in the fleet, an important principle we are applying to all our combat systems development. The FY 00 President’s budget mandated a comprehensive analysis of ship self-defense requirements against capabilities. The results of this analysis provided a blueprint for achieving the capstone requirements throughout the fleet. By eliminating redundant efforts and focusing procurement on select systems, such as the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), the Navy can field integrated combat systems and fully meet ship self-defense capstone requirements.

The requirements of the fleet demand battle group integrity. Future ship self-defense systems will allow for full support of the layered-defense doctrine. The plan supported by the FY00 President’s budget will complete installation of a recently developed weapons control system, the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) Mk 1, in ten LSD 41/49 dock landing ships, and will install SSDS Mk 2 in 12 CV/CVNs, and seven Wasp-class (LHD 1) amphibious assault ships by Fiscal Year 2006 (FY 06). The SSDS Mk 1 and Mk 2 weapons control systems provide integration of sensors and control of engagement systems. SSDS Mk 1 integrates the SPS-49A(V) MPU radar, Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), and SLQ-32 electronic warfare system to detect threats and the RAM Block 0 missile, CIWS and Nulka decoy to engage and defeat incoming ASCMs.

SSDS Mk 2 will integrate sensor inputs from the SPS-48E radar, the SPQ-9B radar, Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) for detection, while relying on the RAM Block 1, the Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Missile system (RNSSMS) with RIM-7P missile, and the SLQ-32 for engagement. Eventually, the RIM-7P will be replaced by the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and the ESSM launching system (ESML).

Several of the key elements of the maritime force protection program have made substantial progress recently in pursuing evolutionary enhancement. The SPQ-9B radar, which is currently completing its Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, will be optimized to meet the ASCM threat in the littoral environment. The upgrade improves the ships’ Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) capability to detect and track sea-skimming, low radar cross-section, high-speed targets in heavy clutter environments, while also providing a low-cost means of fire control for surface engagement. The SPQ-9B uses a high resolution, track-while-scan, X-band, pulse Doppler radar to provide real-time acquisition and automatic tracking of multiple targets. This efficient detection system is an essential element in winning back critical reaction time against the ASCM threat.

 

IRST

The IRST program is developing a passive, lightweight, infrared, horizon detection and tracking sensor specifically for use against sea-skimming ASCM attacks. IRST's infrared system provides ships a unique set of sensing capabilities, required to protect a maritime force in the littoral environment. It can perform 360-degree surveillance, detection and declaration with high bearing accuracy. The IRST also is immune to jamming while complementing radar systems should their performance be degraded.

The IRST program is taking a phased engineering approach and will produce an early engineering development model. The IRST scanner was installed on the Self-Defense Test Ship during the RAM operational evaluation (OPEVAL) during early FY 99. A fully integrated demonstration and evaluation also will be held at the Aegis Combat Systems Center on Wallops Island in FY 99.

 

AIEWS

The development of the AN/SLY-2 Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS) is a two-increment program representing the next generation in shipboard electronic warfare. Specifically designed to employ layered countermeasures in the littoral environment, the main function of AIEWS is linking all soft-kill systems into the ship’s air warfare defense systems. The first increment of AIEWS will include an advanced display, improved emitter processing, enhanced combat system integration, a new receiver capability, and improved emitter identification. Increment two will introduce advanced RF (radio frequency) and IR (infrared) attack subsystems and advanced off-board countermeasures. Moreover, the AIEWS program is committed to preserving an open system architecture, providing the flexibility for easy insertion of future high technologies.

 

Sea Sparrow

The Sea Sparrow Missile system, first introduced in 1970, has had several upgrades to its missile and the fire control system. However, the system reached the point where the computer processing systems were restraining possible improvements to performance. The Rearchitectured NATO Sea Sparrow Surface Missile System (RNSSMS) will replace the old processing and control elements with Higher Order Language--based commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) processors and Navy standard consoles. Additionally, RNSSMS will bring major upgrades to the Mk 73 transmitter and Mk 17 Signal Data Processor.

In effect, the RNSSMS removes the major artificial boundaries between systems. By using a fiberoptic LAN structure with the standard UYQ-70 consoles, RNSSMS creates a "plug and play" environment for NATO Sea Sparrow launchers and radars. In the end, the RNSSMS will reduce control console and manning requirements and will cut life cycle maintenance costs, through highly reliable COTS technology. For example, in the case of the Signal Data Processor (SDP) replacement, the time between critical failures is estimated to improve from 5,000 to 25,000 hours. An initial production contract for RNSSMS has been awarded to support LHD 6, LHD 7, CVN 68 and CVN 76. Future replacement of the current RIM-7P missile with the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) will provide a foundation for the next generation of self-defense systems.

ESSM is an extensive upgrade of the RIM-7P missile with a new rocket motor, new tail control and new warhead. The guidance section is all that remains from the original. ESSM’s improved speed, range, and payload give it the capability to destroy next-generation ASCMs. It is designed to be fired from two existing launchers, the Mk 48 Guided Missile Vertical Launching System (GMVLS) and the Mk 41 VLS. ESSM is planned to be the ship self-defense engagement system in Flight IIA Arleigh Burke destroyers. 

 

RAM

The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Program Office also has begun the implementation of a Helo/Air/Surface (HAS) Mode Engineering Change Proposal to the RAM Block 1. The HAS mode upgrade will involve software changes that will allow RAM to acquire and track an expanded set of close-range, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and small surface craft, while preserving its primary point defense mission. The United States and Germany - cooperative development and production partners on RAM - are near completion on a joint development program for an infrared-all-the-way guidance upgrade, which would provide RAM Block 1 the capability to engage RF-passive ASCMs. RAM will complete operational evaluation testing of the Block 1 upgrade aboard the Self-Defense Test Ship in the second quarter of FY 99.

 

CIWS

The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) is also upgrading to meet the rising threat from ASCMs. The Block 1B surface mode ordnance alteration for Phalanx includes the addition of a thermal imager, an automatic acquisition video tracker and a stabilization system for the tracker to provide threat detection both day and night. The thermal imager also improves the accuracy of Phalanx’s angle tracking information to the firing computer, enhancing the system’s ability to engage ASCMs. The Phalanx Block 1B uses the Navy’s first fused radio frequency/electro-optical (RF/EO) sensor system to improve its AAW capability. The RF/EO system increases the number of hits, extends the initial hit range, eliminates radar glint, and eliminates the effects of multipath propagation.

 

Undersea Warfare

Undersea Warfare is a good example of a mission for which operational primacy is critical. As CNO stated in a message to the fleet last week, "Lest we forget, sea control is the unique contribution the Navy makes to our national miltary strategy…throughout modern history, submarines and mines have been used by less capable adversaries to delay and disrupt highly capable navies of the world. I remain convinced that ASW will be a more potent threat in the future."

In terms of Undersea Warfare (USW), which includes Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare, we are pursuing an aggressive two-pronged strategy. First, we are planning on providing our combatants with an organic minehunting capability, which they presently do not possess. Not everyone will have this, but it will be a capability within every Battle Group. This will allow us to achieve a balance between organic capabilities and maintaining a dedicated fleet of mine hunting and mine sweeping vessels. Second, we intend on taking full advantage of the vast technological advancements in computing power and networking to develop systems which will be able to better exploit the ASW environment; systems which employ multi-static and active acoustic processing techniques critical to defeating the noisy and complex waters of the littoral. Finally, improvements in ship torpedo defensive systems, continued support of an embarked SH-60 helicopter program, and building better surface launched torpedoes, such as the Mark 54 lightweight hybrid torpedo, will result in increased ASW effectiveness.

 

Surface Ship Lightweight Torpedoes

Since the introduction of the first lightweight torpedo, the U.S. Navy has continued to develop and improve its arsenal of capable Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) weapons. In response to the littoral USW challenges, the Navy’s 21st century lightweight torpedoes, including the MK46 Mod 5A(SW), MK50 Block Upgrade I and the MK54, will equip our Sailors with the World’s finest ASW weapons to counter current and future threats.

The MK46 Torpedo has been the workhorse of the U.S. Navy's lightweight ASW torpedo program since 1965. It is currently employed by all U.S. Navy surface and air ASW platforms as well as in the inventory of 25 foreign navies. Initially designed during the 1960s to attack high performance submarines, the MK46 has undergone extensive modifications over the past three decades. Today’s MK46 Mod 5 torpedo is the benefactor of significant improvements in detection, counter-countermeasure and shallow water performance from earlier variants, but it is not adequate. In the late 1980s a major system upgrade was developed to improve MK46 Mod 5 performance in shallow water. The resultant MK46 Mod 5A(S) Torpedo is now the primary ASW weapon for surface ships and ASW fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.

To further enhance shallow water performance and extend the service life into the 21st century, the MK46 Mod 5A(SW) (Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)) Torpedo was developed in the early 1990s and introduced to the fleet in September 1996. The MK46 Mod 5A(SW) SLEP further improved counter-countermeasure resistance, enhanced target acquisition, and incorporated a bottom avoidance feature to enhance operation in shallow water. The SLEP program is scheduled for completion in FY99.

The MK50 is the U.S. Navy’s most advanced lethal lightweight ASW weapon. Introduced to the fleet in October 1992, after 16 years of development to an inventory of approximately 1000, the MK50 torpedo was designed to counter the fast, deep diving, double-hulled Soviet submarine threat of the Cold War period. The MK50 contains an advanced Stored Chemical Energy Propulsion System (SCEPS) capable of increased speed, range, and depths. In addition, the MK50 torpedo has greatly enhanced processing, detection and counter-countermeasures capability relative to the MK46 family of torpedoes. With the shift in emphasis to the littoral, the Navy initiated a software block upgrade program in the early 1990’s to improve MK50 performance in shallow water against diesel-electric threats. In 1996 the MK50 Block Upgrade I was introduced to the fleet and is the shallow water "weapon of choice" for the U. S. Navy.

As the shallow waters of the littoral environment became better understood it was clear that ASW acoustic torpedoes would require more robust detection and signal processing capabilities to further enhance performance in littoral environments. With defense-wide fiscal constraints prevailing, a new "bottom’s up" development program was not feasible. The determination was made that technologies and performance features already incorporated into the MK 50 Lightweight Torpedo and the MK 48 (ADCAP) Heavyweight Torpedo, if effectively adapted to inventory units of the MK 46, would provide a cost-effective alternative to counter today’s threat. In 1995 the MK54 Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo program was initiated to provide a cost-effective shallow water performance upgrade to the lightweight torpedo inventory of MK46 and MK50 torpedoes.

The MK54 torpedo integrates the proven technologies of existing torpedoes, including the MK46 propulsion system, MK50 sonar, and MK48 ADCAP software with state-of-the-art digital signal processing technology available on the commercial market. Incorporating Non-Developmental Item technologies from existing weapons and commercial industry has resulted in a significantly improved shallow water performance while reducing total ownership cost. Extensive use of COTS and open systems architecture enables MK54 to be readily upgraded via technology insertion and software upgrades to counter future threats.

The MK54 program is currently in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase with Developmental Testing (DT) scheduled to begin in 3rd/4th QTR FY1999. Scheduled for fleet introduction in 2003, the MK54 will replace the older MK46 torpedoes with a far superior, expandable ASW weapon capable of countering current and future threats.

 

Mine Warfare

As you are aware, the Navy has embarked on an effort to further decrease response time to commence the mine countermeasures campaign and to expand our overall mine countermeasures capabilities. This initiative is known as "Organic Mine Warfare,"and will mainstream mine countermeasures systems into our Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. They will be integrated, both physically and doctrinally, into all Navy Joint Task Forces, eliminating the exclusive reliance on dedicated mine countermeasures forces. Consistent with the Network Centric Warfare concept, our organic mine warfare countermeasures capability will be provided to the Battlegroup via a "system of systems" to include air, surface, and subsurface components. For surface combatants, one of the systems we are pursuing is the Remote Minehunting System (RMS). This system is being developed to deploy from surface combatants and operate remotely over-the-horizon. The Remote Minehunting System is a semi-submersible diesel powered vehicle that tows minehunting sensors. Remote Minehunting System vehicle sea trials were conducted in fiscal year 1998 and a development contract will be awarded this spring. This development contract will integrate a new sensor package into the Remote Minehunting System and will integrate the entire system into the DDG 51 Flight IIA (beginning with hull number 91 in 2004).

 

Torpedo Defense

Today surface ship torpedo defense capability is provided by a variety of systems because there is no one universal solution to the threat. The appropriate defense depends upon the type of incoming torpedo and upon the type of targeted platform. The defensive measures cover a range of active countermeasures, passive countermeasures, and tactics. Highly maneuverable combatants are able to employ vastly different tactics and countermeasures than would, for example, a slower, less maneuverable amphibious ship, which is not equipped with appropriate crew skills, acoustic sensors, or acoustic quieting.

The AN/SLQ-25A NIXIE system is a soft-kill countermeasure system that acts as a decoy to confuse incoming homing torpedoes. It is the most basic and most widely used torpedo countermeasure system fielded on our ships. The NIXIE is a towed system that operates at all times when the ship is at risk of torpedo attack and unlike some of the more sophisticated countermeasure systems, NIXIE does not rely on cueing from an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) system. Because the system does not rely on cueing, it is well suited for deployment on all US Navy warships, including aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, sealift and large fleet auxiliaries.

Other torpedo countermeasure systems which are currently deployed require that the ship have an Anti-Submarine Warfare capability. One such system is the Multi-Sensor Torpedo Recognition and Processor (MSTRAP). This is a torpedo detection, classification and localization processing system that receives input from both the ship’s hull sonar and towed arrays. It acts as an alertment system that is used in conjunction with maneuvers to evade and deployable countermeasures to effect a soft-kill of the incoming torpedo. This system is being integrated into the AN/SQQ-89 Anti-Submarine Warfare combat system as the Torpedo Recognition and Alertment Functional Segment (TRAFS). It will detect and localize torpedoes at tactically significant ranges when the primary detecting sensor is the towed array. The Navy began deploying the Multi-Sensor Torpedo Recognition and Processor on Anti-Submarine Warfare capable ships in 1997, and will continue to deploy the integrated version, Torpedo Recognition and Alertment Functional Segment, in Anti-Submarine Warfare capable combatants. Further system improvements, currently under way, will enable us to improve performance by discriminating properly between real threats and false targets, thus driving down the number of false alerts.

The Launched Expendable Acoustic Device (LEAD) is now in production and will deliver for Fleet use this fiscal year. Like NIXIE, Launched Expendable Acoustic Device is a soft-kill countermeasure system that decoys or confuses an incoming acoustic homing torpedo. It is deployed only on surface combatants because it requires the ship to be alerted to the incoming torpedo. The Launched Expendable Acoustic Device is most effective when combined with specifically developed tactical maneuvers. An enhancement, currently in early development, known as the Mobile Ship-launched Countermeasure Acoustic Device (MSCAD) will be a self-propelled version of the Launched Expendable Acoustic Device.

 

Theater Air Dominance

From this foundation of maritime dominance, the Surface Navy stands poised to execute two evolving, critical missions necessary to realizing success in the littoral: Theater Air Dominance and Land Attack.

The first, theater air dominance, goes to the heart of providing full-dimension protection, not only for naval forces, but joint and coalition forces that will also be involved in any future operation. In the littoral, the two aspects of theater air dominance about which I am most concerned, and to which I will focus my remarks, are defeating anti-ship cruise missiles and providing theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD).

 

Standard Missile

The Aegis Weapons System, with its Standard Missile, provides a robust Area Anti Air Warfare (AAW) capability against threat aircraft and Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) when conducting operations in the littorals. By providing this Area AAW shield, the Standard Missile is the enabler for operations close to land. For example, Aegis cruisers and destroyers can engage the F-1 Mirage aircraft and its electronic jamming techniques using the SM-2 Block IIIB missile at ranges up to 80 nm. If the Mirage launches ASCMs such as the Exocet, the SM-2 is relied upon to decrement the incoming raid by one half prior to engagement by self- defense weapons systems.

The SM-2 Block IV is an extended range variant of the Standard Missile that will reach initial operational capability (IOC) in FY99. The Block IV can engage threat aircraft and ASCMs at ranges up to 100 nm. It can engage stand off jamming aircraft beyond 100nm. It will also provide an increased capability against maneuvering ASCMs over earlier Standard Missile variants.

Both of these missiles build on the foundation of excellence that we have enjoyed with the Standard Missile family. The SM-2 Block IIIB completed final operational testing and evaluation last December with a "grand slam of sorts" – 9 for 9 hits against incoming targets. These weren’t special missiles, they were production missiles, the types of which are being fielded today. The Block IV missile will complete testing this spring and IOC later this year.

 

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

Positioning theater ballistic missile defense at sea can provide deterrence and war winning leverage. Capitalizing on the inherent flexibility of surface ships, TBMD at sea frees us from the need to provide land-based terminal defenses around every potential target we wish to protect. In the littoral, on-scene surface combatants can immediately influence events because they are combat ready and can sustain themselves independent of host nation support. In short, we position our forces where they are most effective.

In support of forcible entry and sustained ground combat operations, such as those associated with an amphibious landing, Navy TBMD forces provide the earliest capability when the heaviest TBM attack intensity is likely and when other TBMD systems are still enroute or are only present in limited numbers. The Navy Area TBMD System will provide protection against short- and medium-range TBMs for debarkation ports, coastal airfields, amphibious objective areas (AOAs) and expeditionary forces as they move from the sea towards their objective ashore.

 

Land Attack

The second, evolving critical mission at the heart of naval capabilities in the littoral operating environment will be the precision engagement of the enemy – the land attack mission. Although land attack also encompasses long-range, strategic precision strikes, such as those afforded by the Tomahawk cruise missile, for this hearing's purpose I will limit my remarks to Surface Navy's role in providing precision naval surface fires support to Marines or other forces on the beach.

Recent and continuing investment in a robust land attack capability gives us a strong offense. Investment has grown to over $2.0 Billion dollars in the current FYDP. Not only does it support the Marine Corps in an offensive land campaign, but it also helps protect our forces and allies from attack. Land attack adds a whole new dimension to this mission area with the introduction of an offensive, long-range, responsive and lethal capability not previously resident in our surface combatants. This new capability contributes significantly to the definition and execution of the land campaign. I cannot overemphasize this point enough - never before have surface combatants possessed such a combination of precision, range and lethality.

This type of high volume, precise firepower is exactly what is called for by the Marine Corps’ Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) concept. With a target implementation date of 2008, we have synchronized our investment plans to support this date. As OMFTS becomes reality with the fielding of the MV-22 Osprey and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), we will be fielding an improved 5 inch gun and land attack missile. As OMFTS matures, so too will our fire support capability with DD 21 and the 155MM Advanced Gun System (AGS).

Specifically, our acquisition programs will produce a 5"/62 gun system for Aegis ships capable of delivering rocket assisted projectiles to an objective range of 63 NM, and an advanced gun system for DD 21 capable of delivering rocket assisted projectiles to an objective range of 100 NM. Importantly, this allows our combatants to remain over-the-horizon and still deliver ordnance at substantially greater ranges inland against the enemy.

 

Extended Range Guided Munition

The Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) is a 5" projectile that will be fired from the 5"/62 MK 45 Mod 4 Gun Mount. ERGM incorporates a rocket motor and internal Global Positioning System (GPS) coupled with an Inertial Navigation System (INS). The coupled GPS/INS will provide autonomous guidance and control to a fixed target location determined prior to firing. The rocket motor will provide range capability far in excess of current ballistic projectiles (Threshold range: 41nm; Objective range: 63nm). The warhead will consist of a highly effective submunition payload (72 M80s - Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition/DPICM). The combination of the extended range with GPS/INS position accuracy will provide significantly improved performance to meet future NSFS mission requirements.

 

Advanced Gun System

The Advanced Gun System (AGS) is a fully integrated gun weapon system (GWS) which includes dual large caliber (perhaps 155MM) guns, fully integrated gun and fire control systems, and built-in test and fault isolation functions. Each gun will be capable of independently firing 12 rounds per minute from an automated magazine storing 600-750 rounds. AGS will meet DD 21’s stringent reduced manning, radar signature and maintenance requirements, as well as provide the range, lethality, and volume of fire required by the Marine Corps.

The AGS program also includes development of a large caliber Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), a GPS/INS guided, precision munition with an objective range of 100NM. Employing GPS/INS guidance technology developed in the 5" Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) program and submunitions (M80 and, perhaps, Sense And Destroy Armor (SADARM) developed by the Army), the system will address a wide range of targets in support of land forces. Future lethality enhancements may include high explosive (HE) and penetrator warheads.

AGS is being developed as part of the DD 21 Full Service Contractor acquisition strategy, with first system delivery to DD 21 scheduled for FY06.

 

Naval Fires Control System

In order to safely and effectively employ these long range, precision guided weapons in support of complex amphibious and joint land battle operations, we are developing the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS). NFCS is a battle management system that will be the enabler for surface land attack in net-centric warfare. NFCS will support mission planning for 5"/62 - ERGM and AGS. It will automate shipboard Land Attack battle management duties, support evolving Expeditionary Warfare capabilities, tactics and doctrine, and be interoperable and consistent with Joint C4ISR systems and Air Defense and Air Control systems and procedures.

 

Building the Force

I mentioned at the beginning of my statement that we were pursuing "a measured revolution." Measured because it seeks an evolution of our current force, allowing us to leverage off the capabilities of what are already, without qualification, the world's most capable surface combatants. Evolving these platforms to meet what we envision to be the requirements early in the 21st century maximizes their return to both the fleet and the taxpayer. As new technologies mature, we can incorporate these into the designs of our future combatants and effect a true revolution in sea-based combat capability.

Today we are at a threshold. From 1988 to 1998 the DoN's total obligation authority decreased by 40% in constant 1998 dollars. Coincident with this decrease, we have experienced a marked increase in forward presence and contingency operations. In fact, owing to the unique capabilities naval forces bring to a turbulent post-Cold War world, the peacetime Navy has never been busier. As a consequence of the constrained fiscal environment along with a demanding operational tempo, we have not been able to maintain both readiness and still modernize/ recapitalize the Fleet. Deployed readiness has, of necessity, been our priority. Non-deployed readiness and modernization/recapitalization for future readiness has consequently declined. We have "made do", but are at the point where we can no longer safely mortgage our future readiness by further deferring recapitalization and modernization.

In order to sustain a force level of approximately 300 ships beyond the FYDP, we must achieve a building rate of 8 to 10 ships per year. Due to severely constrained finances for the past several years, we have not been able to recapitalize at a rate sufficient to maintain a 300 ship Navy over the long term -- and we have viewed this with increasing alarm.

The severity of the situation is apparent in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recent decision to change his overall risk assessment for a future two MTW scenario from moderate to high. As the CNO has testified, the Navy needs an increase of $6B/year across the FYDP above PRESBUD FY99 levels to restore non-deployed readiness and to recapitalize and modernization to meet future warfighting requirements.

We believe the higher level of funding requested in the President’s FY 2000 budget, along with savings realized by efficiencies in the way the Department of the Navy operates, goes a long way to improve the situation, and will allow us to begin to increase our procurement rates across the FYDP. The chart below depicts the SCN Plan in the FY 2000 President's Budget, and shows the increase in procurement over PB 1999. This is an important step in restoring the Navy’s ability to recapitalize and modernize to meet future warfighting requirements. We look forward to working closely with Congress to address our needs so that the Navy continues to be ready and capable as we sail into the next millennium.

Adaptation of DDG 51 to the Littoral

Beginning with DDG 81, USS Winston S. Churchill, which commissions in 2001, we will begin adapting the successful Arleigh Burke class destroyer to the littoral with the forward fit of the 5 inch /62 caliber gun and extended range guided munition (ERGM). Other changes include the incorporation of an embarked helicopter (SH-60R), an organic minehunting capability and the introduction of an area-wide theater ballistic missile defense capability. The important lesson learned here is the wisdom of building of a multi-mission surface combatant, that allows flexibility and adaptability to meet future requirements.

 

Cruiser Conversion

In order to preserve the relevancy of our Aegis Cruiser force into the 21st century, we are pursuing a program known as Cruiser Conversion. This program will allow the combat system of these very capable ships to address the growing theater ballistic missile threat by incorporation of theater- and area-wide TBMD capability, as well as remaining full participants in the Land Attack mission with the introduction of 5 inch / 62 caliber gun and ERGM in 22 of these ships. They will continue to receive upgrades to their already robust command and control suites to ensure they remain full participants in the joint battlespace. Importantly, this conversion program extends these ships nominal service life from 35 years to 40 years, which subsequently allows us to delay a decision on its replacement – SC 21.

 

DD 21

Our revolutionary platform, DD 21, will be a multi-mission combatant which will establish and maintain superiority over the surface, subsurface and local air battlespace. It will have a new, advanced gun system, capable of providing high volume precise naval fires, and a next generation land attack missile, further extending the battlespace. DD 21, being designed from the keel up to operate in the complex waters of the littoral, will incorporate new stealth technologies to aid in survivability, will have a multi-function radar capable of exploiting that complex radar environment and possess a fully integrated undersea warfare suite to address the littoral’s complex undersea warfare challenges.

 

Summary

The goal of our program is to improve the commander’s warfighting potential in the littoral. We are developing systems keyed to providing offensive, distributed, lethal firepower to the joint land battle. But it is also a program which ensures we continue to perform our traditional mission of maritime dominance using layered defense, which contributes to our role as an enabler for follow-on forces.

Although the very nature of the complex littoral environment and the asymmetric nature of the threat is at times daunting, I am confident we have crafted a realistic and affordable plan from which to begin.

Lastly, I do not want to leave you with the impression that we are going this battle alone. And I don’t use the term "battle" loosely, because that is precisely the point of what I have tried to convey to you here today. Tomorrow’s war, like all wars, will be messy. And we owe it to the Private Ryans of that future war to procure and equip them with the right weapons and systems to accomplish their job – and accomplish it well. It will require a team effort; a team whose membership includes all of the Services, OSD, and the Congress. The American people demand a winning team – and deserve no less.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and your continued support in this regard.