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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

 

 

 

 

PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUBJECT: F-22 Program

 

STATEMENT OF: MRS. DARLEEN A. DRUYUN

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

For Acquisition and Management

 

DECEMBER 7, 1999

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED

BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Air Force’s F-22 program. To maintain its viability, our Air Force needs to be modernized as technology and the threat evolves. The Air Force’s current time-phased modernization effort is rooted in the Air Force’s core competencies and is an affordable balance between readiness and modernization of the aerospace force. Within our modernization efforts, the tactical aviation modernization program is based upon a high-low mix of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft to provide the most combat capable, efficient, and lethal air forces possible with the resources allocated. In this mix, the F-22 provides the high capability force to attack enemy aircraft and highly defended, high value targets, while the lower cost JSF, purchased in large numbers, provides the bulk of the attack force. The current JSF design relies on the F-22 for air superiority.

Control of the vertical battlespace has been, is, and will remain a major element of United States national security policy. The F-22 will enable the United States to obtain Air Dominance--the total denial of the airspace to the enemy. Aircraft survival in the 21st century will require a combination of low observability, supercruise, integrated avionics, and high maneuverability to defeat the emerging fighter and surface-to-air missile threat. The F-22 combines all of these features into an affordable portion of the Air Force’s modernization program.

We appreciate your concern, support, and funding for our efforts to modernize and sustain the world’s most respected Aerospace Force.

 

AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY

The control over what moves through air and space provides a fundamental benefit to joint forces. DoD’s Joint Vision 2010 envisions the U.S. military dominating all aspects of a conflictFull Spectrum Dominance. Full spectrum dominance depends on the inherent strengths of aerospace power: speed, range, flexibility, stealth, precision, lethality, global/theater situational awareness, and strategic perspective. The attainment of Air Superiority is key to the successful use of our military power. Protection of the U.S. and allied joint forces is the number one priority--their protection requires the Air Force to quickly obtain and maintain Air Superiority. Air Superiority provides the freedom from attack, the freedom to maneuver, and the freedom to attack at a time and place of our choosing. Air Superiority prevents our adversaries from interfering with operations of air, space, or surface forces. However, with newer and better ways of preventing aerospace superiority on the horizon, our forces must be modernized to maintain the edge over our adversaries. The F-22 and JSF provide the Air Force with a comprehensive and complementary modernization plan to ensure our nation’s ability to control the vertical dimension well into the 21st Century.

The multi-mission F-22 Raptor is the Air Force’s highest acquisition priority, and most pressing modernization need. The F-22, which will replace the aging F-15, brings an unmatched capability to the battlespace. In the hands of Air Force aviators, the F-22 will dominate the aerial arena of the 21st Century.

 

F-22 Program

I am pleased to provide an update on the progress of the F-22 Air Dominance Fighter program. This update will include: program schedule, flight and ground test accomplishments, improvements in air vehicle manufacturing, integrated avionics development--so central to what F-22 brings to the fight, the impacts of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY2000, and finally progress in affordability initiatives for both development and production. We will also highlight program successes throughout 1999 and our current focus to meet the challenges ahead as we prepare for the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review in December 2000.

In May 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology designated the first two post-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft as Production Representative Test Vehicles (PRTVs). These aircraft will support Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) before joining Air Combat Command as operational test assets. This acquisition strategy balanced the risk associated with concurrent EMD and production, avoided significant program cost increases, and deferred the LRIP production decision to November 1999.

The Fiscal Year 2000 Appropriations Act directed an additional delay in the LRIP decision while allowing the procurement of additional test aircraft for Follow-on Operation Test and Evaluation. This action preserves the overall development and production schedules while retaining the program’s affordability within the cost caps. At the December 2000 DAB, the F-22 team will clearly prove the technical performance of the F-22 weapon system through demonstration of critical test milestones and marked progress in meeting program affordability goals. The two overarching program goals for this year are the progression of integrated avionics testing to the F-22 weapon system level and further development and maintenance of comprehensive program cost control initiatives.

Underpinning F-22 development is the thesis that testing verifies results of previous modeling and simulation, thereby confirming system design and performance. This verification involves both flight and ground test activity. With more than ten percent of the flight testing complete, the F-22 continues to meet or exceed all performance expectations. In 1999, the aircraft achieved the following flight test criteria:

    • Sustained flight above 50,000 feet
    • Weapons bay open testing for both main and side weapons bays
    • Supercruise (Mach 1.5+)
    • Angle of attack greater than 60 degrees with engine thrust vectoring
    • Significant expansion of the flight envelope

During the 1999 test program, the two flight test aircraft were inspected for aft fuselage forward boom buckling - a potential failure predicted from ongoing structural strength analysis. Inspections revealed that neither of the test aircraft had indications of distress and modifications were completed during a scheduled aircraft down time to eliminate potential failures in this area. This experience emphasizes two key aspects of the test program: First, modifications can and will be accomplished during testing without a significant impact to the achievement of flight test results; and second, the small number of these modifications demonstrate the maturity and ability of the aircraft design to meet its mission requirements--a maturity that already predicts the F-22 design will be able to fully meet its operational requirements.

To verify the attainment of all program objectives, aircraft ground testing is as important as flight test. Since the beginning of 1999, both test aircraft have been extensively engaged in ground testing. This includes dedicated logistics test and evaluation, aircraft modifications, and ground tests needed to continue to expand the flight envelope. In 1999, this included the first block of low observable maintenance that demonstrated the ability of the Air Force to organically maintain the F-22. Progress in completing the logistics test points has been outstanding. By the end of 1999, nearly one-third of the logistics test points will have been completed, providing confidence in the ability to complete all logistics tests well in advance of the first operational aircraft delivery.

In addition to aircraft ground testing, engine and aircraft subcomponent testing is also used to verify performance and durability. The amount of subcomponent testing and modeling completed easily makes the F-22 the most tested system ever developed by the Air Force (Figure 1). This includes more than 45,000 hours of wind tunnel testing, 12,000 plus hours of flight control simulation, over 10,000 hours of radar testing and, more than 4,000 hours of signature testing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 1. F-22 Testing to Date

Highlights from 1999 include demonstrating engine maturity to enable certification for engine full flight release--clearing the engine for the full aircraft flight envelope. Another highlight was the verification of the aircraft’s low observable signature on a full-size aircraft model. These tests were conducted using actual flight qualified hardware on the F-22 pole model. Finally, a full-size F-22 static test article was tested to 100% of predicted flight loads in a test rig at the Lockheed Martin Georgia facility.

In summary, F-22 continues to execute a remarkably successful test program. And, we have an even more exciting program ahead next year. Four additional test aircraft will join the Edwards test force, including the first block 2 aircraft (4003) and the first avionics test aircraft (4004). By the end of 2000, the F-22 test team will demonstrated additional capabilities to include: First flight of Avionics block 3.0, Initiation of radar cross-section flight testing, high angle-of-attack testing with weapons bay doors open, and initial separation tests with AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles.

Our number one manufacturing improvement area this past year is the wing. Difficulties with the manufacture of a key casting in the wings resulted in late deliveries of wings to final assembly. This in turn impacted the delivery schedules of EMD aircraft through aircraft number seven. Currently, the wing recovery program is a remarkable success story: a second source for castings has been qualified, machining process problems have been corrected, and wing deliveries have been on-time to the recovery schedule which supports overall EMD test objectives. The recovery schedule for wing deliveries will result in an aircraft production rate of four aircraft in 2000, a rate that will not be seen again until production ramps up in 2002. An F-22 Airframe Schedule Integration Team (ASIT) created in March 99 continues to review and assess the executability of aircraft delivery schedules to support the EMD program. Delivery of critical path assemblies (forward, mid, & aft fuselages and wings) to ASIT planning has been exceptional through October 1999.

A second aircraft production issue is the potential for the aft fuselage forward boom to buckle, which surfaced as an issue during the structural strength analysis. Analysis of the problem determined that the fix for the EMD aircraft could be incorporated on the production line with only a two-week impact to EMD delivery schedules. A Boeing Seattle team was sent to the Lockheed Martin production line in Georgia to perform the repair. The team completed their work ahead of schedule and the affected aircraft have been cleared for the full flight envelope. For the aircraft not in the production line, starting with the first PRTV Lot, a manufacturing change to the affected panels eliminates the buckling strength concern.

In summary, the aircraft manufacturing process has continued to mature in 1999 as minor problems are discovered and corrected prior to formal production. This is consistent with the objective of an EMD program to uncover such problems early and correct them prior to fielding the weapon system. Looking forward to 2000, manufacturing activity will peak with the delivery of the four flight test aircraft and the fatigue test article. Overall, the F-22 program is proceeding well through development challenges; challenges that are remarkably few for a program that seeks such revolutionary change in system performance.

Integrated avionics has been recognized as the critical technical challenge for the F-22. The combining of the inputs from on and off-board sensors into a single comprehensive display will provide the pilot with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and a key advantage in a tactical engagement. To meet this development challenge, the F-22 program plan employs a variety of ground and flight test hardware in order to incrementally achieve maturity on the integrated avionics software. While current integrated avionics program is technically challenging, the development team is currently meeting all critical avionics software and hardware delivery milestones. The current software development schedule, commonly referred to as R-20, was established in February 1999. This plan provides a logical sequence of software development from design through flight testing on the F-22. Use of the Avionics Integration Laboratory (AIL) to determine software operability is followed by checkout in the F-22 Flying Test Bed (FTB) to verify in flight performance prior to delivery to the test aircraft. The AIL is a contractor facility located at Boeing in Seattle, Washington. The AIL incorporates actual F-22 hardware in a ground test environment to determine software and hardware operability and compatibility. The FTB is a modified Boeing 757 incorporating an F-22 forward section housing an APG-77 radar and a roof mounted F-22 sensor wing. A simulated F-22 cockpit is installed in the aft cabin of the 757 in order to evaluate the software with the actual controls and displays. The aft cabin has work stations for 30 software engineers and technicians, who evaluate avionics, identify anomalies and, in some cases, even address anomalies in flight.

Block 0 software is currently flying on the flight test aircraft today. This software provides the basic flight controls for the aircraft.

Block 1 software, consisting of approximately 750K lines of code, represents approximately 45 percent of the total avionics software. Block 1 introduces radar and enhanced communications, navigation, and identification (CNI) capabilities to the test team. The initial release of block 1.1 software was made to the production line May 26, 1999--seven weeks ahead of the first "power-on" testing of aircraft 4004. An enhanced version of the block 1 software, version 1.2, will be delivered to aircraft 4004 in December 1999 in preparation for the first flight of the aircraft in May 2000.

Block 2 software, which completes the radar, CNI and EW integration, is currently testing in the FTB. Block 2 software consists of approximately 1.4 M lines of code representing approximately 70 percent of the total avionics software effort.

In order to gain early insight into the performance of the aircraft sensors, an additional software block was added in the R-19 schedule. This block, identified as block 3S, is currently in testing at the AIL and initiates the sensor fusion and sensor tasking key to the F-22 performance. Our current projections show no slip to the blocks 2 and 3S schedules.

The Block 3.0 software, currently in software coding, will provide the full sensor fusion and weapons integration for the F-22. This software block will consist of 1.8 M lines of code. Congressional direction prevents the awarding of an LRIP contract prior to first flight of the Block 3.0 software in an F-22. First flight of this software is currently scheduled for October 30, 2000.

Again, avionics remains our key technological challenge area. The team has done a magnificent job in supporting critical FTB and aircraft need dates and maintaining critical program milestones. Continued diligent use of the phased software development approach will provide an unmatched level of software maturity at first flight while optimizing both cost and schedule for avionics development. Team performance over the past year clearly demonstrates that it is taking the necessary actions to protect critical avionics need dates in the development program and ensuring avionics testing proceeds on schedule.

The FY00 Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-79) provided full funding of $1.2B for F-22 EMD in FY00. As part of an Appropriations Committee compromise, the procurement funding request was reduced by $1.85B and an additional $1.3B was added to the F-22 RDT&E account for the acquisition of up to 6 additional test aircraft (PRTV II), advanced procurement of 10 Lot I production aircraft and for termination liability. This funding may not be used for acquisition of more than 17 flight-capable test vehicles of which 11 are already on contract. Of the funds provided, a maximum of $277.1M may be used for advanced procurement of 10 F-22 aircraft following Secretary of Defense certification that all of the 1999 DAB program criteria have been satisfied. In addition, $300M of the $1.3B is set aside for termination liability. This $300M can be used for other program requirements, after 1 October 2000, if the program is not terminated.

The FY00 Appropriations Act prohibits awarding an LRIP contract until first flight of an F-22 aircraft with Block 3.0 software has been conducted, the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congressional defense committees that exit criteria for LRIP have been completed, and DOT&E submits a report assessing the adequacy of testing to measure and predict the performance of the F-22’s avionics systems, stealth characteristics, and its weapons delivery systems.

The impacts of the FY00 Appropriation Act will have a minimal impact on the current F-22 cost and schedule (Figure 2). Since the Act provides $1.3B in RDT&E funding for the next 6 aircraft, these aircraft will be purchased using an incremental approach. An existing contract option for these six aircraft and advanced buy for 10 aircraft in the first production lot will be exercised as planned following completion of the 1999 exit criteria and a DAE review in December 1999. Additional funding of $404M in FY01 and $148M in FY02 will be required to complete the 6 aircraft "PRTV II" buy - this will make up the difference in the $1.85B requested in FY00 and the $1.3B appropriated. The additional funding required in FY01 is contingent on the $300M being available for "other program requirements if the program is not terminated." A Low Rate Initial Production decision for Lot 1 (10 aircraft) is planned for December 2000 following completion of the CY2000 criteria and Appropriations language requirements.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2. Impacts of the FY00 Appropriations Act

Cost control is a critical focus with the F-22 team. The Air Force and F-22 contractors are committed to deliver the F-22 within the Congressionally-mandated cost caps. The Air Force and contractor team initiated cost reduction programs in both the development and production phases of the program in 1997 at the conclusion of the Joint Estimating Team (JET). These efforts have achieved cost reductions, which is key to keeping the development and production costs within the cost caps.

In the March 1999 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled, "F-22 AircraftIssues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals," the GAO reported $667M in projected EMD cost growth. This number was developed by the F-22 team and represented the F-22 program office and contractor estimate of future program cost risks. The challenge for the team was to deliver essential combat capability within the EMD cost cap. In December 1998 the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology approved an Air Force plan to accommodate the projected future development risks within the EMD cost cap. That plan involved a combination of development cost reduction initiatives, scrubbing development costs, application of existing management reserves, and deferral on non-essential combat capability.

Since the approval of these initiatives, the Air Force program office and the contractor team have continued to closely monitor the progress on both the realization of the cost risks and the achievement of the cost savings. As of October 1999, $238M of the cost risks had been realized. Despite this realization of cost risk, the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) determined that the EMD program could be completed within the cost cap.

Key to this positive evaluation has been the better-than-expected achievement of cost savings. Table 1 shows that the program has achieved greater than 110 percent of the savings expected and is continuing to explore additional cost savings to offset any future unknown risks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1. F-22 EMD program cost reduction status

The EMD cost savings demonstrate the creative things the program can do to reduce costs. We continue to push these initiatives because they represent cost savings in the remaining development program. In summary, the F-22 team is continuing to pursing a wide range of options to achieve the cost savings necessary to deliver the full combat capability within the EMD cost cap.

Likewise, the AFCAIG estimated that the F-22 production program could be completed within the Congressionally-imposed cost cap ($39.7B in Then Year Dollars (TY$)) by continuously pursuing production cost reductions as part of a series of initiatives referred to as Production Cost Reduction Plans (PCRPs). The Air Force reviews the PCRP program every month. Our methodology is quite simple: review the plans to confirm the required investments have been made, that scheduled milestones have been met, and the basis of estimate remains valid. The PCRP status is shown in Figure 3. We do have examples in areas that exceed initial savings forecasts as well as examples of a few initiatives being discontinued in favor of projects offering even greater savings potential. Early results indicate the production cost reduction initiatives are performing according to plan and over half of these initiatives have been incorporated into the baseline cost estimate.

 

Figure 3. Production Cost Reduction Plan Status

Examples of ongoing PCRPs include:

    • A Lockheed initiative to consolidate parts procurement through a central procurement activity in Fort Worth, Texas. The original plan called for procurement of 2000 parts with estimated savings of $177K per aircraft. To date, 987 parts out of the total of 2000 have been procured and the documented savings are $136K per aircraft. If we achieve similar results in the remaining 1000 parts, actual savings could be substantially higher than the initial projections.
    • Converting the current two-unit system of Sanders and Kaiser heads down display devices to a single Kaiser device. The consolidation reduces the procurement costs by an average $580K per aircraft based on existing procurement quotes.

The F-22 has a dynamic production program and we do terminate or redirect efforts if they fail to yield sufficient savings or the business case otherwise fails to develop. One such example was a planned producibility improvement investment of $800K for a second source redesign of an electric fuel pump. The possibility of competition provided the incentive for the original supplier to reduce the production quote by $25M. This enabled the program to invest the $800K in other opportunities.

In the end, the important performance measure is the final negotiated contract price. In this case, we have very encouraging results from the PRTV I and II contracts for aircraft and engines. In each case, we met the goals established for contract prices and agreed to firm fixed price contracts for these procurements. That relates directly to the contractor’s confidence to deliver a product that meets the Air Force and DoD affordability objectives.

Other measurement criteria are also in place to assess progress in meeting affordability objectives. One is a target price curve (TPC) to measure the recurring cost to build aircraft and engines. The TPC established a mechanism to measure cost savings and allow payment for contractor cost savings investments and a return on their investment to ensure an affordable production program. The TPC provides a $113M incentive to the contractor to reduce the average cost per unit during LRIP (applies to Lot 1 through Lot 3) and establishes the starting point for affordable multi-year procurement (Lots 4-8 and 9-12).

I conduct a monthly execution review to examine cost, performance, and schedule, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology holds a quarterly review as we proceed to the LRIP DAB in December 2000. In addition, all our information is available for oversight by the GAO and all responsible oversight agencies.

Looking at the entire program, our primary focus this summer is to demonstrate producibility by delivering to schedule and affordability by ensuring development costs remain within the EMD caps. We do not want to discount the effort required to meet the challenges ahead, and we assure this committee that every member of the F-22 team knows the yardstick for the year and remains committed to a successful LRIP DAB in December 2000.

Not everyone has agreed the F-22 team can meet the technical, cost, and schedule challenges ahead. However in 1999, the team had a clear yardstick by which to measure its performance and once again met the challenge. Next year we take head-on the challenge of avionics development, demonstrated producibility, and continuing cost control. The F-22 team is committed and working hard to again succeed in meeting the challenge.

 

THE NET RESULT

The F-22 program is on track to meeting all performance parameters within the cost caps. The program continues to meet or exceed all critical user requirements. Senior Air Force and industry leaders are confident the F-22 program will meet its production cost target and remain within its cost cap, provided program funding remains stable. The warfighter will receive the F-22’s revolutionary capabilities on-time at an affordable cost, thus ensuring air dominance in future conflicts.

The American people expect the Air Force to dominate the sky. This is based in large part to the reality that no American service soldier has been killed by an enemy aircraft in over 40 years. As long as the United States is able to dominate its enemies, the United States can achieve its objectives with minimal casualties. While some have said that the cost of current fighter modernization programs is too high, the cost of not having air dominance is unaffordable. In order for the United States to maintain aerospace superiority in the next century we must field the F-22 and JSF.

The Air Force’s tactical aviation modernization program is only a part of our overall efforts to build the world’s most respected Aerospace Force. We are enhancing our expeditionary capabilities by balancing investments across our core competencies. Our focus is improving the Air Force’s ability to project power rapidly, precisely, and globally. The Air Force’s unique aerospace superiority, global attack, and precision engagement capability, supported by information superiority, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support, will produce a force capable of delivering decisive combat power whenever and wherever needed. The F-22's true value must be measured in American lives saved through dominance of the skies in future combat and also by conflicts prevented because other nations understand and fear our unmatched combat power.