![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
Greek-Turkish relations are strained over many bilateral issues, mainly regarding the Aegean Sea, and over Cyprus. These strains echo in U.S. legislation. Key issues for Congress are the 7:10 ratio, linkage of aid to Turkey to aid to Greece, and attempts to link aid to Turkey to progress on Cyprus, human rights, and other concerns.
In FY1993, Congress converted military aid for Turkey and Greece to loans at concessional rates; in FY1994, market rates were applied. For FY1996, Congress, in H.R. 1868, appropriated FMF loans of $224 million for Greece and $320 million for Turkey, $33.5 million in ESF for Turkey, and included the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. H.R. 1868 was signed into law independently as P.L. 104-107 on Feb. 12, 1996. On May 16, 1996, the President determined that it was in the national interest to waive provisions of the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act of P.L. 104-107 regarding aid to Turkey.
On May 29, the House Committee on Appropriations report on H.R. 3540 appropriated FMF loans of $103,471,000 for Greece and $147,816,000 for Turkey and $25 million in ESF for Turkey for FY1997. A floor amendment limited ESF to Turkey to $22 million until it acknowledges the Armenian "genocide" and another denied the President authority to provide ESF to countries in violation of the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, namely Turkey. The House passed the bill on June 11. The Senate Committee on Appropriations provided FMF loans of $122,500,000 for Greece and $175,000,000 for Turkey, struck restrictions on economic aid to Turkey, and made the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act permanent. The Senate passed the bill on July 26. Conference accepted the cut in economic aid to Turkey, with no link to the "genocide," and made the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act permanent, without restricting presidential waiver authority. The bill became part of the omnibus consolidated appropriations act in H.R. 3610, P.L. 104-208, September 30, 1996.
The Turkish Daily News reported that Turkey had canceled its order for 10 U.S. Supra Cobra helicopter gunships. A Turkish military official later confirmed the report, saying "Turkey cannot allow its defense requirements to be held hostage by hostile lobbies." He said that the cancellation did not mean that Turkey would buy no more military material from the United States or Bell-Textron. On November 27, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that it had informed the United States officially of the decision, but gave no reason. The State Department expressed disappointment. (See Linkage between Aid/Military Sales, etc., below.)
Greece and Turkey have been U.S. aid recipients since the late 1940s, when the Truman Administration began a program of post-war recovery aid, in part to prevent the spread of communism in the region. The security dimension of U.S. aid was strengthened when the two nations joined NATO in 1952. At times in the past 40 years, Greece and Turkey have experienced economic difficulties, and the United States has responded with aid. On two separate occasions, the United States suspended military aid -- to Greece after the military seized power in 1967, and to Turkey, when Congress legislated an arms embargo after the Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1974.
Since the mid-1970s, relations between Greece and Turkey have been strained over bilateral issues and Cyprus. (Cyprus, an independent nation whose population is 80% of Greek origin and 20% of Turkish origin, has been divided since 1974. The northern 37% is under Turkish military occupation. (See CRS Issue Brief 89140, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations.) These differences were reflected in disagreements between the Congress and the Executive Branch. Many in Congress feel that pressure on Turkey, through the vehicle of foreign aid, would result in concessions, including reducing or removing troops from Cyprus. The Reagan and Bush Administrations and others in Congress argued that diplomacy would work more effectively to solve the Cyprus problem, and that the aid relationship with Turkey serves many U.S. interests. Cutting aid to Turkey or linking it to Greece's aid, they suggested, may harm American interests in the region, including the important security relationship with Turkey.
Congress imposed an arms embargo against Turkey in 1974. In 1978, the Carter Administration and Congress forged a compromise to lift the embargo. It is contained in Section 620 (C) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which spells out U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and says that security assistance to Greece and Turkey should be designed "to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries of the region, including Greece and Turkey, is preserved."
In the first post-embargo year, both Greece and Turkey received about $175 million in military aid. The next year, the ratio of the aid ($148 million to Greece, $208 million to Turkey) was close to 7:10. This ratio has remained in effect since FY1980. For its supporters, the ratio symbolizes a congressional commitment to balance the impact of aid to Turkey on Greece, in the absence of any resolution of their bilateral problems. It also expresses congressional dissatisfaction over the absence of a diplomatic solution on Cyprus, including a withdrawal of Turkish troops. The ratio does not affect Cypriot interests and is separate from the $15 million annual U.S. aid for Cyprus. Some oppose the ratio because they oppose, in principle, encumbering any aid program with regional political considerations. Others oppose it for, in their view, contributing to the rivalry and tensions between Greece and Turkey rather than stimulating better relations between them. The Reagan and Bush Administrations opposed the ratio for constraining what they and NATO viewed as needed expansion of military aid to Turkey, in light of its military modernization needs and its strategic importance with respect to the Middle East and Central Asia.
In 1985, Congress gave the President authority to transfer to countries of NATO's southern region excess defense articles (at no cost) to help them modernize their armed forces. This amendment to the defense authorization bill was intended in particular to help Turkey and Greece. The concept was later incorporated into foreign aid legislation. The Reagan and Bush Administrations felt constrained by requirement that the value of excess equipment provided to Greece and Turkey correspond to the 7:10 ratio. Officials argued that the ratio impedes promptness and flexibility by not allowing provision of any articles to either Greece or Turkey until articles of appropriate value have been identified and made available to the other. Congressional advocates of the ratio contend that the need to balance forces in the region must take precedence over issues such as promptness and flexibility.
An important rapprochement between Greece and Turkey took place in early 1988, when Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou met his Turkish counterpart, Turgut Ozal, despite lack of progress on Cyprus talks. Such progress had been a longstanding Greek precondition for change in bilateral relations. They agreed to improve relations through confidence-building measures and, in the following months, committees of both nations' foreign and defense ministries met to work out some limited new procedures in the Aegean. After modest progress, the rapprochement was sidetracked by the Greek premier's political and personal problems in fall 1988. It never produced a policy reassessment which could have affected U.S. aid and the 7:10 ratio.
June 1989 Greek elections ended Papandreou's 8-year rule. A coalition government governed until elections on November 5, 1989. Again, New Democracy (ND) won a plurality and Papandreou's PASOK party came in second. Another transitional government ruled until elections on Apr. 8, 1990 brought an ND government led by Constantine Mitsotakis to power. The new government moved swiftly to implement economic austerity and other measures -- such as completion of talks on U.S. bases in Greece -- to restore confidence among Greece's economic and political partners. In June 1990, Mitsotakis became the first Greek premier to visit the United States in 26 years. He made a determined effort to improve relations with the United States, promising to meet Greece's NATO obligations, to prevent use of Greece as a base for terrorism, and to stop rhetorical attacks on the United States that had been Papandreou's hallmark. Mitsotakis also indicated support for a new dialogue with Turkey, but made progress on Cyprus a prerequisite for improvement on other issues.
The crisis created by the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent war highlighted Turkey's strategic location and importance as a Western ally. Turkey allowed U.S. planes to use NATO and Turkish air bases in Turkey to attack Iraq. As Turkey implemented U.N. Security Council resolutions and economic sanctions, its costs escalated. The closure of oil pipelines from Iraq to Turkey engendered high losses. Additional costs resulted from Turkey's loss of a major export market (Iraq) and the reluctance of foreign investors and tourists to deal with a frontline war situation. After the war, Turkey agreed to host Operation Provide Comfort, whereby U.S., British, and French planes based at Incirlik in southeast Turkey enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect Iraqi Kurds. The Operation continues today.
Turkey's President Ozal visited Washington in September 1990, seeking increased textile import quotas, more effective military modernization, and debt relief. He obtained greatly increased textile quotas and military modernization promises. On January 14, 1991, President Bush provided $82 million in emergency military assistance to Turkey under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Greek Foreign Minister visited Washington in early 1991 and asserted Greece's position on the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States agreed to refinance Greece's outstanding defense debt of $447 million at favorable rates and to ship additional arms.
On February 1, 1992, Prime Minister Mitsotakis met his Turkish counterpart, Suleyman Demirel, in Davos, Switzerland. Their communique stated that they had agreed to prepare a "friendship, good-neighborliness, cooperation treaty" to be signed during a Mitsotakis visit to Ankara, and pledged support for U.N. efforts on Cyprus. Mitsotakis was criticized in Greece and Cyprus for not reiterating that a Cyprus settlement is the precondition for improved Greek-Turkish relations and, thereby, for producing some confusion. He rapidly clarified misunderstandings, while emphasizing that efforts to resolve bilateral disputes and to achieve a Cyprus settlement must follow separate and parallel paths and declaring that improved Greek-Turkish ties would benefit Cyprus. No friendship treaty was signed.
During Demirel's February 1992 visit to Washington, he and President Bush spoke of an "enhanced partnership." They signalled expanded cooperation regarding relations with Central Asia. Turkey's geographic proximity and Turkic ties to the region were considered valuable to U.S. interests. New Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller visited in October 1993 to discuss ideas which would not involve the direct outlay of U.S. tax dollars or intergovernmental transfers. She and President Clinton formed a joint committee for economic cooperation. In spring 1994, President Clinton reportedly agreed to assist Turkey in obtaining EXIMBANK and World Bank credit to overcome an economic crisis and to transfer the $1.2 billion Gulf Fund (to which Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates contribute to finance continuing Turkish production of F-16 airplanes) from the U.S. Treasury to Turkey.
The October 1993 Greek national election brought Papandreou's return as Prime Minister. He said that he wanted good relations with the United States and visited Washington in April 1994. U.S.-Greek relations generally have been cordial. No change in bilateral ties resulted from Papandreou's January 1996 resignation for illness and his replacement by Costas Simitis, who won a parliamentary election and his own term in office in September. Since June 1996, when a coalition government headed by the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party took power in Turkey, U.S.-Turkish relations have been somewhat uneasy. Refah appears to want a more nationalistic policy, oriented to the Muslim world, and independent of the United States.
Although the Reagan and Bush Administrations did not share the Greek belief that Turkey poses a military threat to Greece, many Members of Congress are sensitive to Greece's desire to maintain a balance between the levels of aid to the two countries. They favor the ratio as a constraint on increases in aid to Turkey that are not accompanied by increases to Greece. They also saw the ratio as a sign of congressional dissatisfaction with the Reagan and Bush Administrations' policies toward Cyprus that, in their view, did not apply strong enough pressure on Turkey to withdraw.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations believed that the ratio is an undesirable limit on executive authority and imposes the wrong criteria on determining aid levels. U.S. officials and many experts also contend that the ratio does not accurately reflect the balance of U.S. interests between Greece and Turkey in military, geographic, or demographic terms. Reagan and Bush Administration officials tended to regard Turkey as particularly important to the United States because it has the second largest population in Europe and possesses the second largest army in NATO (both after Germany). Moreover, officials noted that the value of Turkey's geostrategic location was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War and hoped Turkey's geopolitical and cultural ties to the newly independent Muslim nations of Central Asia would benefit U.S. relations with the region. In general, they did not perceive comparable interests with respect to Greece.
In 1988 and 1989, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign Assistance Task Force recommended reducing or abolishing earmarks, which would have effectively done away with the ratio. It also recommended aid "graduation," or conversion of grant to loan aid based on living standards, and named Greece and Turkey as countries whose military sales could soon be on a cash basis (H.Doc. 101-32). Although the Task Force recommendations were not all included in the House-passed authorization bill, the ratio was discussed in the FY1990 appropriations deliberations. Supporters of Turkey tried to dilute or eliminate the ratio, in part because they believed the political climate toward Greece and Turkey might favor such action. A contributing factor was the strained U.S.-Greek relations, and another was a large unused military aid pipeline, indicating that Greece had not identified military needs for several years. In final FY1990 appropriations, however, the ratio was preserved through earmarks, but not explicit legislative language. In 1991-93, Greece drew down its unused $1.7 billion military aid pipeline.
Turkey's support for the allied cause in the Persian Gulf generated sympathy among Members of Congress. Discussion of the supplemental appropriation to pay for the war, including extra aid to Turkey, did not refer to the need for balance with Greece that had characterized previous debates. However, aid appropriated was economic (ESF), not subject to the 7:10 ratio. The ratio was referred to again during the FY1992-93 foreign aid authorization. Supporters argued that scrapping it would send the wrong signal to Greece when U.S.-Greek relations were improving. The bill applied the ratio to funding levels without mentioning it. Aid graduation finally became law in the FY1993 appropriation. It affects Turkey, whose previous FMF had been all grant aid. The Clinton Administration requested aid in the 7:10 ratio.
See CRS Report 96-140F, Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis, updated March 7, 1996, for information on bilateral tensions.
This has been the key focus of the debate over aid to Turkey since 1974, before the ratio was introduced. During the embargo years (1974-78), many in Congress believed that progress on Cyprus could be achieved only if Turkey was pressured to change its policies, and they viewed aid as an appropriate vehicle for such pressure. Some continued to seek tying Turkey's aid to Cyprus. The FY1985 aid bill called for a Presidential certification that Turkey was making efforts to reverse its actions regarding Cyprus. The FY1986-87 authorization stated that Turkey's MAP program was provided to prevent bifurcation of Cyprus.
To the Reagan and Bush Administrations and some in Congress, linkage between Turkey's aid and Cyprus was damaging to Turkey and the alliance, making it ineffective as a tool to achieve progress on Cyprus. The Reagan Administration argued that Turkey's military strength was vital to Western interests, and that the Cyprus question should be handled separately, through diplomatic channels. The Bush Administration continued support for U.N. efforts on Cyprus and opposed punitive measures against Turkey relating to Cyprus.
In the 101st Congress, legislation was introduced to relink aid to Turkey to conditions on Cyprus. S. 22 called for a suspension of aid to Turkey unless the President certified six provisions, including withdrawal of Turkish military forces and civilian settlers, return of over persons missing since 1974, and return to the Greek Cypriots of the town of Famagusta. A similar bill was introduced in the House. The bills were not considered by committee, but modified language on Famagusta was included in the FY1990 authorization bill. S. 2808 would have required reductions of U.S. aid to Turkey by 20% annually for 5 years unless Turkey reduced its troops to the level allowed in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and removed settlers from Cyprus.
Discussion of a supplemental appropriation for the costs of the Gulf war, including increased assistance for Turkey, made no linkage to Cyprus nor did subsequent foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills. However, congressional frustration over lack of progress in the U.N. efforts on Cyprus prompted introduction of legislation in March 1992 (H.R. 4399) to prohibit aid to Turkey until it takes actions to resolve the Cyprus problem. Once again, it did not pass. The Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 102-419, Sept. 23, 1992) stated that it is the responsibility of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and the Turkish Government to act in good faith and seek a fair solution within the framework endorsed by the U.N. and declared its intention to monitor closely the actions of all parties in resumed settlements talks.
On January 13, 1993, Senator Pressler asked Warren Christopher if he would support legislation to reduce aid to Turkey until it removed its troops from Cyprus. Christopher observed that it would take an important circumstance to change the ratio and that he did not want to commit to make any change. In November 1993, a resolution was introduced to prohibit aid to Turkey until it takes specified steps to resolve the situation on Cyprus; the session did not act on the resolution.
Turkey. Some Members to seek use aid as leverage over Turkish and Greek policies. After Turkey escalated its war against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists, primarily in its southeast, the State Department and international human rights organizations documented a pattern of Turkish human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians. (For background, see CRS Report 94-267, Turkey's Kurdish Imbroglio and U.S. Policy.) Congress, as one staff member put it, perceives that Turkey's war against terrorism has become a war against Kurds and signalled Turkey that this was not acceptable. Concern was voiced about Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in the war. In Spring 1994, Turkish authorities arrested Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) Members of Parliament and banned DEP. Members of Congress were outraged. For FY1995, some House Members sought to withhold some military aid to Turkey pending State Department reports on human rights. The Senate was willing to grant the aid without cuts, provided that U.S. military equipment not be used against civilians. The Conference withheld a percentage of aid, pending a report on human rights abuses against civilians. Legislation also was introduced to prohibit aid to countries that restrict delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. Although Turkey was not mentioned by name, the bill, in both authorization and appropriations bills passed for FY1996, was intended to force Turkey to lift its blockade of Armenia. On June 1, 1995, in compliance with P.L. 103-306, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1995, the State Department submitted a Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus. It concluded, "Turkey in its struggle against the ... PKK, has relied primarily on a military strategy ... which includes the evacuation and/or destruction of many villages, has resulted in human rights abuses .... Turkey, as the recipient of U.S. security assistance, has the right to use U.S.-supplied weapons for legitimate selfdefense and for internal security . This includes use to combat terrorism by forces such as the PKK. U.S.-origin equipment, which accounts for most major items of the Turkish military inventory, has been used in operations against the PKK during which human rights abuses have occurred. It is highly likely that such equipment was used in support of the evacuation and/or destruction of villages. However, (the Department has) no evidence that verifies reports of torture and extrajudicial killings involving U.S. equipment." The section of the Report on the Situation in Cyprus presents a chronology since August 1994.
In Fall 1994, the Turkish Daily News alleged that the Pentagon was stalling delivery of military equipment to Turkey. It quoted the U.S. Embassy in Ankara as saying that the Turkish Army had not requested the specified arms officially, but later attributing problems to the exporter. According to TDN, Turkish officials claimed that requests had been refused during consultations with U.S. counterparts. Pentagon sources stated that the Defense Department was not responsible for delays. As of Fall 1995, delays were occurring because the State Department had not submitted arms transfers for congressional approval, having been discouraged by Members who intend to disapprove. (Congress has 30 calendar days after formal notification to approve or disapprove of arms sales.) Some defense analysts were concerned about the detrimental impact that a de facto partial embargo could have on U.S. relations with Turkey, on the readiness of a NATO ally, and on the mandate for Provide Comfort. Others argue that delay is justified because of the human rights situation. The State Department denied that there is a de facto embargo, but acknowledged that the human rights situation is considered in all decisions.
The Turkish military appears determined to work around any U.S. or Western limit on use of arms in the southeast. Since 1994, Turkish media have reported purchases from Chile, Russia, and China, and negotiations for purchases from South Korea. Commentators suggest that Turkey is less than happy with some of its non-U.S. arms purchases.
On November 28, 1995, the Human Rights Watch Arms Project protested a proposed sale to Turkey of 120 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) -- the first foreign sale of the ground-to-ground, semiguided ballistic missiles. The Project and some Members of Congress contended that the missiles could be used in the war against the Kurds. The Pentagon countered that the missiles were impractical for use in the war and said that Turkey's need for the weapon had more to do with "bad neighbors," Iran and Iraq. It also said that the sale would not "adversely affect" the regional military balance. Some analysts suggest that the sale was a U.S. attempt to mitigate Turkey's anger over U.S. "flexibility" toward Russia's exceeding Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty limits in the nearby Caucasus. Congress did not disapprove the sale before the December 15 deadline and it went through. In Spring 1996, the Pentagon notified Congress that it intended to sell Greece 40 ATACMs as well as missiles to be used on the F-16. In January 1995, Amnesty International called for an end to sales or transfers of military helicopters to Turkey because, according to Amnesty, they are used to ferry Turkish forces to remote areas where they commit human rights violations against civilians. The Defense Department approved the sale of 10 Apache Super Cobra attack helicopters at estimated cost of $135 million to Turkey in Spring 1994. The State Department did not agree and did not submit a request to Congress. The Administration notified Congress of its intent to transfer two U.S. Navy frigates and to lease a third to Turkey. A hold was put on Congressional approval because of Turkey's actions in the Aegean crisis of January 1996.
Greece. After the U.N. imposed sanctions on Serbia in 1992, press reports documented Greek violations of the sanctions' regime. The Greek government denied violations. Yet, Greece has historic, religious, and cultural ties to Serbia and its people, alone in the European Union, are sympathetic to the Serbs and believe that the international community treats them unfairly. Members of Congress urged stronger action against Serbia and were troubled by reports of Greek violations. They sought to use aid legislation to pursue the truth about Greek actions and to pressure Greece toward greater conformity with the international consensus against Serbia. On June 2, 1995, in compliance with P.L. 103-306, the State Department Report on Greek Government Enforcement of the U.N. Sanctions Against Serbia noted that the Department could not confirm Greek government complicity in sanctions evasion. Yet, it would prefer the Greek government to take a more pro-active approach to sanctions enforcement and listed concerns, including activities of the Serbian Consul General in Thessaloniki, who facilitated movement of goods into Serbia, the presence of Serbian front companies in Greece, only intermittent use of an oil shipment pre-verification system, and goods reaching Serbia via third countries.
The Administration requested $317 million in FMF loans and $50,000 in training funds for Greece and $453 million in FMF loans, $100 million in ESF, $5.5 million for a sustainable development account, $1 million in training funds, and $400,000 in narcotics control assistance for Turkey.
House. The Committee approved H.R. 4426 on May 23, 1994 with FMF loans of $364,500,000 for Turkey and $255,150,000 for Greece, in the 7:10 ratio. It said that 25% of the aid to Turkey would be withheld until the Secretary of State reports on allegations of harassment of Kurdish Members of Parliament and on the unwillingness to reinstate theirs parliamentary immunity; efforts to take away Turkish Kurds' right to practice their culture; and the use of torture and intimidation against Turkish Kurds and the razing of Kurdish villages. The Secretary's report was to address concerns that U.S.-supplied equipment and material may be used in counterinsurgency targeting civilians. The Committee wanted to know the status of U.N. efforts to get confidence-building measures on Cyprus. 25% of the aid for Greece would be withheld until a report on allegations of Greek violations of U.N. sanctions against Serbia and of the U.N. Charter. The House approved the bill on May 25, by a vote of 337-87.
Senate. On June 16, the Committee approved H.R. 4426, with FMF loans of $255,150,000 to Greece and $364,500,000 to Turkey, at the 7:10 ratio. It said that any agreement for the sale or provision of U.S. equipment to Turkey was to be with the understanding that it would not be used for internal security , and that the sale or provision of equipment to Greece was to be with the understanding that it would not be used in violation of U.N. sanctions against Serbia or of the U.N. Charter. The Committee's Rept. 103-287 listed Turkey as a country for which the State Department was to develop a human rights strategy with a plan for using U.S. aid and influence to achieve them. The Committee required the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to report on allegations that U.S.-supplied equipment and material to Turkey has been used in counterinsurgency operations against civilians. The Secretary of State was to report on allegations of Greek violations of U.N. sanctions against Serbia and of the U.N. Charter.
On July 15, an amended bill passed, 84-9. It required that any agreement for the sale or provision of any defense article on the U.S. Munitions List (established pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act) to Turkey state that the article would not be used in violation of international law, and any grant of any excess defense article under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 be subject to the same condition. In any case in which a report to the Congress was required under Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act regarding such a violation, such report was to be submitted to the Committees on Appropriations. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, was to report to the Committees on Appropriations by February 1, 1995, on how U.S. assistance to Greece was promoting respect for principles and obligations under the U.N. sanctions against Serbia, the U.N. Charter, and the Helsinki Accords.
Conference. H.Rept. 103-633, Aug. 1, 1994, provided that 10% of the loans to Turkey be withheld until the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, reported to the Committees on Appropriations on allegations of abuses against civilians by Turkish armed forces and on the situation in Cyprus. 10% of the loans for Greece be withheld until he reported on allegations of Greek violations of the U.N. sanctions on Serbia and of the U.N. Charter. The House agreed by a vote of 341- 85 on August 4; the Senate agreed by a vote of 88-12 on August 10.
The President signed P.L. 103-306 on August 23. Turkey and Greece both rejected the 10% aid that was approved with conditions. $74.25 million of the ESF for Turkey was reprogrammed to help pay for the U.S. operation in Haiti and Administration attempts to restore $25.25 million later were unsuccessful.
House. H.R. 3765 was referred to committee on February 2; and subcommittee on March 23.
The Administration requested $450 million in FMF loans, $52 million in FMF loan subsidy, $100 million in ESF, $5.4 million in development assistance, $1 million for military education and training, $400,000 for narcotics law enforcement for Turkey; and $315 million in FMF loans, $37 million in FMF loan subsidy, and $50,000 for military education and training for Greece.
House. H.R. 1561 introduced and referred to committees on May 3, 1995. H.Rept. 104-128, May 19, 1995, authorized subsidies of $26.62 million for Greece and $37 million for Turkey to support FMF loans of $224 million and $320 million respectively. Funds for Turkey were to complete a commitment to the joint F-16 fighter program. Affirmed the principle of "balance" (7:10 ratio) in aid and applied it to excess defense articles. Authorized $50 million in ESF for Turkey to support efforts to reform its economy. The Committee said that it would pay attention to the opening of Turkish markets to U.S. goods and services. It recognized the importance of security cooperation with Turkey and appreciated Turkey's role in Operation Provide Comfort. As passed on June 8 by 222 to 192, Section 3418 was the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. Section 3105 provided direct loan subsidies of $26.62 million for Greece and $37.8 million for Turkey; Section 3123 reaffirmed the 7:10 ratio for excess defense articles. Senate. The Committee reported S.961 (H.Rept. 104-99) on June 12, including the 7:10 ratio in loan subsidies of $26.62 million for Greece and $37 million for Turkey, and in defense articles. Sec. 721 was the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. A motion to proceed to consideration and a cloture motion were presented on July 26. On July 27, the cloture motion was withdrawn. S.961 did not come to the floor again. The Senate later struck all after enacting clause of H.R. 1561 and substituted S. 908, without aid provisions, and passed it on December 14 by a vote of 82-16.
Conference. H.Rept. 104-478 on H.R. 1561, March 8, 1996, Sec. 1617, was the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. No other references to foreign aid for Greece and Turkey were included. The House agreed, by a vote of 226-172, on March 12. The Senate agreed, by a vote of 52-44, on March 28.
The President vetoed H.R.1561 on April 12. The House failed to override the veto by a vote of 234 to 188 on April 30.
House. H.R. 1868, reported on June 15, provided FMF direct loans of $224 million for Greece and $320 million for Turkey and applied the 7:10 ratio to excess defense articles. Incorporated the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. H.Rept. 104-143 noted that, due to budgetary limits, it was not possible to meet the ESF request for Turkey; ESF was not to exceed FY1995 ($46 million). Specified 7:10 ratio for military aid. Stated that Turkey is a NATO ally and partner that supported U.S. military efforts during the Gulf war and continued active support for U.S. forces stationed in Turkey. Human rights in Turkey were of concern. Passed by a vote of 333-89 on July 11. Per a floor amendment, Section 568 limited ESF for Turkey to $21 million.
Senate. H.R. 1868 passed on September 21, by a vote of 91-9, provided FMF loans of $224 million for Greece and $320 million for Turkey. Rejected an amendment to limit ESF to Turkey to $21 million. The President was directed to seek the Turkish Prime Minister's agreement to permit access for international humanitarian organizations and to report by June 1, 1996, on progress toward such agreement. Sec. Incorporated the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. Provided not less than $5 million of the ESF for Turkey be made available through non-governmental organizations to be used for projects in the ten southeastern provinces under a state of emergency.
Conference. The Conference Report (H.Rept. 104-295), filed on October 26, limited (cut) ESF to Turkey to $33.5 million and deleted language earmarking $5 million in ESF for non-governmental organizations. House and Senate FMF provisions were not in conference because they were the same. On October 31, the House agreed to the report by a vote of 351-71. The Senate agreed on November 1, by a vote of 90-6. On January 26, 1996, the President signed H.R. 2880 into law, P.L. 104-99; Title II by reference incorporated H.R. 1868 as agreed to in the Conference Report. P.L. 104-99 provided funding until H.R. 1868 was signed into law separately as P.L. 104-107 on February 12. On May 16, 1996, President Clinton issued a determination that it was in the national interest to waive the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act provision of P.L. 104-107, permitting Turkey to continue receiving foreign aid.
The Administration requested $60 million in ESF and $1.5 million for IMET for Turkey, and FMF loans of $175 million (supported by a $18.92 million subsidy) to Turkey, and $122.5 million (with a $13.24 million subsidy) to Greece -- scaled back to levels necessary to sustain U.S.-provided equipment.
House. On May 22, in H.R. 3540, House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations capped economic aid to Turkey for FY1997 at $25 million because of its human rights violations, blockade of Armenia, occupation of Cyprus, and abuse of the Kurds. Committee on Appropriations H.Rept. 104-600/May 29, 1996 appropriated FMF loans of $103,471,000 for Greece and $147,816,000 for Turkey, and $25 million in ESF for Turkey. In floor consideration on June 5, the House agreed to an amendment to deny the President authority to provide economic aid to countries found violating the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act (See other LEGISLATION, below), i.e., Turkey, by a vote of 301-118, and 1 present and to an amendment to limit ESF to Turkey to $22 million until it acknowledges the Armenian genocide of 1915-23 by a vote of 268-153. [The Turkish government subsequently announced that it would reject all economic aid.] The House passed the bill as amended on June 11 by a vote of 366-57.
Senate. On June 18, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations approved an amended bill, striking restrictions on economic aid to Turkey required by the House The Committee appropriated FMF loans of $122,500,000 for Greece and $175,000,000 for Turkey, maintaining the 7:10 ratio. It amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, adding Sec. 620I, to make permanent the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act (See other LEGISLATION, below). In S.Rept. 104-295, June 27, the Committee reaffirmed its strong support for Turkey, "a staunch and reliable NATO ally," and noted "the extraordinary contribution that Turkey has made in support of Operation Provide Comfort." The Committee requested an updated report on misuse of U.S. military aircraft and helicopters in attacks against Kurdish villages and on Administration efforts to monitor end-use of U.S. military aircraft and helicopters in Turkey. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 93-7 on July 26, including FMF direct loans of $122,500,000 for Greece and $175,000,000 for Turkey. No economic assistance was earmarked for Greece or Turkey. The bill amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, adding Sec. 620I to make permanent the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, below.)
Conference. The conference report was passed as part of the omnibus consolidated appropriations act in H.R. 3610, the Defense Appropriations Act by a House vote of 370-37 and 1 present on September 28 and a Senate voice vote on September 30. The final bill provided FMF loans of $122,500,000 for Greece and $175,000,000 for Turkey; and that not more than $22 million in ESF) may be given to Turkey. It reiterated the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. The President is required to notify the House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and both houses' Committees on Appropriations prior to issuing a determination to waive the Act in the U.S. national security interest, and to inform them of the effective date of the waiver and the reasons for it. The Act was made a permanent part of foreign aid law and will not have to be renewed annually. The President signed it into law as P.L. 104-208 on September 30, 1996.
H.R. 942 (Smith, C.)
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. Same as S. 230, below. Introduced February 14, 1995;
referred to Committee on International Relations. Incorporated into the appropriations
(H.R. 1868) and authorization (H.R. 1561) bills for FY1996.
H.R. 1274 (Andrews)
Same as S. 578, below. Introduced and referred to Committee on International
Relations on Mar. 21, 1995. Considered and rejected as an amendment to H.R. 1561.
H.Con.Res. 124 (Torricelli)
Sense of Congress that the President should suspend the proposed sale of ATACMs to
Turkey until it improves its human rights record, terminates its embargo of Armenia,
and progress is made to resolve the conflict on Cyprus. Introduced and referred to
Committee on International Relations, December 21, 1995.
H.Con.Res. 125 (Pallone)
Sense of Congress that the President should suspend the proposed sale of the ATACMs
to Turkey until it takes significant and concrete steps to end the military occupation
of Cyprus, lift its blockade of Armenia, cease its campaign against the Kurdish people,
and demonstrate progress on the protection of human and civil rights within Turkey.
Introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations, December 22, 1995.
S. 230 (Dole)
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. Prohibits U.S. assistance to countries that prohibit or
restrict the transport or delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. (Directed at Turkey,
which has refused to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Armenia as long as
Armenians occupy Azeri land.) The prohibition shall be waived when the President
determines that assistance is in the U.S. national security interest, and shall cease
when the President certifies that a country is no longer restricting delivery of U.S.
humanitarian assistance. The President shall report to Congress describing
prohibitions or restrictions on the transport or delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance
by the government of any country receiving or eligible to receive U.S foreign assistance.
Introduced January 13, 1995; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 578 (D'Amato)
Turkish Human Rights Compliance Act. Limits assistance for Turkey until it complies
with certain human rights standards. Congress finds continuing human rights abuses
by Turkey. Turkey continues to deny the existence of its 15,000,000 Kurdish citizens
and has used military force to deny them an identity, destroying more than 2,000
Kurdish villages and uprooting more than 2,000,000 Kurds. Turkey continues fits
illegal military occupation of Cyprus and has obstructed efforts to reach a resolution
to the division of Cyprus. Turkey continues to blockade Armenia, obstructing the
delivery of humanitarian relief. Turkey continues to place restrictions on the religious
leadership of Christian communities within Turkey and has failed to protect these
communities adequately from acts of violence and vandalism. Restrictions: Of the
funds made available for FY1996, the President shall withhold, first from grant
assistance, if any, and then from loan assistance, $500,000 for each day that Turkey
does not meet certain conditions. The President may waive the conditions in the U.S.
national security interest. The conditions are met when the President certifies that
Turkey allows unfettered monitoring of the human rights situation within its territory;
recognizes the civil, cultural, and human rights of its Kurdish citizens; ceases military
operations against Kurdish civilians, and takes demonstrable steps toward a peaceful
resolution of the Kurdish issue; takes demonstrable steps toward the total withdrawal
of its military forces from Cyprus and demonstrates support for a settlement; removes
its blockade of Armenia; and removes official restrictions on Christian churches and
schools and offers protection against acts of violence and harassment directed at
members of the clergy, and against acts of vandalism directed at church and school
property. Introduced Mar. 20, 1995; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
Country Data
Country data were taken mostly from The World Factbook, CIA; and Foreign Economic Trends, U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
Greece
Population ('95): 10.64 million Population Growth Rate ('95): 0.72% GDP ('93): $3.2 billion Per capita GDP ('94): $8,870 Annual GDP real growth rate ('94): 0.4% Annual inflation rate ('94): 10.9% Unemployment rate ('94): 10.1% Avg. life expectancy ('94): 77.9 years International debt ('93): $26.9 billion Proportion of the labor force in agriculture ('94): 23% Major crops: wheat, corn, barley, sugar beets, olives Major exports and value ('93): manufactured goods, food and live animals, fuels and lubricants/ $9 billion Major imports and value ('93): machinery and transport equipment, light manufacture, fuels/ $19.2 billion
Turkey
Population ('95): 63.4 million Population growth rate ('95): 1.97% GDP ('94): $305.2. billion Per capita GDP ('94): $4,910 Annual per capita GDP growth rate ('94): -5% Annual inflation ('94): 106% Unemployment rate ('94): 12.6% Avg. life expectancy ('95): 71.48 yrs International debt ('94): $66.6 billion Proportion of the labor force in agriculture ('94): 44% Major crops: tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets Major exports and value ('93): manufactured goods, foodstuffs, mining products/$15.3 billion Major imports and value ('93): manufactured goods, fuel, foodstuffs/$27.6 billion
xxbeginz
ESF (Economic Support Fund) Through the ESF, a flexible but complex aid category, the United States provides economic assistance to countries of special economic, political, or military significance. Much ESF provides short-term economic stabilization and budget support. The foreign aid budget submitted by the Administration links ESF and military aid under the general security assistance heading. Authorization committees in Congress treat ESF as a separate category distinct from either development or military aid while appropriations committees include ESF among bilateral economic aid programs.
Military Aid Military aid provided on a loan basis at market rates through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) guaranteed loans, at below market rates through FMF concessional lending (about 5% interest), and on a grant basis through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). FMF loan subsidy is the amount required to protect the United States against possible loan default. Military training grants are offered through the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).
Other Assistance Aid to countries to assist their efforts to control the production and distribution of narcotics (NARC).