![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
Begun in FY1982 by the Army and funded in part by the Air Force before FY1988, the V-22 is now a Marine Corps program funded entirely by the Navy Department. The aircraft is being developed and produced by Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters, with engines produced by Allison. Flight testing and operational evaluation of pre-production V-22s is expected in 1996-98.
The future of the aircraft was at issue in 1989-92, when then Secretary of Defense Cheney sought to cancel the program on grounds of affordability. Congress continued to fund the program in FY1990 and later years. Through FY1996, Congress provided some $5.5 billion for the V-22, which in December 1995 the Defense Department estimated to cost some $46.6 billion to develop and produce 523 aircraft.
In 1993, the Administration obligated prior-year funds provided by Congress, and Congress authorized and appropriated $10 million for the V-22 in FY1994. The Administration's FY1995 budget requested $497 million in R&D funds for the program, $467 million of which was provided by Congress. For FY1996, Congress provided $805.6 million of the $811 million requested, including advance funding to begin production of the V-22. The Administration's FY1997 budget requested $1,136 million, including procurement funds for the first four aircraft. Congress authorized $1,475 million for procurement of six V-22s and later appropriated $1,325 million for procurement of five aircraft in FY1997.
Congress has supported the V-22 as a new technology with multi-service military applications and civilian uses, since derivatives of this tilt-rotor aircraft could be used in civil aviation with potential commercial and foreign sales implications. Critics of the V-22 question its affordability at a time of reduced defense spending and argue that its performance would not be worth the cost of developing and producing this tilt-rotor aircraft.
In 1986, the Defense Department approved full-scale development of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. Based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype developed by Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977, the V-22 tilt-rotor design combines the helicopter's operational flexibility of vertical take-off and landing with the greater speed, range, and fuel efficiency of a turboprop aircraft. The V-22 Osprey takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter but flies like a fixed-wing aircraft by tilting its wing-mounted rotors 90 degrees forward to function as propellers. The V-22 is being developed by Bell Helicopter Textron of Fort Worth, TX, and Boeing Helicopters of Philadelphia, PA. The aircraft is powered by two T406 turboshaft engines produced by Allison of Detroit, MI.
On March 19, 1989, the first of six V-22 prototypes was flown in the helicopter mode and on September 14, 1989 as a fixed-wing plane. As of February 1995, four prototypes had flown 994 hours in 855 flights. Two of these aircraft were destroyed in crashes. The fifth prototype crashed on its first flight June 11, 1991, because of incorrect wiring in a flight-control system. The fourth prototype crashed on July 20, 1992, while landing at Quantico Marine Corps Air Station, VA, resulting in loss of the aircraft and crew. The accident was caused by a fire resulting from component failures and design problems in the engine nacelles. The aircraft had flown over 90 test flights, including carrier operations and extreme-weather tests. Flight tests were resumed in August 1993 after several changes were incorporated in the prototypes. Flight testing of the first of four V-22s funded in late 1992 is expected in 1996-98, with the first operational aircraft in 2001.
The Department of Defense began the program in 1981, first under Army leadership but with the Navy/Marine Corps later taking the lead in developing what was then known as the JVX (Joint-service Vertical take-off/landing Experimental aircraft). The V-22 could perform a variety of Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force missions, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious assault, search and rescue, special operations, and anti-submarine warfare. The Marines' MV-22 version can transport 24 fully-equipped troops some 200 nautical miles (nmi) at a speed of 250 knots (288 mi/h), exceeding the performance of the CH-46 medium-lift assault helicopters the MV-22 would replace. The Navy's HV-22 version can replace HH-3 helicopters now used for search and rescue, and the Air Force can use a CV-22 version for special operations. Army officials have testified that the service has no requirement for the V-22, but the Air Force has expressed strong interest in the CV-22 for U.S. Special Operations Command.
In 1989, the Defense Department projected a 663-aircraft program, with six prototypes and 657 production aircraft (552 MV-22s, 50 HV-22s, and 55 CV-22s). As projected in 1996, the V-22 program would procure 523 production aircraft (425 MV-22s for the Marines, 50 CV-22s for special operations by the Air Force, and 48 HV-22s for the Navy's combat search and rescue operations), with procurement beginning in FY1997. Procurement of the 523 aircraft would continue into the 2020s, because the Defense Acquisition Board limited annual expenditures for Marine MV-22s to $1 billion (FY1994 dollars) when it approved entry into engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) in September 1994. The FY1997 budget projected procurement of 35 MV-22s in FY1997-FY2001, beginning with 4 in FY1997, followed by buys of 5 (FY1998), 7 (FY1999), 9 (FY2000), and 10 (FY2001). This procurement profile may be changed in response to Congressional direction to accelerate procurement.
Through FY1996, about $5.5 billion has been invested in the V-22 program. The Defense Department's Selected Acquisition Report of June 30, 1996, estimated the total acquisition cost of a 523-aircraft program at $46.6 billion then-year dollars -- yielding a program unit cost of about $89 million then-year dollars, which refer to actual funding in prior years and projected funding in future years. The program acquisition cost includes funding for development and production of the aircraft and for related activities. The procurement or flyaway cost of an aircraft excludes research development and some procurement-related items, making these estimates significantly lower than the estimated program acquisition cost. Estimates based on then-year dollars generally vary widely from constant-dollar estimates. For example, the V-22's procurement unit cost is about $55 million in constant FY1996 dollars.
Despite efforts by former Secretary of Defense Cheney to terminate the program in 1989-92, Congress continued to provide funds for development of the V-22. The Reagan administration had requested $1,487.8 million in R&D and procurement funds for the first 12 production aircraft in FY1990, but the Bush administration's revised FY1990 budget requested no funds for the program. In submitting this budget to Congress on April 25, 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the House Armed Services Committee he "could not justify spending the amount of money ... proposed ... when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed ... by using [CH-53E] helicopters instead of the V-22."
Proponents of the V-22 see it as a way to replace the aging helicopter fleets of all four services with a more capable multi-purpose aircraft that could also have civilian applications. They argue that in the types of conflict likely to occur in the third world, the Osprey would be needed to transport U.S. Marines from ship to shore in opposed landings, where the tilt-rotor's speed advantage over any transport helicopter would be of critical military value. They argue further that the V-22 would be more survivable than helicopters in such operations. Critics of the V-22 question the need for such combat capability and doubt the multi-service acceptance and affordability of the tilt-rotor aircraft at a time when the services are facing budgetary constraints and reduced force requirements.
Supporters of the V-22 also cite the tilt-rotor's potential value for civil aviation, law enforcement, and foreign sales by the U.S. aerospace industry. (Congressional Record, April 19, 1989: S4507-S4509). A February 1988 study by the FAA and NASA concluded that tilt-rotors could help relieve airport congestion by diverting commuters and short-distance passengers to vertiports in urban centers. The importance of U.S. production of a tilt-rotor aircraft for civilian purposes was the subject of a hearing on July 17, 1990, by the House Committee on Science, Space , and Technology's Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. In 1992, Congress enacted legislation (H.R. 6168) directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish a "civil tiltrotor development advisory committee" to evaluate the feasibility and viability of developing civil tilt-rotor aircraft and infrastructure necessary to incorporate tilt-rotor aircraft into the national transportation system. The role of tiltrotor aircraft in civil aviation was discussed on April 12, 1994, before the House Committee on Science, Space , and Technology's Subcommittee on Technology, Environment, and Aviation.
The strongest support for the V-22 has been in the House, which voted on July 27, 1989, to authorize FY1990 funds for the program, despite Defense Secretary Cheney's opposition. The House Armed Services Committee in its FY1990 report (H.Rept. 101- 121) recommended authorization of $351 million in R&D funds and $157 million in procurement funds for long-lead procurement for 12 pilot production aircraft in FY1991. Opposing Secretary of Defense Cheney's plan to substitute CH-53E helicopters for the V-22, the committee directed Secretary Cheney "to provide with the FY1991 budget request an independent cost and operational effectiveness analysis of all reasonable V-22 alternatives including, but not limited to, the CH-53E, BV-360, EH101, CH-46E, CH-60 aircraft or any combination thereof."
The Senate authorized R&D funding but no procurement funds for the program in the FY1990 defense authorizations bill passed on August 2, 1989, when it also passed a sense-of-Congress amendment urging the President to continue development of the V-22. (Congressional Record, August 2, 1989: S9440-S9446). The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 101-81) directed the Secretary of Defense "in conjunction with the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration" to submit a report to Congress that would examine questions on "the viability of tilt-rotor technology in commercial aviation, ... tangible signs of commercial interest in the V-22, ... the export potential of the V-22, and ... efforts underway in other countries to develop tilt-rotor technology." To assess the V-22's value in amphibious landings and special operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directed "to coordinate an examination of the roles and missions of all amphibious force and the special operations mission...."
House and Senate conferees on the FY1990 authorizations and appropriations bills agreed to authorize and appropriate $255 million in R&D funds only, with no procurement funds in FY1990. The conference report on the FY1990 defense authorizations bill stated that the conferees agreed that the V-22 "represents revolutionary technology that holds considerable promise for the military" but also noted that the cost of the program "may prove unaffordable. The costs of the V-22 can be reduced either by exploiting its commercial potential or by expanding its application to other missions by other military departments." The conference report on the FY1990 defense appropriations bill (P.L. 101-165) noted the importance of FY1989 funds for advance procurement to preserve the option of a production decision in FY1991.
In December 1989, however, the Defense Department directed the Navy to cancel FY1989 procurement contracts for long-lead items, because the Department opposed production of the aircraft. Since the "de-obligated" FY1989 funds were not impounded or reprogrammed, congressional approval of DOD's action was not required by law. On March 28, 1990, however, the Administration reversed DOD's cancellation of FY1989 procurement contracts and funds for the V-22, which had been strongly criticized in Congress and by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The FY1990 supplemental appropriations bill approved by the House Appropriations Committee on March 27, 1990, had included language disapproving of DOD's deferral of FY1989 funds appropriated for the V-22 and other programs. A GAO review of DOD's action concluded that it was an unauthorized deferral of funds, since the conferees on FY1990 authorizations had permitted the obligation of FY1989 procurement funds by rejecting Senate language to prohibit the use of prior-year procurement funds. The Impoundment Control Act, in GAO's view, does not authorize the Administration to substitute its policy choices for those of Congress on grounds of establishing "a contingency against incurring additional unnecessary costs," as DOD justified its deobligation action.
The Administration requested no funds for the V-22 in FY1991, while requesting $435 million to buy CH-53E helicopters in lieu of V-22s. Continuation of the program was a contentious issue between Congress and the Defense Department in 1990. Supporters challenged Secretary Cheney's contention that the V-22 was unaffordable, noting that the proposed CH-53E alternative would also be costly in the near term. They also believed the program should be continued to preserve a U.S. lead in tilt-rotor technology, arguing that such aircraft might be produced by foreign competitors. Some proposed delaying production and buying fewer aircraft than originally projected. Critics argued that this would only stretch procurement over a longer period, increasing costs over the long run for an aircraft whose military value they considered marginal.
On June 29, 1990, the Defense Department released to Congress a long-awaited report by the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA), Assessment of alternatives for the V-22 assault aircraft program. The study concluded that the V-22's speed, range, and survivability advantages could help a 356-aircraft force be more effective than the proposed helicopter alternatives in Marine Corps missions, Navy search-and-rescue, and Air Force special operations missions. Moreover, if used in anti-drug operations to trail smuggling vessels and aircraft and deploy enforcement personnel, the V-22 would be substantially more effective than helicopter alternatives. While the V-22's near-term costs would be higher than most alternatives, slowing production would make it cheaper than the other alternatives studied, according to IDA.
Secretary Cheney told Congress that after reviewing the IDA report his assessment was "that the decision made last year remains valid..., the investment cost to procure [the V-22] remains too high. In the current era of declining budgets, we must give up certain capabilities." David Chu, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, testified before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on July 19, 1990, that "The driving factor underlying the V-22 cancellation decision was the comparative up-front investment cost of the V-22 versus an alternative force of helicopters ... judged capable of performing [Marine Corps assault and Navy search and rescue missions] reasonably well."
The Senate version of the FY1991 defense authorization bill (S. 2884), passed August 4, 1990, authorized $238 million in R&D funds for the V-22, including the $200 million in FY1989 advanced procurement funds. The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended that these funds be transferred to the Navy's R&D account "to reduce the uncertainties associated with developing and producing this innovative aircraft." (S.Rept. 101-384). Citing the concept of "fly before buy," the committee recommended that no procurement funds be authorized for the program in FY1991. The Senate bill also denied authorization of FY1991 funds to buy the 23 CH-53E helicopters proposed by Secretary Cheney in lieu of the V-22.
The House bill (H.R. 4739), passed September 19, 1990, authorized for the V-22 program $238 million in R&D funds and $165 million in advance procurement funds in FY1991, which "when combined with $200 million of deferred FY1989 authority would provide $365 million for advance procurement of long-lead material to support the option to enter pilot production in FY1992." (H.Rept. 101-665) The House bill also denied authorization of funds requested to buy 23 CH-53E helicopters in lieu of the V-22. The conferees on FY1991 defense authorizations accepted the House bill's funding of the V-22 ($365 million in procurement and $238 million in R&D), which was appropriated in the FY1991 defense appropriations bill (P.L. 101-511).
The Administration's FY1992 defense budget requested no funds for the V-22, reflecting Defense Secretary Cheney's continued opposition to the program. Conferees on the FY1992 defense authorizations bill (P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991) authorized funds for the V-22 at the House level ($990 million, including $365 million in prior-year funds) for development, manufacture, and operational testing of three productionrepresentative aircraft, as well as $15 million for a CV-22 variant for special operations missions. Conferees on the FY1992 defense appropriations bill (P.L. 102-172, November 26, 1991) agreed to fund the program as authorized.
The Administration's FY1993 budget also requested no funds for the V-22, and the Defense Department did not obligate FY1992 funds for the program. The Navy testified in March 1992 that the funds provided by Congress in FY1992 would not build three production-representative aircraft using production tools as intended by Congress. Instead, the Navy proposed construction of two aircraft with new fuselages and wing assemblies from existing prototypes, which would continue the R&D program and provide aircraft for operational testing. On June 3, 1992, the General Accounting Office ruled that FY1992 funds had been illegally impounded and must be obligated.
In the FY1993 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5006, passed June 5, 1992), the House authorized $755 million for three more production-representative aircraft, with language requiring the staff of the DOD Comptroller's office to be reduced by 5% for each month the Department fails to obligate V-22 funds (Section 212). H.R. 5006 also earmarked $15 million in FY1993 funds for defense agencies to use in development of the CV-22 special operations variant. The House denied authorization of $27.9 million requested for modification of executive helicopters, pending completion of V-22 development and testing for use as executive transport aircraft for the White House staff. The Senate Armed Services Committee also recommended authorization of $755 million for the program. For FY1993, Congress authorized and appropriated $755 million for the V-22, with $15 million authorized to develop the CV-22 special operations variant.
The V-22 program was an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign, with Democratic candidates Clinton and Gore supporting development of the aircraft while the Bush Administration opposed the program until late October when Vice President Quayle announced a contract award to the development team. On October 22, 1992, the Navy awarded a $550-million contract to the Bell-Boeing team to build four new V-22 derivatives and to modify two existing V-22 prototypes for evaluation of proposed changes in the original design that are expected to meet reduced performance requirements at lower costs.
The Clinton Administration's FY1994 defense budget requested $82.3 million for the V-22 program. The House authorized FY1994 funds for the V-22 as requested. The Senate authorized $10 million (on grounds that unspent prior-year funds were adequate for the program in FY1994) and $15 million for the CV-22 variant for special forces missions. House and Senate conferees agreed in November 1993 to authorize and appropriate $10 million for the program.
The Administration's FY1995 budget request of $496.9 million for the V-22 program was authorized by the House in the FY1995 defense authorizations bill (H.R. 4301, passed June 9, 1994) and by the Senate in its version of the authorizations bill (S. 2182, passed July 7, 1994). This figure was also contained in both the House version of the FY1995 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4650, passed June 29, 1994) and the Senate version (passed August 11, 1994). House and Senate conferees reduced the FY1995 appropriation to $466.9 million while reaffirming "their strong support for this unique aircraft." The conferees expect DOD "to provide sufficient long lead procurement funds in the FY1996 budget request to commence low rate initial production of the V-22 in FY1997....for a V-22 initial operational capability in FY2001." (H.Rept. 103-747, passed September 29, 1994).
The Administration's FY1996 budget requested $810.6 million for the V-22 -- $762.6 million in R&D funds and $48 million in advance procurement funds, to begin production in FY1997. The FY1996 budget projected a request of $1,275.3 million for the V-22 program in FY1997, including $692.8 million in procurement funds for production of four aircraft. The House authorized the $810.6 million requested in its version of the FY1996 defense authorizations bill (H.R. 1530, passed June 15, 1995). The House National Security Committee noted in its report on H.R. 1530 that the current plan to procure 523 V-22s "over a period of twenty seven years ... [would result] in a very low and inefficient production rate." The Committee directed DOD to report on options to reduce program costs and provide a more efficient production rate by submission of the FY1997 defense budget. (H.Rept. 104-131, p. 31.) The Senate version of the FY1996 defense authorizations bill (S. 1026, passed September 6, 1995) also authorized requested funds for the V-22.
In the FY1996 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 2126, passed September 7, 1995; S. 1087, passed September 5, 1995), the House approved requested funds for the program (H.Rept. 104-208), while the Senate provided some $5 million less than was requested for the program without explaining the grounds for this reduction (S.Rept. 104-124). House and Senate conferees agreed to the Senate's lower figure of $805.6 million in H.Rept. 104-261, which the House rejected on September 29, 1995, for reasonshttp://thomas.loc.gov unrelated to the V-22 program. FY1996 funds for the program was provided in a modified version of the conference report (H.Rept. 104-344) that the House and Senate passed on November 16, 1995 (P.L. 104-61, December 1, 1995). This amount was later authorized in a modified conference report on the FY1996 defense authorizations bill (H.Rept. 104-450) passed in January 1996 by the House (January 24, 1996) and Senate (January 26, 1996).
The Administration's FY1997 budget requested $1,135.5 million for the V-22 program ($558.7 for procurement of four aircraft and $576.8 in R&D funds). During hearings on the FY1997 defense budget, supporters of the V-22 emphasized the need to accelerate procurement beyond the levels projected in the Administration's budget, arguing that this would reduce program costs over the long term and would get more aircraft in service sooner. Secretary of the Navy Dalton indicated that if more procurement funding were available, the Navy would buy six V-22s in FY1997 versus the four requested by the Administration. (Foote, Sheila. House Panel Eyes Adding Funds; Asks Services for Priorities. Defense Daily, March 11, 1996: 366.)
In May 1996, both the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended procurement of six V-22s in FY1997. The House version of the FY1997 defense authorizations bill (H.R. 3230, passed May 15, 1996) included $1,414.5 million for the program ($613.8, R&D; $800.7, procurement). The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 104-267) noted that an increase of $302 million for procurement of six aircraft in FY1997 and advance procurement funds for 12 in FY1998 "would result in a cost saving of $32 million ... through fiscal 2001." The Committee also directed the program to make one Marine Corps MV-22 version available in 1999 for remanufacture as a CV-22 variant to be flight-tested by Special Operations Forces. The Senate bill (S. 1745, passed July 10, 1996) authorized $1,506.5 million for the V-22 in FY1997. House and Senate conferees agreed to authorize $1,474.5 million for the program in FY1997, with funding for procurement of the first six production V-22s (H.Rept. 104-724), passed by the House on August 1, 1996, and by the on September 10, 1996.
The House version of the FY1997 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3610, passed June 13, 1996) also provided $1,474.5 million for the program, including funds for a 6- aircraft buy in FY1997 and advanced funding for 12 V-22s in FY1998. The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 104-617) directed "that the FY1998 and subsequent budgets ... continue the ramp-up [of the V-22 program] to reach an economic rate of 36 aircraft per year not later than FY2000." The Senate version of the bill (S. 1894, passed July 18, 1996) appropriated $1,455.5 million for the program in FY1997, with procurement funds for six aircraft. House and Senate conferees agreed in September 1996 to appropriate $1,325 million for the V-22 program in FY1997: $749 million for procurement of five aircraft and $577 million for R&D. (H.Rept. 104-863.)
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor V/STOL aircraft, capable of vertical or short take-off and landing, with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. Graphite-epoxy composite materials comprise almost 60% of the weight of the airframe. The Marine Corps's MV-22 version will have the following characteristics:
Main arguments of those who say "Yes". The Defense Department should accelerate procurement of the V-22, which the Marine Corps considers its most important aviation program, in order to obtain these aircraft sooner and at more economical production rates. The V-22 is needed to replace aging military helicopters in all the services, which are costly to maintain and operate safely and effectively. The Army should reconsider its decision not to buy the V-22, which the Air Force wants to procure for its Special Operations missions. This tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the operational flexibility of a helicopter without the helicopter's inherent limitations of speed, range, and altitude. When landing on hostile shores in a third-world conflict, the V-22 would be critical for the transport of Marines from ship to shore. The development of tilt-rotor aircraft for the armed services will also have significant spin-off effects for civil aviation and U.S. technology, giving the U.S. aerospace industry a major competitive advantage in the international market.
Main arguments of those who say "No". The V-22 is unaffordable in the present budgetary environment, when the cost of buying large numbers of these transport/cargo aircraft would most likely be at the expense of more critical defense needs. Ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less expensive helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which the Marines are likely to be involved, where the V-22's greater speed and range would not be needed. Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would involve ship-to-shore movement of the necessary mix of troops and equipment in coordination with aircraft having less speed and range than the V-22. As currently funded, the V-22 program is not the jointservice effort it was expected to be, despite the potential multi-service uses of this tiltrotor aircraft. Whatever commercial value a tilt-rotor aircraft might some day have for civil aviation, the V-22's value as a military system is insufficient to justify its cost in these times of budgetary constraints.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization Act, FY1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. (104th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report no. 104-563)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. (104th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report no. 104-617)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization Act, FY1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. (104th Congress, 2nd session. Senate. Report no. 104-267)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, FY1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. (104th Congress, 2nd session. Senate. Report no. 104-286)
Chu Defends Decision to Terminate V-22 Program Despite Favorable IDA Study. Inside the Navy, July 23, 1990: 1, 11.
Civil Tiltrotor Touted Before Congress. Helicopter News, April 15, 1994: 9.
Garner: CSAR Aircraft for Navy Adds to Corps' V-22 Buy. Navy News & Undersea Technology, May 15, 1995: 1, 3.
Hanifen, Maj. Timothy G. V-22 Osprey: There is no Alternative. Marine Corps Gazette, May 1995: 34-36.
IDA Study Finds V-22 Most Effective for Several Missions. Aerospace Daily, July 10, 1990: 44.
Navy Budgeting to Buy 18 V-22s a Year Over 30 Years, Mundy Says. Aerospace Daily, May 19, 1993: 303.
Schweizer, Roman. USMC Advisory Group Recommends Boosting MV-22 Buy, Helo Improvements. Inside the Navy, March 18, 1996: 14.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Navy Aviation, V-22 Development -- Schedule Extended, Performance Reduced, and Costs Increased. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994: 36 p. (GAO/NSIAD-91-45).
V-22s Cleared to Resume Flight Testing; Redesigns in Place. Aerospace Daily, May 19, 1993: 303.