![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
Domestically, Germany faces major challenges. The unification of Germany in October 1990 has proven difficult economically, politically, and psychologically. Many western Germans resent the massive financial transfers from public sector bodies to eastern Germany, while eastern Germans continue to suffer from a high unemployment rate. In a national election on October 16, 1994, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's governing coalition was returned to power, but with a greatly reduced majority.
Globally, the unified Germany is defining a larger political role for itself. Thus far, Germany seems committed to exercising its international influence largely through multinational (EU, U.N.) rather than national channels. As the European Union's largest and economically strongest state, Germany has considerable influence over EU policy. The Kohl government is committed to deepening European integration, and supports the creation of a single currency by 1999 and greater foreign policy coordination, as agreed upon at the Maastricht summit in December 1991. Since the summit, the German public's enthusiasm for greater European unity has waned. Issues of interest to the United States include progress on monetary and political union in the EU, and EU enlargement to the east.
Germany remains central to NATO. The bulk of the remaining 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe are based in Germany. Germany is in favor of NATO's gradual eastern expansion in a way that does not antagonize Russia or Ukraine. Kohl has cultivated good relations with Russian President Yeltsin.
Germany's Constitutional Court ruled in July 1994 that German troops could participate in U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking missions given parliamentary approval. German military missions are likely to remain rare. Germany, together with the United States, Russia, France and Britain, is part of the "contact group" to coordinate diplomatic responses to the war in Bosnia. In June 1995, Germany assigned roughly 1500 troops and 14 Tornado jets to protect and support the U.N. Rapid Reaction Force. In November 1995, Chancellor Kohl's cabinet decided to commit 4,000 troops to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to safeguard the peace in Bosnia; most of them are stationed in Croatia. German officials have announced that 3,000 troops, including for the first time armored infantry units, will serve in Bosnia as part of a successor force once IFOR's mandate expires on December 20, 1996.
Germany's geographic position, economic strength, large conventional forces, and influence in the European Union, coupled with the end of superpower rivalry and national unification, are providing Bonn with the opportunity to play a central role in international affairs. The united Germany boasts a population of about 80 million in an area of land roughly equivalent to that of the state of Montana. Sixteen states comprise the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany's population density is eight times greater than that of the United States. Germany's GDP is about one third the size of the United States', though Germany's per capita GDP is roughly equivalent. Germany is a leading trade partner and close political ally of the United States.
After the Second World War, the United States used its economic strength to assist in rebuilding Western Europe. The United States also led the effort to establish NATO to counter the Soviet threat on the continent. U.S. leaders believe that the security of Western Europe is closely tied to the security of the United States. A strong U.S. role in European affairs has therefore been deemed to be in the interest of the United States by a succession of administrations. During the Cold War, West Germany saw the U.S. military presence and U.S. political leadership as vital to German security. Today, the unified Germany in post-Cold War Europe is much less dependent on the United States. German economic policies and increasingly its security policies are being crafted in the councils of European institutions rather than in primary consultation with the United States. Many observers believe that the long-term transatlantic alliance will be shaped in part by U.S.-German relations, driven by mutual self-interest and, at present, by the strong personal relationship between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton. On May 23, 1996, Kohl joined President Clinton in Milwaukee for his 23rd visit to the United States since becoming chancellor in 1982.
The collision of the two German economies after the July 1990 economic union resulted in the collapse of the east German economy. The process of economically integrating the five new eastern states is proving expensive. Most revenue transfers from west to east fund unemployment insurance, wage subsidies, and health and pension programs. Net financial transfers to eastern Germany by public sector bodies totalled roughly DM155 billion ($108 billion) for 1995, equalling about 40% of eastern Germany's GDP. Transfer payments are likely to continue at least through 1998. Despite the economic hardships of unification, signs of recovery abound. The marked improvements in infrastructure in the east provide one example.
Unemployment has been a persistent problem for unified Germany. The number of unemployed reached a postwar high of 4.27 million in February 1996; the number of jobless has dropped marginally since. In October, the unemployment rate in western Germany was 9.0% and 14.7% in eastern Germany. Domestic rationalization and transfer of production to lower-cost sites abroad led to the loss of one million jobs in the German manufacturing industry between 1991 and 1994. German industry is worried about its international competitiveness because Germany has the highest labor costs and shortest working hours in the world. Several major German companies have built plants elsewhere to offset the high cost structure in Germany.
The Kohl government is taking steps to address some of the fundamental issues. Most recently, on April 26, 1996, Chancellor Kohl introduced a package of spending cuts, welfare reforms, and tax changes, which would total $46 billion in savings, to counter Germany's growing budget deficits and create more jobs. The savings package for next year includes specific measures such as cuts in pension fund outlays and in sick pay, and exemptions for small companies from tough employment protection rules. Germany's weak economic position, high labor costs driving industry out of Germany, and the desire to improve public finances in order to qualify for a single European currency in 1999 forced government action. The opposition Social Democrats (SPD) and the trade unions have criticized the program sharply. The unions have organized warning strikes across Germany. On June 15, over 300,000 demonstrators marched in Bonn to protest the proposed cuts in the welfare system. The coalition government, however, has proven committed to pushing the package through at a time when the electoral calendar is largely free until the general election in the fall of 1998. On September 13, the important elements of the savings package cleared their final legislative hurdle when all 341 members of the governing coalition, representing more than the absolute majority of the 672 seats in the Bundestag needed to override the opposition of the Bundesrat (upper house), voted in support of initial legislation. On September 7, about 240,000 people had demonstrated against the cuts in six of Germany's largest cities, and the unions have promised a "hot autumn" of protest. For example, over 400,000 engineering workers went on strike on October 25 to protest the sick pay cut. However, a public opinion poll published on September 11 indicated that 64% of Germans believe that the Chancellor's savings plan is necessary, a marked increase from 44% in May 1996.
Germany's Council of Economic Advisors calculated in mid-November that Germany's gross domestic product, a measurement of the total output of goods and services, would increase 1.5% in 1996 and 2.5% in 1997. German interest rates are at historic lows, and the rate of inflation is low at 1.4%.
In 1994, Germany conducted approximately 20 elections at the local, state, federal, and European levels, culminating in the national election on October 16, the second since Germany's unification in October 1990. Chancellor Kohl's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its coalition partners, the Bavarian-based Christian Social Union (CSU) and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), claimed a narrow victory, but with a much reduced majority of 10 seats (from 134 previously) in the parliament. Nonetheless, the coalition is stable and is expected to serve out its four-year term. Three other parties also won parliamentary representation. The center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the main opposition party, garnered over 36% of the vote, an increase over the 1990 results. The SPD has a majority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of parliament, and thus can block most legislation. The environmentalist Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the former eastern German Communists, also won seats in the parliament. The far-right Republikaner party, seen as a spent political force, failed to clear the five percent hurdle necessary to enter the Bundestag. Voter turnout, up slightly from the 1990 election, equalled 79.1%. Election themes included unemployment and economic growth, particularly in light of unification, as well as law and order. Except for the future of the European Union, foreign policy issues did not figure in the election campaign.
Poor electoral performances at the state level have led many observers to question the staying power of the Free Democrats as a political force in Germany. With the FDP having failed to cross the 5% electoral threshold needed for representation in 12 of 13 previous state elections, attention focussed on three state elections which took place on March 24, 1996. FDP officials were visibly relieved when their party scored 9.6% in the prosperous, southwestern state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, 8.9% in the "rust belt" of Rhineland-Palatinate, and 5.7% in the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein. In all three states, the FDP campaigned as the party of low taxation, greater deregulation, and less bureaucracy; its traditional commitments to civil liberties and individual rights were not emphasized.
The SPD remains a party plagued with problems, and it suffered setbacks in these three state elections, losing on average five percentage points. In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the SPD ran a populist campaign, calling for European Monetary Union to be postponed and for further restrictions on the number of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union who can settle in Germany; this campaign backfired and the SPD lost votes to the FDP and the Greens. The rivalry between the leading figures in the SPD is intense. At the November 1995 SPD congress, delegates unexpectedly ousted Rudolph Scharping, the SPD's 1994 chancellor candidate, as party chairman in favor of Oskar Lafontaine, premier of Saarland and unsuccessful chancellor candidate in 1990. A dynamic speaker and charismatic figure, Lafontaine represents the left of the party; he opposed the deployment of German Tornado jets over Bosnia and favors a policy of rapprochement with the PDS. Scharping, who remains the party leader in the Bundestag, also has a bitter rivalry with Gerhard Schroeder, premier of Lower Saxony. Schroeder, who would like to be the SPD's next chancellor candidate, favors pro-business policies, such as lower taxation, greater flexibility in the workplace, and the reintroduction of Saturday work hours. Several prominent members have resigned party posts in the squabble over the SPD's direction. The disarray in SPD ranks is particularly striking in comparison to the ruling CDU, where Helmut Kohl reigns as the unchallenged leader. On October 31, 1996, Kohl became Germany's longest-serving postwar chancellor, having held that office for over 14 years. The good showing of Chancellor Kohl's CDU and his coalition partner, the FDP, in the March 1996 state elections was interpreted less as a ringing endorsement of the federal coalition and more as a sign of SPD weakness.
The environmentalist, pacifist Greens continue to grow in popularity and they gained in all three states. If the Greens endure as the third strongest party, they may replace the FDP as the potential kingmaker in a coalition at the federal level. The SPD and the Greens govern together in four of Germany's 16 states.
The far-right Republicans won 9.1% of the March 1996 vote in Baden-Wuerttemberg which marked the first time the party had been reelected to a state parliament. Some accused the SPD's anti-immigration campaign of having played into the far right's hands.
Germany remains a country coming to terms with the unification of east and west in 1990. Much still divides eastern and western Germans, not least economic success, and the PDS has been able to capitalize on eastern resentments. All five eastern states held elections in 1994 and the PDS garnered between 16-23% of the vote; many observers were surprised by the PDS' electoral strength. In the October 1995 Berlin election, the former communists won 2.1% of the vote in the western part of the city and 36.3% in the east, making it the most popular party in eastern Berlin. The party's city-wide total was 14.6%.
Asylum. After the end of the Cold War and German unification, the right to asylum became a major topic of debate in Germany. Germany's constitution contained a liberal regulation on the right to asylum and, in 1992, 438,191 asylum seekers streamed into Germany. The majority of asylum seekers were from Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Many Germans complained that the liberal German law allowed in many people who were not political refugees, but rather economic migrants who took advantage of the country's generous welfare system and competed with Germans for scarce housing. Extreme right-wing parties capitalized on widespread resentment against asylum seekers.
On December 6, 1992, Kohl's governing coalition and the opposition Social Democrats agreed on a constitutional amendment to limit the right to asylum. The asylum compromise between the government and the opposition includes several important changes. For one, any asylum seekers from European Union states or states which accept the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the European Human Rights Convention have no right to asylum in Germany. For another, any refugee passing through "safe third countries," which include all of Germany's neighbors, is not eligible for asylum. An individual may appeal this decision, but may not stay in Germany during the course of that appeal. In exchange for these concessions, the Social Democrats won agreement on placing an annual limit of 200,000 on the immigration of ethnic Germans who receive automatic German citizenship, and on easing terms for citizenship for long-time foreign residents of Germany. Parliament approved the new asylum law in late May 1993 and it took effect on July 1.
The number of foreigners seeking asylum in Germany has fallen notably since July 1993. According to the Interior Ministry, 127,210 persons applied for asylum in 1994, as compared to 322,599 in 1993 -- a decrease of roughly 61%. In 1995, 127,937 asylum petitions were filed; the single largest group of asylum seekers (33,000) were citizens of the former Yugoslavia. During the first nine months of 1996, Germany registered 86,000 asylum applications, 6.3% fewer than during the same period of 1995.
On May 14, 1996, the German Constitutional Court ruled on a challenge to the asylum law brought by five individuals who had been refused asylum. After six months' deliberation, the court held that three central elements of the 1993 law were compatible with the constitution. The Kohl government welcomed the decision; human rights advocates criticized it.
Right-Wing Violence. In the early 1990s, incidents of right-wing violence grew markedly in Germany, but since 1993 those incidents have declined. In 1992, right-wing extremists committed 2,639 acts of violence, an increase of 77% from 1991; that figure sank to 2,232 in 1993, to 1,489 in 1994, and to 837 in 1995. Through August 1996, right-wing extremists were responsible for 165 violent offenses. Roughly 60% of the attacks occurred in western Germany; the rest in eastern Germany, which is home to roughly 20% of the population. Close to 90% of the right-wing attacks were directed against foreigners -- above all, at asylum seekers and their lodgings. Germany is home to 6.9 million foreigners, who comprise 8.5% of the population. About 75% of these attacks are committed by youth under the age of 21.
Following a November 1992 firebombing in Moelln (western Germany), in which three Turkish residents were killed, the government began a crackdown on far right violence. Of Germany's 80 million people, two million are Turks, making them the country's largest minority. Two-thirds of those Turks have lived in Germany for at least a decade. Following Moelln, for the first time, the Federal Prosecutor took over the investigation of an anti-foreigner attack and the decision was made to charge the perpetrators with murder, rather than manslaughter, as had been the case in previous fatal arson attacks. Other measures included banning several small neo-Nazi organizations, and outlawing the sale, manufacture, and distribution of the music of at least five neo-Nazi rock bands. On December 8, 1993, the two persons accused in the Moelln case received the maximum possible sentences. The overwhelming majority of Germans condemns xenophobia and neo-Nazism. Following the Moelln attack, over 3 million Germans demonstrated across the country against xenophobia, anti-semitism and right-wing violence.
A group of right extremists, reportedly totalling 150, led an anti-foreigner riot in the eastern town of Magdeburg on May 12, 1994. That riot increased support for an anticrime package which was passed by the parliament in September 1994. The crime bill included stiffer jail terms, preventive detention, and punishment for those who deny the Holocaust took place, as well as extending a ban on the use of Nazi symbols to slogans and signs that resemble Nazi symbols. An Amnesty International report, released in May 1995, charged German police with ill-treatment of foreigners, citing over 70 cases of abuse. A study commissioned by the interior ministers of Germany's states was released on February 5, 1996 and acknowledged that police brutality does take place against foreigners, though no systematic pattern of abuse was evident.
On March 20, 1995, Danish authorities arrested an American neo-Nazi, Gary Lauck, on an international warrant issued by Germany accusing Lauck of distributing racist and far-right propaganda. Lauck, who heads the National Socialist German Workers Party, Overseas Organization, has been the main supplier of neo-Nazi literature to German neo-Nazis for two decades. In Germany, freedom of expression is not unrestricted and the federal penal code outlaws Lauck's conduct. On March 23, German police raided 80 apartments around Germany and seized banned propaganda published by Lauck, as well as weapons and ammunition. On August 24, Denmark's supreme court approved the German request for Lauck's extradition. Lauck was transferred to a Hamburg jail on September 5; his trial began on May 9, 1996. Convicted of inciting racial hatred by a German court on August 22, Lauck was sentenced to four years in prison; however, under German rules on parole and pretrial time served in prison, he could be released and deported by February 1997. Anti-Semitic crimes in Germany, such as desecrating Jewish cemeteries, rose from 656 in 1993 to 1,366 in 1994.
Unified Germany is in a position to take a more assertive role in world affairs than was possible in the Cold War era, when foreign policy in a divided Germany was largely consumed by the contest of political and security issues that two competing alliance systems played out on its soil. After the Second World War, West Germany anchored its economy in the European Community and depended on NATO for military security. Leaders of the united Germany assert that the state's external policies will continue to be expressed through international institutions, a move in part meant to reassure those concerned about a Germany of increasing power and influence. At the same time Germany's restored sovereignty, strong economy, and geographic position provide it with a greater voice in shaping the course of those institutions. Some observers criticize Germany for not playing a greater international role, particularly in the area of peacekeeping and peacemaking, while others express uneasiness over what they see as increased German assertiveness in the international arena.
Policy Toward Iran. Germany's diplomacy on Iran has been singled out as an example of the country's readiness to conduct a foreign policy distinct from that of Washington. The Clinton Administration has sought to isolate Iran by banning all U.S. trade and investment, in an attempt to dissuade Iran from allegedly sponsoring international terrorism, developing nuclear weapons, and working to sabotage the Middle East peace process. Most west European countries and Japan share U.S. concerns over Iranian intentions, but they do not agree on the appropriate response. The Kohl government has pursued the EU's policy of "critical dialogue," believing that limited political and economic engagement are the best means to moderate Iranian behavior. This policy is driven in part by economic motives and in part by political motives, namely the desire to retain a minimum of influence in Iran. Iran owes Germany roughly $8.6 billion from previous commercial deals and makes annual debt servicing payments of one billion marks. On the trade front, German exports to Iran have dropped to 2.3 billion marks in 1995 from 9.1 billion marks in 1992 while imports from Iran have stagnated at 1.1 billion marks. According to a November 1996 news report, Iran ranks 42nd on the list of Germany's leading export markets.
Reportedly, when Chancellor Kohl visited Washington on February 9, 1995, some U.S. officials expressed concern that Iran was using materials imported from Germany to build weapons. At a news conference, Kohl said the government was working with German firms to ensure dual-use equipment would not be sold to Iran that could be used for armaments. Senator Alfonse D'Amato has been a leading Congressional critic of the Kohl government's decision to reschedule over $5.6 billion of Iran's debt at low rates. In a February 13, 1996 letter to the Chancellor, he urged the Kohl government to end Germany's "preferential treatment of the terrorist regime in Iran." Reportedly, when Chancellor Kohl met with President Clinton in Milwaukee on May 23 the two men had agreed to continue to disagree about Iran.
On March 15, 1996, Germany's Federal Court of Justice ordered the arrest of Iran's Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahiyan, who is suspected of ordering the 1992 killing of exiled Iranian Kurdish leaders in Berlin -- that murder trial (the "Mykonos" trial) is underway in Berlin. Officials in Bonn said that Fallahiyan's extradition from Iran was practically impossible, but that the warrant was a "diplomatic gesture" which the Kohl government had hoped would never be issued. In May 1996, the European aircraft consortium Airbus that includes Germany announced its readiness to sell at least 10 airliners to Tehran for about $1 billion. In July, Germany brokered a prisoner exchange between Israel and Iranian-backed Hezbollah guerillas, a breakthrough German officials felt was only achievable because of the relationship they had cultivated with Iran. Germany, together with its EU partners, has strongly objected to the recent U.S. law, signed by President Clinton in August 1996, imposing sanctions on foreign companies that invest in energy projects in Iran and Libya.
The "Mykonos" trial for the 1992 attack in a Berlin restaurant that left four Iranian Kurdish opposition activists dead has created considerable ill will between Bonn and Tehran. In November 1996, prosecutors suggested that the defendants acted upon the orders of Iran's political leaders; that claim sparked vehement criticisms of Germany by Iranian officials and the state-controlled media. Demonstrators outside the German embassy in Tehran have called for the prosecutors to be "executed." Verdicts in the case are expected in January and some observers predict a severing of German-Iranian diplomatic relations. However, Foreign Minister Kinkel continues to advocate a policy of "active influence" with Iran. At the same time that German relations with Iran are deteriorating, some believe that the United States is reconsidering its policy of isolating Iran in order to counterbalance Iraq which has renewed its activism in its northern Kurdish region.
Policy Toward the United Nations. The Kohl government has been pressing diplomatically for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. This step has been widely interpreted as a sign that the unified Germany wants to take a role in global politics commensurate with its economic strength. After the United States and Japan, Germany provides the third largest contribution to the U.N. budget. The Clinton Administration favors giving both Germany and Japan permanent seats on the Security Council. In October 1994, Germany was elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for 1995 and 1996. Foreign Minister Kinkel reiterated Germany's desire for a permanent seat in a November 1996 newspaper column.
Germany views the European Union (EU) as the institution central to its political and economic future and to the future of Europe as a whole. EU members represent Germany's most important trading partners, with France, Italy and the Netherlands heading the list. Almost 47% of Germany's foreign trade is with EU states.
Many Europeans, including Germans, view the deepening of the EU's economic and political structures as a way of anchoring a reunified Germany in the West and ensuring a European Germany, rather than a German Europe. As the EU's largest and economically strongest state, Germany has considerable influence over EU policy. Observers from other EU countries leave no doubt that few important policy initiatives survive without German support. However, Germany cannot control outcomes; Bonn must act in concert with other member states on important policy initiatives. On crucial issues, such as expanding the European Union or modifying the EU's areas of responsibility, approval by all EU countries is necessary. A weighted majority voting system in the Council of Ministers determines the outcome of less critical legislation. Therefore, Germany must look for allies to advance its policies in EU councils.
Political and Monetary Union. Both Germany's commitment to deepening European integration and Germany's ability to affect that process were apparent in the outcome of the EC's Maastricht summit in December 1991. At Maastricht, the EC decided to improve cooperation on foreign policy matters by establishing rules for joint action. Most decisions in this area will still require unanimity. EC members agreed on a defense role for the Community. The WEU will be the defense arm of the developing European Union (EU), while maintaining close links to NATO. The EC also agreed on a plan for economic and monetary union (EMU). The EC is to create a single currency and a regional central bank by 1999, as the culmination of a three-stage process of monetary union. The Germans, in particular, had insisted on specific criteria for economic convergence (relating to inflation, budget deficits, interest rates, and currency stability). Also in line with German preferences was the EC's decision to model a European Central Bank System (ECBS) after the German Bundesbank. An ECBS will be independent of government control and reflect the anti-inflationary basis and stability-oriented fiscal policy of the Bundesbank.
The Treaty on European Union, agreed upon at Maastricht, charts out the development of a federal system with some form of supranational government. Enthusiasm for the treaty flagged across the EU as concerns over forfeiting national currencies and political traditions grew. Within Germany, the Bundesbank expressed various concerns, including whether the criteria for admittance of individual countries to the currency union would be rigorously applied. Germany's 16 federal states demanded a constitutional guarantee to ensure them greater influence in EU lawmaking. Despite waning public support, both houses of the German parliament ratified the Maastricht treaty in December 1992. On October 12, 1993, Germany's constitutional court ruled that the Maastricht treaty was compatible with the German constitution, removing the final obstacle to the treaty going into effect on November 1, 1993.
Germans continue to debate the merits of a common currency. Some observers maintain that a single European currency will confirm Germany's de facto economic preeminence, with little risk of other EU states gaining much additional leverage in collective European policy-making on interest rates or industrial policy. Others, however, contend that EMU would decrease German economic control. In late 1995, a public opinion poll showed that two out of every three Germans want to keep the Deutsche mark and nearly 70% of all Germans think a single European currency would be less stable than the mark. In light of this opposition, Chancellor Kohl, who has committed himself repeatedly to achieving a single currency by 1999, has worked diligently to get certain concessions from his European allies in order to mollify German critics. For example, in late October 1993, the EC decided to locate the European Monetary Institute, the forerunner to the European Central Bank, in Frankfurt -- a decision for which the Kohl government had pressed. Further, at the EU's Madrid summit in December 1995, the Chancellor prevailed upon his European colleagues to adopt the name "Euro" for the planned currency, rather than the term "Ecu" favored by most countries; and to undertake a study of a proposed stability pact to ensure fiscal discipline in EMU -- an agreement in principle on a stability pact was reached by EU finance ministers in September 1996. Final agreement on the terms of a stability pact is likely to be reached at the EU heads of state meeting in Dublin on December 13-14.
The Kohl government remains committed to securing deeper integration at the EU's intergovernmental conference (IGC), which began on March 29, 1996, in Italy. On March 26, Foreign Minister Kinkel issued a paper detailing German goals for EU reform at the IGC. First, in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy, Germany would like to see the EU create a unit for analysis and planning, expand qualified majority voting in certain areas (excluding military missions), and integrate the Western European Union into the EU in the medium term. Second, on justice and interior policies, Germany would like to see strengthened police cooperation, and Community-wide visa policies, asylum rights, customs cooperation and immigration rights. Third, Germany would like to create more transparency in EU legislative work, better public access to EU documents, and more democratic control through a strengthened European Parliament. Fourth, the Kohl government has advanced many ideas for institutional reform, including more qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and limits on the number of commissioners and on the size of the European Parliament. Fifth, Germany advocates adding a "flexibility clause" to the treaty which would stipulate that EU member states who would not or could not join the integration process should not hold it up (i.e., no veto right), and that no state which could and wanted to participate could be excluded (i.e., no "hard core" Europe). On October 22, 1996, Germany and France formally announced joint proposals for a multi-speed Europe in which groups of countries could progress toward greater integration without having to wait for all member states to participate.
EU Enlargement to the East. Germany has been the primary enthusiast for the EU's eastern enlargement as a means to ensure political and economic stability on Germany's eastern border. Germany sees its prosperity as tied to the fortunes of these countries, in part, because of their geographical proximity. Germany is the major Western trading partner of every country in Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1990-93, Germany accounted for 25% of total foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe; the United States led, accounting for 29%. Germany has been the largest single aid donor to the Central and Eastern Europe countries, with aid commitments totalling about $33 billion form January 1990 to December 1994. Other EU members have raised concerns about the EU's enlargement, because they worry that EU institutions will become weaker and more cumbersome, that the process of integrating former communist countries will prove too costly, and that the balance of power in the EU will shift decisively in favor of Germany.
Germany has said that it favors full EU membership for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania as soon as they meet economic standards for membership. During its six-month EU presidency which ended on December 31, 1994, Germany gave priority to readying the way for EU accession of these countries. At the Essen summit of EU leaders in December 1994, Germany invited the leaders of these six central and east European states to attend the closing session. While this was an important symbolic step, substantive progress was more limited. The EU soft-pedalled on trade liberalization measures and avoided a commitment to reform the structural funds and the common agricultural policy, both necessary reforms if the cost of eastward enlargement is not to be prohibitive. The importance of these reforms ensures that the process of eastern enlargement will be divisive within the Union, because the poorer, more rural member states are reluctant to see existing aid reduced. EU leaders have stressed that membership negotiations will be carried out case by case and will not begin until after the conclusion of the 1996 intergovernmental conference to review the Maastricht Treaty, expected to end in June 1997. Chancellor Kohl, during a visit to Poland in July 1995, suggested that Poland could join the EU by the year 2000; his remark represented the first time a west European leader has offered a specific date for an east European state's EU entry.
Germany remains central to NATO. At NATO's summit in January 1994, the alliance adopted the "Partnership for Peace" program to reach out to the former members of the Warsaw Pact. At that time, some German officials were disappointed by the U.S. proposal, because they had sought a more far-reaching plan which would lead to eventual entry of several of these states into NATO. The summit also adopted a plan for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) through which NATO could make available forces and command-and-control structures to the Europeans in crises in which the United States chose not to act. The decision potentially gives greater weight to the development of a European defense identity, sought above all by France and Germany. At the June 1996 NATO foreign ministers' conference in Berlin, the alliance took concrete steps toward establishing CJTF structures.
U.S. Forces in Germany and Base Closures. Whereas 207,660 U.S. troops were deployed in Germany in 1990, the current base figure is 65,000. However, that represents the bulk of the 100,000 U.S. troops remaining in Europe. Two German-U.S. corps will form a substantial component of the future NATO main defense forces in central Europe. While some Germans question the U.S. commitment to keeping forces deployed in Europe, some Americans wonder whether Germans will continue to want foreign forces stationed on their territory in peacetime, particularly given that the withdrawal of the 338,000 troops of the former USSR was completed on August 31, 1994. The Kohl government has made clear its desire for a continued U.S. presence, because Germany is bordered by economic, social and political turmoil to its east.
Germany's Military Role Abroad. Following unification, the issue of what role German troops should play abroad became the center of political debate. Many Germans interpreted their constitution as strictly limiting military involvement outside of the NATO area. Chancellor Kohl did not share this view, but he committed himself to revising the constitution in order to clearly permit German forces under U.N. or other multilateral auspices to operate in and outside of Europe. The opposition Social Democrats, whose support was necessary to bring about any constitutional change, believed that German forces should only participate in U.N. peacekeeping, not combat, missions. Thus, the route to amend the constitution appeared blocked. Instead, the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats (Kohl's coalition partner) brought cases before the Constitutional Court to rule on what the correct interpretation of the constitution was.
While this debate continued, the Kohl government took steps to widen the role of the German military. In mid-May 1992, 140 German army medics left for Cambodia to take part, for the first time, in a United Nations peacekeeping force. One German soldier was killed in Cambodia in October 1993. The U.N. mission there ended officially on August 31, 1993. On July 15, 1992, Germany announced plans to join the joint sea and air patrol assembled by the Western European Union and NATO to enforce United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. On August 9, the SPD greeted that decision by bringing a charge before the Constitutional Court, claiming the government had overstepped its powers because it did not consult the parliament before sending soldiers abroad. On November 22, 1992, NATO and WEU launched a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic, which a German destroyer participated in, with some restrictions. In late March 1993, the German air force joined U.S. and French military aircraft to air-drop emergency supplies to eastern Bosnia. German crews also comprised 30% of NATO's AWACS aircraft fleet which were monitoring Bosnian airspace. Kohl's Christian Democratic Party endorsed the use of these crews in enforcing a U.N.-sanctioned no-fly zone, but the Foreign Minister's Free Democratic Party argued that, if the U.N. were to request NATO to use force against aircraft in Bosnia's airspace, Germany could not participate on constitutional grounds. In early April 1993, the Free Democrats, joined by the opposition Social Democrats, petitioned the Constitutional Court for an injunction to ban German involvement in enforcing the no-fly zone. Instead, the Court cleared the way for German participation in the no-fly operation, maintaining that Germany's credibility as a reliable NATO partner and its international standing would suffer if the German crews withdrew.
On April 20, 1993, the Kohl government announced it would send roughly 1,700 soldiers to help in the reconstruction of Somalia under U.N. operational control, in response to a direct request from the U.N. Secretary-General. The first contingent of German troops arrived in Somalia in May 1993, representing the first time armed German forces had been deployed outside the NATO area since the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955. The SPD petitioned the Constitutional Court on the Somalia mission as well. The soldiers, the last of whom returned to Germany on March 18, 1994, had been deployed in areas where there was no fighting among Somali clans and they had been allowed to use weapons only in self-defense. Bundeswehr troops killed one Somali intruder on January 21, 1994.
On July 12, 1994, the Constitutional Court ruled that German troops can take part in both U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as long as the Bundestag approves each operation by a simple majority. The 142-page decision specified that Germany can assign forces to NATO and WEU operations directed at implementing resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. President Clinton was visiting Germany at the time the decision was announced and he greeted it with great exuberance, leading Chancellor Kohl to temper Clinton's comments by adding that the German government would exercise extreme caution in deciding which military missions German soldiers will participate in.
Germany's army consists of 340,000 soldiers. The focus of an ongoing restructuring effort has been the creation of a 50,000-man crisis reaction force, an all-volunteer division equipped with advanced weapons and support and designed for combat missions outside Europe.
Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia. The United States and its European allies have had difficulty formulating a coherent policy in trying to halt the war in the former Yugoslavia. At times, the Clinton Administration has singled out Germany for criticism, for instance, on the issue of Germany's successful drive for European Community recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991. In mid-June 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher contended that Bonn "bears a particular responsibility" for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the escalation of war, because of its premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The Kohl government has rebuffed this critique as unjustified.
Germany, together with the United States, Russia, France and Britain, is part of the "contact group" to coordinate diplomatic responses to the war in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly rejected a plan drawn up by the contact group that would give the Serbs 49% of Bosnia, and the Muslims and Croats 51%. Germany supported a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia based on the contact group plan. No German soldiers participated in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and Germany stated that it would not put ground troops in Bosnia because of Germany's controversial history in the region (see above section on "Germany's Military Role" for other information on German military contributions in the former Yugoslavia). Germany, together with its European allies, opposed lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, fearing that such a step could bring an escalation of fighting and prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid.
On November 30, 1994, NATO military command requested six to eight Tornado fighter-bombers with special electronic capabilities to use against mobile Serbian surface-to-air missile batteries and to protect NATO air patrols over Bosnia. Reportedly, Chancellor Kohl leaned toward approving the request, but he was unsure that he could muster the parliamentary majority necessary to approve such an action and thus chose not to pursue it. Kohl apparently did not want to set a negative precedent following the July constitutional court ruling. Early in December, NATO then asked Bonn how it might be willing to assist the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia, should that be necessary. The German government responded on December 21 that it would provide logistical assistance and combat air cover in order to show solidarity with its closest allies in the event of a withdrawal.
In early June 1995, the Kohl government announced that it would participate in NATO military support for a redeployment of UNPROFOR to more defensible locations in Bosnia. On June 30, the Bundestag approved a government motion to assign roughly 1,500 German troops to protect and support the U.N. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in the former Yugoslavia. This deployment marked the first time that Germany had assigned combat units to a U.N. mission. Opposition politicians criticized the deployment arguing that the presence of German soldiers would escalate the conflict in light of the atrocities Nazi troops had committed during World War II. The government maintained that Germany had to show solidarity with its NATO allies and signal its willingness to shoulder international burdens. On September 1, 1995, German fighter-bombers flew their first combat mission since World War II, taking reconnaissance photos over Bosnia.
On November 28, 1995, Chancellor Kohl's cabinet decided to commit 4,000 troops for 12 months to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to safeguard the peace in Bosnia. German soldiers primarily have supported logistics, transport, medical and engineering units; most of them have been stationed in Croatia. Germany's difficult history in the region and sensitivity there to a German military presence explains why the government chose to play largely a support role in IFOR with its troops based in a neighboring state. The contribution to IFOR represents the largest military mission deployed by Germany outside the NATO area since 1945. The Bundestag approved this plan by a wide majority on December 6, with most of the opposition Social Democratics and many Greens voting with the government. Opinion polls suggest that most Germans approve of German participation in the Bosnia mission. On February 7, 1996, Chancellor Kohl's cabinet and on February 9, the German Parliament approved the deployment of Tornado fighter-bombers to support the U.N. peace mission in the Serb-occupied Croatian region of Eastern Slavonia.
The Kohl government, like its EU partners, is extremely wary of the U.S.-backed effort to train and arm Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces. In March 1996, Foreign Minister Kinkel complained: "It is not right to undermine arms control by rearmament."
In October 1996, Defense Minister Ruehe stated that 3,000 German troops will serve in Bosnia as part of a successor force once IFOR's mandate expires on December 20, 1996. The Defense Minister said that the German role would not be limited to providing medical and logistics support as it has been in IFOR, but would include, for the first time, the deployment of infantry troops with armored vehicles -- further indication of Germany's desire to be a full partner in multinational military missions. The German parliament is expected to approve this deployment overwhelmingly in mid-December.
Germany has taken in more refugees from the former Yugoslavia than the rest of western Europe combined, and spends about $2.5 billion annually to care for these 320,000 refugees. In August 1996, the 16 federal states and the Interior Ministry agreed on a three-phase program to return the refugees -- either voluntarily or by force -- beginning with criminals, single people and childless couples. The agreement went into effect on October 1, 1996. The conservative southern state of Bavaria became the first to forcibly expel Bosnian war refugees on October 9; as of December 4, 35 Bosnians have been forcibly deported and 2,500 have left voluntarily according to the Bavarian interior minister. Bavaria has been caring for 65,000 Bosnians, the largest concentration in any German state. The Green party, humanitarian and church groups oppose the expulsion policy, but the opposition Social Democrats have been reticent to criticize the government because of widespread public support.
NATO Enlargement. One of the first proponents of rapid NATO expansion to the east, the Kohl government appears to have become more hesitant of late. While anxious to extend its security zone, Germany appears increasingly concerned over the danger of alienating Russia (which opposes NATO's expansion) and thus endangering democratic reform there. Public opinion polls suggest that 64% of the German public think admitting the countries of central and eastern Europe into NATO will benefit Europe's overall security. Germany was the driving force behind the Western European Union's offer of "associate partner" status to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in May 1994. At a joint news conference with President Clinton on February 9, 1995 at the White House, Chancellor Kohl said that both Germany and the United States desire a "gradual...stepby -step" extension of NATO that does not antagonize Russia or Ukraine. At a meeting of statesmen and security experts in Munich in early February 1996, the Chancellor reiterated that the issue of NATO's eastern enlargement must be handled with "care and prudence," with particular attention being given to the "well-understood security interests" of Russia and Ukraine. When Kohl met with President Yeltsin on September 7, 1996, reportedly he assured Yeltsin that NATO enlargement would not take place this year, and that negotiations over Russia's role in an enlarged NATO would not begin until the Russian President had recovered from his heart surgery.
The Eurocorps. On October 16, 1991, German Chancellor Kohl and then French President Mitterrand proposed the creation of a corps-strength Western European army that would give the region an independent defense capability. That proposal was formalized on May 22, 1992. The Eurocorps numbers roughly 50,000 and was declared operational on November 30, 1995. Its headquarters are in Strasbourg, France, representing the first time German troops have been based on French territory since World War II. The corps has three major missions. First, it can be deployed for the common defense of NATO members. Second, the corps can provide humanitarian assistance abroad. Third, the force is authorized to operate in areas outside the NATO treaty in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.
The United States, concerned about protecting NATO's role in defending Europe, initially voiced criticism of the Eurocorps. On November 30, 1992, France and Germany announced that the Eurocorps could be placed under NATO command, in the case of an attack on the alliance or of a decision by NATO governments to dispatch a peacekeeping force outside alliance territory. On January 21, 1993, an official agreement was signed on the terms of cooperation between NATO and the Eurocorps, thus ending fears that the Eurocorps would undermine NATO.
France and Germany have invited all WEU members to participate in the Eurocorps. On June 25, 1993, Belgium announced its participation in the Eurocorps with a 12,000- man mechanized division. In November 1993, Spain decided to assign a brigade of 3,500 to the Eurocorps. Luxembourg decided to join in May 1994 and completed its formal accession in May 1996; it will contribute 180 soldiers. French President Mitterrand invited the Eurocorps to participate in the Bastille Day military parade on July 14, 1994; for the first time since 1944, German troops marched down the Champs Elys‚e. The Eurocorps holds annual exercises; some observers have expressed concern about the interoperability of the corps' major units, such as whether all units have mutually compatible information transmission systems.
The symbolic importance of the Eurocorps increased when France announced a huge reduction of its military personnel in Germany on July 17, 1996. By the end of 1999, France plans to reduce its current presence of roughly 20,000 to 3,000. German Defense Minister Ruehe stated his hope that the "intimacy" created by the presence of French soldiers in Germany would live on in the Franco-German brigade that is part of the Eurocorps. Reportedly, the Franco-German brigade will be deployed in Bosnia as part of the successor force to IFOR.
Policy Toward Russia. Chancellor Kohl believes that there can not be stability in Europe if Russia is unstable. Russia's relations with Germany, its largest trading partner and most generous aid donor, are closer than with any other western state. From 1989 through 1994, German assistance to the former Soviet Union equalled about $71 billion. German Foreign Minister Kinkel is fond of pointing out that, since 1989, every German has given over $360 per capita in economic aid to Russia, as compared to $36 from each American and $8.9 from each Japanese; Germany has contributed more than all other countries combined. Given the tremendous financial burden the reconstruction of eastern Germany has put on Germany, the Kohl government has stressed to the international community (and particularly to Japan and the United States) its inability to further increase aid to the former Soviet Union. Germany has encouraged its allies to increase assistance to the region.
Chancellor Kohl, who prides himself on his good personal ties to President Yeltsin, visited Russia in February 1996, in a trip interpreted as having the "scarcely disguised aim" of bolstering Yeltsin in his reelection bid. Kohl stressed that Russia was Germany's "most important partner in the East," and Yeltsin "a tried and tested friend of Germany." Unlike Foreign Minister Kinkel, the Chancellor uttered little criticism of Russia's brutal war in Chechnya. Kohl described himself as "especially pleased" with Yeltsin's victory in the July Russian presidential run-off.
In early March, German banks announced that they would lend Russia another DM4 billion (roughly $2.71 billion), a move seen as another pre-election boost for President Yeltsin. These German funds will augment the $10.2 billion loan promised to Russia by the International Monetary Fund on February 22, a step which the German government backed. Chancellor Kohl also supports full Russian membership in the Group of Seven leading industrial nations, but reportedly no other G-7 member supports the idea of going that far.
Chancellor Kohl became Yeltsin's first foreign visitor following the Russian President's reelection in July, when the two men had a four-hour informal meeting on September 7, 1996. Kohl sought to allay concerns about a power vacuum in Moscow resulting from the President's extended illness.