![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
The Administration's proposed FY1997 defense budget requested $699.1 million in funding for SSN-23 and $296.2 million in advanced procurement funding for an FY1998 submarine. The budget submission identified a requirement for $504 million in FY1997 advanced procurement funding for an FY1999 submarine but did not request this funding.
One issue relating to FY1997 submarine procurement funding concerned the $699.1 million requested for SSN-23. Congress could either approve this amount, reduce the Administration's request (as Congress did with the Administration's FY1996 request for SSN-23), or increase the Administration's request by accelerating into FY1997 $105 million in SSN-23 funding now planned for FY1998.
Another issue relating to FY1997 submarine procurement funding concerned the $504 million FY1997 funding requirement for the FY1999 submarine. The Navy identified this as the top item on its "wish list" for using any funding that Congress added to the Navy's FY1997 budget. Regarding FY1997 submarine RDT&E funding, the March 26, 1996 report by the Secretary of Defense identified various options for accelerating submarine technology development. The Baciocco panel recommended increased efforts in several submarine technology areas, including some not in the Secretary of Defense report.
Regarding post-FY1999 submarine acquisition, there does not appear to be a consensus between Congress and the Administration, or within Congress, on how many submarines to procure during the period FY2000-FY2002, on whether competition should be used to decide who should build these submarines, and on whether submarine production should shift to a new-generation design starting in FY2003.
Regarding DOD/Navy organization and management for submarine technology development and submarine acquisition, the Navy has established a Submarine Technology Oversight Council to coordinate submarine technology development within DOD. The Baciocco panel recommended establishing a single-point attack submarine product manager with clear authority and accountability.
The conference report (H.Rept. 104-863) on the FY1997 omnibus consolidated appropriation bill (H.R. 3610), which includes the defense appropriation bill, was approved by the House on September 28, 1996, by the Senate on September 30, and signed into law by the President on September 30 (P.L. 104-208). The report provides $649.1 million for SSN-23, $296.2 million for the FY1998 SSN, and $501.0 million for the FY1999 SSN. It also provides funding for submarine-related research and development.
The end of the Cold War and reductions in U.S. defense spending have resulted in a major restructuring of U.S. attack submarine programs. The issues for Congress in FY1997 were: (1) FY1997 funding for submarine procurement; (2) FY1997 funding for submarine research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); (3) the postFY1999 submarine acquisition strategy; and (4) DOD/Navy organization and management of submarine technology development and submarine acquisition.
The U.S. Navy operates nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSBNs' basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The SSNs perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including surveillance and intelligence collection; covert insertion and extraction of special operations forces and other personnel; strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile; anti-submarine warfare; and antisurface warfare, including mining operations.
During the Cold War, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against the Soviet submarine force was the primary stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although surveillance and intelligence collection and covert insertion/extraction operations were probably important on a dayto -day basis as well. In the post-Cold War era, although maintaining a capability for conducting anti-submarine warfare against the Russian submarine force remains an important mission, missions that contribute to U.S. military operations in littoral (nearshore ) areas against regional adversaries are receiving increased emphasis.
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs. The Bush Administration's proposed Base Force for FY1995 and beyond originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs, but the SSN goal was reduced in mid-1992 to about 55 boats. A 1992 Joint Staff requirement (updated in 1993) called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level quieting by the year 2012. The Clinton Administration, as part of its September 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy, wants to maintain a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs. The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, and peaked at 98 boats at the end of FY1987. It numbered 78 boats as of the end of June 1996, and is scheduled to decline to 55 boats by the end of FY1999.
While ASW against Russian submarines is only one mission for U.S. SSNs in the postCold War era, it continues to be an important factor in determining requirements for the U.S. SSN force, particularly with regard to determining how capable future U.S. SSNs need to be.
Although most elements of Russia's military capability have collapsed or eroded substantially since the Soviet breakup, the Russians have apparently identified submarines as one of two or three high-priority military programs on which to concentrate limited resources. Russia is producing submarines at a much lower rate than the Soviet Union did in the 1980s, but the production rate for submarines has not been reduced nearly as deeply as production rates for other major weapons. More significantly, compared to past Soviet trends, Russia apparently has not reduced the rate at which new and more advanced submarine designs are being introduced into service. As a result, the Russian submarine fleet is a much smaller but more proportionately modern force than the old Soviet submarine fleet.
Russia now has in operation about half a dozen Improved Akula nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). These SSNs are quieter than the best U.S. SSNs now in service. Quieting is a key factor in submarine capability, and this is the first time that Russia's best SSNs have had a quieting advantage over the best U.S. SSNs. (The U.S. will regain a narrow edge in SSN quieting when the first Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarine (see below) is commissioned in 1997.) Production of Improved Akulas continues. Production of a more advanced SSN, known variously as the Severodvinsk, Papa IX, or fourth-generation boat, is underway; it is expected to enter service around 2000. A fifth-generation submarine is reportedly more than two years into the design process.
There are at least four theories as to why Russia has chosen to maintain submarine production while production of most other major weapons has been cut more deeply: (1) because Russian SSNs are important to protecting its ballistic missile submarines, which as a result of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control agreements are becoming increasingly important in maintaining Russia's status as a world power; (2) because any Russian plan to reconstitute its general-purpose military forces 10 or 20 years from now might have to begin today with a program to rebuild the submarine force, submarines being the "long pole in the tent" of any such effort; (3) because submarine construction is viewed as necessary to maintain Russia's submarine industrial and technological base; and (4) because building submarines maintains social tranquility in the communities that build them, notably the city of Severodvinsk on the White Sea. These theories are not mutually exclusive.
In the years immediately following the Soviet breakup, Russia's submarine force stayed almost entirely in Russian home waters. Recent press reports apparently based on U.S. Navy information indicate that Russia's submarines are returning to more Cold Warlike deployment patterns by making deployments to more distant areas, including the waters off the U.S. East and West coasts. There are at least three theories as to why Russia is once again deploying its submarines to U.S. coastal waters: (1) to gain operational experience in using its newest submarines against various U.S. submarines; (2) to demonstrate to U.S. officials that Russia is a world power still capable of conducting such operations; and (3) to impress Russian officials responsible for making decisions about the Russian Navy's budget. These theories, too, are not mutually exclusive.
Two U.S. shipyards build nuclear-powered submarines:
There are currently four major U.S. submarine programs -- one SSBN program and three SSN programs. The following briefly discusses each.
Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine. Procurement of Trident ballistic missile submarines, more properly known as Ohio (SSBN-726) class submarines, ended in FY1991 with the funding of the 18th boat. As of the end of July 1996, 17 Trident submarines had entered service. The 18th ship will enter service in 1997.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Attack Submarine. A total of 62 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarines (commonly called "688s") were funded from FY1970 through FY1990. As of the end of June 1996, 61 had entered service, and 4 had been decommissioned. The final 688 will enter service by the end of 1996. 688s have a submerged displacement of 6,950 tons and can carry 26 torpedoes or cruise missiles. 688s funded from FY1978 onward (the final 31 boats) are equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) in their bows for 12 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles. 688s funded from FY1983 onward (the final 23 boats) include a number of other major improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles-class submarines, or 688Is. The Navy has stated that the 688I design has about twice as much overall capability across a range of SSN missions as the original 688 design.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Attack Submarine. The Seawolf (SSN-21) program began in 1982. The Seawolf was justified primarily in connection with the need to counter the Soviets' new generation of improved submarines and still better Soviet submarines that were expected to appear in the future. The Seawolf design has a submerged displacement of 9,150 tons and can carry 50 torpedoes and cruise missiles. It is considerably quieter than the 688I design, particularly at higher speeds, and has better sonars and combat system electronics. The Navy has stated that the Seawolf design has about three times as much overall capability as the 688I design.
The first Seawolf (SSN-21) was funded in FY1989 at a cost of about $1.9 billion and is now under construction at the Electric Boat Division (EB) of General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, CT. The boat is scheduled to enter service in 1997; the Navy now projects that its total cost will be about $2.4 billion. A second Seawolf (SSN-22) was funded in FY1991 at a cost of about $1.8 billion and is now under construction at EB. The boat is scheduled to enter service in 1998; the Navy now projects that its total cost will be about $2.3 billion. A third Seawolf (SSN-23) was funded in FY1992 at a cost of about $2.0 billion. A total of about $10.5 billion was appropriated for the Seawolf program through FY1992.
In January 1992, as part of its proposed FY1993 defense budget, the Bush Administration announced it was terminating Seawolf procurement and would seek to rescind funding for procurement of SSN-22 and SSN-23. Under the Bush Administration's plan, only the first Seawolf (SSN-21) would be completed. The rescission bill as enacted (P.L. 102-298; H.R. 4990) retained funding for SSN-22 and provided $540.2 million in funding to be used at the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy for either SSN-23 or some other project to preserve the submarine construction industrial base.
In September 1993, as part of its Bottom-Up Review of U.S. defense policy, the Clinton Administration decided to reinstate procurement of SSN-23 as the final Seawolf class submarine and apply the $540.2 million from the 1992 rescission bill toward the cost of the boat.
The total projected cost of SSN-23 is now about $2.4 billion. Subtracting out $382.4 million in funding that was obligated and expended on SSN-23 components prior to the 1992 Seawolf program rescission and the $540.2 million made available by the 1992 rescission bill, about $1.5 billion in new funding was needed to complete (for a second time) the funding of SSN-23.
The Administration requested $1,507 million in its proposed FY1996 defense budget to complete funding for SSN-23. Congress approved the request to reinstate procurement of SSN-23 in FY1996 as the final Seawolf class submarine but provided only $700 million in additional funding. The Administration's FY1997 defense budget submission reduced the $700 million appropriation to $674.5 million and requested $699.1 million in FY1997 for SSN-23. A final $105 million to complete funding for SSN-23 was to be requested in FY1998.
Section 133 of the FY1996 defense authorization act (P.L. 104-106, S. 1124) repeals a previous cap on the combined cost of SSN-21 and SSN-22 and replaces it with a $7.223 billion cap on the combined cost of SSN-21, SSN-22, and SSN-23. (See pages 27 and 624-625 of H.Rept. 104-450, the conference report on S. 1124.)
New Attack Submarine (NAS or NSSN). The Navy in 1988-1990 began work on a smaller and less expensive successor to the Seawolf design. This new submarine, which the Navy announced publicly in 1991, was at first called the Centurion, in honor of the upcoming centennial of the U.S. Navy submarine force. The name was later changed to the New Attack Submarine, abbreviated as either NAS or NSSN.
The Navy's goal for the NSSN program is to develop a multimission SSN that is (1) substantially less expensive than the Seawolf design, (2) capable enough to maintain U.S. undersea superiority against the future Russian submarine force, (3) more capable than the Seawolf or 688I designs for operations in littoral (near-shore) areas, and (4)better able than the Seawolf or 688I designs to incorporate major new submarine technologies when they become available.
As envisioned by the Navy, the NSSN would be as quiet as the Seawolf, would have a submerged displacement of about 7,700 tons, and would be armed with a total of 38 weapons (including 12 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles in a 12-cell VLS). Compared to the 688I and Seawolf designs, the NSSN design would have improved features for operations in littoral waters, including better shallow-water maneuverability, a sail with a reduced radar cross section, and a better capability for covertly delivering special operations forces. The NSSN design is also intended to be more flexible and adaptable than the 688I or Seawolf designs. The NSSN would feature a torpedo room that could be used as a reconfigurable internal space for carrying specialized mission packages.
The Navy wants to eventually procure 2 NSSNs per year, so that NSSNs would replace 688s that will begin to retire in large numbers after the turn of the century. The Navy originally wanted to procure the first NSSN in FY1998, the second NSSN in FY2000, and additional NSSNs at a rate of 2 boats per year starting in FY2002.
The Navy estimates that the first NSSN will cost $3.103 billion to procure. This figure, however, includes $1.156 billion in non-recurring detail design costs for the NSSN program. Excluding this one-time detail design cost, the actual, hands-on construction cost for the first NSSN is $1.947 billion. The Navy estimates that follow-on NSSNs (i.e., the fifth and following ships in the class) will cost about $1.55 billion each in FY1995 dollars to procure, assuming a procurement rate of about 2 boats per year. The Navy estimates that NSSN research and development costs would total about $3.5 billion, not including the $1.1 billion in detailed design costs included in the procurement cost of the first boat.
Through FY1995, Congress appropriated $910 million for NSSN research and development for the program. In FY1996, Congress appropriated an additional $455 million in research and development funding and $804.5 million in advanced procurement funding for the program. Of the advanced procurement funding, $704.5 million was for the first (FY1998) boat and $100 million was for the second (FY1999) boat. The Administration's FY1997 budget submission reduced these advanced procurement appropriations to $678.8 million and $96.4 million, respectively.
The Administration's proposed FY1997 budget requested $487.6 million in research and development funding for the program and $296.2 million in advanced procurement funding for the FY1998 submarine. Most of the FY1997 advanced procurement funding requested for the FY1998 submarine is for continued detailed design work on the baseline NSSN design. The Administration's FY1997 budget submission also identified a requirement for $504 million in FY1997 advanced procurement funding for the FY1999 submarine but did not request this funding.
In 1995, as part of its consideration of the FY1996 defense budget, Congress considered the issue of whether to proceed with the Navy's plan for procuring the NSSN design. The House National Security Committee decided that the NSSN design was not affordable enough to be procured in the numbers the Navy desired, and not capable enough to counter Russian fourth- and fifth-generation submarines that would be entering service at the same time. The Senate Armed Services Committee disagreed with the Administration's plan to allocate the first few NSSNs to the Electric Boat Corporation rather than award them on the basis of a competition between Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding. Each committee proposed legislation addressing its concerns. (See CRS Report 95-870, Navy Submarine Acquisition in the FY1996 Defense Budget: Committee Action, by Ronald O'Rourke.)
The two committees' concerns and legislative proposals were merged into Section 131 of conference version of the defense authorization bill (S. 1124, P.L. 104-106). In addition to authorizing FY1996 funding for submarine procurement, Section 131 outlined a plan that would significantly restructure the Administration's proposed submarine acquisition strategy into a strategy for procuring four submarines -- one each in FY1998, FY1999, FY2000, and FY2001 -- followed by procurement of the first of a class of next-generation submarines in FY2003.
Section 131 appears to avoid referring to the four submarines to be procured in FY1998-FY2001 as New Attack Submarines and refers four times to the submarine or submarine design "previously designated" or "previously designated by the Navy" as the New Attack Submarine. This may reflect an intent to use a different collective name to refer to the FY1998-FY2001 submarines. To date, however, no new collective name has emerged. In the absence of a such a new collective name, this issue brief refers to these submarines as the transitional SSNs. The Navy, DOD, and supporters of the NSSN program continue to use the term New Attack Submarine.
Under Section 131 (see pages 23-27 and 620-624 of H.Rept. 104-450, the conference report on S. 1124.) --
Submarine-related issues for Congress in FY1997 were: (1) FY1997 funding for submarine procurement; (2) FY1997 funding for submarine research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); (3) the post-FY1999 submarine acquisition strategy; and (4) DOD/Navy organization and management of submarine acquisition.
One issue relating to FY1997 funding for submarine procurement concerned SSN-23. As discussed earlier, the Administration proposed to complete funding for SSN-23 with $699.1 million in FY1997 and $105 million in FY1998. For FY1997, Congress could either approve the Administration's requested figure, reduce the FY1997 request to some lower figure (as Congress did last year with the Administration's FY1996 request for SSN-23), or increase the request to $804.1 million by accelerating into FY1997 the final $105 million now planned for FY1998. Accelerating the final $105 million into FY1997 is the final item on an 11-item "wish list" totalling about $3 billion that the Navy submitted to the defense oversight committees showing the Navy's preferences for spending additional funding that the defense oversight committees added to the Navy's budget as part of an effort to add several billion dollars to the Administration's overall FY1997 defense budget.
Another issue concerned FY1997 funding for the FY1999 submarine. As discussed earlier, the Administration's FY1997 budget submission identified a requirement for $504 million in FY1997 advanced procurement funding for the FY1999 submarine but did not include a request for this funding. This $504 million funding requirement was the top item on the Navy's 11-item wish list.
Factors that Congress could consider in deciding on FY1997 funding for submarine procurement included the potential effects of various funding levels on the construction schedules and eventual total costs of SSN-23 and the FY1999 submarine, as well as competing demands for defense funding in FY1997 and FY1998.
Congress in FY1997 also considered issues relating to funding for submarine research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). As discussed earlier, Section 131 of the FY1996 defense authorization act authorized $150 million for development by DARPA of several submarine-related technologies. For FY1997, the main issue was whether submarine-related RDT&E should be increased above the Administration's request and, if so, which RDT&E projects should be increased, and by how much.
The Secretary of Defense's March 26, 1996 report to Congress on submarine acquisition presented a variety of options for increasing the submarine-related portions of the Navy's RDT&E account. Most of these options would accelerate programs the Navy has planned for improving the capability of the baseline NSSN design; a few would result in reductions to the procurement cost of the design. The Navy estimated that pursuing all of the options listed would increase submarine-related RDT&E funding requirements by a total of about $2 billion over the 7-year period FY1997- FY2003. The report stated that "the Navy is evaluating core (submarine-related) technology investment options. The Navy's preliminary estimate is that an increase of $60 million per year in (RDT&E) might be required."
The "Baciocco" panel -- an independent submarine technology assessment panel established by the Navy to advise it on matters relating to submarine technologies and chaired by retired Vice Admiral Albert J. Baciocco, Jr. (pronounced ba-CHO-ko) -- found both strengths and weaknesses in the Navy's submarine technology program. The final (March 15, 1996) report of the panel recommended increasing the level of work in several submarine technology areas, including some not included in the Secretary of Defense's March 26, 1996 report.
An expanded, 52-item version of the Navy's FY1997 "wish list" totalling about $7.9 billion included $158 million for NSSN-related RDT&E work as the 13th item and $60 million for NSSN-related Baciocco-panel technologies as the 48th item.
Non-governmental witnesses who testified before the House National Security Committee in September 1995 and before the Senate Armed Services Committee and House National Security Committee in March 1996 on submarine acquisition issues argued that the Navy's submarine-related technology efforts are insufficient to stay ahead of the Russian submarine program and generally recommended a much more aggressive U.S. submarine technology development effort.
Factors that Congress could consider in deciding on FY1997 funding for submarine RDT&E included the cost and capability of the Navy's baseline NSSN design; the Navy's baseline program for improving the design over time; current and future foreign, especially Russian, submarine capabilities; potential development costs, technical risks, and cost and operational benefits associated with individual submarine-related RDT&E programs; and competing demands for defense funding in FY1997 and later years.
Congress and the Administration appear to agree that two shipyards should be kept involved in submarine production, at least for the time being; that two submarines should be procured in FY1998 and FY1999, with the FY1998 boat being built by EB and the FY1999 boat by NNS; that these boats should be based on the Navy's baseline NSSN design; that the baseline NSSN design, currently resident at EB, should be transferred to NNS; and that competition should eventually resume in the awarding of submarine production contracts.
Beyond this, however, there does not appear to be a consensus between Congress and the Administration, or (Section 131 of the FY1996 defense authorization act notwithstanding) even at this point within Congress, on the exact road map for submarine acquisition after FY1999. The defense oversight committees addressed this issue as part of their FY1997 markup.
The Navy stated that it will build the four submarines described in Section 131 if Congress funds their procurement in FY1998-FY2001, but questioned the affordability of procuring four boats in this time period. DOD estimated that compared to its FY1996 baseline plan of funding boats only in FY1998 and FY2000, the Section 131 plan to procure two additional boats in FY1999 and FY2001 would cost an additional $3.8 billion. The Administration also believes that not procuring a submarine in FY2002 would disadvantage EB in a subsequent competition against NNS. The March 26, 1996 report to Congress presents options for starting competition between EB and NNS after three boats or five, rather than four boats as outlined in Section 131. DOD and the Navy support continued evolution of the baseline NSSN design over time rather than switching to a new-generation design starting in FY2003 as outlined in Section 131. DOD and the Navy do not feel that increasing submarine-related RDT&E significantly above Navy's baseline plan is needed or affordable. The March 26, 1996 report states:
The baseline New Attack Submarine satisfies military requirements .... The (Defense) Department would face major near term affordability issues in pursuing the plan directed by Congress or the alternatives presented in this report. The Department believes that these alternatives place disproportionate near term funding emphasis on one weapon system (i.e., the attack submarine) at the expense of other weapons systems across the Future Years Defense Program. The Department believes the baseline ship and program fully satisfies military requirements.
The Baciocco-panel report found strengths and weaknesses in the Navy's NSSN program. The panel concluded that the NSSN, as presently designed, meets established requirements and that there are no revolutionary submarine technology advances on the near horizon which would justify delay in the program. The panel recommended that the Navy proceed with the NSSN but commit to continuous evolution of the design, including the formulation and maintenance of a technology insertion plan. The panel also noted that there are technologies which could be available in the far term that may warrant a redesign of future submarines.
Non-governmental witnesses who testified before the defense authorization committees in September 1995 and March 1996 recommended replacing the Navy's NSSN program with a program to build prototype submarines for testing new submarine technologies.
In the March 1996 hearings before the defense authorization committees, members inquired about both the military adequacy of the NSSN design and about when competitive awarding of submarine construction contracts should resume.
A final submarine-related issue that Congress could address in FY1997 was whether there should be changes in the Navy's organization and management of submarine technology development and submarine acquisition. This issue was a subject of legislative activity in 1995: Section 909 of the original conference version of the FY1996 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1530) contained a provision (Section 909) that would, effective October 1, 1998, repeal Section 1634 of the FY1985 defense authorization act, which gives permanent status to the Executive Order 12344 relating to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and require that any Executive Order to amend, modify, or appeal Executive Order 12344 may not be issued until 60 days after Congress is notified of the intent to issue such an Executive Order (H.Rept. 104-406, pages 231-232 and 838). Section 909 was deleted from the second conference version of the FY1996 defense authorization bill (S. 1124, H.Rept. 104-450), which was signed into law (P.L. 104-106).
As stated in the March 26, 1996 Secretary of Defense report to Congress, DOD has established a "Submarine Technology Oversight Council, co-chaired by (the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, (which) will ensure (that) efforts to advance submarine technology from initial concept to production are coordinated within the Department of Defense." The Council will also inform the special, 6-member congressional review panel created by Section 131 of the status of the submarine modernization program and submarine-related research and development.
In addition, the report stated: "To emphasize the ongoing process of advancing technology from development to operational status, the Navy has an integrated team of senior leaders from the science and technology, research and development, acquisition, and operational communities, including (DARPA). Under the joint direction of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Sea Systems Command, the role of the team is to establish and recommend priorities for technology investment and to leverage submarine research and development programs, emphasizing transition to operational status at an affordable cost." Ten submarine system-oriented working groups assist the senior leadership team.
The Baciocco panel noted that, "historically, major [submarine] technology development efforts have not had continuity and have been limited to low risk options for the immediate submarine acquisition program .... We also found that the submarine requirements, acquisition, and technology communities lack both effective coordination and a common vision which would be expected to be documented in a formal long-range plan. There is no single organization with technical authority and accountability across all aspects of submarine science and technology maturation and insertion."
On the basis of its conclusions regarding submarine technology development, the Baciocco panel recommended "that the Navy define a single attack submarine product manager dedicated to acquisition and life-cycle support, including the maturation and insertion of technology into existing, newly designed, and future submarines. This product manager should have clear authority and accountability of the attack submarine product throughout its lifetime, plus continuing coordination responsibility with Naval Reactors. The panel recommends that, in addition to its acquisition responsibilities, the organization be held accountable for the performance of the futureoriented activities, including the formulation and maintenance of a long-range submarine technology plan."
In his September 1995 testimony before the House National Security Committee, naval writer Norman Polmar suggested that the four-star status of the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program be reviewed. In his March 1996 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he repeated this suggestion and also recommended establishing a Submarine Technology Review Office, directly under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, to coordinate and direct all submarine technology, design, and development.
House and Senate Versions. The House position on future submarine acquisition is set forth primarily in Section 121 of the House version of H.R. 3230, and on pages 58-60 and 157-159 of the House National Security Committee's (HNSC's) report on the bill (H.Rept. 104-563 of May 7, 1996). The Senate position is set forth primarily in Section 123 of S. 1745, on pages 56-57 and 154-157 of the Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASC's) report on the bill (S.Rept. 104-267 of May 13, 1996), and in the floor debates during which the Senate passed three amendments intended primarily to clarify and reinforce the position in the Senate committee's report (see Congressional Record, daily edition, June 19, 1996, pages S6484-S6485, S6490, and S6491-S6492).
Regarding FY1997 funding for submarine procurement, both the House and Senate versions authorized the requested amount for the FY1998 SSN. The House version approved the requested amount for SSN-23, while the Senate version accelerated the final $105 million for SSN-23 from FY1998 to FY1997. The House version authorized $504 million in funding for the FY1999 SSN (the funding requirement identified but not requested in the Administration's budget submission), while the Senate version authorized $701 million so as to "satisfy all known long-lead requirements for this submarine...." In addition, the House version contained a provision (Section 122) that would divide the current collective cost cap on the three Seawolf submarines into two separate cost caps -- one for SSN-21 and SSN-22, the other for SSN-23.
Regarding FY1997 funding for submarine RDT&E, the House version recommended $108 million in additional funding for advanced submarine technologies as identified in the March 26, 1996 report of the Secretary of Defense and the March 15, 1996 final report of the Baciocco panel, while the Senate version recommended $100 million for these technologies. The House version also recommended an additional $90 million in submarine RDT&E funding -- $40 million for design modifications to the FY1998-FY2001 SSNs, and $50 million for initiating work on new next-generation SSN designs -- while the Senate version would not. The Senate version also contained a provision (Section 214) to repeal Section 132 of the FY1996 defense authorization act, which made $50 million in FY1996 funding for the National Defense Sealift Fund available only for DARPA RDT&E work on advanced submarine technologies.
Regarding post-FY1999 SSN procurement, the House version would procure four individually modified SSNs during the period FY1998-FY2001 and then compete some or all of these four modified designs against two entirely new designs for a nextgeneration submarine. The competition would be based on best value to the government, and the selected design would enter serial production not earlier than FY2003. The Senate version, as amended, would begin serial production of submarines not earlier than FY2000. No new next-generation SSN designs would be developed or considered, and the competition to build future submarines would be based on price rather than best value.
Regarding Navy and DOD organization and management of submarine acquisition, the Senate Committee encouraged the Navy and the Defense Department to take up the issue as a matter of priority, in part because it "senses a desire by other elements in Congress to take a more directive approach toward this organizational issue...."
Conference Report. The position of the conferees on the FY1997 defense authorization bill regarding submarine development and procurement is presented in Section 121 of the conference version of the bill (H.R. 3230) and in the conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 104-724). The report was approved by the House on August 1, 1996, and by the Senate on September 10, 1996. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 104-201) on September 23, 1996.
Regarding FY1997 funding for submarine procurement, the conference report adopted the House bill's FY1997 funding level for SSN-23 ($699.1 million) and the Senate bill's FY1997 funding level for the FY1999 SSN ($701.0 million). The report did not contain the House provision that would have divided the Seawolf program cost cap into two separate caps.
Regarding FY1997 funding for submarine RDT&E, the conference report authorized $98 million in additional funding for advanced submarine technologies as identified in the March 26, 1996 report of the Secretary of Defense and the March 15, 1996 final report of the Baciocco panel. The conference report did not contain the additional $90 million from the House version for design modifications to the FY1998- FY2001 SSNs and for initiating work on new next-generation SSN designs. It also repealed Section 132 of the FY1996 defense authorization act and transferred the $50 million funding provided under that section from DARPA to the Navy.
Regarding post-FY1999 submarine procurement, the conference report states that contracts for the construction of submarines procured after FY1999 or (if four submarines are procured in FY1998-FY2001 as provided for in Section 131 of the FY1996 defense authorization act) after FY2001 shall be awarded on the basis of price. The report also modifies the plan for future submarine procurement outlined in Section 131 of the FY1996 defense authorization act to provide "the option for selection of a design for a next submarine for serial production not earlier than" FY2002, rather than FY2003 as set forth in Section 131 of the FY1996 act.
The conference report also directs the Navy to implement acquisition reform initiatives for submarines similar in form and intent to the Air Force's "Lightning Bolt" initiatives begun in May 1995 (a modification of a provision in the House version), and limits the obligation and expenditure of a portion of FY1997 submarine procurement and RDT&E funding until DOD certifies and reports to Congress regarding compliance with congressional directions regarding submarine development and procurement.
House and Senate Versions. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, in their reports (H.Rept 104-617 of June 11, 1996 and S.Rept 104-286 of June 20, 1996, respectively) on the FY1997 defense appropriation bill (H.R. 3610/S. 1894) recommended funding levels that in some cases were the same as, and in other cases less than, those recommended by their corresponding authorization committees.
With regard to FY1997 funding for submarine procurement, the two appropriation committees recommended funding levels equal to those of their respective authorization committees, except for SSN-23, where the Senate committee recommended the lower House-recommended level.
With regard to FY1997 funding levels for submarine RDT&E, the House Appropriation Committee (HAC) recommended an increase of $98 million for advanced submarine technologies identified in the Secretary of Defense and Baciocco panel reports, rather than $108 million as recommended by the HNSC. The HAC, moreover, did not recommend the additional $90 million recommended by the HNSC for design modifications to the FY1998-FY2001 SSN and for initiating work on new, nextgeneration designs. The HAC also recommended an $11.7 million decrease in funding for basic RDT&E work on the NSSN program to reflect contract savings. Similarly, the Senate Appropriation Committee (SAC) recommended an increase of $20 million for advanced submarine technologies identified in the Secretary of Defense and Baciocco panel reports, rather than $100 million as recommended by the SASC.
Conference Report. The conference report (H.Rept. 104-863) on the FY1997 omnibus consolidated appropriation bill (H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208), which includes the defense appropriation bill, reduced funding for SSN-23 by $50 million, to $649.1 million, and resolved differences between the House and Senate committees regarding funding for the FY1999 SSN and submarine-related RDT&E. Table 1 below shows selected submarine-related funding items for FY1997.
Electric Boat Corporation. America's Next Submarine. Falls Church, VA(?), 1996. 9 p.
Statements to the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 27, 1996, by John W. Douglas, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments; Vice Admiral Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., USN (ret.), chairman, Submarine Technology Assessment Panel; A. R. Battista; Norman Polmar; and Lowell Wood.
Submarine Technology Assessment Panel. Final Report. Washington, 1996. (March 15, 1996, An independent evaluation prepared for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Contract Number N000-14-95-C-2091, For Official Use Only.) 43 p.
U.S. Department of Defense. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Report on Advanced Submarine Technology. Washington, 1996. (In Compliance with Section 121, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, October 1996.) 36 p.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 94-643. Navy New Attack Submarine Program: Is It Affordable? by Ronald O'Rourke.