Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress 91-137 F
-ti- China's Prospects After Tiananmen Square: Current Conditions,
Future Scenarios, and a Survey of Expert Opinion
January 15, 1991

Kerry Dumbaugh
Analyst in Asian Affairs

and

Shirley Kan
Foreign Affairs Analyst

and

Robert Sutter
Senior Specialist in International Politics
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

January 15,1991

CHINA'S PROSPECTS AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE: CURRENT CONDITIONS,
FUTURE SCENARIOS, AND A SURVEY OF EXPERT OPINION


SUMMARY

Since the violent military crackdown around Tiananmen Square, most
Western observers have struggled to understand and explain three
major questions concerning the Chinese situation: first, why a
forward-looking and reform-minded Chinese leadership chose such
violent force over a more accommodating approach toward the
peaceful public protests of June 1989; second, how to assess
current political and economic conditions in China in light of
Tiananmen Square; and third, what the events of the last two years
mean for China's future prospects.

In 1991, China specialists still differ about the reasons behind
the brutality of Tiananmen Square. Some stress the nature of
Chinese political culture, the concern of Chinese leaders with
erosion of party authority, and the fear of social instability
based on leaders' personal experiences during the Cultural
Revolution. Others place the crisis within a political power
struggle between leaders pushing for faster and more thorough
reform and a group of hardliners seeking to place limits on and
reversal of economic and political changes of the past decade. Many
emphasize that the crackdown could not have occurred without major
misperceptions among and between senior leaders and student
activists and their supporters.

In the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, assessments of economic and
political policies provide a decidedly mixed and often
contradictory picture of what is happening in China today.
Political power remains essentially personal rather than
institution-based, raising important questions about China's
political stability as current elderly leaders die and their
successors vie for power. China's economy remains caught in the
middle of reforms, with leaders agreeing that a return to the tight
state control of the 1950s will not work, but continuing to
disagree about what future economic choices to make. Although China
remains an important actor in Asia, global reaction to the
Tiananmen Square crackdown has eroded the country's influence in
world affairs, at least among western-aligned countries.

Given these continuing uncertainties, many believe that nearly any
scenario is possible for China's political future, from renewed
reform to political contention and even chaos. China's economic and
political future is likely to depend on a number of variables.
Political variables include the order of deaths of key elder
leaders; whether their remaining constituencies and supporters
realign to solidify their power or segment into contending groups;
and the extent or absence of future public dissent. Economic
variables include the leadership's ability to initiate and pursue
effective and successful economic policies; how successfully
leaders deal with economic issues such as corruption, unemployment,
and inflation; and the extent to which new economic policies bring
real economic benefit to Chinese enterprises and citizens,
particularly in urban areas.

This report was originally prepared at the request of Congressman
Stephen Solarz. It is released with permission.


CHINA'S PROSPECT'S AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE: CURRENT CONDITIONS,
FUTURE SCENARIOS, AND A SURVEY OF EXPERT OPINION

INTRODUCTION

China's June 1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square in many respects
marked the end of the Deng Xiaoping reform era and ushered in a
period of great uncertainty. Since 1978, Deng and a coalition of
reform colleagues had implemented an extraordinary series of
pragmatic economic and political reforms designed to cast off the
shackles of ideological Maoism and to provide a rational,
efficient, and institution-based foundation for Chinese
policy-making. The reforms de-emphasized socialist central planning
and injected market mechanisms and profit incentives into the
economy. In the less restrictive reform environment, Chinese
leaders also appeared more tolerant of public criticism and more
receptive to increasing demands for greater political
liberalization. Western observers viewed the changes as favorable
not only to China but also to U.S. interests. As the decade
progressed, most observers became increasingly confident that the
pragmatic reform program was solidly entrenched and would continue
after Deng's death.

The Tiananmen demonstrations and the resulting crackdown brought an
abrupt end to these optimistic projections. Tiananmen exacerbated
what are known to have been long-standing conflicts between
conservative and moderate elements in China's leadership coalition.
The coalition itself, one of Deng's most important achievements
over the decade, now appears to have broken apart. It has been
replaced by continuing disagreement and political infighting that
reaches to the very top of the leadership hierarchy. Old guard
leaders from the Maoist era, most of whom had already retired from
their official positions, suddenly re-emerged after Tiananmen as
principle holders of power. Moreover, these elderly leaders appear
far less tolerant of public dissent and more cautious about new
ideas than during the leadership coalition. In the face of
leadership dissent, progress on most elements of the reform agenda
has halted.

China's economic and political troubles, and apparent pressure by
more conservative leaders for reversal of key economic and
political changes of the past decade, raise important
considerations for a US. China policy constructed in the
environment of continuing pragmatic reform in China. Elder leaders'
return to prominence and power despite their lack of official
positions reduces the credibility of institutionalized leadership
posts in China, raising the question of what kind of "power vacuum"
may be left once elder leaders die and what political views those
filling that vacuum may hold. The extent of public support for
political liberalization, illustrated so clearly by the size of the
Tiananmen Square demonstrations, raises questions about how
politically and economically effective any future leadership which
ignores these sentiments can be.

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The purpose of this report is to survey ant analyze expert opinion
on three questions which have dominated debate on China since
Tiananmen Square: first, why a forward-looking and reform-minded
Chinese leadership chose such violent force over a more
accommodating approach toward the peaceful public protests of June
1989; second, how to assess current political and economic
conditions in China in light of Tiananmen Square; ant third, what
the events of the last two years mean for China's future prospects.
This report examines key leadership decisions during the Tiananmen
Square crackdown, analyzes conditions in China in the aftermath of
Tiananmen, and presents a range of possible scenarios for China's
future. An appendix, surveying the views of seventeen American
experts on China's prospects, provides additional information on
these scenarios.

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TIANANMEN CRACKDOWN, JUNE 4, 1989: REVIEW OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND
THE DECISIONS1

WHY SUPPRESS AND WHY USE MAJOR MILITARY FORCE?

Why the central Chinese leadership violently crushed the 1989 pro-
democracy movement is the most problematic question concerning the
many causes which led to the loss of hundreds of lives in Beijing
last June.2 Certainly, many western observers believe that the
precipitating events (the non-violent mass demonstrations and the
leadership power struggle) did not warrant huge campaign-style
military deployments that led to the killing in large numbers of
unarmed students and workers.3 The movement was apparently
spontaneous in key respects, had wide popular support, and
reflected patriotic motivations and frustrations with state control
and corruption. The initial moderate demands called for reforms
based on constitutional rights, not revolution. Even if the
accommodating approach of party chief Zhao Ziyang had failed to
remove the people from the square, it was not inevitable that other
Chinese leaders should order several units of armored vehicles and
infantry to take over the capital just when the movement was losing
steam. Moreover, with Zhao reportedly under house arrest, an
important factor in the political battle was gone.

SOURCES OF EXPLANATION

Western observers have tried to go beyond the Chinese explanation
that a "counter-revolutionary rebellion" threatened to bring chaos
to China and overthrow the government. China specialists offer
different interpretations, including the nature of China's
political culture4, the leaders, concern with the erosion of party
authority and fear of social instability based on personal 

-

1 Prepared by Shirley Kan, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.

2 The number of people killed has not been determined, and
estimates have ranged from several hundred to several thousand.
According to the Amnesty International Report 1990 (p. 65), the
Chinese military killed at least 1,000 people and injured thousands
more in Beijing in early June 1989.

3 The leadership deployed at least ten group armies (the powerful
main force units of the PLA) from four military regions to Beijing,
according to Joffe, Ellis, "The PLA and the Massacre in Tiananmen
Square," in Richard Yang (ed.), SCPS Papers No. 1 (Taiwan), October
1989. Also see, Delfs, Robert, Tiananmen Massacre, Far Eastern
Economic Review, June 15, 1989, who also gave the estimate of
troops deployed toward Beijing at 100,000-200,000.

4 Pye, Lucian W. China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society. Foreign
Affairs, Fall 1990.

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experiences during the Cultural Revolution5,--and an obsession with
the prospect of a Poland-type situation in China.6

Other analysts place the crisis within a political power struggle
at the apes. One observer coined the phrase, "pre-mortem struggle,"
where a need to discredit the factional opposition and deal with
widespread popular resistance required the ruling faction's harsh
crackdown.7 An anonymous writer describes the developments as an
uncontrollable "political meltdown" with surprising events and
unexpected brutal suppression.8

Ellis Joffe gives a useful analysis of the People's Liberation
Army's (PLA) intervention in the crisis, pointing out the
complexity and large scale of the operation, which involved
multiple group armies from several military regions. He also
characterized the use of massive military force as the result of "a
process of escalation" fueled by misperceptions of both the
students and the rulers.9

A TALE OF TWO STRUGGLES

Nicholas Kristof furnishes the most detailed and comprehensive
reconstruction of the decisional dynamics before and during the
June 4th crackdown.10 There were not one but two ongoing struggles:
the first between "people power" and dictatorship; and the second
between then party chief Zhao Ziyang and the hardliners led by
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. This analysis indicates that the
tragedy on June 4, 1989 resulted from two misperceptions. The
hardliners exaggerated the linkage between the two struggles: the
students were Zhao's pawns and were helping him win power. The
students failed to recognize that there was a connection between
the conflicts: their refusal to leave Tiananmen Square doomed both
the conciliatory policy debated among the leaders and its
supporter, Zhao Ziyang. While the outside world is not fully
knowledgeable on secret Chinese decision-making, Kristof's account,
based on conversations with dozens of people, including many

-

6 MacFarquhar, Roderick. The End of the Chinese Revolution. The New
York Review, July 20,1989.

7 Nathan, Andrew J. China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and
Prospects for Democracy. New York Columbia University Press, 1990.
p. 186.

7 Dittmer, Lowell. China in 1989: The Crisis of Incomplete Reform.
Asian Survey, January 1990.

8 Commentator X, ~The PLA and Tiananmen: The Dilemma of National
and Internal Security," in Richard Yang (ed.), SCPS Papers No. 1,
October 1989.

9 Joffe, p. 14-16.

10 Kristof, Nicholas D. How the Hardliners Won. New York Times
Magazine, November 12,1989.

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party officials, and public and secret Chinese documents, seems
quite credible. The summary of key decisions below is based on his
article.

KEY DECISIONS

1989

April 24  Prime Minister Li Peng presides over a meeting of the
          Politburo Standing Committee (minus Zhao Ziyang, who is
          in North Korea) that decides to respond firmly to the
          demonstrations.

April 25  Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun report to Deng
          Xiaoping. The senior leader is outraged by the protests
          and alarmed by possible massive unrest. He tells his
          visitors that tolerance of unrest in Poland led to
          economic collapse there. Deng reportedly says PLA troops
          must be used to crush further protests.

April 26  On the eve of planned student demonstrations, senior
          party officials plead for restraint in implementing
          Deng's order to use military force. Qiao Shi, head of
          security matters and one of the five Politburo Standing
          Committee members, decides the troops would follow a
          policy of non-violence.11

May 17    During the Gorbachev summit visit, Deng Xiaoping is
          furious at the embarrassment caused by continuing student
          demonstrations. He calls a Politburo Standing Committee
          meeting at his home, where there is a confrontation
          between Deng and Zhao, who pleads for conciliation. Li
          Peng and Yao Yilin strongly oppose Zhao. Qiao Shi and Hu
          Qili are sympathetic to Zhao, but not willing to oppose
          Deng at a showdown. Deng and his elder colleagues decide
          to bring troops to the capital and declare martial law,
          in hopes of re-establishing order. They also intend the
          PLA to guard key government installations and ministries
          from a possible attack, precluding a coup by Zhao [who is
          still Central Military Commission (CMC) first
          vice-chairman.]12

May 19    After Zhao - followed by Li Peng - visits hunger strikers
          in the square, Li convenes the Politburo Standing
          Committee to endorse the declaration of martial law.
          Later, in an impromptu announcement at a televised mass
          meeting, Yang Shangkun,

-

11 Also see, Leung, Julia. Party Blocked Call from Deng for
Crackdown. Asian Wall Street Journal, May 12-13,1989. p. 1.

12 By now, the movement had spread far beyond Beijing, with student
protests taking place in major cities and small college towns
across China.

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          (president and CMC executive vice-chairman), orders
          troops to Beijing. Zhao does not attend the meeting.13

June 3    Though the movement has been winding down and only
          several thousand students are left in Tiananmen Square,
          hardliners deploy thousands of unarmed PLA soldiers to
          Beijing in the early morning. They intend the new troops
          to bolster the show of force and gradually take control.
          Some soldiers are attacked by angry, defiant crowds.14

June 4    The hardliners become alarmed by the massive, popular
          resistance and resolve to act decisively. Deng orders the
          PLA to take control of the capital, using whatever force
          is necessary. As a result, troops fire into unarmed
          crowds and armored vehicles race through the streets.

POSSIBLE MOTIVATING FACTORS

Based on the various accounts, it appears that three factors
motivated the decisions behind the use of military force to
suppress the pro-democracy movement.

1. The hardliners and elder leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping,
feared the possibility of a Poland-type situation developing in
China, with greater urban unrest and economic collapse. Thus, they
were uncompromising toward the autonomous student and worker unions
set up during the protests--seen as the beginnings of a potential
Chinese "Solidarity." Any political organization independent from
the party was unacceptable. The movement was particularly alarming
because of the unprecedented scale of defection from the party line
within both the government and military, and because it involved
nationwide participation.

2. Deng Xiaoping, his octogenarian colleagues, and the hardliners
in the Politburo found defiance of party authority alarming and
intolerable. They saw a crushing recapture of Tiananmen Square as
necessary for re-establishing party authority and their ruling
power, not only in Beijing, but across China as well.

-

13. When troops arrived at the edge of Beijing, many citizens took
to the streets to non-violently block their advance. Hundreds of
thousands of people proceeded to demonstrate in the city. This
scale of popular resistance may have led the hardline leaders to
employ massive numbers of PLA soldiers later.

14. The deployment of unarmed troops to the capitol may have been
a ploy to create a pretext for the June 4th crackdown and to stir
up the PLA. In other words, the hardliners may have anticipated the
confrontation.

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3. The hardliners were engaged in a power struggle with Zhao
Ziyang. The Democracy Movement which gave the Zhao forces
credibility within the party had to be eliminated for Deng to
achieve his objectives. Deng and his colleagues also needed the PLA
to prevent feared coup attempts by Zhao and/or his supporters.

Three points can be made about the decision-making that committed
the use of the PLA to force compliance with the party line.

1. The hardliners intended a show of force when they called in
troops to the capital and declared martial law. Bringing in
elements of a group army stationed nearby was a useful tactic in at
least one provincial capital.15 In Beijing, however, the deployment
of soldiers backfired on the leadership when crowds of citizens
challenged the military takeover of their city. The hardliners then
employed harsher measures to achieve their objectives. 

2. Deng Xiaoping appears to have been the top decision-maker in
calling for massive use of PLA soldiers to suppress the movement.
He was supported by a group of elder colleagues and the hardliners
in the Politburo.

3. However, Deng apparently did not issue explicit orders to use
whatever force was necessary to retake Tiananmen Square until June
4. Qiao Shi was able to adopt a non-violent strategy on April 27.
On June 3, PLA soldiers entered the capital unarmed, and some were
attacked by residents. After the encounter, Deng and the hardliners
apparently decided that massive lethal force was required.

CURRENT CONDITIONS IN CHINA: TOWARD A BALANCED ASSESSMENT16

Authoritative reporting and assessments of Chinese domestic and
foreign policies provide a decidedly mixed and sometimes
contradictory picture as to what is happening in China and what it
means for interested foreign partners, including the United States.
In comparing these conflicting images, it appears prudent to avoid
extremes. Thus, China under Deng Xiaoping does not appear to be on
the brink of social, political or economic disaster. By the same
token, the events of the past year cannot be dismissed as a needed
adjustment in political or economic policy designed to assure
stability in the 1990s.

-

15 The PLA dispatched elements of the 64th Army to Shenyang as a
show of force to drive home the fact that martial law had been
declared in the capital. Shenyang citizens did not harass the
troops.

16 Prepared by Robert Sutter, Senior Specialist in International
Politics. Sources for this section include CLA, "The Chinese
Economy in 1989 and 1990," EA 90-10023, July 1990; testimony before
the Joint Economic Committee, June 28, 1990; Far Eastern Economic
Review, August 23, 1990, pp. 29-48; and interviews in the U.S. and
China, October 1990.

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NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989, Western
press and other reporting has been downbeat and generally negative
in reporting on conditions in China. The Chinese authorities have
been repeatedly portrayed as discredited internally, isolated
internationally and following misguided economic and social
policies that are likely to result in strikes, turmoil and economic
collapse. Even normally cautious U.S. officials such as Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger raised in congressional
testimony in February 1990 the specter of Chinese officials
reverting to the autarchic Stalinist model of economic development
and a possible return to the highly disruptive Chinese foreign
policies of the Maoist period.

Among U.S. government and media circles, it was widely anticipated
that the spring of 1990 would see many demonstrations and
disruptions as disgruntled Chinese marked the first anniversary of
the "Beijing Spring" and the Tiananmen crackdown. The Chinese
leadership is viewed as sharply divided and unable to pursue
effective policies regarding economic development and foreign
affairs. Factional infighting is seen to go to the very top of the
leadership where Deng Xiaoping appears to remain at odds with more
conservative-minded leaders like Chen Yun and Yang Shangkun who
reportedly have been pressing for limits on and reversal of
economic and political changes of the past decade. The result, at
best, has been gridlock in Chinese decision-making.

International trends are also seen to be working against China's
interests. Western-aligned countries have remained alienated as a
result of China's hardline political crackdown and muddled economic
policies. Tourism and foreign investment are still down markedly.
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, reform in the Soviet
Union and emerging collaboration in US.-Soviet relations have
worked against Chinese interests. These trends have meant that
Western aligned countries and the financial institutions backed by
them have been much less inclined to provide support for China's
modernization and more likely to focus special attention on the
newly reforming societies in the former Soviet bloc. Sino-U.S.
relations declined to a new low, particularly following the
congressional and popular outrage that greeted President Bush's
initiatives in sending National Security Adviser Scowcroft on two
secret missions to China after the Tiananmen crackdown.

Typical of the downbeat view of conditions in China was the CIA's
annual assessment of the Chinese economy released in late June
1990. It pointed to Beijing's overly restrictive austerity policies
causing China's worst economic slump in a decade, a record
government spending deficit, the highest level of unemployment in
a decade, falling urban living standards and an extremely volatile
social situation. It saw the leadership's focus on using
administrative means to treat economic ills as almost certain to
preclude a return to market oriented reform.

A draft State Department assessment of China's prospects in the
1990s also painted a bleak picture. It depicted a clash in
expectations as the ossified

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leadership of the old guard communists attempted to deal with the
increasing demands of political, economic and social forces in
China that have grown in the past decade of reform and will not be
satisfied with the dictums and policies of the past.17

OFF-SETTING TRENDS

All the negative points stressed by these and other reports noted
above are accurate - as far as they go. But what they often fail to
do is to attempt to balance their emphasis on the negative with an
assessment of what, from some perspectives, could be seen as
positive features or features favoring stability and material
progress in China's current situation or recent developments. As
seen below, many specialists and others dismiss or give little
weight to these more "positive" features in assessing the broad
trends in China. And they do not get much of a hearing in the
Western press. But the more positive features they discuss are
important to any calculus as to where China is likely to go in the
period ahead.

As 1990 progressed, it was increasingly evident that the open
factional fighting, social turmoil or economic collapse predicted
by some was not coming to pass. Beijing managed to avoid further
excesses in economic or political retrenchment and maintained an
approach to foreign affairs that avoided egregious behavior. By
mid-year it was clear that the central authorities were capable of
taking action in economic and other areas that served the pragmatic
interests of the Chinese state. They had eased up on administrative
control of the economy and on the previous tight money policy.
Attempts by some conservative elements to stifle the dynamic
township and village enterprises -- that had grown markedly under
the reform policies of the past decade -- appeared to end. Some
senior reform-minded leaders, notably Li Ruihuan, were outspoken in
urging that limits be placed on ideologically based propaganda and
other efforts that could impede more pragmatic economic growth.
Industrial growth was reviving after the marked slowdown of the
previous year, the agricultural sector was expected to turn in the
best harvest ever for the year, and overall growth could reach the
projected target of six percent for the year. Inflation was down to
3.6 percent in the first half of 1990, from the high level of 25
percent in the first half of 1989. China's government funding
deficit rose to 37 billion yuan, or 2.4 percent of GNP-a manageable
level. The government's administrative measures led to a sharp
cutback in imports and a marked increase in China's foreign
exchange reserves - reserves Beijing will need as it begins to pay
back borrowings made during the 1980s.

Foreign investment and tourism remain lower than they would have
been had the turmoil of 1989 been avoided, but investors from Hong
Kong once again are seeking opportunity in China while a rapid rise
in investment from Taiwan helped to offset the slowdown in
investment from Western-aligned countries.

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17 Paper presented at CRS workshop on the future of the Chinese
economy, Washington, April 27, 1990.

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The World Bank and Japan are slowly but surely resuming their aid
programs in China. And the EC has formally ended sanctions against
China. The United States continued MFN treatment for Chinese
imports and US. leaders met repeatedly with senior Chinese leaders
over foreign policy issues. The Asian games took place in Beijing
in fall 1990 without incident. Official Sino-U.S. exchanges of
scholars and students were more restricted and difficult, but
private Chinese exchanges with the United States and other
countries remained very active.

The central authorities showed pragmatism in several other areas:
they compromised with provincial authorities over economic planning
and local autonomy; dealt effectively with the United States over
the release of Fang Lizhi, and the MFN debate; handled numerous
commercial issues with US. and other businesses; and negotiated
economic deals with such disparate foreign characters as the
Reverend Moon (Panda cars) and Taiwan's leading plastics magnate.
Over the past year, Beijing also managed to consolidate relations
with Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, ant Saudi Arabia,
moved to improve ties with Vietnam' and sustained relations with
North Korea and the Cambodian resistance.

A CURRENT BALANCE SHEET

China today faces many potentially intractable problems. At the top
of the list is the tenuous political situation. Political power in
China remains essentially personal, not institution-based. Since
real power rests in the hands of a small group of very old men,
instability is very likely as these men pass on and their
successors vie for power. The events of 1989 showed that the party
and government structure was not strong enough to deal effectively
with the mass demonstrations. There remain important questions
about the responsiveness of the PLA to a renewed call to crack down
on mass popular discontent, should it arise.

The economy remains caught in the middle of reforms. The leaders in
China seem to have reached no consensus on how far to push reform
in the future. What appears to have been decided over the past
year, however, is that a return to the tight state control of the
1950s will not work in fostering the regime's overall goal of
increasing national wealth and power. Thus, observers can
anticipate a continued muddled picture in economic policy. However,
Chinese decision-makers are making choices on savings, investment
and modernization that appear likely to foster further economic
growth. China's location smack in the middle of the dynamic East
Asian rim provides an added reason to expect strong economic growth
through the 1990s.

In foreign affairs, the world revulsion with the Tiananmen
"massacre" and the collapse of communism in Europe have worked to
erode China's influence in world affairs, at least among
western-aligned countries. But China remains an important actor in
Asia and has recently increased its influence and status by
establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Singapore, and
Saudi

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Arabia, and by lending its support to international efforts to
bring an end to the Persian Gulf Crisis.

Beijing has worked hard to reassure foreign traders and investors
of its continuing strong interest in close economic relations with
other countries. Indeed, from one perspective, Beijing has had
little choice but to sustain close economic relations abroad. The
post-Mao reforms had seen China's economy become increasingly
dependent on foreign trade and exchanges. Thus, total exports
(including services) now account for 22.2 percent of China's GNP,
up from only 6 percent in 1980. The level of China's trade relative
to its total economy has far surpassed that of other large
economies such as Brazil, India or the Soviet Union.

It has been common in the West in the past year to focus on the
foreign pressures and sanctions brought to bear on China, and on
China's loss of international influences as a result of the
U.S.-Soviet detente. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the
changes in world events in 1989-1990 have had positive as well as
negative effects on China's interests. Thus, the decline in Soviet
power markedly reduced the strategic threat faced by China from the
Soviet Union; it increased China's foreign policy leverage in such
strategic areas as North Korea, Indochina and Southeast Asia.
Finally, some countries in East Asia, notably Taiwan, ignored
sanctions against Beijing and rapidly increased trade and
investment.

SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE18

The current conditions of gridlock in Chinese decision-making
described above, in which there is no clear consensus among leaders
on many issues and little definable policy vision, may well
continue until the death of key octogenarian leaders or even
beyond. Thus, continuation of the status quo serves as one scenario
for China's future. The other scenarios discussed below presume a
change in current conditions, in particular assuming the deaths of
key elder leaders. They represent an array of possibilities. (See
appendix for a range of opinion voiced by U.S. China experts.) Of
course, the actual scenarios that are possible for China's future
are neither discrete nor mutually exclusive. This report deals with
these conceptual difficulties by presenting a range of variables
that could affect political developments in China. The scenarios
are not necessarily presented in order of likelihood.

RENEWED PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM

One set of scenarios assumes the reemergence of a reform-minded
coalition among China's leadership that is able to coalesce on
policy decisions and begin movement once again toward a program of
reform and modernization, similar to the initial reform movement of
the late 1970s. Such a coalition could be

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18 Prepared by Kerry Dumbaugh, Analyst in Asian Affairs.

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formed in several ways: in an effort to break out of policy
difficulties, current leaders could reach a series of compromises
on policy and personnel decisions; or, a new, reform-minded
paramount leader could emerge with sufficient influence and stature
to forge a coalition among leader with divergent views. In either
case, the need to assure continued economic progress would once
again take precedence in policy-making. Adherence to pragmatic
principles in decisionmaking would likely be increased, and the
role for ideological decision and propaganda would be deemphasized.

Moderate or Limited Reform

This version of the reform scenario presumes a more cautious,
risk-averse reform coalition - meaning, a coalition probably
comprised of a wide range of reform-minded leaders, including some
favoring more radical experimentation with market-economy
mechanisms; those favoring a balance among economic, political, and
social concerns; and those favoring a stronger role for central
planning. Such a situation would require continuing compromises
that would accommodate differing leadership views. Progress toward
reform would likely be gradual - perhaps even glacial - and would
probably be on a trial-and-error basis, similar to the initial
progress of the reform program. Economic policy decisions may
include a mix of market mechanisms with central planning, and would
likely reflect leadership concerns that rapid relaxation of central
planning could cause widespread economic instability. The regime
may view a balanced state budget and an expanded role for the
marketplace, as long as they complement central planning without
overshadowing it. Regional authorities would probably retain their
recently acquired autonomy over many economic decision-making
matters.

A coalition of this sort would mean the ascendancy of younger, more
reform-minded leaders, such as Tian Jiyun and Li Ruihuan, who had
remained in positions of power through ant beyond the Tiananmen
Square crackdown; yet, it could still accommodate the presence of
leaders with more traditional views such as Chen Yun, Peng Zhen,
ant Hu Qiaomu.19

More Radical Reform

Another version of the reform scenario assumes a balance of power
tipped even more sharply toward a reform agenda - toward what might
be called "radical" reform. This scenario would presume a coalition
dominated by reformers less committed to economic precedents from
the experience of the

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19 The majority of those interviewed considered renewal of moderate
reform to be a likely scenario for China's future over the mid to
long-term, but not in the near future. Several did think that
moderate reforms could be renewed in the near future, but at least
one stated that the government pursuing such reforms could be
authoritarian in nature. Some thought a coalition of any sort
unlikely, particularly in the absence of a powerful paramount
figure (like Deng) who could fashion harmony out of the divergent
leadership agendas that now exist.

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People's Republic of China and in favor of subordinating central
planning to the role of the marketplace in determining economic
policies.

Such a coalition would likely pursue more daring economic
experimentation, and would be willing to tolerate a certain amount
of social instability as a reasonable price for experimentation
that led to economic progress. Not only would a radical reform
coalition be more receptive to political reform issues, but some in
this leadership could even make such issues a priority. Reform at
every level would proceed at a more rapid pace. In the past,
reformers such as Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, and Wang
Zhaoguo could have been expected to be ascendant in such a
coalition, and younger leaders with more daring ideas, including
many supporters of Zhao Ziyang, likely would rise rapidly in
positions of responsibility. Regional authorities would probably
not only retain the autonomy they had been granted since 1978, but
would likely acquire new autonomy and power over economic
decisionmaking as economic experimentation continued.20

Reform Based on More Traditional Socialist Principles

A third reform scenario presumes a new leadership that is dominated
by more conservative and perhaps even authoritarian leaders who
nevertheless assign a priority to China's economic progress and
well-being. Although more moderate reform-minded leaders could be
included, to call this a "reform" regime is perhaps a misnomer;
leaders would be less inclined or even disinclined to experiment
with market mechanisms and other western economic principles.
Instead, they would place greater emphasis on more traditional
tenets of socialism and communism, and would give central planning
and state control dominant roles in economic policy. This regime
would place a greater emphasis on making incremental improvements
in the existing system and in bringing greater efficiency to the
whole. Leaders may also dismantle those reforms of the late 1970s
and 1980s regarded as more destabilizing.

In such a regime, there would be little likelihood of political
liberalization. Central leaders probably would attempt to wrest
back from regional authorities much of the autonomy they had gained
since the Third Plenum, thus creating greater tensions between
Beijing and the provinces.21

-

20 Generally, experts thought it less likely that a future Chinese
government would embark on radical reforms, particularly as many of
the key personalities it would seem to require are deceased or out
of power. In addition, some thought the pursuit of radical reform
would require a reversal of verdicts on the Tiananmen Square
crackdown - an enormously difficult thing to achieve. The several
who thought radical reform possible tended to be somewhat
circumspect, citing that it "might possibly" occur, or that it
might occur after 7-10 years.

21 Few experts thought it likely that China would return to more
traditional communist principles.

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Variables

The resumption of progress on agendas along the lines described
above depends on a number of variables, some of which include:

-- The order of deaths of key elderly leaders. Generally, it is
thought that the cause of reform in China would be advanced by the
deaths of hardline and conservative elder leaders prior to Deng
Xiaoping's. These are leaders who are thought to oppose key aspects
of Deng's pragmatic reform agenda and who have capitalized on the
fear of instability and challenge to party rule to push for more
restrictive and traditional economic policies.

-- The ability to deal with complications of reform. Regardless of
their level of commitment to reform and to economic progress,
Chinese leaders in the past have been unable to deal successfully
with the increasing political, economic, and social pressures that
are the consequences of reform. Although these pressures have been
squelched temporarily by the Tiananmen Square crackdown, they would
likely be renewed by resumption of progress on a reform agenda, and
possibly even enhanced should reform proceed more rapidly or should
a more conservative regime gain power. The success of a future
reform coalition would depend on how well leaders tolerated or
dealt with these renewed pressures.

-- The success of specific economic policies. New economic policies
in the late 1970s were successful early on, but ran into problems
- such as inflation, unemployment, an unwieldy price system,
corruption, and an uneven distribution of wealth - as the reform
agenda progressed. The influence and staying power of any new
regime that emphasized economic progress could depend on how
successful it was in dealing with these difficult problems, and on
how much economic success its policies achieved.

Authoritarian/Coercive Government

This scenario assumes the emergence of a more coercive
authoritarian regime whose primary concerns are maintaining
domestic stability, enforcing the unchallenged authority of the
communist party, and reasserting central control over basic
economic, political, and social matters. As was once the case with
Taiwan, such a regime could give high priority to achieving
economic progress, even to the extent of initiating new and
forward-looking programs. But, authoritarian leaders would not
hesitate to employ coercion or repressive measures to achieve these
and other objectives. Maintaining power and stability would
overshadow other policy issues such as rationalization of
bureaucratic institutions. Although such a regime would be based
more on power than ideology, leaders could seek to expand the role
of ideologically motivated propaganda as a coercive tool.

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A coercive authoritarian regime could emerge out of the current
policy difficulties if hardliners or leaders with authority over
coercive apparatuses come to dominate policy-making. More
reform-minded leaders may be purged from their positions; or, they
may continue in party and government positions, but with
insufficient influence to temper central government policies.
Tensions between central government authorities and regional
authorities could increase significantly should Beijing seek to
regain control over all aspects of policy decisions. On the other
hand, provincial authorities could feign compliance with Beijing's
dictates while pursuing their own agendas where possible.22

Variables

The above scenario could depend on the following variables:

-- The extent to which existing or new leaders can agree on the
need to maintain power and stability, regardless of the economic or
other policy issues which they may individually espouse.

-- The degree of success that an authoritarian approach may have in
bringing about real economic benefit to Chinese enterprises and
citizens.

-- The extent to which social stability is maintained without
resort to coercive measures.

Movement Away From Reform

Another set of scenarios presumes that China's leaders are unable
to form a coalition, reach compromises on an economic agenda, or
agree on an effective method for maintaining power and stability.
Instead, leaders would be preoccupied with an ongoing struggle for
political dominance or survival.

Contention

One scenario presumes that current leadership groups not only would
be unable to resolve their policy differences, but also would be
unable either to compromise effectively on policy issues or to
muster enough support for any policy line to gain decisive power.
The result would be a period of contention among leadership groups
fairly equal in power, with none having sufficient stature
consistently to dominate policy decisions. This would seem
particularly likely in the e~rent of Deng Xiaoping's death and the
absence of a new paramount leader or leadership group. In this
scenario, there would be

-

22 A number of specialists thought some degree of authoritarianism
or coercion could be an important feature of China's policy-making
over the near and medium term. Some said that even the most
enlightened and economics-minded of Chinese reformers would resort
to authoritarian methods if stability were threatened, and cited
the Taiwan model as an example.

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continued struggle among leaders for political influence, and
possibly continual realignment among leadership groups in an effort
to gain political ascendancy.

Contention would mean that the government would be unable to reach
decisions on important issues and perhaps even on minor matters. No
clear policy direction would be evident, nor would any clear leader
or leadership groups be in control. To a certain extent some policy
decisions, such as in the foreign policy arena, may remain above
the fray; but increasingly, the struggle for political power could
come to dominate policy processes. The resulting power vacuum could
mean a number of things for decision-making elsewhere in China:
regional government and party authorities could assume even more
autonomy over decision-making processes relating to their own
spheres of influence; or, decision-making everywhere could stagnate
as authorities waited to see the outcome of events in Beijing.23

Collapse at the Center/Chaos

In the absence of a dominant authoritarian leader or group, the
"contention" scenario described above could become one where
central authority collapsed altogether. There would, in effect, be
no central government control. Government and party organs could
become factionalized and fragmented as individual leaders became
power centers around which supporters rallied. The resulting
political struggle and chaos could be reminiscent of Cultural
Revolution days.

The power vacuum and instability of this scenario could mean
several things for decision-making elsewhere: regional authorities
could gain power and authority, and could even become economic
"warlords," making most policy decisions for their own
jurisdictions without answering to a central authority, and forming
adversarial relationships with other regions. But China's provinces
also could become captive to the chaos, losing the ability to make
decisions at any level or on any matter.24

-

23 Some specialists described this scenario as an "ineffective
coalition," meaning that a variety of views and groups were
represented in the leadership but without a strong unifying leader
to provide coherence and direction. Although a majority of
specialists mentioned some type of "contention" scenario as the
most likely for China's near future, there was less agreement about
the particulars. Some thought contention among leaders would lead
to chaos, and could coexist with coercion in the political system.
Others thought contention would lead to the restructuring of a
"weak central government" with increasing power and influence
devolving to regional leaders.

24 Most specialists thought that the chaos of a "collapsing center"
was an unlikely scenario for China's future, although one or two
thought it the "most likely."

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Variables

The above two scenarios may depend on some of the following
variables: 

-- The death or incapacitation of Deng Xiaoping and one or two
other key hardliners (such as Yang Shangkun) and the fragmentation
of their constituencies into groups of fairly equal power and
influence. Each of these constituencies may have strong control
over certain policy spheres and bureaucracies, but none with the
kind of overarching influence or power necessary for ultimate
leadership.

-- The absence of sufficient public unrest to cause leaders to
unite in order to maintain power and ensure stability.

-- The inability of any single leader or group to exert coercive
control, either over the military or the public security
apparatuses, in such a way as to assert power by force.

-- The willingness and ability of regional leaders to feign
compliance with central government directives without directly
challenging them (in effect, to "pretend" that there is an
effective central government.)

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APPENDIX I: SURVEY OF AMERICAN SINOLOGISTS ON THE PRC'S FUTURE25

Seventeen China specialists in the United States with political
science, economics, military, and history scholarship backgrounds
were surveyed. [See appendix for affiliations.] They shared their
views on various scenarios for the post-Deng political scene and
prospects for political liberalization in the PRC. Beyond agreeing
about basic aspects of China, those Sinologists are split over
several dimensions of the evolving political system on the Chinese
mainland.

Some of the experts state the caveat that there is a wide range of
possibilities in China's future. Most rule out a return to
traditional communism as a likely scenario. Many mention
contentious political struggle as inevitable in the immediate
succession crisis. A majority predict the eventual renewal of an
uneasy or ineffective coalition to undertake moderate economic and,
possibly, political reforms and to deal with the increasingly
strong provinces. A minority of analysts view radical political and
economic reforms as having a high probability in the long run.
Another minority see collapse of the political center as a
realistic scenario. A third minority foresee the scenario of an
authoritarian central regime pursuing no political reform, although
one believes it will be repressive, and others, economically
liberal.

Areas of General Consensus:

ù low probability of return to traditional communism and central
planning

ù persistence of the tensions between the center and provinces

ù little chance of stable, parliamentary democracy in the
foreseeable future

Areas Where Opinions Differ:

ù importance of the passing of the octogenarian leaders, Deng in
particular

ù likelihood of collapse at the center of the political system

ù role and power of the military in the unity of the state

ù possibility of chaos (breakup of the state and social disorder)

ù pace of undertaking political reforms, if at all

ù origination of efforts for political liberalization

ù possibility of any dissident having any political role

ù value of lessons from Taiwan, the USSR, or Chinese history in
helping to preview the future

-

25 Prepared by Shirley Kan, Analyst in Foreign Affairs.

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A. DOAK BARNETT

It is impossible to predict what will happen in China in the
immediate future. Major variables include the sequence of death
among the leaders and what happens to the economy. At present,
there is contention and confusion at the central leadership level,
with continuing struggle for power. In the future, there may be a
sequence of events: 1) great uncertainty in the immediate
succession crisis after the death of Deng Xiaoping - this confused
period lasting until the octogenarians die off may include a brief
time with conservatives in control; 2) afterwards, the most likely
scenario for a period of time is the resumption of gradual reforms
by a coalition in which moderate reformers predominate, but the
coalition could include conservative reformers; 3) then,
eventually, more far-reaching reforms may be pursued. The majority
of officials favor reforms, that is, a continuation of the pre-1989
trends. There will be a trend toward political liberalization, but
it will be gradual, and political reform will lag behind economic
reform. The balance between central and provincial power will
continue to shift toward the provinces, but it is unlikely that the
provinces will openly challenge Beijing's central authority.

PARRIS CHANG

Political reform is dead at present. After at least five years, the
momentum for reform may return, as the result of the passing of the
elder leaders and changes in the leadership. The next step after
the current regime will be contention at the top with more
divisions. Thus, the situation will worsen with confusion after
Deng's death. After a considerable period of turmoil, there may be
a realignment of leadership with more radical reformers gaining
ascendancy. Thus in the long-run, radical, dramatic reforms
("surgical operation") will be implemented because such measures
will be needed. There may be a repudiation of the Tiananmen
crackdown and other efforts to attract intellectuals back to China.
Thus, the situation will get worse before it gets better.
Provincial leaders, input in central decision-making will increase.
However, the political system will likely include a coalition of
central and regional reformist leaders, and not contention between
the center and the regions. Provincial policies will largely
determine national policy. A possible resolution of differences
among the provinces may involve agreements by the richer areas to
subsidize the poorer localities.

LOWELL DITTMER

In the past, Chinese politics have featured the pattern of a
succession crisis followed by the rise of a new leadership. The
situation of China today may similarly depend on who dies first (if
Deng first, then the political system will turn toward more
orthodox policies; if Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, and/or Chen Yun first,
then the turn will be toward more reformist policies). In the
short-term, there will be contention and instability in the
succession crisis. In the long-term, there is a good chance for the
renewal of reforms, with a spectrum of 

CRS-21

policies like those pursued by Zhao Ziyang, whose reform efforts
had different tendencies. The long-run scenario may be a move to a
more radical reformist regime. However, whether there will be
moderate or radical reform depends on what happens in places like
Poland and the Soviet Union, and whether economic liberalization
ant privatization are successful there. A seniority principle is in
operation now where younger leaders must wait for their elders to
die. The next generation of leaders will be more open and more
vulnerable to political demands. There is little probability of
regionalism, in spite of the long-term tendency of devolution.
There is less of a danger in China for the state to fragment than
in the Soviet Union, because China is a unitary state by
constitution.

Political liberalization will be less likely than economic reform.
Even radical reformers in the past have been wary of political
reform (e.g., Zhao's new authoritarianism"). Only Fang Lizhi at the
extreme end has endorsed it. There is an outside possibility that
if a weak central regime needed to generate vigorous support for
its policies, it may pursue political reform. As for other
political systems, the most relevant may be the USSR, depending on
what happens there. There is greater continuity with the Leninist
tradition with the USSR. Going the Soviet Union's way may involve
revitalizing the legislature, holding multiple candidate elections,
and revoking the leading role of the communist party. Factions in
the party may lead to multi-party politics. The PLA [People's
Liberation Army] would have a political role only in a situation of
extreme chaos. Taiwan's gradual democratization in the contest of
economic modernization is a possible model for the PRC,
particularly in the contest of the growing economic relations
between Taiwan and the mainland.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

In describing China's future scenario, a "weakened center" with a
greater role for regional leaders is a more accurate term than
"chaos." It is likely that there will be an uneasy coalition with
reformist and conservative leaders in contention over policy
choices, and some confused or contradictory directions being given
out by the party center as a result. The political agenda will be
particularly sensitive because of the lack of good economic
solutions. Neither the reformers nor the conservatives have been
able to devise a flaw-proof plan: the solution adopted to correct
one problem seems to cause another problem. No faction can prevent
convincing evidence that its plan is better.

The economic situation argues for greater political liberalization.
At the same time, the widening gap between the rich and poor, and
the growth in corruption, calls for greater central control.
Increasing regionalism poses a dilemma for the central leadership,
and efforts to counter the trend may strengthen the hand of
conservatives. With the central government divided, regional
leaders are devising their own methods of coping, which in turn
weakens central control still further. What is good for a
particular province is often not good for the country as a whole.
For example, recently there have

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been problems with provinces and even local areas imposing
roadblocks and collecting taxes on goods in transit from one part
of China to another.

The role of the military is a potentially decisive factor. Personal
loyalties have traditionally been an important factor in the
command and control of armies in China. Many analysts feel that it
was Deng Xiaoping, by the force of his influence with individual
commanders, who managed to convince an otherwise reluctant PLA
[People's Liberation Army] to move against the demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square in June 1989, and that no one else could have
played this role. The implication is that, when Deng departs the
political scene, no one else will be able to play the role of
unifying the military. Should military regionalism be added to
economic regionalism, Beijing's role could be fatally weakened.
Should provincial leaders have a greater role in choosing the
military commanders and commissars assigned to their areas, real
problems could ensue. The PLA contributes to the problem because of
regional military centers.

The most salient example of a dominant regional figure is Ye
Xuanping, governor of Guangdong province, with its substantial
economic base and independent-minded Cantonese population. Ye is
native to the area, and the son or Marshal Ye Jianying, who was
also successfully able to defy Deng Xiaoping. Ye recently declined
a post in Beijing, apparently not wishing to be separated from his
regional base of power. Wang Enmao in Xinjiang, though loyal to the
Beijing government, has also been able to bend or reinterpret
central government policies which he felt were inappropriate to the
province, with its Turkish Muslim majority and Soviet Central Asian
orientation.

Among the populace, there is a great amount of support for
political reforms, but the demands have been somewhat conflicting
and unrealistic. For example, students at the Tiananmen Square
asked for guarantees of a better living standard (the "iron rice
bowl") as well as more economic and political freedoms. And,
although Deng has lost a great deal of his popularity through his
autocratic actions, no one wants what some view as the alternative,
chaos, either. There is widespread support for reform, but its
supporters appear unwilling to accept the consequences of reform.
Chinese who advocate political reform seem to understand by it a
greater ability to choose their leaders, less government/party
control over literature and art, more jobs, more personal choice
over their jobs, and an end to favoritism and corruption generated
by state control. In the short term, at least, there will probably
be little political action by social groups. The Chinese political
system is likely to move in the direction that the Soviet Union has
gone, though not as far or as quickly.

HARRY HARDING

The most likely middle-term scenario is for continuing contention
among competing groups of leaders, with little decisive movement
toward either retrogression or reform. Popular dissatisfaction with
government, ethnic tensions in border regions, and pressure from
provinces to retain their

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autonomy over economic ant financial matters will all serve as
serious constraints on the power of the central government.
Nonetheless, the likelihood of extreme scenarios - civil war,
revolution, or a collapse of central authority - remains low. Nor
is it likely that Chinese leaders will have the will or the ability
to return to central planning or to a totalitarian political
system. Instead, the danger for China is the decay of the central
government's ability to make decisions on critical issues and
implement them effectively.

The order of death of the elder leaders will make a temporary
difference in this middle-run scenario, but not a lasting one.
After the death of Deng Xiaoping, there could well be a succession
of relatively weak transitional leaders, comparable to those who
emerged in the Soviet Union after Brezhnev. Some might be more
oriented to reform, and others less, but none would have an
enduring impact. Ultimately, a strong younger leader could emerge
and consolidate his power, but there is no guarantee that he would
be oriented to radical economic and political reform. That will
depend on the state of the Chinese economy, and the experience of
reform elsewhere in the former Communist world. Even if reform were
to revive, there is the danger that it would encounter many of the
same problems as it did in the late 1980s. China could well
experience another severe economic or political crisis if the
dilemmas of reform are not more successfully handled.

Political liberalization, if it occurs at all, would be a gradual
process. Although most Chinese want a more competent, less corrupt,
and more responsive political system, presently few seem to demand
the fluidity ant instability that they associate with Western-style
democracy. Over the longer run, however, mainland China's political
system may experience changes similar to Taiwan's, with the regime
responding to pressure to tolerate more dissent, ant gradually
moving toward a multi-party system.

HAROLD C. HINTON

Political reform will be slow and painful after the current
leadership passes. There will be a lot of unrest and discontent
with no easy transition. In the long-run, there is a reformist
trend. Economic and political decentralization will also continue.
What happens in the future depends on two variables. First, China's
leaders will look at Gorbachev's prospects in the Soviet Union ant
how political reform develops there. Second, the People's
Liberation Army's (PLA) view of political freedoms and social
instability is another factor. The Chinese military is the main
cement holding the country together - more 80 than the party. It is
difficult to say whether economic reformers will make a comeback.
Political liberalization in China is not going to come about soon,
if one refers to true liberalization and not just "tinkering" of
the system. Democracy requires true opposition parties - unlike
those in South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan. China is on the same track
as Asian countries, but even farther behind. Political reform will
be a difficult process, and may take decades, especially given
China's population and ecological pressures. The situation will get
worse before it gets better, and may never get better.

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HARLAN JENCKS

In the short-term, requirements of politics will continue to
dominate the leadership. Future outcomes are difficult to predict
and will depend on when leaders die and in what order. The PLA will
probably play a king-maker role again, but the situation is more
complex than that of 1976. Political reform is inevitable and will
come sooner or later. However, the overthrow of communism in
Eastern Europe, especially the bloody upheaval in Rumania, has
hardened the resolve of the conservatives in Beijing

Since the reforms of the 19808, competition between the regions and
the center has increased, and this regional trend is here to stay.
Beijing may not be able to regain control. One example is the issue
of obtaining adequate revenue resources from the provinces.
Regional leaders are important to the hardline coalition. The
regions now have their own resources (ties to the outside world and
extra-budgetary revenue). In the short-run, hardliners will try to
re-centralize. But in the long-run, the trend toward increased
pluralism is there whether the leadership likes it or not. The
country is likely to be held together by the PLA, however. Even if
the PLA splits up, the units will not necessary fight each other.
There might be a number of independent regions, but still one
Chinese state. There are many historical precedents for such
regionalism. Chaos is not likely.

NICHOLAS LARDY

After Deng's death or demise, there will be continue to be
contention in the Chinese political scene, similar to the present
situation. Over the medium term, there is likely to be renewal of
a coalition like that which existed during the Deng Xiaoping reform
period. The regionalism scenario may be popular, but there has
already been economic regionalism to a large degree, and this will
continue. However, China has very vast differences from the Soviet
Union. The provinces have nothing great to be gained from political
sovereignty, either de facto or de jure. They do gain from getting
China back on the road to development and presenting an image of
stability. Still, the regional factor will be an important factor
in the coalition, as in the 1980s. The regional economies have
benefitted from previous reforms and want the advantages of a
unified state. Thus, we are unlikely to be regional demands for
increased formal political power. What political influence the
local leaders have will be exercised to maintain support for
reform.

Political reform like the one started in the late 1980s may be
resumed in 5-7 years. Political liberalization in the Chinese case
means making government at the margins more responsive to social
demands. There may be elections for the National People's Congress
and local congresses, and a more critical press. But China is not
likely to move beyond the pre-1989 level of progress, and will not
be genuinely pluralistic. Support for political liberalization in
the Western sense comes only from intellectuals. Such views are not
held by the PLA or workers,

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but could possibly arise (as in the USSR and Eastern Europe). If
there are not increases in consumption and income levels, then the
populace may demand political changes. If the leadership can
deliver improvements in living standards (the first objective of
the people, maybe with the exception of the small urban
professional groups), then political demands can be contained.
Other models have little value for predicting what course China
will follow.

KEN LIEBERTHAL

A sustained renewal of political and economic reform directed from
the center is not to be realized, although efforts may be launched
by a reformist leader who rises to the top, for example, Zhu
Rongzhi, the mayor of Shanghai. There is a low probability of
centrally-directed efforts, either in the direction of radical
reforms or return to orthodoxy. No integrated, effective reform
program is on the shelf. There are barriers to inter-regional
trade, a great degree of corruption, lack of political discipline,
and disagreements among the leaders. It cannot be assumed that
central directives will be obeyed by the regions. Different
policies are being implemented in different provinces. On some
issues, we can speak of "Shandong vs. Guangdong," for example, but
not "China." Chances are not trivial that there will be central
collapse. There is a lot of feigned compliance now and some real
compliance. In the future, there will likely be less real
compliance, and maybe also less feigned compliance. Contention at
the top leading to chaos is a realistic scenario, if the top
leadership publicly splits after Deng ties, but this situation may
be short-lived.

There are four realistic scenarios: 1) China a la 1911: center
collapses, less feigned compliance, fragmented market, inability to
address national issues like the environment; 2) China a la 1989:
open split in the leadership that spills into the streets,
short-lived conflict, dramatic dynamic; 3) China a la 1990: weak
center, feigned and some real compliance, regional diversity
without fragmentation; and 4) China a la 1956-57: strong communist
system (which would most likely emerge from 1989-type disorder,
followed by strong coercive measures - it would be economically
disastrous and is the least likely of the four outcomes). Thus, the
range of potential options is extraordinarily large.

Political liberalization will vary by region, and will be de facto,
rather than de jure. Regional leaders will practice different forms
of political reform, and will differ on the extent to which they
allow greater expression of opinions, a greater role for reformers,
a continued foreign presence, more diversity of local newspapers or
other printed material, and fewer executions. Political reform is
not likely to reach the point of legal protection for the citizens.

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR

The political system has been severely eroded and is likely to
collapse. Deng Xiaoping and the founding generation of gerontocrats
have been the keystone preventing the system's collapse. The Party
has never regained

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the cohesion and authority of its reign before the Cultural
Revolution started. The imperial political structure of China, ably
reclothed in Leninist-Maoist garb by the CCP, is crumbling, the
bureaucracy is delegitimized, and the communist ideology
discredited. Like the Qin and Sui dynasties, the communist regime
likely will not long outlive its first generation. Only inertia and
the founding generation still keep it in place.

ANDREW NATHAN

In the three or 80 years after Deng's death, there will inevitably
be a period of contention among the leadership, because of the lack
of a leader with Deng's level of authority and power. In the long
run (six to ten years), the political struggles are likely to end
with more radical reformers dominating. This will be the only
development to move the system forward, but how that will come
about is unclear. The examples of political reforms in Taiwan and
Eastern Europe will place pressure on the leadership to try
political reform as the only viable solution to problems in China.
China's economic problem is the stagnation of the state
enterprises. The political problem is the tenuous legitimacy of the
regime. These problems will require radical reform. Thus, some
elements within the leadership will point to the experiences in
Taiwan or Eastern Europe and argue for radical political reform in
China.

A renewal of a reform coalition after Deng is unlikely, because
such a coalition depended on Deng's personal authority. The
traditional communism scenario is impossible because communism will
not solve the two problems. A coercive regime with no political
reform is also not likely because, 1) China's leaders need a
mandate to rule, 2) it would amount to a military takeover, but the
PLA does not wish to inject itself openly into the political
process, and 3) the future senior leadership will no longer include
men with dual party and military backgrounds. The collapsed center
scenario has little probability, because regional leaders have an
interest in supporting the national system, to be part of the
central elite and national apparatus, which is viewed as an elite
club. The party has its own appeals. There is also the Chinese
sense of national security, and regional leaders would not want to
be seen as traitors. Thus, regional elites will not want to carry
economic autonomy into political autonomy, but will pretend there
is a central regime.

Political liberalization may take place in three or four years
after the political struggle that occurs after Deng's death.
Political reform will likely come about when a reformist group of
party leader seeks a mandate from the people. They may argue that
the party has always called for democracy. Then, they may hold a
fairly open election for the National People's Congress, including
the existing minor parties, overseas groups, maybe even the
Federation for a Democratic China, and newly formed parties. The
communist party will generate sufficient votes to win, because of
the political machine (local cadres) in place. The Chinese populace
in many places support their local leaders, even when they do not
support the regime as a whole. The system will not be stable,
however. Ground rules will be constantly struggled over, while

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the system liberalizes at the same time. The system will move to
more freedom of speech, but those holding power will try to limit
discussion on certain issues. Many issues will be bitterly
contested, sometimes with violence. Peasants with heavy voting
power will alter some of the economic policies that have so far
favored urban over rural interests.

BARRY NAUGHTON

All scenarios are possible, which shows the enormous range of
possible outcomes in China. A renewal of a coalition has declining
probability, because the middle ground is eroding, both politically
and economically. The previous economic strategy has run out of
steam, and people are too disaffected and alienated. The most
likely scenario is a coercive, authoritarian regime that uses power
to pursue economic reforms. The reasons for such a regime will be
based on power rather than ideology. A renewal of political reforms
has slight possibility. The least likely scenario is contention at
the top leading to chaos. Political conflict will be avoided,
because the leaders are 80 afraid of the consequences.

Political liberalization has a small chance of happening, and it
would be part of a political strategy for one contender to gain
ascendancy. The system will likely be "authoritarianism with
limits," offering sufficient private space for people to live
without fear, such as the relatively controlled environment in
Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s. Having no political
liberalization is just as likely as having liberalization. On the
surface, there will be conformity, while there is more freedom
underneath, as in 1988. The evolution of the system would move
towards that of Taiwan's in the 1950s and 19608, but not as far as
today's Taiwan.

Regionalism is not that important. Centrifugal forces are not as
great as political differences. The death of Deng and other
octogenarians will be important, but there is a significant
possibility that the leadership will be able to manage the
succession. It may not be true that there is a liberalizing trend
that is being blocked by elder leaders. The key question in all
this is how the government will solve its revenue crisis. If the
leadership is able to restructure the system to provide sufficient
revenue for the government, there would be the political will and
ability to pursue economic liberalization, which may later lead to
political reforms.

MICHEL OKSENBERG

The lesson from history is that any scenario can occur at some
point in China's future. At this time, there is a great degree of
uncertainty. Some of the important factors that will shape China's
future course are: 1) the posture and power of the PLA; 2) the
timing and sequence of deaths of the elders; 3) domestic economic
conditions; and 4) the international environment.

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The scenarios listed [in the previous section] ranked from least to
most probable are: collapse of center; radical reform; traditional
communist reform; military coercive authoritarianism, and confusion
at the center. The most likely immediate scenario is the
continuation of confusion at the center, even after a succession
shakedown, because no dominant figure is likely to arise to give
coherence to the system.

For the long run, the most likely future for the Chinese political
system will be an "ineffective coalition" at the center. This
scenario envisions the PLA as the last remaining source of
coherence in the system. The central government will continue to
weaken, but not collapse. This reflects the center's revenue crisis
and inability to control personnel assignments in the provinces.
The coastal regions will be increasingly pulled into foreign
economies (Guangdong to Hong Kong, Fujian to Taiwan, Shanghai to
the west, Liaoning to Japan, etc.). There will be feigned
compliance with central directives. This situation is similar to
that of China during the late 19th century, with outside powers
helping to maintain the center which serves their interests. Even
an ineffective coalition will be difficult to form, because it will
have to include associates of Zhao [Ziyang], which in turn will
need a reversal of verdicts on June Fourth [the Tiananmen
crackdown]. The June Fourth legacy is a more massive problem than
dealing with Mao's legacy after the Cultural Revolution. A limited
number of leaders could be targeted to share the blame. The PLA
will not allow itself to become a scapegoat. A coalition can only
be formed after the forceful removal of the alleged perpetrators by
the military. The Tiananmen tragedy bore similarity to the bloody
slaughter in Mexico in 1968, but the Mexican tragedy was quickly
set aside and the leadership turned to the future. In China, the
leaders have repressed intellectuals and revived bygone ideology.
Thus, at best the coalition in the post Deng era will be weak: it
will lack credibility, a forceful leader, or strong ties to the
provinces. The future of the political system in China can best be
described as the "restructuring of a weak central government." But
this scenario may last for only a limited period of time. China's
political future is likely to consist of a series of leadership
clusters at the top interacting with the provinces.

Comparisons with the Soviet Union are misleading. China should be
compared with its past and with other large developing countries.
"Liberalization with Chinese characteristics" is more likely to
produce regionalism, corruption, and ineffective governance than to
promote a pluralistic and orderly democracy.

LUCIAN PYE

A renewal of a coalition that undertakes gradual political and
economic reforms is more likely than the ascendance of radical
reformers. China is moving more and more to tacit acceptance of
regionalism, though the situation will not be chaotic. The
leadership's rhetoric will try to project centralized control. The
provinces will perform the ritual of "feigned compliance." In
practice, the provinces will continue to do their own thing, while
the center will

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pretend it is in control. There will be high-level contention
behind the scenes. The country will be concerned with maintaining
the appearance of orderliness, and everyone will go along -
especially if the economy improves. China is now in a "Brezhnev
stage," where the system looks stable and improving on the surface.
Subsidies prop up the system in the short run, but will sap the
strength of the economy in the long run. The question then is how
bad does the economic reality have to be before a "Gorbachev" comes
along. In China's case, people have a great capacity to absorb
suffering. The problem for Western businesses is that they will
want to know who is in charge in China (looking for legal
guarantees), while investors from Taiwan or Hong Kong, more
accepting of leadership uncertainty, will have an easier time. U.S.
foreign policy has the problem of either going along with the
pretense of a central government in charge or facing reality. The
PLA will be in the background as the ultimate force to unite China.

No strong breakthrough for liberalization is in sight. Future
political reform has not been discussed. Dissidents are divided
over issues. There is no coherent opposition, just alienation and
dissatisfaction. There is no clear sense of what will replace the
Communist Party. No faction in the leadership has called for
reform. There is no charismatic leader to rally around. Political
reform for the Chinese leadership will mean only separating the
party from the government, not the overthrow of the Communist Party
and not a multi-party system. There is no independent social or
political organization to come up with a coherent agenda - although
a lot of autonomous activity is latent. The groups favoring
political reform are intellectuals, students, urban professionals,
and an alienated group of migrants. China is moving to a period
when intellectuals will learn the ground rules: the regime will
tolerate discussion of political and economic reforms, apparent
liberalization (such as the TV series "River Elegy"), and allow
intellectuals to engage in theoretic discussions - all without
leading to real reforms.

The passing of Deng and other octogenarians will Dot be
significant, as the political system will continue to operate. A
different triggering event other than Deng's death will be required
for a great social response. Hu Yaobang's death came at a moment
when the stage was already set. The Chinese political system may
evolve to something like that in an African or Latin American
country, where a quasi-military party welcomes foreign investment,
provides enough jobs to the urban professionals, and promotes
development rather than chaos. There is tremendous built-in
optimism among the Chinese: China should be great and this goal can
be achieved. It is the political system that disappoints them.

THOMAS ROBINSON

The spectrum of future possibilities is now much broader and much
less positive than before the Tiananmen Repression. Four
alternative futures for China are: 1) a leftist Third World police
state, 2) military control, either preserving at least part of the
system or pursuing rapid economic growth, 3) reliberalization once
again with the reform program of Zhao Ziyang, and 4)

CRS-30

revolution from below. It seems apparent that the alternative
taking shape in the latter part of 1989 - that of China as a Third
World police state - could last for a considerable time and that,
therefore, the stage might be set for decline into violent
revolution after the turn of the century. It may be that attempts
will be made, after Deng, to put the pieces together again through
military rule or reliberalization. Yet, it is not clear that the
country can avoid a Third World police state regime and/or a
revolution. Rapid reliberalization seems highly unlikely.

ROBERT SCALAPINO

No scenario for China's future can be totally ruled out. The
present situation is a transitional one, with no agreement on key
domestic economic policies, tension between the provinces and
center over both policies ant power, and the aging of the
first-generation revolutionaries who still stand at the apex of
power. The leadership seems reasonably united on two points:
continued commitment to interaction with the Pacific-Asian market
economies and a "law and order" program that brooks no basic
challenge to Leninism. In the longer run, China's political system
will probably be one which is best defined as
"authoritarian-pluralism." Politics will be restricted, with
limitations on political competition and civil rights, although not
as absolutistic as the Stalinist or late Maoist models. In the
social sphere (education, religion, family), there will be a degree
of autonomy from the state. And in the economy, the market will
play a significant role, albeit, with the state still the principal
force. This system will bear some resemblance to that of South
Korea and Taiwan at an earlier stage of their development, and to
other Asian developing societies. Leadership will remain an
important variable, and one key question is whether China will
continue to demand a paramount leader as has been the case
virtually throughout the 20th century, or whether a greater degree
of collective or coalition leadership will prevail. I incline
toward the belief that the former requirement will continue, at
least for the near term--and that may pose a major crisis since no
strong leader seems in sight.

Almost certainly, the regions, and especially the more rapidly
developing regions, will continue to seek and gain greater
autonomy, and certain economic zones have already crossed political
boundaries: Guangdong-Hong Kong-Taiwan, Fujian-Taiwan, and
potentially, Shandong-South Korea. In certain respects, even today,
there is not one China, but many Chinas. How far will regional
autonomy go? That has been a perennial issue for China in this
century. Warlordism of an earlier time is unlikely - but if massive
unrest threatens, the PLA will certainly come to play a greater
role, as it did at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The
military, however, is not united today, and the odds favor the
continuance of civilian rule, albeit with areas of China --
especially on the periphery - largely under military control. 

In sum, China will not move toward extensive political openness in
the near term, although leaders - aware of the low popularity of
the party and government--will allow greater discussion, especially
of economic issues, and

CRS-31

will assert their interest in "listening to the voice of the
people." The Chinese conservatives at present point to the
"negative lesson" of the USSR, arguing that with more liberal
policies, China might have fallen into chaos. Stability is and will
remain the by-word in China. But in the final analysis, the
government's legitimacy will hinge upon performance not blind
faith. Efforts to use the indoctrinational techniques of the 1950s,
therefore, are not likely to succeed despite the efforts of aging
ideologues to return to traditional methods. In all probability,
China will muddle through, with retreats and advances, but in
general, pursuing a course that lies between Leninism and
parliamentarism -- the authoritarian-pluralist path.

DONALD ZAGORlA

In the immediate future, the most likely scenario is the renewal of
some sort of a coalition including the moderate reformers and the
conservatives. China needs further economic reform, and progress in
this direction will continue, but the pace and scope of reform will
depend on the nature of the coalition. In the long run, a
disintegration of the system as in the Soviet Union cannot be ruled
out in China, unless significant progress takes place in the
economy. Such a scenario is likely to occur if the economy
deteriorates, if the leadership does not grant substantial powers
to the provinces, and if the leadership does not properly manage
the ethnic minorities problem. Political liberalization is going to
be slow. Political reform will follow economic reform, because
economic reform will unleash political forces demanding greater
participation.

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APPENDIX II: AFFlLlATIONS OF THOSE SURVEYED

A. Doak Barnett  . . . . School of Advanced International Studies
                         (Johns Hopkins University)

Parris Chang . . . . . . Pennsylvania State University

Lowell Dittmer . . . . . University of California, Berkeley

June Teufel Dreyer . . . University of Miami

Harry Harding  . . . . . Brookings Institution

Harold Hinton  . . . . . George Washington University

Harlan Jencks  . . . . . University of California, Berkeley

Nicholas Lardy . . . . . Jackson School of International Studies
                         (University of Washington)

Kenneth Lieberthal . . . University of Michigan

Roderick MacFarquhar . . Harvard University

Andrew Nathan  . . . . . Columbia University

Barry Naughton . . . . . University of California, San Diego

Michel Oksenberg . . . . University of Michigan

Lucian Pye . . . . . . . M.I.T.

Thomas Robinson  . . . . American Enterprise Institute

Robert Scalapino . . . . University of California, Berkeley

Donald Zagoria . . . . . Hunter College