![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
Events of the 1980s greatly affected Soviet armed forces, particularly dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in early 1991. Arguments about reforms and the future of Soviet forces were subsequently circumscribed by the failed coup of August 1991, which facilitated the breakup of the "Soviet empire" in December. At the time of these events, the Soviets possessed the largest military force in the world in terms of manpower (4.0 million) and hardware. In view of the weakness of the Soviet economy, disclosures of the dominant role of military production and expenditures continue to surprise Western analysts and Soviet citizens. It appears likely that the size of the forces and their role in the new states of the region will diminish.
Many ideas and trends will shape the evolution of these military forces. Most important will be the political definition and relationships of the successor regimes. Will the former U.S.S.R. really become 15 separate armed and sovereign nations, or will some of them confederate into some workable form of commonwealth? Other external, or nonmilitary factors, will play roles: potential threats and instabilities along and within the long Eurasian boundaries; recently concluded and ongoing international arms control regimes; new concepts of democracy and civilian control of the military (a force for stability or coup?); and the effects of the loss of ideology. Important military philosophies at work include the traditions of quantity versus quality of forces; the advantages of conscript versus volunteer military personnel; and the role of offensive versus defensive military doctrines and policies.
How are post-Soviet forces evolving? At the moment, there are multiple, regional military forces. The largest is the Russian force, under 2 million; next is that of Ukraine, at about 250,000. Reconstitution of a centralized military with a larger force structure now seems unlikely, although some functions such as air defense are being coordinated through CIS.
The forces of the former Soviet Union, though smaller, will continue to have implications for the United States and its allies at various levels. Internationally, they will still be of strategic concern so long as they maintain nuclear capabilities. As regional powers, these forces could affect many potential flashpoints throughout Eurasia, within and outside the borders of the former U.S.S.R. The United States may want to seek areas for cooperation with these forces. The United States is encouraging favorable trends. Congress made one step in authorizing $400 million of FY1992 Defense funds to help dismantle Soviet nuclear weapons and subsequently backed the Freedom Support Act. Finally, post-Soviet forces may for some time continue to be a factor in shaping U.S. forces, particularly in planning for reconstitution and in intelligence activities.
To 1996, the once-awesome Soviet military machine continued to devolve into separate and smaller forces, and the Russian successor army demonstrated poor preparedness to deal with lightly-armed opponents in Chechnya. Moscow's attempt to maintain a Joint Armed Forces under the Commonwealth of Independent States has yet to be realized. The purpose of this issue brief is to provide a benchmark for thinking about the transition underway within the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, to analyze the forces and influences at work, to track developments, and to present major policy implications for the United States. The scope of concern is the total structure of military capabilities within the former U.S.S.R. Emphasis is, however, on conventional forces. Questions about strategic nuclear weapons and associated command and control problems are addressed in greater depth by CRS Issue Brief 91144, Nuclear Weapons in the Soviet Union: Location, Command, and Control.
Only 10 years ago, the Cold War seemed an immutable feature of the world's geopolitical landscape. For six decades, peoples in the heart of Eurasia had been "building socialism" and for 30 years their communist rulers had been actively challenging the capitalist democracies for world leadership. Within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a unified, centrally planned economy that supported the largest military force on earth. The U.S.S.R. was further protected by an outer empire, a ring of European nations under the Warsaw Pact and Mongolia, where Soviets not only had forces but also oversaw divisions and wings from the satellite nations. By 1980, the U.S.S.R. had forcibly added Afghanistan to its outer empire and seemed to believe that the "correlation of forces" in world history had tipped from capitalism to socialism.
Perceptions began to change, however, as it became increasingly evident that the economy of the Soviet Union was not catching up to the West, but falling behind. By 1981, the United States had determined to meet the Soviet military challenge through a defense buildup and modernization, deployment of intermediate range nuclear delivery systems to NATO Europe, and active support against their Afghan adventure. All presented challenges that the moribund and technologically backward Soviet economy was ill-prepared to meet. New Soviet leadership, under President Gorbachev, took strong measures, introducing glasnost and perestroika after 1985, to open Soviet society and begin to restructure the economy, and pressing forward with historic nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations with the West. Soviet political leaders determined it was wise and prudent to begin reductions in both nuclear and conventional forces, to adopt a defensive national military strategy, and to withdraw voluntarily from Afghanistan. These initiatives resonated throughout Eastern Europe; eventually the Berlin Wall fell and, in the spring of 1991, the outer empire of the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded. What about the inner empire and its huge Soviet armed forces?
The 1980s were turbulent for the Soviet military. The great war machine forged in the crucible of World War II, and the bulwark of world socialism, was forced to question many values. Doctrine and structure geared to the offense were suddenly asked to support a defensive strategy. The virtues of mass and quantity were suddenly constrained by arms control agreements and economic limitations. The bitter withdrawal from Afghanistan was contrasted to the brilliant performance of Western arms against Soviet-equipped Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. Attack by NATO forces seemed increasingly less likely, and a military offensive to save the world for communism now seemed absurd to most.
By nature a conservative institution, the Soviet military could not change as rapidly as the events around it. Ambivalence on reforms and arms control agreements were detected in the statements and actions of military officers, sometimes reflecting generational differences. The August 20, 1991 coup attempt was a watershed event in resolving many questions about the future of Soviet armed forces. Some officers who opposed democratic reforms were removed or chastened; some who stood against the coup hard-liners were rewarded with advancement and a mandate for reform. It became clear to the reformers that NATO and the West could be friends for stability and reform and had no intention of pressing military adventures against them. On April 25, 1993, President Yeltsin's "crisis of power" referendum took place with no intervention by the Russian armed forces -- a sign of military stability and maturity. On October 4, 1993, the armed forces stood with President Yeltsin. Armored and airborne units quelled violent uprisings and captured anti-Yeltsin parliamentarians in Moscow.
Although a gradual reduction in size began around 1985, at the time of the coup in 1991 Soviet armed forces were still the largest, by far, in the world. Measuring that force had long been a difficult preoccupation of U.S. and other intelligence services. Because of secretiveness, compartmentalization, and nonrational economic accounting systems, even Soviet officials had difficulty assessing the true effect of the military on their society. Since glasnost, some Soviet officials have acknowledged, and even decried, the extent of militarization of their economy. In terms of active duty military, a commonly accepted figure for the beginning of 1991 is 4.0 million personnel, down from 4.5 million in 1985. A comparable U.S. figure was 2.5 million. Table 1 depicts a number of specific measures of Soviet military forces in late 1990/early 1991.
The unified Soviet armed forces were controlled from a centralized high command in Moscow, headed by the Minister of Defense, traditionally a marshal from the ground forces. Forces were organized under the high command into functional arms and services and into territorial commands. Major functional components included the ground forces, navy, air forces, strategic rocket forces, air defense forces, and border guards (recently transferred from the KGB). Geographic commands were the Western Theater facing NATO, the Southern Theater facing Southwest Asia, and the Far Eastern Theater facing China and Japan. Corresponding naval formations were the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Mediterranean Flotilla, Caspian Flotilla, and the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Ground forces were also forward deployed in Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and Cuba; and navy elements were in Vietnam and the Arabian Sea.
The majority of Soviet uniformed personnel, some 80%, were conscripts on 2-year tours of duty. The draft served several purposes. It provided an adequate pool to man the large force at a very low cost per soldier. In a population of diverse nationalities, some thought the common military experience would help mix the peoples, to "sovietize" them, or, more cynically, to "russify" them. Significantly, the draft rotation also provided a huge pool of trained reservists to mobilize rapidly in wartime.
The role of the armed forces in Soviet society was extraordinary; the economy was largely a military-industrial complex. The Communist Party "militarization" of society has been openly criticized by former communists. Revelations about defense spending continue to astonish the populace. Some estimates state that the defense sector employed 10 million people and consumed over 25% of the Soviet gross national product (Business Week, July 29, 1991, quotes 52%). Defense industries as a group were larger than any other industrial sector, and some Soviet officials claim that they contained over 50% of the nation's technological production capabilities. The size of the Soviet defense budget was a mystery, even to Soviets, because of the irrational pricing system of the economy. The stated defense budget for 1991 was 98 billion rubles, but some Soviet economists claim it was at least 300 billion rubles and, even then, many defense-related activities were not included. Ten other ministries likely included a defense component within their separate budgets. In contrast, during 1995 not a single new fighter aircraft was purchased by the Russian armed forces.
Where Is the Motherland? Uncertainties will face the successor armies of the Soviet armed forces until the successor states resolve their political relationships. At the beginning of 1996, the collective structure of the post-Soviet armed forces still lacked the clearly defined missions and sustaining resources of their Soviet past. The Soviet Union had historic and geographic reasons to support a large military structure. Besides defending the motherland, from 1945 to 1990 the Soviet military was the shield and enforcer for the community of satellite socialist nations that it dominated. If the Soviet Union remained intact today, it would contain some 290 million people in a territory of over 22 million square kilometers, or 1/6th of the earth's land surface. Instead, the former U.S.S.R. is fragmented into 15 independent nations, the three Baltic states totally independent and the other 12 maintaining loose political and economic association under the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.).
Among the fragments of the U.S.S.R., the largest single political entity is the Russian Federation, containing some 150 million people (120 million are ethnic Russians) in a territory of 17 million square kilometers. The ultimate size of Russia may also be in question, however, because non-Russian nationalities living therein are also fighting for some form of independence. On March 31, 1992 a Treaty of Federation was signed by 86 of 88 territorial constituents of the Russian Federation. Chechnya and Tatarstan abstained, and by December, 1994 secessionist tensions provoked President Yeltsin to deploy an armored force of 40,000 troops into Chechnya. The poorly planned and executed operation failed to resolve the issue and, despite great destruction and many casualties, Chechen guerillas were still capable of serious attacks on Russian forces in August of 1996.
A great debate took place on how to divide non-strategic forces of the former Soviet military. Six former republics, including Russia, initially favored a unified C.I.S. army. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova wanted independent armies and Belarus and Uzbekistan expressed reservations about the proposed commonwealth defense force. Without unanimity, C.I.S. relinquished all pretense of controlling conventional forces and, eventually, of strategic forces as well. The obvious, short-term source of troops and equipment for separate armies was partitioning of Soviet forces, and some republics lay claim to all units and facilities on their territory. For example, Ukraine instantly accounted for 20 maneuver divisions, 4000 tanks, and, of even greater contention, the entire Black Sea Fleet. A complicating factor is that Soviet forces are of mixed nationalities, and usually a majority are Russian, as are most officers. Partitioning on early 1992 locations would have yielded 12 separate armies, as shown in Table 2.
Who Is the Enemy? Every military force must be structured to some degree against its most likely opponent or combination of opponents. When the Soviet military was facing the free world and an unfriendly China, it was easy to justify large, powerful forces. Bellicosity against the West has lessened greatly. In February 1993, Russian President Yeltsin said "we do not consider any country or coalition of countries either in the West or in the East to be an enemy." Russian military doctrine adopted in 1993, reaffirmed a "no-official-enemy" policy. Although Yeltsin and other senior officials once suggested that Russia could join NATO in the future, they are now strongly opposed to any NATO eastward expansion. Cooperating with, rather than joining, NATO is now the stated position.
The demise of the Cold War has not brought peace and stability to Eurasia. As a region, Russia and the other former Soviet republics face a variety of potential armed crises around the southern periphery and even within their own territories. Ethnic groups, millions strong, from Ukraine through the Caucasus and even along the Volga, threaten to become militant. Central Asia is vulnerable to intensified Islamic fundamentalism exported from Iran. The fate of Russian minorities in the new "belt of friendly states" around Russia -- the "near abroad" -- is a major concern of Russian nationalists. Political disagreements and suspicions between Russia and other former Soviet republics, most ominously Ukraine, continue to surface. Despite current peaceful initiatives, the long boundary with China contains stretches that even "fraternal socialist states" once bitterly contested; a resurgent, united China would give great concern to Russia. Russians will always watch for any signs of deviation in Germany's posture as a peaceful member of Western Europe and NATO. Russian doctrine now calls for establishment of basing rights in former Soviet republics that will grant them.
International Cooperation and Arms Control Agreements. An apparent self- imposed constraint on the future size of former Soviet armed forces is the newly developed openness and spirit of cooperation with former enemies in the West. Even before the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets had accepted the advantages of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), certain confidence- building measures under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the on-site inspection conditions of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Even more invasive inspection measures were agreed to under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
A ceiling on the future size of Soviet successor forces, in terms of specific numbers of major weapons, is set forth in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which was signed November 19, 1990, and has been ratified by the United States. The treaty was flexible enough to accommodate uncertainties in the transition of the Soviet armed forces. Although pre-coup conservative forces acted to protect over 50,000 military vehicles from CFE limits by moving them east of the Urals (and transferring some ground force units to the navy), subsequent military leaders supported observation of overall CFE limits. So doing would result in a reduction of former Soviet ground and air combat vehicles throughout Europe from a total of 71,645 to 52,975. The seven former republics agreed in 1992 on how to apportion allowed levels of treaty-limited equipment. Whether those numbers can be sustained is questionable in light of the other factors involved, particularly economic difficulties. The major allocations of tanks were 6,400 to Russia, 4,080 to Ukraine, and 1,800 to Belarus. Russia met overall CFE obligations by November, 1995. Ukraine has a minor problem in the Crimea, where jurisdiction with Russia remains unclear for some equipment. Belarus is behind, claiming financial constraints.
Russian officials have requested a readjustment of CFE equipment allowed on their flanks. New Russian borders and conditions created a requirement to find places to station returning troops in the northwest, and to deal with several active ethnic conflicts raging in the Caucasus on the south. Particularly on the southern flank, the allocations of 580 armored combat vehicles (not tanks, of which there are 700) for Russia and 660 ACVs for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are seen as operationally insufficient. Continuation of operations in Chechnya, though diminished, contributed to a flank treaty violation in November. Treaty signatories were originally not sympathetic to an adjustment, but President Clinton has suggested the United States could work with Russia, through NATO, on this problem. This issue should figure prominently in the CFE Review Conference scheduled for May 1996.
Soviet leaders gained further confidence in the advantages of working with the West through the events of German reunification and the Persian Gulf war crisis. A positive indicator of progress in this area was the serious suggestion that former Soviet republics would request associate status in NATO and their participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace. Russian military doctrine also emphasizes participation in international peacekeeping operations, and they are contributing a brigade to NATO Implementation Force operations in Bosnia -- under U.S control. A controversial aspect is that Russia seeks international approval for a primary role in the former Soviet republics -- what some would label a "sphere of influence." This approach is also reflected in the growing and passionate opposition in Russia to the prospect of NATO enlargement to the east.
Democracy and Civilian Control. No one knows how the Soviet successor states will fare as they move toward democratic self-governance after centuries of despotism and dictatorship. Post-coup military officials seem to have accepted the idea that the armed forces should be supervised by civilians, as in western democracies. The last Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., Marshal Shaposhnikov, purchased civilian suits and toyed with the idea of resigning his military commission. Subsequently, however, he became acting Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and remained in uniform. Subsequent Russian ministers of defense, Generals Grachev and Rodionov, were also not civilians.
Significantly, 1992 defense budgets were the first ever subject to the scrutiny of elected officials and the people -- the new governments could not vote to support the military at previous levels. The Russian Parliament cut military technology and weapons spending 68% below 1991 levels. For 1993, equipment orders were somewhat increased, but lowered again in 1994. Parliament is concerned about the collapse of the huge military industrial base. Despite drops in manpower, Russia will continue to devote significant resources to defense. In an attempt to stabilize the process, in late 1995 it was proposed that the Ministry of Defense budget be stabilized at 5.3-6% of GDP over 5-7 years. The 1996 budget proposal was, however, 3.76% of GDP. Arms exports will continue to be important but not on the scale of the past. For 1994, despite large contracts with Kuwait and Malaysia, Russian arms sales were a disappointing $1.7 million. Stepping up efforts, the industry hopes to achieve $2.5 to $3 million in 1995.
Since 1988 there have been efforts to convert elements of the giant defense industry to civilian production. Both civilian and military production has dropped, the military suffering the greatest in percentage until 1994, when both sectors dropped about 30%. Civilian sales by the defense industry are much higher than deliveries to the Russian military. It is reported that over half of Russian land controlled by the military was returned to civilian control, primarily for agriculture.
The political role of the Army in Russia was tested during the crisis of power between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet during March and April 1993. General Grachev, Minister of Defense, speedily asserted his intent that the Army remain neutral during the political fray and referendum. Dissension and dissatisfaction within the officer corps and Grachev's own admission that he could not guarantee total control, however, left open the possibility that some units might elect to intervene. Such actions did not occur, and behavior patterns continue to verify that the Army is a force for stability in Russia. During the parliamentary rebellion of October 1993, the armed forces remained united and supported President Yeltsin. The debacle in Chechnya, with many desertions by draftees and criticism of the mission by senior officers, raises another test for the proper role of the military.
One element of military life has already been greatly effected by the new openness of Soviet society. The traditional hazing and mistreatment of young, conscript soldiers, including high death rates, have been widely exposed in the press. Senior officers have been embarrassed, and steps to change this long-standing condition of Russian military service are apparently being taken. Insofar as it reflected ethnic tensions, the new republic governments have made the practice a political issue.
Ideology and Morale. Although most armies are primarily security instruments of their homeland, the Soviet armed forces for many years had an additional source of pride as the shield for the workers of the world in building socialism. Since almost all Soviet males spent some time in the military, it was a major means by which the state passed on a uniform communist indoctrination to its diverse ethnic and regional population. When this role was canceled, some 60,000 political officers were temporarily jobless until retrained for other positions. Russian officers realize military tradition is important, and are resurrecting symbols from the Russian Army and Navy of Tsarist times.
Many soldiers, comfortably stationed on the frontiers of socialism were returned to economic chaos in the motherland. The army was suddenly too large for its missions, resources, and facilities -- as many as 300,000 military families found themselves homeless. In 1991 Western television transmitted pictures of a tank division living in tents in Ukraine. The division had been withdrawn from Eastern Europe a year earlier, and its tanks sent much further east, beyond the Urals to Siberia where they would not count against CFE Treaty limits. Such conditions continue into 1996 for many elements. Furthermore, no division tactical training was conducted by any Soviet forces in 1991 or 1992 -- for 1995, field exercises are only planned to the regimental level. Add to this serious draft evasion and conflicting loyalties between the traditional forces and ethnic republics, and morale in the Soviet armed forces has become very low. Those officers who build the successor armies may well be ideologically cynical and cautious about building a larger army than military logic and political will can support.
Rumors of an impending coup sponsored by disgruntled elements of the old military- industrial complex continue to circulate. Some refer to the complex as a "16th republic" which could restore the former union. Various groups of officers have organized unions, associations, and protest meetings. By and large, their interests seem to center on protecting a professional military environment and quality of life for soldiers rather than on usurping political control. Although a region-wide coup sponsored by the military seems unlikely, should economic conditions totally deteriorate instances of local commanders taking over local governments could occur. Such cases of "warlordism" would probably revolve around unit survival, not political ambition. This was illustrated in September 1995, when the Northern Fleet seized power stations in the Kola Peninsula after electricity had been cut off to submarine bases for non-payment of $4.4 million in bills.
Quantity versus Quality. Russian and Soviet armies have invariably been thought of in terms of size, mass, and immense expenditure of blood and resources. Such resources and philosophy eventually overwhelmed the smaller but more technically qualified and doctrinally agile German forces in World War II. The Russians would, of course, prefer to exploit both quantity and quality. As Lenin said, however, "Quantity has a quality all its own." During the Cold War, U.S. and NATO planners were always faced with an enormous disparity in their own and Soviet armored vehicle production and ability to generate combat divisions. Warsaw Pact attack plans featured multiple echelons of attacking forces, with massed artillery and tanks creating decisive force-ratio advantages at critical points. It should be noted that many Soviet artillery and tank models were of high technical quality. As a technical response, and for other reasons, the West developed tactical nuclear weapons and precision guided antitank missiles. In the late 1970s, the Soviets adopted a methodology for static force-on-force assessment that combined qualitative and quantitative measures.
Given their traditions, it is possible that future Russian officers may continue to favor the security of building large military formations. Many now, however, have doubts. The Commander in Chief of Ground Forces, Colonel General Semenov, criticized excessive Soviet force levels by saying, "And ultimately we filled the country with piles of metal in the form of vast quantities of stockpiled hardware which there are neither the people nor the money to operate. The result -- direct losses to the national economy." Another stark lesson Soviet military planners are studying is the dramatic victory of Western arms against great quantities of Iraqi-manned Soviet material in Desert Storm. Diligent students of war, the Soviets intend to glean the correct lessons about modern military technology and warfighting from their observations made in and around Iraq. The new military doctrine accepts a "revolution in military affairs" and emphasizes deep strike weapons and information warfare. Priority will be given to research for new weapons rather than serial production. Events in Chechnya, however, show that the Russian military still believes in massed firepower, even when more patient, humane, and sophisticated methods would seem more appropriate to western observers.
The Russians continue to develop new weapons and command and control (C2) systems to support their future restructuring and to remain competitive with the West. In July 1993, many government officials were given a demonstration of more than 100 new and experimental items of ground force equipment. The T-90 and T-80U tanks exercised were reputed to match the U.S. M1A2. Although the Navy is retiring half of their 250 submarines, 5 modern boats were launched in 1993. Undersea warfare appears to remain a high priority for Russian research and development. Testing of a new air defense system was revealed to the public in March 1995. The Ministry of Defense has stated that its acquisition priority is modern command, control, and communications (C3).
The unlikelihood of any unified C.I.S. force, new security perceptions, and continuation of military reforms initiated in the late Soviet period will lead to major structural and doctrinal changes. Immense fronts and theaters of old will be replaced by much smaller regional commands. In October 1991 it was announced that the basis for Russian combat formations would change from field armies to corps and combined arms brigades. These smaller, more flexible units could be made compatible with NATO operations, should that be desired in the future.
A related concern is what the future attitude will be towards weapons of mass destruction. Soviet military planners have long incorporated tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, and possibly biological agents, into their doctrine as a matter of course. Despite actions in the arms control arena, new Russian military doctrine does not rule out limited nuclear warfighting. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons remain in Russia, as does an estimated 40,000 tons of lethal chemical agents.
Conscript versus Professional. Conscription served the Soviet armed forces well on many counts. It was a way to raise large numbers of young men to undergo an experience that was not always pleasant, as noted above. Although not part of a market economy, military costs were a factor and conscription made personnel costs affordable. For example, conscripts were paid about $5.50 U.S. per month. Perhaps most important, however, by cycling millions of men through the military every two years, the Soviets built an enormous pool of recently trained reservists. Industry had also produced great pools of stored equipment. Thus, Soviet military planners could consider reconstituting one or two hundred divisions early in a major war, along with additional navy, air, and air defense forces.
Conscription has drawbacks, and many Soviet officers advocate going part way toward a professional, volunteer army on the U.S. and British models. Short-term conscripts - - now obligated for 2 years -- do not provide the numbers of skilled specialists needed to operate sophisticated weapon systems, nor do they provide enough experienced sergeants to lead small units through fast-paced, independent actions that might occur on modern battlefields. On the other hand, volunteers cost money (4 to 5 times as much), and future force planners cannot count on adequate funds. Most public Russian projections now are for a hybrid force containing a 40%-60% mix, either way, of conscripts and volunteers (also called "contract personnel"). Local efforts to recruit volunteers for 3-year contracts have been successful. Even if such a mix is feasible, both current difficulties in enforcing the draft and in squeezing funds from a shaky economy argue for much lower force levels in the future (drafts have been yielding only about 15% of eligible draftees). Defense Minister Grachev is not ready to switch yet, telling the Duma that contract service is "unhealthy," and that "in Rus (old Russia) people always served not for pay, but for the faith, for the tsar, and for the fatherland." He has criticized the performance of contract soldiers in Chechnya and suggested that pay must be further raised to ensure a quality professional cadre.
Offense versus Defense. Since the 1930s, the dominant emphasis in Soviet military doctrine has been the offensive at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. This preoccupation was reinforced by the successes of the great campaigns of 1944-45 against the Germans on the Eastern Front, and by the 1945 strategic offensive against Japan in Manchuria. The latter, known as August Storm, was similar in decisiveness to the U.S. Desert Storm of 1991. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet military planning was fixed on building the potential for a rapid offensive across Western Europe should war erupt. By the 1970s, weapons, units, command structures, and logistics were designed and emplaced to that end. Innovative Operational Maneuver Groups were formed to penetrate and destroy NATO rear areas and nuclear strike capabilities.
It was a shock when Gorbachev, to make arms control and accommodation with the West credible, decided to change to the strategic defensive. No one knew what size force would ensure "defensive sufficiency," but an initial reduction of 500,000 men was undertaken. The Soviet military bureaucracy was only slowly changing doctrine, plans, and force structure when the Cold War abruptly ended. There is, therefore, an immense residual of offensive-oriented material, literature, and mindset. Although new Russian doctrine forswears large-scale surprise attacks, its "reliable defense" includes provisions to generate massive counter-offensives into enemy territory and stresses acquisition of modern precision weapons and communications capabilities. Smaller battles, however, confront them in today's regional conflicts, resistance movements, insurgencies, and terrorism. Offensive doctrine at the tactical and operational levels will be essential for future success.
Projections of future military force sizes and structures vary widely among current responsible officials. Former U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov, acting as commander-in-chief of the successor force, wanted to maintain a centralized force for the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even before C.I.S. he had planned a drawdown to 3.0 million men. A complicating factor was that some republics -- notably Ukraine -- held firm for carving off their own portion of the force. By November 1991, Shaposhnikov agreed to discuss "resubordination" with the new Ukrainian Defense Minister. By March 1992, Russia began to establish a separate defense identity, and C.I.S. eventually lost claim to all conventional forces. No one knows how long it will take to sort out all the new institutional arrangements for the former Soviet Union, but some foreign observers predict 10 years, and General Semenov mentioned the year 2000 for all "military reforms" to be completed. Based on current trends, post-Soviet armed forces will be multiple, independent military forces with minimal central control and coordination.
The people of Ukraine voted for total independence on December 1, 1991, spelling the end of the U.S.S.R., and, subsequently, for maintaining unified Soviet forces. Russia quickly reconfigured and asserted control over a sizeable portion of the former Soviet armed forces. Without an effective armed force, it was vulnerable to secession movements by some of its ethnic minorities such as the Chechens and Tatars, to border adjustments by former fraternal republics, and to problems along its Siberian borders with China and Japan. Although President Yeltsin worked hard to keep the former Red Army together under C.I.S. control, on March 16, 1992 he announced formation of the Defense Ministry for a Russian military force. By May 8, even Kazakhstan had followed suit. Various rearrangements of command, nationalization, and deployments continue; estimates of current status are shown below.
The active armed forces of Russia will likely be somewhat comparable in size to U.S. armed forces. In September 1995, President Yeltsin announced a reduction to 1.5 million, although Defense Minister Grachev stated that 2.1 million were required. Its most unique feature will be the strategic deterrent forces, its surviving signature of a superpower, where systems for nuclear deterrence and defense will be maintained. An Army, Navy, Air Force, and Border Guards will be spread over a huge country, and their mission will likely be defense of borders and internal stability. For some time, power projection will likely be limited to assisting former republics, as treaties and circumstances allow, and participation in U.N. efforts in Eurasian trouble spots such as Bosnia. A high priority will be creation of a Mobile Force based on several airborne divisions, helicopter regiments, fighter and bomber squadrons, and organic transport aviation. The new naval strategy stresses peacetime containment of potential adversaries and wartime defense of the coast and sea communications. They intend to remain one of the few nations with an advanced nuclear submarine capability.
The Ukrainian armed forces, had they controlled all former Soviet forces on its territory, would have been 1.2 million strong. Defense officials instead planned for a force, based on the number of Ukrainians in uniform, of about 420,000. Defense Minister Morozoz, responding to criticism of such a large force, referred to it as a "transitional" force that could eventually be reduced to 200,000-250,000. This force includes a naval component based on the Black Sea Fleet, an elite National Guard, and a small group of "red berets" selected from Interior Ministry (MVD) troops. Ukraine has left nuclear weapons under Moscow's control, with alleged veto power over employing them from Ukrainian territory. After a long period of wrangling over the allegiances of military personnel and how to divide the 300 ships of the Black Sea Fleet, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine reached agreement. As of August, 1992 the fleet and ports will be under joint command of Russia and Ukraine for 3 years. Details of an ultimate division are still under discussion.
Other republic forces will be smaller than the Russian and Ukrainian. All former republics have now organized independent forces, Tajikistan doing so only in the fall of 1993. Central Asian republics initially favored confederation with C.I.S. over the expense of independent forces. Turkmenistan has proposed a joint arrangement to share forces with the Russian Federation since C.I.S. has become powerless to subsidize conventional forces. Uzbekistan may have the best of the Central Asian forces. Most former Soviet states, lacking their own institutions, will continue for some time to rely upon Russia to train various officers and specialists.
President Gorbachev clearly intended to maintain central control of all military forces under the treaties he advanced for the proposed "Union of Sovereign States." That proposal died on December 8, 1991, when Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed a treaty to form the Commonwealth of Independent States, subsequently endorsed by a total of 11 former Soviet republics. The leaders of the former Soviet armed forces supported the political leadership of the new Commonwealth. All parties initially agreed to maintain central control of all strategic nuclear forces. The former U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense, Air Marshall Shaposhnikov, was named Commander in Chief of all C.I.S. forces. Central command of conventional forces did not prove possible, as noted above. Central control of strategic nuclear forces was also abandoned, with Russia assuming launch authority from C.I.S. in July 1993.
The post-Soviet armed forces, while they are enduring their turbulent transition, are unlikely to constitute a dominant threat to U.S. and world security. The safety and control of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons will, of course, be of serious concern. The focus for the new forces will be internal and regional rather than global; their military effectiveness or lack thereof could become factors for stability or instability in many tension spots within Eurasia. Many consider it in the U.S. interest to encourage emerging trends: democratization and civilian control of the military, adherence to international arms control and conflict resolution processes, and perhaps close cooperation or associate status with NATO. Cooperation with the emerging military forces of the former U.S.S.R., rather than competition, could provide the United States some leverage to affect the many changes that are occurring around the rim of our previous chief adversary, from Eastern Europe through Southwest Asia to North Korea. Major decisions and trends in these areas will develop largely in the context of regional perceptions, politics, and threats, but U.S. influence may well be a factor.
Most of the trends identified in assessing the future of former Soviet armed forces are positive in terms of U.S. security interests. Certainly, the unlikely but possible prospect of a reversion to conditions akin to those of the Cold War era merits preventive attention. Policy questions center about whether it is wise to intervene in this historic process, and, if so, what measures could be effective?
A case is widely argued for large-scale programs to aid the transition to democratic/market systems. Supporters argue that the transition in prospect may well be socially explosive, could dissolve into anarchic disorder, and consequently result in migrations of dangerous proportions or a militarily restored regime of adversarial and authoritarian nature. Avoidance of such developments, it is argued, justifies expenditures that are large in terms of foreign aid but small in comparison to U.S. defense budgets past and prospective. The Clinton Administration has proclaimed that the stakes are high and deserve active engagement by the United States.
Arguments are made, on the other hand, for the United States to maintain a low profile as the former Soviet Union evolves. Realistically, it is unlikely that the dissolution of the global communist threat is reversible; efforts formerly devoted to containment of that threat should be redirected to other needs. Proposals to render aid for the transformation of the former Soviet economy properly compete with other U.S. spending priorities, many of them domestic. In the long term, the states of the former U.S.S.R. must create their own recovery -- most of them have significant natural resources and talented peoples. The rest of this section examines proposals directed at lingering security concerns such as "loose" control of nuclear weapons.
The United States, at a minimum, could foster an image of concern. It can share all its knowledge of democratic and free market institutions, and particularly how military institutions can interact within such a society. It can demonstrate willingness to entertain a leadership role in mustering critical emergency assistance from the developed nations, should that be necessary. These measures should not be costly and would maintain prudent engagement with unfolding events.
The United States can make a significant contribution as one of the possible role models. Only minor appropriated funds might offer significant returns if they encourage a large number of exchange visits across the range of governmental activities; in the security arena, military-to-military contacts could significantly influence organization of new military institutions throughout the former U.S.S.R. while giving American officers unprecedented access to individuals and regions formerly closed. As a start, the Class of 1993 at the U.S. Army War College included a Russian and a Ukrainian student as International Fellows. In the summer of 1994, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division exercised with Russian forces in Russia. Another joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercise took place during October 1995 in Kansas.
Congress took the initiative in addressing immediate concerns over safety of the former Soviet Union's huge stockpile of nuclear and other weapons. In P.L. 102-228 (Section 201 et seq.) and P.L. 102-229 (Section 108) Congress included language giving the President authority to spend up to $400 million of DOD funds to assist "successor entities" of the former Soviet Union in destroying "nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons." In addition, these Acts (Section 301 and Section 109, respectively) gave the President authority to spend up to $100 million for "humanitarian assistance" to such successor entities. In early 1992, the U.S. Air Force flew 54 sorties of food and medicine to 23 cities of the former Soviet Union. The United States will fund, with $25 million, international science centers in Russia and Ukraine to engage former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists with the problems of de-nuclearization. In addition, the United States has donated special equipment for transport of nuclear weapons; secure rail cars, large containers, and bullet-proof "blankets." Despite slow initial implementation, Nunn-Lugar funding has continued and now totals $1.052 billion obligated.
In the post-Cold War period, U.S. forces will also be smaller. Many factors govern the overall extent of U.S. drawdown and the refocusing of national military strategy. Former Soviet forces will, however, still play a role in determining U.S. force design and expenditures. Their strategic nuclear capabilities will continue to demand attention, both in arms control activities and research and development. The conventional capabilities of independent Russian and Ukrainian armed forces will at least match those of other regional powers as potential challenges. It is possible that remnants of the old Soviet weapons design bureaus, once streamlined and modernized, will continue to produce state-of-the-art systems U.S. labs will need to counter. Russian fighter aircraft, in particular, continue to intrigue the international arms trade community and new submarine models are of concern to the U.S. Navy.
A centralized Commonwealth of Independent States military would retain some of the vaunted Soviet ability to generate huge ground forces, and the United States should consider retaining its ability to reconstitute large forces in the event of reversal of the global situation and the need to mobilize. Warning times should be measured in months, compared to days during the Cold War. A related, new military expenditure, not necessarily large, is indicated in the need to expand the pool of intelligence analysts and area experts to follow events and interact with the new military organizations of the former Soviet republics. In the past, it was only thought necessary for Soviet and East European area specialists to learn Russian language and culture since it was common throughout the Soviet Union, and even the Warsaw Pact. Now that requirement has become more complex and demanding -- programs to teach additional languages and monitor independent military-political developments may be required.
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief 93108. Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol. (Updated regularly)
CRS Issue Brief 95077. The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff. (Updated regularly)
CRS Issue Brief 91144. Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Location, Command, and Control, by Amy F. Woolf. (Updated regularly)
CRS Issue Brief 92089. Russia, by Steven J. Woehrel. [Washington] 1992. (Updated regularly)
CRS Reports
CRS Report 94-812. Russian Officer Resettlement Program, by Steven J. Woehrel.