![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
This issue brief is one of several on tactical aviation programs. Others review --
CRS Issue Brief 92035, F/A-18E/F Aircraft Program
CRS Issue Brief 87111, F-22 Aircraft Program, and,
CRS Issue Brief 86103, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Congress has questioned these tactical aircraft modernization plans on grounds of affordability and requirements. Members of defense oversight committees have called for assessment of these programs from a joint, interservice perspective, rather than on a program-by-program basis. In assessing these plans, Congress may consider several issues, including cost and affordability, mission requirements, force levels, service roles and missions, and effects on the defense industrial base. Congress has generally provided funding as requested and authorized the F-22, F/A- 18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as well as the Marine Corps's V-22 tilt-rotor transport aircraft, which until 1993 the Administration considered unaffordable.
For FY1997, the Administration requested funding for the F/A-18E/F ($2.5 billion), F-22 ($2 billion), V-22 ($1.1 billion), and JSF ($589 million) as well as the C-17 airlifter ($2.2 billion) and smaller tactical aircraft programs, such as the AV-8B, F-15E, and F-16. The conference report on FY1997 defense authorizations approved funding as requested for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F and more than was requested for the V-22 and JSF programs. House and Senate conferees agreed to appropriate funding for these programs essentially as authorized with some minor reductions.
Tactical or theater aircraft -- fighters, fighter/attack planes, and attack planes -- constitute a major component of U.S. military capability. They played a prominent role in Operation Desert Storm and are expected to play a leading role in future military operations, particularly in situations where U.S. leaders hope to limit or avoid the commitment of U.S. ground forces. Tactical aviation, including both combat and support aircraft, may account for as much as one-fifth of the defense budget, counting the costs of developing, procuring, and operating aircraft, engines, avionics, and weapon systems, manpower, training, and administrative costs.
The U.S. military currently operates some 3,000 fixed-wing tactical combat aircraft. Of these, the Air Force operates about 63% and the Navy and the Marine Corps about 37%. In addition to these fixed-wing combat aircraft, the Army operates tactical combat helicopters. This issue brief focuses on fixed-wing aircraft.
These aircraft are referred to as "tactical" combat aircraft to distinguish them from the Air Force's B-52, B-1, B-2, and F-111 "strategic" bombers. When applied to aircraft, "tactical" means smaller and shorter-ranged, while "strategic" means larger and longer-ranged. Both tactical and strategic types are operated by USAF's Air Combat Command, which in 1992 replaced Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC). Reflecting the post-Cold War demise of SAC and TAC, tactical types are now sometimes referred to as "theater aircraft."
Fighter planes primarily engage in air-to-air combat, either at close/visual range or at ranges requiring radar-guided missiles and stand-off munitions (sometimes termed "precision-guided munitions"/PGMs). Attack planes focus on air-to-surface combat operations such as close air support (CAS) for friendly ground forces engaged in battle, battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against enemy forces away from the front line, and deep interdiction (also known as deep strike) against the enemy's military and industrial infrastructure. Fighter/attack planes (also known as fighter-bombers, strike fighters, or multirole fighters) perform both air-to-air and air-to-surface missions. Long-range bombers and cruise missiles can also be used in BAI and deep strike operations. Differing air-to-air and air-to-surface missions and differing basing modes (i.e., sea versus land-based) have resulted in differing performance specifications for combat aircraft, making commonality in aircraft between missions and services difficult to achieve in many cases.
In response to an emerging congressional consensus and recommendations by the Defense Department's bottom-up review of U.S. force structure requirements, the Clinton Administration decided in late 1993 to continue two major aircraft programs then underway -- the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter, a low-observable-to-radar (stealthy) fighter being developed for the Air Force; and the F/A-18E/F, a new version of the F/A-18 fighter/attack plane being developed for the Navy Department -- while also pursuing new aviation technology initiatives through the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program. The Bush Administration's plan for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft had focused on four key aircraft programs: (1) the F-22, (2) the F/A-18E/F, (3) the AFX, a stealthy attack/fighter aircraft to be developed for the Navy and Air Force, and (4) the Multirole Fighter (MRF), a new aircraft or an upgraded version of the Air Force F-16 fighter/attack plane envisioned for the Air Force.
The F-22, built by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, features a stealthy design (difficult to detect by radar), advanced engines by Pratt and Whitney, and new avionics by Hughes and other subcontractors. It will replace the F-15 as the Air Force's air superiority fighter. The program was in competitive prototyping from 1986 to 1991 and is now in engineering and manufacturing development, with first prototype flights expected in May 1997. (See CRS Issue Brief 87111, F-22 Aircraft Program.) Like the F-15E, the F-22 will have some air-to-surface attack capabilities although primarily designed for air-to-air fighter operations.
The F/A-18E/F, built by McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, and powered by General Electric engines, is an enlarged and more expensive version of the current F/A- 18 fighter/attack plane. With more range/payload than existing F/A-18s and more potential for future modernization, it also features radar-low-observable modifications. The plane will replace the Navy Department's F/A-18A/Bs and C/Ds in the fighter/attack mission and will eventually assume the air-to-air missions now performed by the F-14 fighter as well as some missions of the A-6 attack plane. In May 1992, the program entered engineering and manufacturing development as a major modification of the F/A-18 design. (See CRS Issue Brief 92035, F/A-18E/F Aircraft Program.)
The AFX program started as the "AX" in 1991, following cancellation of the Navy's A-12 attack plane program in January 1991. Compared to the goals established for the A-12, the AFX attack/fighter was to have less range/payload and less stealth but was to be less expensive. The plane would have entered service first with the Navy as a replacement for aging carrier-based A-6Es, and later with the Air Force as a replacement for F-111, F-117, and F-15E attack and fighter-attack aircraft. When canceled in September 1993, the program was only in its concept design stage.
The MRF (Multirole Fighter) was the least well defined program in the 1992 modernization plan, with no funding for the MRF in budget requests for FY1993 or FY1994. Described as either a new aircraft design or an upgrade or derivative of the Air Force F-16 fighter/attack plane, the MRF program had by late 1992 been deferred indefinitely, and in September 1993 it was officially canceled.
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) -- originally designated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program -- emerged in the wake of cancellations of the AFX and MRF in late 1993. Conceived as a comprehensive R&D effort to design and develop components and systems for joint-service and multi-purpose aircraft that would be affordable and could meet post-2000 military requirements, the program includes work on advanced airframes, engines, avionics, and munitions. Some critics charged in 1994 that JAST was not focused enough on production of aircraft to maintain necessary inventories and capabilities in U.S. tactical aviation. Others argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union will allow time to explore various possibilities for meeting future requirements and noted that future threats as well as technological developments are unpredictable.
In 1994, Congress directed the JAST program to include development of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft as well as conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) types. On November 16, 1996, the Defense Department announced selection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin to demonstrate their designs for a Joint Strike Fighter in a 51-month competition. One of these contractors will be chosen in 2001 to develop and build the JSF family of joint-service and multi-purpose fighter/attack planes, with CTOLs for the U.S. Air Force and Navy and STOVL aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.K. Royal Navy. As now projected, production would begin around 2005, with procurement of over 3,000 planes (USAF, 2,036; USMC, 642; USN, 300; RN, 60). JSF program officials maintain that these aircraft will be affordable because of commonality among components and high-volume production of planes to meet service requirements. (See CRS Report 96-980, Joint Strike Fighter Program: Background, Status, and Issues, December 4, 1996.)
In FY1994-FY1996, Congress provided $404 million of the $583 million requested for the JAST program, which in March 1996 was projected by the program office to cost some $2.2 billion in FY1997-FY2000. The Administration's FY1997 budget requested $589 million for the JSF program in Air Force ($263.8 million), Navy ($246.8 million), and Defense Department ($78.4 million) R&D funds. Congress authorized and appropriated $602 million for the JSF program in FY1997, including $10 million to support competitive engine work. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended funding as requested, while questioning "the current pace of the Joint Strike Fighter program, given the costs to continue it, the potential for cost growth, and the need to fund other service high priorities now and in the future." (S.Rept. 104-286: 99). The conference report on the FY1997 defense authorizations bill retained a House provision (Section 220) requiring a report by May 15, 1997, detailing force structure requirements for projected threats in 2000-2025, alternative force mixes of aircraft and munitions, and estimated costs, operational effectiveness, and delivery schedules for these weapon systems. (H.Rept. 104-724: 37-38.)
The V-22 Tilt-Rotor Aircraft, built by Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters for the U.S. Marine Corps, will replace aging helicopters to transport troops and equipment into combat zones. Although not designated as part of the Administration's tactical aircraft modernization effort, the V-22 will be in funding competition with these aircraft programs when it enters production in the late 1990s. Estimated by the Defense Department to cost some $46.6 billion for development and production of 523 aircraft, the program was funded by Congress at about $1.3 billion in FY1997. (See CRS Issue Brief 86103, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.)
Decisions made by Congress and the Defense Department over the next few years may have important long-range implications. The F-22 and F/A-18E/F are approaching procurement and could remain in production for 20 years or more. The next-generation combat aircraft that are expected to result from joint-service efforts now getting underway through the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program might be in production through the 2020s. Decisions about the funding of these programs will influence which U.S. aircraft manufacturers survive in the aviation industry and may well affect the division of combat roles and missions among the services in the next century.
Congressional debate on tactical aviation has recently reflected desires by the defense committees to assess tactical aircraft programs from a joint and interservice perspective rather than on a program-by-program or service-by-service basis. The JAST/JSF program is a prime example of this concern for joint-service development and procurement of weapon systems and equipment for budgetary reasons. In 1994, the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that "the only affordable long-term modernization plan must maximize commonality, where the Air Force and the Navy procure and operate the same aircraft." The Committee also "believes that both the Air Force and the Navy could face the same threats and operate side by side, necessitating a common technological approach." (S.Rept. 103-282, p. 82.)
Given probable reductions in defense spending due to concerns over budget deficits, can we afford tactical aircraft modernization programs as currently projected?
Tactical aviation accounts for a significant share of the U.S. defense budget, although estimates vary widely, depending on how costs are allocated. In 1995, some Defense Department analysts estimated that over 40% of the projected cost of developing and producing the 20 most expensive weapon systems during the FY1996-FY2013 period would go to three tactical aviation programs: JAST (16.5 %), F-22 (14.5%), and F/A- 18E/F (11%). These data did not assess the relative military value of such aircraft in comparison with other weapon systems, however, nor did they compare the cost of aircraft with that of other weapon systems on an historical basis. In FY1996, tactical aircraft programs accounted for about 6% of the acquisition budget, and these programs are currently projected to account for roughly 10% of the acquisition in the FY1997- FY2001 Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
Bush Administration officials argued that their tactical aircraft modernization plan was designed to be affordable within the smaller defense budgets projected for future years. In efforts to reduce tactical aviation costs, the Administration terminated several aircraft programs in 1990-92, including continued procurement of Navy F-14D fighter/attack planes and development of a naval variant of the Air Force F-22 stealth fighter. In a hearing on tactical aircraft before the House Armed Services Committee on April 29, 1992, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysts testified that the procurement costs of the four tactical aircraft in the Administration's plan would be affordable "only under optimistic assumptions about trends in costs and available funds." CBO concluded that these aircraft would probably be procured in smaller numbers than originally planned and without some of the technological features and performance capabilities that earlier were regarded as military requirements.
In a hearing on the same subject before the House National Security Committee's R&D and Procurement Subcommittees on June 27, 1996, CBO analysts expressed similar doubts about the JSF, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs, concluding that DOD is understating the costs of these aircraft, which "may not be affordable and will probably need to be scaled back...." General Accounting Office (GAO) analysts also testified that attempting to pay for DOD's tactical aviation programs as planned "appears to be unrealistic" in light of probable levels of defense spending in the 2000s.
Given the demise of the Soviet Union and the changed international security environment, how capable do U.S. tactical aircraft need to be?
The F-22 program was started in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union was expected to continue producing high-performance aircraft and air-defense missiles that could pose serious threats in the 1990s and beyond. Both the F-22 and the AFX were justified as advanced, stealthy aircraft capable of performing their missions in a high-threat environment. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the changed international environment, some question whether the United States needs to develop and procure large quantities of expensive, high-capability aircraft. Alternatives would be to produce only limited numbers of these aircraft, focusing instead on upgrading and extending the service lives of existing combat aircraft such as the Air Force's F-15E and F-16 and the Navy's F-14D and F/A-18.
Others argue that high-capability aircraft are still necessary because the former Soviet bloc may continue aircraft and missile programs for export to potential adversaries of the United States and its allies. It is also argued that some European and Asian companies will be able to market advanced aircraft and missiles to potential enemies. In this view, the demise of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of potential high-threat areas requiring advanced aircraft. For example, Iraq's Air Force included some advanced, Soviet-designed fighters that are aerodynamically equivalent to the F-15, and its air-defense system included advanced equipment of both Soviet and European design. Against this force, the F-117 played a crucial role in attacking targets in high-threat areas. Such advanced aircraft, it is argued, will help ensure operational success in future conflicts with well-armed adversaries.
Most of those questioning the modernization plan acknowledge that proliferation of advanced aircraft and air-defense equipment in the Third World will require the United States to field some new-generation high-capability aircraft. They argue, however, that the Gulf War showed the United States has a formidable advantage in air-to-air combat, which can be maintained by procuring a limited number of F-22s for use against those adversaries who may be able to make effective use of modern Soviet or European aircraft. They note that the 40 some F-117s used in the Gulf War constituted a tiny percentage of all tactical aircraft employed against Iraq and that only a few of the non-stealthy planes used in the Gulf War were shot down, even in the early days of the war. Moreover, they argue that cruise missiles and stealthy B-2 bombers as well as B-1 bombers and F-111s equipped with adequate standoff munitions could be used against heavily defended targets. In this view, the F-22 can be procured in limited quantities and operated as special "silver bullet" forces.
Others take issue with the need for any F-22s, arguing that the Air Force and Navy will face generally the same adversary aircraft in the future and currently have roughly equal capability in air-to-air combat as well as considerable air-to-surface attack capabilities with F-15Es and F-14Ds. Others point out that the Navy will eventually conduct its air-to-air combat mission primarily with the F/A-18E/F -- an updated version of a 1970s-era strike-fighter. If the Navy does not need a new-generation fighter for the post-Cold War era, they ask, why is such an aircraft required for the Air Force? Some also argue that the improved attack capability of the F/A-18E/F will be sufficient for carrier-based attack missions against the most likely adversaries in regional conflicts. On the other hand, GAO analysts have argued that the F/A-18E/F's performance improvements over the current C/D version may not be cost-effective. Furthermore, it can be argued that the successful development of longer-range and more accurate and lethal standoff munitions would significantly increase the combat effectiveness of current-generation tactical aircraft. (See Missiles for standoff attack: Alternatives to the TSSAM program by Bert Cooper. CRS Report 95-889 F, December 6, 1995.)
How many wings of tactical aircraft does the United States need?
The Bush Administration's proposed Base Force for the mid-1990s and beyond reduced force structure to 26.5 Air Force fighter and attack wings, 13 Navy carrier air wings, and four Marine Corps air wings (compared to 35, 15, and 4 air wings respectively in FY1990). Budgetary considerations and radically altered international conditions led to these reductions, which some argued were appropriate for the post-Cold War era, while others saw this reduced force structure as excessive after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced in September 1993 that the Clinton Administration projected a base force of 20 Air Force fighter/attack wings, 11 Navy carrier air wings, and four Marine Corps air wings.
The question of how many wings of tactical aircraft the United States needs for the post-Cold War era, and how this number should be determined, is part of an on-going debate in the Defense Department and Congress over the proper overall size of the U.S. military for the mid-1990s and beyond. Decisions on this issue can affect views on the affordability and focus of plans for modernizing tactical aircraft. A reduction in the number of air wings would lead to a corresponding reduction in the number of aircraft to be procured. On the other hand, a reduction in the number of air wings may lead to a decision to increase the percentage of higher-cost F-22s and naval aircraft in the force, on grounds that reduced forces need more capable equipment.
How should views on service roles and missions be factored into decisions on tactical aircraft modernization?
The high cost of tactical aircraft programs has renewed interest in the division of tactical aviation roles and missions among the services. The apparent redundancy in tactical aviation among the services -- the Air Force plus air components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army -- has often been criticized as a duplication of efforts. In May 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions advocated the continuation of air components in every service, but suggested that the overall force structure as well as the mix of capabilities and support infrastructure should be reviewed. GAO analysts concluded in 1996 that DOD's current plans for tactical aviation have not taken adequate account of overall capabilities and requirements from a joint-service perspective.
The main roles-and-missions issue affecting current modernization plans concerns the respective roles of the Air Force and Navy in projecting U.S. air power overseas. Most defense analysts view this as not an either-or question but a question of the appropriate balance between these services in a shared and joint mission. Some would give the Air Force primary responsibility for power projection overseas; others argue that geopolitical factors would require naval assets for sustained air operations in many situations. Canceling the AFX in 1993 and relying mainly on the attack capabilities of the F/A-18E/F has been viewed by some as reducing the Navy's role in overseas projection of air power, which to some would call into question the value of aircraft carriers. Others would argue that carrier-based aircraft are needed for missions other than deep-strike operations, such as shorter-range land attack, air superiority, airborne early warning, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.
How should industrial-base considerations be factored into decisions on tactical aircraft modernization?
Congressional decisions on tactical aviation programs will have major implications for the aerospace sector of the U.S. industrial base, which has long been a major source of technological innovations as well as export earnings. Aerospace is the nation's leading net exporter of manufactured goods, with a trade surplus of some $22 billion in 1995. There is general agreement that there are more aircraft manufacturers and subcontractors than may be needed in the post-Cold War era -- or more than recent levels of defense spending can sustain. Consequently, the aerospace industry, like other industries that have been heavily dependent on Pentagon spending, is now undergoing a shakeout, with some companies leaving the military aircraft business and others merging with financially stronger competitors and downsizing production lines; e.g., during 1994 Lockheed bought General Dynamics' aircraft production facilities in Ft. Worth, Texas; Grumman merged with Northrop; and Martin Marietta merged with Lockheed. Similar buy-outs and mergers have continued, with Boeing buying McDonnell Douglas in December 1996.
Congressional decisions on which military aircraft programs to support may in large part determine which aircraft manufacturers and subcontractors remain in business. While the U.S. economy as a whole regularly absorbs declines equal in magnitude to that projected for defense aerospace, in the short- and medium-term, thousands of skilled engineering and manufacturing jobs as well the health of local and regional economies are at stake. Some argue that preservation of critical components of U.S. defense industry is now as important as military requirements, which have always been matters of judgment based on threat assumptions that are subject to change. There is no apparent consensus, however, about what is critical to future U.S. military requirements or how excess military industrial capabilities can be converted to civilian production that might enhance international competitiveness in export trade.
Several questions arise out of the industrial base issue: How many aircraft manufacturers are needed to support U.S. military needs? Should the survivability of these firms be taken into account in deciding which aircraft programs to pursue? Which aspects of the aerospace industry are unique and vital to production of tactical aircraft? How can competitiveness among U.S. defense contractors be maintained with fewer firms? Should foreign sales of U.S. military aircraft be factored into decisions on which tactical aircraft programs to pursue? How might decisions on tactical aircraft programs affect U.S. export earnings and international competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry? There are no easy answers to such questions and no consensus on these industrial base issues, which confront all industrial nations in the 1990s.
For FY1997, the Administration's proposed defense budget requested funding for the Air Force F-22 ($2,003 million in R&D funds); the Navy/Marine Corps F/A-18E/F ($2,515.3 million -- $2,154.8 for procurement of 12 planes and $360.5 in R&D funds); the Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft ($1,135.5 million -- $558.7 for procurement of 4 aircraft and $576.8 in R&D funds); and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, also known as JAST, ($589 million -- $263.8 in Air Force, $246.8 in Navy, and $78.4 in DOD R&D funds). The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program was designated the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program in 1996.
The Administration's FY1997 budget also requested funds for procurement of four F15E ($185.4 million) and four F-16 ($105.5 million) Air Force fighter/attack planes; the Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) fighter/attack plane ($321.8 million for R&D and procurement of 10 remanufactured planes); and development of a Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) for Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft ($198.6 million). FY1997 funds were also requested for eight C-17 airlifters ($2,230.3 million) and weapon-modification of the B-2 strategic bomber ($633.6 million).
The House version of the FY1997 defense authorizations bill (H.R. 3230, passed May 15, 1996) authorized funding as requested for the F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter and $1,414.5 million for the V-22, funding procurement of six aircraft instead of the four requested. The House also authorized more than was requested for several other programs; e.g., procurement of 6 F-16s, 6 F-15Es, 10 C-17s, and 14 remanufactured AV-8Bs and $290 million more than requested for the B-2. The House also authorized funds as requested for development of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Standoff Land Attack Missile with Expanded Response (SLAM ER), and Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) as well as funding that was not requested for procurement of three Air Force standoff munitions: 250 AGM-130s, 100 Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs), and 50 AGM-142 Have Nap missiles. (For more information on these tactical missiles, see CRS Report 96-880F, November 6, 1996.)
The most controversial tactical aviation issue in the House authorization bill was its limitation of JSF funds to developing conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) planes, which could meet Air Force and Navy requirements but not those of other participants in the program. As reported by the House National Security Committee, H.R. 3230 contained language (Section 220 b) prohibiting use of Joint Strike Fighter funds for development of advanced short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. This would preclude participation in the JSF program by the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.K. Royal Navy, which require planes that are not dependent on long runways and can operate from amphibious ships. The Senate version of the authorization bill did not include the House bill's exclusion of STOVL aircraft from the JSF program, and this language was not included in the conference. (See Corps Plans Offensive to Restore STOVL Cancellation. Navy News & Undersea Technology, May 13, 1996: 1, 3; see also remarks by Representatives McDade and Peterson in Congressional Record. May 14, 1996: H4933-H4934, H4939.)
The House Appropriations Committee directed DOD to include in the JSF program a STOVL aircraft to be developed "concurrently with, or ahead of, other variants." The House version of the FY1997 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3610, passed June 13, 1996) funded the F/A-18E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs essentially as requested but with some additional funds, while providing $20.5 million less than the $2,003 million requested for the F-22 and more than was requested for the V-22 ($1,474.5 million, including funds for six aircraft vs. the four requested). H.R. 3610 would also fund procurement of four F-16s as requested, 12 F-15Es (vs. the 4 requested), 12 remanufactured AV-8Bs (vs. the 10 requested), and 10 C-17s (vs. the 8 requested), while providing $50 million less the $198.6 million requested for JASSM. For other standoff munitions programs, the House bill would appropriate more than was requested for SLAM ER and JSOW as well as funding that was not requested for procurement of AGM-142 Have Naps ($20 million), AGM-130s ($40 million), and 100 CALCMs ($15 million). For the JSF program, the House bill would appropriate the $589 million requested plus $13 million for a competitive engine (as recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee).
The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended funding as requested for the F-22 and F/A-18E/F and additional funding for procurement of more aircraft than requested - - 6 V-22s, 8 F-16s, 6 F/A-18Cs, 9 C-17s, and 12 remanufactured AV-8Bs. The Senate bill (S. 1745, passed July 10, 1996) authorized $1,506.5 million for the V-22 and an additional $13 million for the JSF program for competitive engine research. S. 1745 would also authorize funds as requested for development of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Standoff Land Attack Missile with Expanded Response (SLAM ER), and Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) as well as funding not requested for procurement of three Air Force Standoff munitions: 100 Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs), 100 AGM-130s, and 54 AGM-142 Have Nap missiles.
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended funding as requested for the F-22 and JSF programs, with a minor reduction in F/A-18E/F funds and increased funding for procurement of 6 V-22s as well as 12 F/A-18Cs, 8 F-16s, and 12 AV-8Bs. The Senate appropriations bill (S. 1894, passed July 18, 1996) would provide the funding requested for JASSM and JSOW as well as added funds for SLAM ER, AGM-130s, and AGM-142 Have Nap missiles. Floor amendments that would have reduced funding for procurement of F/A-18C/Ds and F-16C/D were debated and defeated on July 17 and 18.
House and Senate conferees agreed to authorize funding as requested for the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F and more than requested for the V-22 and JSF as well as several other aircraft and missile programs. The conference report (H.Rept. 104-724) on the FY1997 defense authorizations bill (H.R. 3230/S. 1745) passed the House on August 1, 1996, and passed the Senate on September 10. It was signed into law (P.L. 104-201) on September 23, 1996.
FY1997 defense appropriations were included in the conference report (H.Rept. 104-863) on H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208, passed by the House on September 28 and the Senate on September 30 as the Omnibus Consolidated FY1997 Appropriations Act of September 30, 1996. The conferees agreed to appropriate funding as authorized for the JSF program ($602 million) and slightly less than was authorized for other major tactical aircraft programs: $1,987 million for the F-22, $2,498 million for the F/A-18E/F, and $1,325 million for the V-22. (For further discussion of congressional action on these programs, see CRS Issue Brief 96024, Defense Authorization and Appropriations for FY1997: Major Weapons and Other Defense Programs.)
Table 1 provides FY1997 funding data for four major tactical aircraft programs: the Air Force's F-22 stealth fighter, the Navy's F/A-18E/F fighter/attack plane, the Marine Corps's V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
Last year the Administration's FY1996 budget included requests for the Air Force F-22 ($2,138.7 million in R&D and $12.1 million in military construction funds); the Navy/Marine Corps F/A-18E/F ($1,082 million -- $845.1 in R&D and $236.9 million in advance procurement funds) and procurement of 12 F/A-18C/D aircraft ($687 million); the Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft ($810.5 million in Navy R&D funds and advance procurement funding); and the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program ($331.2 million in Air Force, Navy, and DOD R&D funds). Table 2 below provides FY1996 funding data for these programs.
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