-ti- East Asia: Disputed Islands/Offshore Claims Issues For U.S. 
Policy
July 28, 1992
Congressional Research Services, Library of Congress
Robert G. Sutter 

[Robert G. Sutter is Senior Specialist in International Politics 
Office of Senior Specialists]

SUMMARY

Some territorial disputes involving island and offshore 
territories in East Asia have become focal points of regional 
disagreement and tension, and of concern for U.S. policy. The 
thaw in the Cold War, easing Sino-Soviet rivalry and moderation 
of other political-military confrontations in Korea and Indochina 
mean that Asian leaders are no longer distracted or preoccupied 
with these larger global or regional political-military disputes. 
In the new situation, they have taken pains to assert claims to 
disputed territories and to support those claims with diplomatic, 
political, economic and military action. The territories involved 
are sparsely populated or uninhabited, but they are strategically 
located, many are thought to contain oil or other valuable 
resources, and they have become potent political symbols of 
nationalism for the countries concerned.

The controversy over the disputed territories generally works 
against U.S. policy, which strives to ease regional tensions and 
promote stability. The disputes have the potential to complicate 
U.S. free navigation through Asian-Pacific sealanes. They could 
place U.S. policymakers in a difficult position of contending 
with competing claimants who are friends or allies of the United 
States and who seek U.S. support for their respective positions 
regarding the territorial disputes.

The United States has not followed a clearly defined, consistent 
policy in dealing with these territorial issues. In the case of 
an important Russian-Japanese dispute, the Bush Administration 
has seen U.S. interests best served by inserting the United 
States into discussions designed to resolve it. The main risk for 
the United States involves possibly alienating one or both the 
disputants in the course of delicate discussions.

In other territorial disputes the United States generally had 
endeavored to avoid direct involvement. Heightened 
political-military tensions over disputed territories in the 
South China Sea in 1992 prompted the Administration to more 
strongly stress U.S. interest that these disputes be resolved 
peacefully. Options for U.S. policy include stronger efforts to 
deter Chinese expansion, support for regional security 
discussions, or a more clear cut U.S. determination to stay out 
of such contentious regional disputes. 

CONTENTS

EAST ASIA: DISPUTED ISLANDS AND OFFSHORE CLAIMS
--ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY.............................1
RUSSIAN-JAPANESE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.................2
SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES ............................4
JAPANESE-CHINESE DISPUTE ............................7
JAPANESE-KOREAN DISPUTE .............................8
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY ..................8
APPENDIX ...........................................11 

(Page 1)

EAST ASIA: DISPUTED ISLANDS AND OFFSHORE CLAIMS --
ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY

The thaw in the Cold War, easing Sino-Soviet rivalry and 
moderation of other political-military confrontations in Korea 
and Indochina have given new prominence to a number of important 
territorial disputes involving island and offshore territories in 
East Asia. No longer distracted or preoccupied with larger global 
or regional political military disputes, Asian countries have 
taken pains recently to assert claims to disputed territories and 
to back those claims with diplomatic, political, economic and 
military activities.

The territories involved are sparsely populated or uninhabited. 
They are strategically important as they lie astride or near 
important sea lines of communication, and they are of central 
importance to the competing claims of East Asian countries to 
maritime and seabed resources (e.g., oil) contained in East Asian 
coastal regions. Those claims are especially important as Asian 
states formally reassert territorial rights prior to the 
imposition of the Law-of-the-Sea regime expected in the near 
future, possibly 1993. [1] Nationalistic sentiment over the 
competing territorial claims also runs high among the Asian 
countries and adds to recent trends prompting a number of Asian 
governments to build-up their defense capabilities to deal with 
military contingencies over the disputed territories or other 
matters.

Not all disputes over islands and offshore claims in East Asia 
have generated recent controversy, but several have become 
prominent enough to warrant consideration by U.S. policymakers. 
Most recently, President Bush has attempted personally to ease 
the Japanese-Russian dispute over contested claims to islands 
north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. While supporting Japan, 
the President is trying to overcome the obstacle the territorial 
issue poses for substantial Japanese aid to the struggling 
Russian economy. Senior U.S. policymakers in the State, Defense 
and other executive departments have noted with some concern the 
assertion of claims and related political and military actions by 
nations with claims to territory in the South China Sea. They 
have followed closely efforts of Asian governments to involve 
U.S. oil companies in exploration for oil in disputed offshore 
tracts in the South China Sea. They have emphasized the U.S. 
interest in seeing these disputes settled peacefully. [2]

In general, such regional points of controversy work against U.S. 
policy goals of easing tensions and promoting stability in the 
region; they have the potential to complicate achievement of U.S. 
desire for freedom of navigation through Asian-Pacific sea lanes; 
and they could place U.S. policymakers in a

____________________________________________________
1 For one thing, those states that have not formally asserted 
their claims to contested coastal-sea territorial areas are 
thought to be at a distinct disadvantage once the regime is 
approved by enough states, comes into effect, and then calls for 
negotiations or other means to settle disputed claims among those 
states with formal competing claims to particular areas.

2 See, for example, remarks by Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Solomon at House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on 
Asian affairs, July 8,1992. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 2)

difficult position of having to deal with efforts by competing 
disputants (often friends or allies of the U.S.) to elicit signs 
of support from the United States.

This report introduces congressional Members and staff to several 
territorial disputes that involve, or are seen as having the 
potential to involve, U.S. policy concerns. The disputes are 
considered in order of their current priority for U.S. policy. 
The consideration includes review and assessment of competing 
claims and related political, economic and military activities, 
along with notation -- where applicable -- of any U.S. policy 
positions or interests specifically involved. Maps of many of the 
disputed areas, provided by the Office of the Geographer, 
Department of State, are in an appendix.

[All maps are available by contacting Gateway Japan]

RUSSIAN-JAPANESE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE [3]

At issue is the ownership of four islands: Etorofu, Kunashiri, 
Shikotan, and the Habomai group (the latter, a cluster of small 
islets), which the U.S.S.R. occupied in August-September 1945. 
The Soviets maintained that these islands are part of the Kuril 
chain, granted to the U.S.S.R. in the Yalta and Potsdam 
Agreements. The Russian government has adhered to the Soviet 
claim, though its rhetoric suggests more openness to a compromise 
settlement than appeared under the U.S.S.R. The Japanese, calling 
them the Northern Territories, argue that they are an integral 
part of the Japanese home islands, illegally seized by the 
U.S.S.R. (see Maps 1 and 2).

[Available by contacting Gateway Japan]

The United States has long supported Japan's position. During the 
Cold War, siding with Japan against Soviet occupation of the 
Northern Territories was an important feature of high level 
U.S.-Japanese statements affirming the strength of the 
American-Japanese alliance. With the collapse of the U.S.S.R., 
U.S. Government efforts to support the Russian government of 
Boris Yeltsin have seen senior U.S. leaders, notably President 
Bush, take part in discussions over the dispute. (Such 
discussions, involving the United States, were active leading up 
to the G-7 summit meeting in Germany in July 1992.) Japan has 
said that it is reluctant to provide large scale aid to Russia 
until the territorial dispute is settled satisfactorily. The 
United States is anxious to encourage greater Japanese government 
assistance to the struggling Russian government. [4]

The United States also has important strategic interests in the 
area. The Japanese government sees continued U.S. support for 
Japan's territorial claim as an important benefit in Japan's 
alliance relationship with the United States--the most important 
U.S. security commitment in Asia and the Pacific. The contested 
islands currently also permit Russian forces to better protect 
and control access to the Sea of Okhotsk (see Map 1), where the 
Russian navy

____________________________________________________
3 This section draws heavily from, Soviet Policy Toward Japan and 
the Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, by Stuart Goldman, 
February 27, 1984. CRS Report 84-64 F, p. 21-28.

4 See among others, U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
(FBIS) Daily Report Asia and Pacific, June 29, 1992, p. 4, July 
2, 1992, p. 4-5. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 3)

deploys many of its intercontinental ballistic-missile-firing 
submarines. If some or all of the contested islands came under 
Japanese rule, Russian ability to protect the Sea of Okhotsk from 
U.S. attack submarines or other potential intruders would be 
reduced.

Background and current status: The 1855 Treaty of Shimoda, which 
first established relations between Russia and Japan, set as the 
boundary between their territories a line through the Kurils, 
north of Etorofu. This formally recognized Japanese sovereignty 
over Etorofu, Kurashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais, and awarded 
the rest of the Kuril Islands to Russia. In 1875 Russia 
voluntarily gave Japan the whole Kuril Archipelago in exchange 
for Japan's dropping all claims to the larger Sakhalin Island, 
then jointly occupied. A regional rivalry soon developed between 
the two countries. As a result of its victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Japan won control of southern 
Sakhalin. Japan remained the dominant power in Northeast Asia for 
the next 40 years.

At Yalta in February 1945, as part of the then secret deal 
whereby Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan, Roosevelt 
agreed that the U.S.S.R. would receive southern Sakhalin and the 
Kuril Islands. The Potsdam Declaration, which Japan accepted with 
its unconditional surrender, stipulated that Japan renounce all 
its overseas territories, although no specific beneficiaries were 
named. Shortly after the U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan, 
Soviet forces invaded and occupied the entire Kuril Archipelago, 
as well as Shikotan and the Habomais. Within a few years the 
16,000 Japanese inhabitants were expelled, Japanese place names 
replaced by Russian, and the territory turned into an integral 
part of the Sakhalin district (oblast) of the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic of the U.S.S.R.

Japan has never accepted the legality of the Soviet seizure of 
the Kurils (or of Southern Sakhalin). Tokyo argues that it was 
not a party to Yalta, and that neither the Potsdam Declaration 
nor the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty name the U.S.S.R. as 
recipient of these territories. More importantly, the Japanese 
have consistently denied any justification for the Soviet seizure 
of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais, arguing that 
these islands had never been part of Russian territory before 
1945, and that Shikotan and the Habomais had always been regarded 
as part of Hokkaido. The closest of the Habomais is only two 
miles from Hokkaido.

From the inception of post-war Soviet-Japanese relations, Tokyo 
sought the return of these four islands. In October 1956, when 
diplomatic relations were finally restored between the two 
countries, Moscow indicated willingness to transfer Shikotan and 
the Habomais to Japan after the conclusion of a formal peace 
treaty. But when the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement was renewed 
and strengthened in 1960, the Soviets declared that not even 
those minor islands would be returned unless all U.S. forces were 
withdrawn from Japan.

From the 1960s through the 1980s Tokyo and Moscow moved steadily 
further apart on this territorial issue, while the dispute itself 
grew in prominence. In 1968, Moscow ceased recognizing even 
residual Japanese

(Page 4)

sovereignty in the Northern Territories. In 1976, the Soviets 
stipulated that former Japanese residents of Shikotan and the 
Habomais could no longer visit relatives' graves without valid 
passports and Soviet visas. In 1977, Moscow included all of the 
Northern Territories in an abruptly and unilaterally declared 
200-mile economic zone. And in 1978, the Soviets began a major 
military buildup on the disputed islands.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. saw Boris Yeltsin's Russian 
government succeed to control over the Northern Territories. 
Anxious to get beyond this obstacle and promote the flow of 
Japanese aid and investment, Yeltsin's government has signaled 
interest in a compromise accord. But Russian flexibility has been 
substantially limited by the need to accommodate various 
interests (e.g., the military, local government representatives, 
and Russians concerned that compromising territorial disputes 
with Japan will encourage others with claims on Russian 
territory). Indeed, some Russian officials suggested in late July 
1992 that Yeltsin cancel his Japan trip in order to avoid 
compromise over the territorial dispute. The Russians have also 
reportedly been concerned with recent Japanese government 
statements implying that Japan will be little interested in 
encouraging greater investment and aid in Russia for many years, 
on account of the poor economic conditions there, even if Moscow 
meets Tokyo's demands on the Northern Territories. [5] Japan, 
meanwhile, seems intent to use its economic leverage to maximize 
Russian territorial concessions, leading some observers to 
predict that the on-going Russo-Japanese talks on the islands may 
remain at an impasse for some time. Others are a bit more 
optimistic about a break, suggesting that Russia's desperate need 
for Japanese aid and investment and the high-level Western, 
especially U.S., attention to the territorial-aid issue could 
result in a compromise settlement over the next year. [6]

SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES [7]

Territorial disputes of significant current concern for U.S. 
policy in this area focus on:

a) Competing claims involving the Spratly Islands, and to a much 
less degree, the Paracel Islands (see Map 3).

[Available by contacting Gateway Japan]

b) Competing claims involving offshore seabed resources, 
especially oil.

The United States has avoided taking positions in favor of 
particular claimants. U.S. officials view with concern a series 
of military actions taken by disputants to back their claims, 
along with political and economic initiatives. The disputes 
complicate U.S. interest in free navigation, stability in 
Southeast

____________________________________________________
5 FBIS Daily Report Asia and Pacific, July 2, 1992, p. 4-5.

6 Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 1992.

7 Among useful recent reviews, see, The Conflicting Claims in the 
South China Sea. Asian Defense Journal, June 1992. p. 7-19. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 5)

Asia, and a safe environment for exploiting the region's 
resources. They pose potentially difficult choices for U.S. 
policy in dealing with the competing demands of the claimants, 
some of whom are close friends or allies of the United States. 
U.S. officials have voiced support for efforts by Indonesia and 
others to mediate in the dispute and have underlined U.S. 
interests in seeing the disputes settled peacefully. The U.S. 
position was featured during Secretary of State Baker's 
discussions with ASEAN ministers in late July, 1992. [8]

Background and current status: The Spratlys are more than 190 
barren islets [9] in an archipelago approximately 150,000 square 
miles located about 300 miles off the Vietnamese coast and 600 
miles southeast of the Chinese island of Hainan. The Philippine 
Island of Palawan is 50-90 miles to the east and the Malaysian 
state of Sabah and country of Brunei are 160 miles to the south. 
The People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the 
entire area; the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim some 
parts. [10] All except Brunei have taken military actions (e.g., 
occupying islets) to support their claims (see Map 4).

[Available by contacting Gateway Japan]

North of the Spratlys are the Paracel Islands claimed by China, 
Vietnam and Taiwan (see Map 3). [Available by contacting Gateway 
Japan] China has occupied the entire archipelago, located 150 
miles both from Hainan Island and the Vietnamese coast, since 
1974. At that time, Chinese forces attacked and evicted troops of 
the South Vietnamese government that had occupied some of the 
Paracel Islands for several years.

Significant military actions in the region since that time 
include:

* The Vietnamese communists sent troops to occupy some of the 
Spratly Islands following the collapse of the South Vietnamese 
government in 1975. They have expanded their presence since then.

* The Philippines continued to build up forces on islands it 
claimed; by 1978 it had 1,000 marines backing its claim.

* Taiwan has for decades sustained its military occupation of the 
Spratly island of Itu Aba, garrisoned by 600 troops.

* Malaysia landed troops on reefs and islets it claimed in 1983 
and 1986.

____________________________________________________
8 Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 1992. See also Wall Street 
Journal, July 27, 1992 and Financial Times, July 28, 1992.

9 The reported number of islets in the Spratlys varies widely, in 
part because many are often or almost always under water. This 
figure is from the source noted in note 7.

10 The Geographer's office, Department of State reports that 
Brunei has not publicly claimed any Spratly islands, but the 
foreign minister has reportedly stated a claim to waters around 
Louisa Reef. (Correspondence, July 30, 1992.) 
____________________________________________________

(Page 6)

* China built naval and amphibious capabilities in Hainan and the 
Paracel Islands. China conducted a variety of military surveys 
and patrols in the Spratlys during the 1980s and began occupying 
and fortifying some islets.

* A significant but limited clash between Chinese and Vietnamese 
forces occurred on Johnson Reef in the Spratlys in March 1988, 
with Chinese forces driving away the Vietnamese.

The easing of Sino-Vietnamese tensions by 1991 muted comment by 
these protagonists on territorial differences in the South China 
Sea, but disputes emerged anew in 1992. China's National People's 
Congress passed a territorial sea law in February 1992 
stipulating PRC sovereignty over the South China Sea and other 
areas and authorizing the use of force to keep foreign naval and 
research vessels away. Subsequently, Chinese naval officers were 
quoted noting that even though "a lot of countries" challenge 
China's maritime interests, China is determined to sustain its 
sovereign claims. Other disputants protested the PRC sovereignty 
legislation. Taiwan soon drafted its own territorial sea law. 
Taiwan sent 100 legislators to visit its garrison force in the 
Spratly Islands; Malaysia sent the King to visit some of its 
claimed islands. [11]

Meanwhile, the related Sino-Vietnamese disputes over oil 
exploration rights in the South China Sea near the Spratly 
Islands saw China sign an agreement in May 1992 with a U.S. oil 
exploration company (Crestone) to explore for oil in areas also 
claimed by Vietnam. Crestone's president claimed that Chinese 
naval forces had pledged to back the exploration efforts in the 
disputed area. Vietnam in July seemed to respond by awarding to a 
French oil firm, Total, rights to explore in a block near the 
area granted to Crestone by China. [12]

There also have been continued reports of military buildup and 
activities in the region. Chinese, Vietnamese and other troops 
are busy fortifying the small islets they control. The Vietnamese 
reported that Chinese troops on July 4 landed on an unoccupied 
reef in the Spratlys claimed by Vietnam and set up a sovereignty 
marker there. The Vietnamese protested but to no avail. [13]

Although the Spratlys and the South China Sea are often seen as 
potential flash points of conflict in post Cold War Asia, there 
is considerable evidence that the countries concerned have an 
interest in seeking a solution to competing claims short of 
warfare. In particular, Indonesia has taken the lead in holding a 
series of unofficial conferences where representatives of 
claimants and others

____________________________________________________
11 Developments regarding the disputed Spratly Islands are 
covered by the Far Eastern Economic Review and by the Indochina 
Digest. A flurry of review articles appeared in the New York 
Times, Financial Times, and elsewhere in western media coincident 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
ministerial meeting in late July 1992.

12 Reviewed in, among others, Indochina Digest.

13 Indochina Digest, July 10,1992. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 7)

in the region have shown flexibility about jointly developing the 
resources of the area while putting aside resolution of formal 
territorial claims. All the disputants are officially on record 
supporting such an approach, and their official representatives 
took care to reiterate their desire for peace at the ASEAN 
ministerial meeting in late July 1992. At the same time, they 
also continue the efforts noted above to stake out and protect 
their claims. As a result, outside analysts often point to rising 
military tensions over competing territorial claims in the 
region, but they are unsure if this will lead to conflict or to a 
crisis prompting disputants to deal pragmatically through 
negotiations with their competing territorial claims.

JAPANESE-CHINESE DISPUTE

Beijing's territorial waters law of February 1992 also reaffirmed 
reaffirmed China's claim to eight islets located about 100 miles 
north of Taiwan that are also claimed by Japan and Taiwan. Known 
as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese and the Senkaku Islands in 
Japanese, the territories are uninhabited but they occupy an 
important strategic location, and the region around the islets is 
considered highly prospective for oil resources (see Map 6). 
[Available by contacting Gateway Japan] The Japanese government 
strongly and promptly protested Beijing's sovereignty law while 
Taiwan subsequently reasserted its claim to the islets. [14]

Background and current status: The roots of the dispute go back 
to the 19th Century. Japan defeated China in a war and took 
control of Taiwan in 1895. Following Japan's defeat in World War 
II, Taiwan was returned to China. But the islets remained under 
U.S. control. Japan's claim to the islands appeared strengthened 
when the United States returned them to Tokyo's control along 
with nearby Okinawa in 1971. Since then, the U.S. Government has 
endeavored to keep from taking sides in the dispute.

In the 1970s, Tokyo and Beijing agreed to put the disputed 
islands issue aside as they normalized diplomatic relations and 
signed a peace treaty addressing issues stemming from World War 
II. Japanese rightists built a makeshift lighthouse on one of the 
islets in 1978, but the Japanese government took 12 years before 
it was prepared to give the beacon official status. The Japanese 
coast guard has patrolled near the islands and has fended off 
efforts by fishermen and others from Taiwan to assert claims to 
the island. In 1990, Taiwan citizens wanting to place a flag on 
one of the islands were blocked by Japanese forces.

Beijing's recent reassertion of its territorial claim and the 
prompt Japanese protest clouded the atmosphere of Chinese Party 
Chief Jiang Zemin's April 1992 visit to Japan and further reduced 
Japanese interest in plans reported earlier to have the Japanese 
Emperor travel to China soon. None of the disputants is

____________________________________________________
14 For background and recent coverage see New York Times, October 
31, 1990, p. A7; Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 1990, p. 
5; Free China Journal, February 28, 1992, p. 2. See also related 
coverage in FBIS Daily Report Asia and Pacific. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 8)

known to have taken military steps to escalate the conflict, 
suggesting that at least for the present the dispute will remain 
a political sore point but not a military flash point among 
Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei.

JAPANESE-KOREAN DISPUTE

A long-standing island dispute between Tokyo and Seoul involves 
an inhospitable rocky islet in the Sea of Japan. Known as 
Takeshima by the Japanese, it is occupied by South Korea, which 
calls it Tokto. In 1977, Japan tried to lay claim to the island, 
touching off protests in Seoul. Since then, Korea has planted 
trees, dug a well and set up a family as island residents. Japan 
has sent patrol craft to the vicinity of the island.

The United States takes no position on the dispute, which is 
important for U.S. interests largely because the dispute is one 
of several sources of discord between these two important U.S. 
allies in Northeast Asia.

ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States has not followed a clearly defined, consistent 
policy in dealing with these territorial issues. In the case of 
the dispute between Russia and Japan, the Bush Administration has 
seen U.S. interests as best served by inserting the United States 
into the discussions over the disputed islands. The United States 
continues to support Japan's claim to the islands but also shows 
strong interest in moving beyond the obstacle of the territorial 
dispute to allow for Japanese aid to the Russian economy. During 
the Cold War, by contrast, the United States sided strongly with 
Japan's claim and opposed assistance to the U.S.S.R. There has 
been little criticism in the United States of the 
Administration's current approach, although some argue that the 
disadvantage of such a mediating posture is that it increases the 
risk of alienating one or both of the disputants in the course of 
delicate discussions.

In the case of the other territorial disputes, the United States 
had endeavored to avoid direct involvement. U.S. policymakers 
seemed to judge that American interests in stability, free 
navigation and good relations with Asian allies and friends were 
best served by this low keyed approach. Few disagreed with this 
position until recently when the rising tensions in the South 
China Sea caused many to question the recent U.S. approach. Some 
now call for more active U.S. efforts to maintain stability in 
the region, and recently the Bush Administration has emphasized 
U.S. interests in the peaceful settlement of these disputes. [15] 
But the options proponents of greater action suggest often have 
seemingly unattractive consequences for U.S. interests. Suggested 
options and their possible consequences include the following:

____________________________________________________
15 Some U.S. officials point to the perceived U.S. failure to 
appear forceful in opposition to Iraqi threats prior to Sadam's 
invasion of Kuwait as prompting them to urge a more active U.S. 
stance in defense of peace in the South China Sea. (Interview, 
Washington, D.C., July 30, 1992.) 
____________________________________________________

(Page 9)

* Check China. 
Seeing PRC power growing in the South China Sea, advocates argue 
that the U.S. Government should take stronger political, economic 
and other measures (e.g., more active naval patrolling) to check 
China's expansion and sustain the status quo. This approach is 
thought to be consistent with the toughening of U.S. policy 
toward China seen since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the end 
of the Cold War. Moreover, U.S. friends in Southeast Asia 
reportedly privately would welcome this U.S. stance, although 
they would not say so in public for fear of alienating China. 
[16] However, such a U.S. posture would probably alienate Taiwan 
-- which backs the "Chinese" claims in the South China Sea; could 
encourage other disputants to be more assertive in backing their 
claims against China; and would align the United States with 
Vietnam -- a politically unpopular position in the United States.

* Maintain A U.S. Military Presence. 
U.S. Defense Department officials maintain that the American 
naval presence in Southeast Asia is a stabilizing force, a 
deterrent to assertive action by disputants in the region. But 
critics assert that this posture begs the question as to what the 
U.S. military would actually do in the event of a crisis or 
military clash. To be an effective deterrent, they assert, the 
United States military presence must have the support of the 
American government and people to take action when the need 
arises; they question whether such support is present.

* Keep Hands Off. 
This would involve the U.S. Government adopting a more clear cut 
stance that the United States does not intend to get involved in 
South China Sea and other disputes. Thus, U.S. officials would 
not portray the American military presence as a deterrent to 
assertive action by claimants; the United States would set strict 
and well publicized limits on its willingness to back allies and 
friends who might wish to associate the United States with their 
claims or with their defense in the event of military conflict 
over their claims; and the U.S. Government would take stronger 
efforts to discourage and disassociate the U.S. Government from 
efforts by U.S. oil and other companies to search for resources 
in disputed regions. The main disadvantage of this stance is that 
it would appear to open the way for a regime in the South China 
Sea where the stronger would feel free to prey upon the weaker. 
In particular, it might appear to facilitate Chinese expansion.

* Encourage Regional Negotiations. 
This would involve more active U.S. support for Indonesian 
efforts and discussions at the post-ministerial ASEAN meetings to 
ease tensions over South China Sea disputes and facilitate 
cooperation and confidence

____________________________________________________
16 Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 1992. 
____________________________________________________

(Page 10)

building measures. The Bush Administration recently has formally 
supported the Indonesian efforts. Some assert that U.S. policy 
should go further and endorse calls by some in the Asia-Pacific 
for a regional security forum where such issues as the South 
China Sea territorial disputes could be discussed and controlled, 
if not settled. The Bush Administration remains skeptical of the 
utility of a region-wide security forum, although it favors some 
ad hoc sub-regional meetings on security and other issues. 
Administration officials privately note that a significant reason 
for their opposition lies in the fact that such broad regional 
groups could dilute American influence in the region, which rests 
strongly on the United States position as a hub of a series of 
bilateral security arrangements with Asian-Pacific States. [17]

Whether U.S. policy will move in the direction of one or more of 
the policy options noted above will depend heavily on 
developments in the region. Analysts are focused on the South 
China Sea disputes as the most volatile. If the disputants move 
toward further military action or confrontation, a more decisive 
U.S. policy may be called for. Trends toward easing tensions 
under the auspices of Indonesia's mediation or other auspices 
argue for the continuation of a more low keyed American posture.

____________________________________________________
17 Interviews, June, July 1992.
____________________________________________________

Appendix (pages 11-15)

Map 1 Northern territories/kurils

map 2 detail: etorofu, kunashiri, shikotan, and habomais

Map 3 south china sea: selected claims

map 4 spratly islands dispute

map 5 senkaku/diaoyu islands dispute