[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]

93056: Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations

Updated December 16, 1996

Steven R. Bowman
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

U.S. Military Operations
U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)
IFOR/SFOR Mission
IFOR Withdrawal and SFOR Follow-on Force
Costs
IFOR/SFOR Force Components

Arms Control and Military Assistance

Congressional Reaction
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25

LEGISLATION


SUMMARY

In Paris on December 14, 1995 the presidents of Bosnia , Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement they negotiated in Dayton, OH. The following day the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized for one year the multilateral NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for 18 months.

During 1996, the United States stationed about 15,000 troops in Bosnia, and roughly 5,000 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. There has been only one hostile fatality (landmine). All NATO nations have contributed personnel, along with 18 non-NATO nations, for an IFOR total of about 54,000 troops. SFOR will be a smaller force, about 25,000-30,000, with the United States providing 8,500 in Bosnia and additional support personnel again elsewhere in the region. The bulk of U.S. troops will be from the 1st Infantry Division, replacing IFOR's 3rd Armored Division units.

IFOR's missions were to: 1) ensure its self defense and freedom of movement; 2) mark boundaries and separation zones; 3) monitor and enforce troop withdrawals; 4) control airspace and ground movements over major routes; 5) establish Joint Military Commissions among factions; and 6) assist withdrawal of non-IFOR U.N. troops. In addition, at its discretion and if resources permitted, IFOR provided a secure environment for humanitarian efforts and war crimes investigations, and monitored landmine clearance operations. Under SFOR it is expected that the "discretionary" elements of the mission will assume greater attention as political stabilization efforts continue fitfully. Less clearly defined, these tasks associated with refugee resettlement and war crimes prosecutions have led to increased concerns about "mission creep" and possible confrontational situations. Some NATO officers have also expressed concern that SFOR's smaller size may encourage renewed belligerency among contending factions in Bosnia . Though the Administration maintains that the United States should remain a full partner in this NATO operation, some Members of Congress believe that further Bosnia efforts should be carried out by the European allies alone.

For IFOR's FY1996 funding, Congress approved reprogrammings and rescissions/supplemental appropriations totalling $2.26 billion. As of September 26, 1996, DOD estimated that FY1997 IFOR related operations will require an additional $1.2 billion, bringing the estimated total for the one-year operation to $3.3 billion. GAO believes, however, that this revised estimate may still be too low. These estimates do not include any costs for expected SFOR operations from December 20 through June 1998.


MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

With IFOR's mandate expiring December 20, 1996, NATO and the United Nations Security Council have approved a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR), comprising about 25,000-30,000 to remain in Bosnia through June 1998. The Clinton Administration had agreed to provide about 8,500 ground troops, not counting support personnel in the region. Troops currently serving in Bosnia will be withdrawn and replaced primarily with units from the 1st Infantry Division stationed in Germany.

Gen. William Crouch, Commander of U.S. Army, Europe and NATO LANDCENT has assumed IFOR command, and will remain to lead SFOR.

The United States has completed its shipments of about $100 million in equipment to support the "equip and train" program for the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation. Other nations are expected to fulfill their commitments around the first of the year. Within NATO, the United States remains isolated in its support of this program, with the other allies opposing the introduction of more arms into the region and consequently still observing a West European Union arms embargo.

The Department of Defense has established a Bosnia Homepage on the World Wide Web, providing news releases, fact sheets, briefing transcripts, and also access to the new IFOR Homepage (http://www.dtic.dla.mil/bosnia /index.html).


BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

U.S. Military Operations

U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)

IFOR/SFOR Mission. While steadfastly refusing to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia , the Clinton Administration, beginning in February 1993, maintained a commitment to provide them to oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton OH, Administration officials began to lay out their rationale and initial planning for U.S. participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) for Bosnia . Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces was necessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian , Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. ground force participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation was necessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clinton subsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to aid in ending the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia , and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. In brief, the military elements of the agreement, in addition to establishing IFOR and granting it full authority and freedom of movement to enforce the agreement, calls for: 1) withdrawal of forces behind ceasefire lines within 30 days, with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) of four kilometers; 2) withdrawal of heavy weapons and personnel to barracks; 3) provision of information on personnel, weaponry, and landmines; 4) arms reduction negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). All these objectives have been completed, with the exception of the arms reduction process which the OSCE continues to oversee.

IFOR/SFOR are NATO operations. IFOR involved approximately 54,000 ground troops in Bosnia proper, and lasted until December 20, 1996. The smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) assumes IFOR's missions until June 1998. There is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations.

IFOR Headquarters listed the following tasks in its mission statement:

In addition, the following secondary tasks were undertaken, depending upon available resources:

NATO officials have indicated that IFOR's "secondary" tasks will become the main focus for SFOR operations, assuming that the military provisions of the Dayton Accords continue to be observed. The International War Crimes Tribunal requested and received protection for its investigators and for suspected war crimes sites. IFOR also agreed to detain suspected war criminals, if encountered, but declined to participate in investigations or pursuit operations. To date, IFOR personnel have detained no indicted war criminal suspects. IFOR's refusal to take more effective action to apprehend suspected war criminals has led to continued criticism from the War Crimes Tribunal and human rights advocates. Citing a combination of concerns for political calm and the practical difficulties of identifying minor suspects or seizing heavily guarded Bosnian Serb leaders, IFOR headquarters has firmly resisted greater involvement in the war crimes process. It remains to be seen whether SFOR will adopt a more active role, though its reduced military strength may make that unlikely. Civil violence and arson in refugee resettlement areas have led to strong criticism of IFOR's unwillingness to assume greater policing responsibilities. IFOR has occasionally dispatched troops to troubled areas, but continued to emphasize its primary mission of overseeing implementation of the military aspects of the settlement. Critics maintain that unless civil violence is deterred or rapidly quelled, trust in the overall peace settlement cannot be developed. These pressures are indicative of those that SFOR will be under during the next 18 months to dedicate its resources to the many civilian undertakings that complement the military aspects of the peace agreement. Though IFOR HQ and NATO's North Atlantic Assembly have repeatedly stressed the necessity of "even-handedness" in enforcing the peace agreement, NATO's reticence in responding to transgressions could lead to an eroding of public confidence in its ability to guarantee a secure environment in Bosnia .

IFOR Withdrawal and SFOR Follow-on Force. The lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction among the ethnic factions, including within the Muslim-Croat Federation, led to the wide-spread belief that some NATO military force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996 mandate. The Defense Intelligence Agency, in its annual threat assessment briefing for the Senate Intelligence Committee, cited these factors as the grounds for its pessimistic assessment of Bosnia's stability after IFOR's withdrawal. (Defense Week, March 18, 1996. p. 10) On June 12, 1996, at a press conference in Macedonia, Defense Secretary Perry said he would recommend that some U.S. ground forces remain in Bosnia after December, if NATO decides a continued military presence is necessary for political stability in the country. Both U.S. Gen. Joulwan, NATO Supreme Commander, and British General Sir Michael Walker indicated they expected some sort of NATO military force to be required in Bosnia well beyond 1996. (Reuters, 6/12/96) On July 24, 1996 this assessment was reinforced by officials from the CIA, DIA, and the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Each testified that a follow-on force to IFOR would be required to prevent the renewal of ethnic conflict, and that the extent of U.S. participation would be a critical element in any follow-on force's success.

Some have suggested the withdrawal of U.S. forces at year's end, leaving the European allied forces in Bosnia to maintain order during civilian reconstruction. However, both Britain and France have indicated they will withdraw their troops if American forces leave Bosnia , even though both nations' governments have indicated they believe a longer deployment may be desirable. Without U.S., British, or French ground forces, it is generally assumed that all NATO Bosnia operations would collapse, possibly returning the crisis once again to the United Nations.

Congressional concern over the duration of the U.S. military presence in Bosnia is reflected in the House National Security Committee's DOD FY1997 Authorization bill (H.Rept. 104-563, p. 353). The Committee voices its concerns over an expanding IFOR mission and the possibility of the deployment lasting beyond December 1996, and directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report within 60 days of enactment (09/23/96) detailing the Administration's guidelines to avoid "mission creep and its exit strategy for U.S. forces."

Costs. Each nation contributing to IFOR is to bear the cost of its own deployment and operations. On November 29, 1995, the Defense Department released an estimate for U.S. costs totalling about $2 billion. During 1996 this estimate was periodically revised to include unforeseen expenses, with the most recent estimate of $3.3 billion coming in late September. This estimate covers costs only through December 1996, and does not include the costs of withdrawing IFOR units or costs for SFOR through June 1998.

***TABLE or GRAPHIC not shown here***

Military personnel comprises special additional pay to troops deployed and pay for the activated reserves; it does not include normal personnel payroll costs. Personnel support includes subsistence and medical support costs. Operation support covers fuel, spare parts, communications, and engineering support. Transportation costs include deployment, sustainment, and redeployment. This estimate assumed a 12-month mission, with 35,000 U.S. personnel in Bosnia and neighboring countries, and an operational tempo higher than humanitarian aid missions, but lower than combat levels. In April 1996, the DOD Comptroller's Office revised the overall estimate upwards by $500 million, citing increased intelligence aircraft operations, effects of unexpectedly harsh weather conditions, and unanticipated NATO support requirements. In September 1996, Deputy Secretary of Defense White, testifying before the House National Security Committee, raised the estimate to $3.3 billion.

DOD submitted rescission/supplemental and reprogramming requests to Congress covering $1.6 billion to support IFOR through FY1996, and an additional $200 million to fund other agencies' efforts in civilian reconstruction; $820 million was taken from unobligated appropriated funds of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the remaining $991 million from savings owing to lower inflation rates than anticipated. In passing H.R. 3019, an omnibus spending bill, both House and Senate have stipulated that the $200 million intended for civilian reconstruction be an emergency supplemental appropriation offset by non-DOD rescissions, and that the full $820 million in DOD rescissions be reprogrammed for IFOR costs. Subsequently, the $200 million for civilian programs was appropriated under H.J. Res. 170, which passed both houses March 29. On July 11, the House National Security Committee approved DOD's third FY1996 IFOR funding request, to reprogram $519 million. However, the Committee prohibited DOD from using about $100 million in modernization funds in the reprogramming, and suggested the Defense Business Operating Fund as a source of additional monies. To date $2.26 billion has been appropriated to support U.S. IFOR operations in FY1996. DOD estimates that FY1997 first quarter funding for IFOR and related operations will total 1.1 billion, bringing the total for the one-year mission to approximately 3.3 billion.

On July 25, the General Accounting Office released a report, Bosnia: Costs Are Exceeding DOD's Estimate, GAO/NSIAD-96-204BR supplementing their earlier Bosnia: Costs are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD Estimates (NSIAD-96-120BR), comparing DOD's Bosnia cost estimates and the actual expenditures to date. The most recent report concludes that the DOD $3+ billion estimate for total cost is at least $451 million too low. The floods which complicated ground force deployments and the unanticipated high cost of civilian contractors performing engineering and logistics tasks were reported to be driving the cost increases. GAO also believes that costs could run even higher, depending upon three factors: 1) operational tempo; 2) withdrawal transportation costs; and 3) refurbishment of equipment and retraining personnel once the operation is concluded.

IFOR/SFOR Force Components. The U.S. IFOR contingent was built around 13,000 personnel from the 1st Armored Division from Germany (100 M1 tanks, 250 armored fighting vehicles, and 50 Apache helicopters), temporarily augmented by airborne infantry from the Southeast Europe Task Force in Italy, and several thousand troops from the United States. The total number of U.S. personnel deployed in Bosnia averaged about 18,000. Not all personnel were deployed in Bosnia proper; an additional 6,000+ were deployed in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy performing support functions, including air support. U.S. forces are headquartered in the Tuzla area in eastern Bosnia . British forces are headquartered in central Bosnia at Gornii Vakuf, and French forces in Mostar. Other national contingents are subordinated to these three major commands, all of which will serve under NATO LANDCENT commander Gen. William Crouch, who is based in Sarajevo. This headquarters arrangement will continue under SFOR.

For IFOR, the President activated 3,359 personnel from 78 Army National Guard and Selected Reserve units for training and possible deployment. Some of these personnel deployed to Bosnia , but most filled slots in Europe left vacant by deploying troops. In July 1996 about 500 were released from active duty and returned to the United States. These personnel are combat support and combat service support units (e.g., logistics, medical, military police, civil affairs). Under title 10 U.S.C 12304, the President may call Selected Reservists to active duty for up to 270 days, without declaring a national emergency. Under this statute, up to 200,000 Selected Reservists may be on active duty at any one time. The 270-day time limit on their active duty service may require that an overall total of more than 3,500 reservists be brought to active duty during IFOR's one-year mission. The President may also call members of the Ready Reserves to active duty for period not to exceed two years if he declares a state of national emergency under Title 10 U.S.C 12302. Up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists may be on active duty under provisions of this statute.

IFOR was about 54,000 strong in Bosnia . This included around 15,000 NATO troops who served under UNPROFOR, and then reverted to NATO command. All NATO nations have contributed troops except Iceland, which has no armed forces and sent medical personnel. In December 1995, the Department of Defense published the following estimates for NATO countries: Belgium -- 1,000, including troops in Croatia; Canada -- 1,500; Denmark -- 800; France -- 7,500, plus 2.500 in regional support; Germany -- 4,000 in Croatia; Greece -- 1,000; Italy -- 2,100; Luxembourg -- 22; Netherlands -- 2,000; Norway -- 750; Portugal -- 900; Spain -- 1,000-1,250; Turkey -- 1,300; United Kingdom --13,000, plus 3,000 regional support.

A number of non-NATO countries have contributed troops: Austria -- 300; Bangladesh -- 1,250; Bulgaria -- TBD; Egypt -- TBD; Estonia -- TBD; Finland -- 850; Czech Republic -- 800; Hungary -- support facilities; Malaysia -- 1,500; Latvia -- TBD; Lithuania -- TBD; New Zealand -- TBD; Pakistan -- 1,000; Poland -- 660; Russia -- 1,500-2,500; Slovakia -- 406; Sweden -- 850; Ukraine -- 500.

IFOR HQ has released the following sector-by-sector breakdown of forces deployed. These deployments will be in a state of transition for much of the winter as IFOR units withdraw and are replaced with SFOR units. This information will be updated as available.

North Sector (U.S. HQ -- Tuzla)

Southwest Sector (British HQ -- Gornji Vakuf)

Southeast Sector (French HQ--Mostar)

IFOR HQ support units include Hungarian and Romanian engineer units, a British signal regiment, a multinational Belgian/Luxembourgois/Austrian/Greek transportation unit, and multinational special forces and psychological operations units. German military units deployed in Croatia include: 1 field hospital, 1 engineer battalion, 1 army aviation battalion, 1 transport battalion, and 1 logistics battalion.

Secretary Perry and Russian Minister of Defense Grachev negotiated arrangements for Russian participation in IFOR. A brigade of infantry and airborne troops will be under the "day to day" control of Major General William Nash, 1st Armored division commander, while receiving its "long-term" orders through Col. Gen. Shevtsov, now serving as an assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), U.S. General George Joulwan. This relatively complex command arrangement seeks to placate the Russian military's resolve not to serve directly under NATO command, and an equally strong Western resolve that IFOR remain a NATO-led operation.

SFOR is expected to total about 25,000-30,000 troops. Of this, the United States will contribute 8,500. Other NATO contributors include: United Kingdom -- 5,000; Germany -- 3,000; France -- 2,500; Italy -- 1,900; Spain -- 1,300; Norway -- 600; Belgium 300. Additional personnel will be forthcoming from other NATO and non-NATO countries, but exact contributions have not yet been determined.

Arms Control and Military Assistance

Believing that the Bosnian Serb advantage in weaponry was a major contributing factor to the initial outbreak of hostilities, the Administration is seeking to establish a relative military parity in the region. Preferably this would be achieved through arms reduction, but the United States is also leading an effort to bolster the Bosnian -Croat Federation through military aid and training, believing arms control efforts to be only a partial solution. This position continues to evoke considerable discussion within NATO, with the European allies opposing introduction of more arms into the region.

On January 26, 1996, the Muslim, Croat, and Serb factions in Bosnia and the governments of Croatia, and Serbia signed an agreement, negotiated under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), stipulating a wide range of confidence-building measures they will undertake, including: exchanges of military information, restrictions on weapons and troop deployments, notification of troop movements/exercises, and establishment of a verification regime. Confidential data exchanges on military forces have taken place between the factions, and OSCE inspections have begun.

The Dayton Agreement (Annex 1B, Article IV) also called for the signatories to, within seven days, begin negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to limit weapons, and to begin negotiations on voluntary reductions of military manpower. These negotiations were held between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia, and Bosnia -Hercegovina, with manpower and equipment allocations for Bosnia -Hercegovina divided between the Bosnian -Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. An agreement was signed on June 11 1996, with weapons reductions to include tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and attack helicopters. The agreement, using the current equipment levels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the "baseline", assigns the following upper limits on equipment categories: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- 75% baseline; Croatia -- 30% baseline; Bosnia -Hercegovina -- 30% baseline, to be divided on a 2 to 1 ratio between the Bosnian -Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs. There is still serious doubt whether the agreement, to be overseen by the OSCE, will be adequately verifiable and enforceable. The agreement does, nevertheless, provide another tool for the international effort to contain conflict in the Balkans.

In funding the military assistance program for the Croat-Bosnian Federation, Congress required presidential certification that all "foreign forces" have left Bosnia in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. In this instance, "foreign forces" referred essentially to the Muslim irregular troops, primarily from Iran, who had assisted the Bosnian Muslim army. Viewed as extremists, these forces have been considered a potential threat to IFOR personnel in general, and U.S. forces particularly. On June 26, President Clinton provided certification that all foreign forces had withdrawn from Bosnia . IFOR officials, however, believe that several hundred Muslim irregulars still remain, having been granted citizenship by the Bosnian Muslim government to avoid the designation "foreign forces".

With presidential certification regarding "foreign forces" and the July passage of the Bosnian Croatian-Muslim Federation legislation creating a joint ministry of defense, the way was cleared for U.S. military assistance to the federation. The U.S. transfer, valued at about $100 million, included 46,000 M-16 rifles, 840 light antitank weapons, 1,000 M-60 machine guns, 80 armored personnel carriers, 45 M-60 tanks, 15 utility helicopters, and 6,592 tactical radios/telephones. (Department of Defense, July 7, 1996). The United States hopes to have other nations contribute up to an additional $400 million in assistance, and contributions amounting to $140 million in funds and an additional $120 million in equipment have been pledged by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Brunei. Some other Islamic nations are willing to assist the Muslims, but have reservations about their aid going to Bosnian Croat forces also. The NATO allies remain highly skeptical about this effort. Though they agree that a military balance should be established in the region, they believe that the emphasis should be upon arms reduction, fearing that new arms shipments into the region are potentially de-stabilizing.

Congressional Reaction

As demonstrated with U.S. deployments in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Congress has a high interest in whether such deployments are necessary, and if they are, what will be their size, cost, duration, objectives, and the contributions of other nations. In the FY1994 Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriation Act (P.L.103-139), and in the FY1996 DOD Appropriation Act (H.R. 2126; Section 8124), Congress has expressed its desire for the Administration to seek its approval prior to any peacekeeping deployment:

It is the sense of the Congress that none of the funds available to the Department of Defense shall be obligated or expended for the deployment or participation of United States Armed Forces in any peacekeeping operation in Bosnia -Herzegovina, unless such support is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act; ....

In the 104th Congress, a number of resolutions opposing or seeking to constrain deployments to Bosnia were considered. On October 30, 1996, the House passed H.Res. 247 (315-103), which expresses the sense of the Congress that President Clinton should neither deploy nor pledge to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia without congressional authorization. The resolution received bipartisan support from both those who oppose any deployment and those who might support a deployment, but wished to ensure a role for Congress in any such decision. On November 17, 1996, the House passed H.R. 2606 (243-171), which would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of DOD funds for the ground deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia as part of any peacekeeping or implementation force, unless they have been specifically appropriated for that purpose. This legislation was defeated in the Senate on December 13, 1996, along with S.Con.Res. 35, which opposed the deployment but expressed support for the troops involved. The Senate then passed S.J.Res. 44, sponsored by Senator Dole, offering conditioned support for the deployment. S.J.Res. 44 calls for the President to determine that IFOR's mission will be only to implement the military annex to the peace settlement and for the President to start an immediate international effort to arm and train the Croat-Muslim armed forces. The House also defeated prohibitive legislation (H.R. 2770), and then passed H.Res. 302, which expresses "concerns and opposition" to the deployment, but support for the troops involved. Neither chamber has taken up the other's legislation.

Nevertheless, congressional reaction to Administration actions regarding Bosnia remains cautious. During hearings in both chambers, Members have raised a variety of questions, among them:

Critics of U.S. ground force participation generally prefer to continue U.S. air and naval support, but insist that our European allies should take responsibility for any troop deployments required. They emphasize their belief that no vital U.S. national security interests are at stake in the Bosnian conflict, and that European forces alone should be capable of monitoring a true peace.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25

On May 3, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 25. This document was the subject of intense and protracted interagency review. Although PDD 25 is a classified document, the White House has released an unclassified summary. The document provides guidelines for deciding which U.N. peacekeeping operations the United States should support politically and for deciding whether U.S. armed forces should participate. Consequently, it provides insight on the kinds of issues the Administration will be addressing with both Congress and the United Nations regarding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia .

Briefly, PDD 25 sets out seven criteria to aid in determining whether U.S. forces should participate in a peacekeeping operation: 1) participation will advance U.S. interests; (2) risks to U.S. personnel are "acceptable"; (3) personnel and funding are available; (4) U.S. participation is necessary for success; (5) the roles, objectives, and duration of participation for U.S. forces are clear; (6) public and congressional support exists or "can be mustered"; and (7) command and control arrangements are acceptable. If the operation presents the "likelihood" of combat, the PDD calls for this to be reflected in the operational planning along with the commitment of sufficient force and a provision for periodic reevaluation of the operation.

PDD 25 also addresses the issue of executive-congressional relations with regard to peacekeeping operations. In general, it calls for regularized consultation and briefings and an annual written report. It also suggests that the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) be amended to (1) include a "consultative mechanism" and (2) eliminate the provision requiring withdrawal of U.S. troops within 60 days unless authorized by Congress. Within Congress, however, there appears to be little current interest in opening the War Powers Resolution for amendment. (See also CRS Issue Brief 81050, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance.)


LEGISLATION

P.L. 104-134, H.R. 3019
Provides supplemental appropriations and reprogramming authority for Department of Defense operations in the former Yugoslavia. Passed House March 7, 1996 (209-206) and Senate March 19, 1996 (79-21). Signed into law April 26, 1996.

H.R. 1172 (Smith, C.)
Terminates U.S. observance of the United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia . Introduced March 8 1995; referred to Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 2606 (Hefley)
Prohibits the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense being used for the deployment of U.S. armed forces on the ground in Bosnia . Introduced November 9, 1995. Referred to Committees on National Security and International Affairs. Passed House November 17, 1995 (243-171, 2 Present). Received in Senate November 18, 1995; referred to Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 3230 (Spence)
Provides for the authorization of appropriations for Department of Defense. Referred to Committee on National Security. Reported from Committee, May 7, 1996.

H.Res. 247 (Buyer)
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should not deploy or pledge to deploy U.S. Armed Forces on the ground in Bosnia . Introduced October 30, considered under suspension of the rules, and passed (315-103) October 30, 1995.

S. 5 (Dole)
Repeals the War Powers Act of 1973 and provides a framework for U.S. participation in international peacekeeping operations. Introduced January 4, 1995; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.

S. 21 (Dole)
Terminates U.S. observance of the United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia . Introduced January 4, 1995; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. Passed Congress August 1; vetoed by President Clinton August 11, 1995.

S. 1137 (Dole)
Establishes a Multilateral Self-Defense Fund for Bosnia -Hercegovina, and authorizes U.S. contributions. Introduced August 10, 1995, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

S.Res. 187 (Feingold)
A resolution to express the sense of the Senate that Congress should vote on the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia . Introduced October 20, 1995. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.