![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
Among the current issues in U.S.-Egyptian relations are the shared concerns over the continuing terrorist attacks against Egyptian police, religious, government, and tourist facilities, and what these attacks may signal for Egypt's domestic stability. The United States and Egypt have disagreed over the extradition of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, convicted for his involvement in a conspiracy to attack people and targets in New York and also wanted in Egypt on criminal charges. The two nations may disagree over Egypt's interpretation of applying human rights practices to Islamic terrorists. The two countries disagree over the speed and depth, but not the need for some of Egypt's economic reforms. Egypt and the United States agree on the importance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the need to continue current Arab-Israel peace talks, and the need for regional stability. The two nations agree on Egypt's determination to introduce democratic reforms to Egypt.
The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of $2.2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. For FY1995, Egypt received $1.3 in military grants, $815 million in economic grants ($200 million of which is direct grant to the government), and will receive additional food aid.
The National Democratic Party (NDP) won 317 of the 444 seats in the November 29/December 6, 1995, elections for the Peoples' Assembly. Ninety-nine of the 114 elected independents voted with the NDP in the vote of confidence. Only 13 opposition party members were elected. On January 6, 1996, President Mubarak appointed three women, six Copts, and one Muslim man to the PA. Some observers suggested that the NDP victory was an endorsement of the Government's economic and anti-terror policies, but other observers suggested that the lopsided vote resulted from Government-led fraud.
Since October 1992, over 1,000 have died in the continuing confrontation between police and Islamic militants. The Egyptian Government has jailed hundreds and executed 56 Islamic militants convicted in military courts of terrorism.
During his April 2, 1996 visit to Egypt, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry announced that Egypt would receive 21 F-16 aircraft and a missile frigate. The aircraft will cost $500 million, to be paid for with U.S. aid, and will be delivered beginning in 1999.
The United States endorsed the 1952 Revolutionary Command Council military coup that overthrew King Faruk and the monarchy. The military reformers appeared to have Egypt's best interests at heart, and, although not pro-Western, at least were not pro-Soviet. But, U.S.-Egyptian relations soured when the Colonels turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for military training and equipment after the West refused defense assistance. That same year, 1955, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and India led the third world nations at the Bandung Conference in establishing a movement independent from the Eastern and Western blocs, an act that further alienated Egypt and the United States. In July 1956, following a U.S.-British decision to retract an offer of economic assistance and help for the Aswan Dam, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use the revenues to finance the dam. (Egypt owned the Suez Canal, but the British-French company operated the Canal, and collected the revenues from which it paid a small rent to Egypt.) In late October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt, Israel to stop Palestinian guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel, and France and Britain to occupy the Canal. President Eisenhower persuaded the three invaders to withdraw from Egypt in early 1957, which improved U.S.-Egyptian relations briefly. (According to persistent but unconfirmed reports, Eisenhower's persuasion included threats to cut U.S. aid to Israel and to withdraw support for the British and French currencies.)
Many in the West believed Egypt fomented the 1958 anti-Western unrest in Jordan and Lebanon and coup in Iraq that led to the U.S. intervention in Lebanon and the British intervention in Jordan, and relations between Egypt and the United States remained strained. Egypt broke formal diplomatic relations during the June 1967 war following Egyptian charges that the United States provided direct assistance to Israel. Egypt expelled Soviet advisors in July 1972, an act that some in the United States considered a harbinger of better Egyptian-U.S. relations. Egypt attacked Israeli forces occupying the Sinai Peninsula and Syria attacked the Golan Heights in October 1973. In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations, and in December, the two nations participated in the Geneva peace conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's so-called shuttle diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements in 1974 and a second set of Egyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975. The United States resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an 8-year hiatus.
The United States endorsed Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's dramatic and courageous trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, and provided good offices to assist in the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979. The United States organized the peacekeeping regime along the Egyptian-Israeli border, and maintains a rotating infantry battalion in the force.
A primary U.S. interest in continued good relations with Egypt is to capitalize on Egypt's leadership role in the Arab world. Often, other Arab states look to Egypt to initiate action or set an example on regional problems. In the past, other Arab states followed the Egyptian lead in turning to the Soviet Union for weapons, in nationalizing foreign interests, in land reform programs, in introducing democratic institutions, and in many other areas. In a more recent example, despite the initial Arab rejection of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, the Arabs now recognize Egyptian reasoning behind the agreement and are following Egypt's lead in seeking an end to the war with Israel.
Another U.S. interest in good relations with Egypt is to sustain Egypt's moderate voice in Arab councils, and in some cases to rely upon Egypt to persuade less moderate Arab states of the wisdom of compromise. Egyptian President Mubarak, for instance, proposed a compromise between the Israeli and Palestinians positions on returning the Palestinian deportees to the occupied territories following the Israeli expulsion in December 1992. Mubarak also served as a conduit carrying the various proposals among the Syrian, Lebanese, U.S., Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian negotiators. Mubarak hosted the first practical meeting between PLO Chairman Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Cairo on October 5, 1993, and Egypt hosts the continuing Palestinian-Israeli meetings. Egypt will host the economic summit in November 1996.
A third U.S. interest is to maintain the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
A fourth reason for maintaining good U.S.-Egyptian relations is defense cooperation in opposing threats or aggression against regional friends, as was demonstrated in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. Cooperation between U.S. and Egyptian armed forces in joint military exercises over the previous decade (the "Bright Star" exercises) prepared the way for the 1990-1991 defense of the Arabian Peninsula.
Beginning after World War II, the United States opposed all aspects of Egypt's belligerency toward Israel, including military posturing, military expansion, arms purchases, the economic boycott, use of Soviet military advisors, attempts to exclude Israel from international fora, providing haven for guerrilla attacks against Israel, refusal to negotiate, and other gestures or positions considered unfriendly. As a result of Egypt's cooperation with the 1974-1975 disengagement agreements, President al- Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem, the 1978 Camp David agreements, and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Egypt's policy toward Israel changed from belligerency to cooperation, and U.S. policy toward Egypt changed as well. At first, U.S. friendly gestures toward Egypt appeared to be intended as guarantees for Israeli security and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, but in the 14 years since the peace treaty signing, U.S.-Egyptian relations have evolved, moving beyond the limited connection to Israel and toward an independent bilateral friendship. The United States provides foreign assistance, cooperates in economic development, shares military equipment and technology, participates in joint military exercises, and includes Egypt among its advisors and confidants on Middle Eastern affairs.
Although the United States fostered independence among nations, the United States did not approve of Egypt or other newly independent states fomenting or aiding armed rebellion among remaining European colonies in Africa and the Middle East, as, for example, Egypt's support for the 1954-1962 Algerian rebellion against France. The U.S.-Egyptian policy difference over colonial independence has faded as Middle Eastern and African nations became independent until today it is no longer an item of contention.
Egypt, with Yugoslavia and India, chaired the 1955 Bandung Conference that led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the time and for many years afterward, most U.S. Administrations saw countries either as pro-Eastern Communist Bloc or a pro-Western Free Bloc, without room or reason for a third choice, the Non-Aligned Movement. Many in the United States presumed that nations choosing to associate with the Non-Aligned Movement, among them Egypt, actually were sympathetic to the Soviet-dominated Eastern Bloc. U.S. attitudes changed during the 1970's, becoming more tolerant of nations that preferred not to be aligned either with the Soviet or with the Western blocs. With the 1990s demise of the Soviet system and the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc, such "cold war" alignments are no longer an issue, but Egypt's association with the Non-Aligned Movement and friendship with the Soviet Bloc caused much U.S.- Egyptian friction until the early 1970s.
In the past, Congress earmarked foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign aid authorization and/or appropriation bills. (See Table 1, and section on Current Issues in Egyptian-U.S. Relations below) The annual earmark included a statement that Egypt should undertake economic reforms in addition to reforms taken in previous years. The House Appropriations bill for FY1994, H.R. 2295, did not contain any earmarks, although the report accompanying the bill did make recommendations. P.L. 103-87, signed into law on September 30, 1993, provided $1.3 billion in military and $815 million in economic aid for Egypt. Other current laws involving Egypt state that:
Egypt is exempt from the $100 million limitation on U.S. aid for construction of productive enterprises (Section 620(k), P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 757, June 30, 1976);
It is the sense of the Congress that the security supporting assistance program for Egypt is important for Middle East peace efforts, and that the U.S. Executive branch should make the program a success (Section 9, P.L. 95-92, 91 Stat. 614, August 4, 1977);
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should continue to promote direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt (Section 28, P.L. 95-384, 92 Stat.730, September 26, 1978, 22 U.S.C. 2346a note);
The President is authorized to transfer to Egypt facilities of the former Sinai Support Mission (Section 6, P.L. 95-35, 93 Stat. 89, July 20, 1979);
Congress requires the President to file an annual report on Egypt's economy (also Israel, Turkey, and Portugal) to assist Congress in foreign assistance decisions that could affect Egypt's debt problem (Section 1205, P.L. 99-83, 99 Stat. 190, August 8, 1985); and
It is the sense of Congress that U.S. foreign aid is provided to Egypt with the understanding that Egypt will continue its peace efforts and will honor the Camp David and 1979 peace treaty provisions (Section 1206, P.L. 99-83, 99 Stat. 190, August 8, 1985).
In 1977, President Anwar al-Sadat announced that he would go to Jerusalem to discuss peace with the Israelis. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin extended an invitation, al-Sadat accepted, and the visit led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979. Egypt benefitted from the peace treaty by being able to redirect resources from defense to development, but Egypt suffered by being ostracized by other Arab states in March 1979. There were other problems with implementing the peace treaty: Israel wanted Egypt to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, which the Egyptians would not do; Israel complains that Egypt failed to fulfill its part of the peace treaty by not engaging in more bilateral Egyptian-Israeli enterprises (the "cold peace" issue).
President Mubarak acts as a broker, advisor, messenger, and arbitrator for the continuing peace talks. Mubarak offered Cairo as a venue for the talks, offered compromise positions on returning the 415 deportees in Lebanon in December 1992, encouraged the other Arabs to continue the talks, and endorsed the Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel in Washington on September 13, 1993. President Mubarak has hosted numerous meetings between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in the continuing peace talks.
President Mubarak hosted the March 1996 anti-terrorism meeting at Sharm al-Shaykh attended by President Clinton and other heads of state, and hosted the Arab summit of June 21-24, 1996, at which Arab leaders discussed the change in the peace process brought on by the conservative victory in the May 29, 1996 Israeli elections.
Egypt and the United States disagreed over the procedure for renewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), in the spring of 1995. Egypt led several other Arab states in refusing to sign the NNPT unless Israel signed or agreed to sign in the future. In lieu of the NNPT, Egypt proposed that Middle Eastern nations sign a regional treaty banning mass destruction weapons, but Israel rejected both the NNPT and the regional treaty. Egypt offered a compromise that Israel agree to sign within a two-year period after peace treaties were signed, but Israel did not accept the Egyptian offer. President Mubarak told U.S. government officials during his April 1995 visit to Washington that Egypt opposed the "unconditional" extension of the NNPT favored by the United States. The United States preferred that the Arab nations sign the treaty without regard to Israel's actions. Finally, the nations agreed to a compromise, a resolution stating that all Middle Eastern nations should sign the NNPT. Many observers believe Israel has nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, although the Israelis neither confirm nor deny the reports. In August 1996, Egypt announced that it would not sign the anti-chemical weapons treaty unless Israel signed the NNPT.
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious) law and Muslim principles. Governments of Egypt at times have restricted the Muslim Brotherhood and at other times have allowed it relative freedom to operate, its current condition. The Muslim Brotherhood exists as a religious charitable and educational institution, but is prohibited from operating as a political party. The Brotherhood has fielded local candidates under the Socialist Labor Party banner, but boycotted the 1990 People's Assembly and Shura Council elections.
An offshoot of the Brotherhood, the Jamaah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Group), is more militant and uses violence in an attempt to overthrow the Government. The Jamaah was implicated in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat, and in the recent attacks against the police and tourists. Since October 1992, the confrontation between the police and the Islamic militants has resulted in almost 800 killed (7 of whom were foreign tourists). The Jamaah al-Islamiyyah and some other Islamic revivalist forces claim they want to rid Egypt of foreign, and therefore in their view anti-Islamic, influences, and attack Coptic Christians (Copts comprise about 10% of the total population), tourists and tourist sites, and the police protecting the tourists as a way to drive the foreigners from Egypt. President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials have stated that the Islamic reformers are financed, trained, and directed by Iranian and Sudanese religious militants and returning Egyptian volunteers from the Afghan war. Some have expressed concern that the Egyptian police may not conform to international human rights standards in pursuing and bringing to justice Islamists suspected of terror attacks (see Human Rights below).
Shaykh (an honorific title for a learned religious or tribal leader) Umar Abd al-Rahman is a 54-year-old cleric and Islamic scholar who is associated with the Jamaah movement. Abd al-Rahman was arrested 6 times in Egypt on various charges, and served prison time although he was acquitted of involvement in the al-Sadat assassination. In 1989, Abd al-Rahman went to Sudan, where, one year later, he acquired a U.S. visitors visa despite having his name on a list of undesirables.
On June 24, 1993, the FBI arrested 8 men in New York suspected of plotting to assassinate several prominent people and planning to bomb several targets in New York. Reportedly, the accused were associated with Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and his New Jersey mosque. Abd al-Rahman and 14 others were indicted for conspiracy in the assassination and bombing schemes on August 25, 1993. Egypt requested Abd al- Rahman's extradition on July 3, 1993. The trial of 10 men in custody began on January 9, 1995, and ended on October 1, 1995, with guilty verdicts for all.
Some observers speculated that the United States served Egypt's best interests by refusing extradition and trying Shaykh Abd al-Rahman in U.S. courts because the Shaykh may have become a martyr and rallying symbol for the militant Islamicists at an Egyptian show trial.
Many Egyptians believe the Islamic reformers do not pose a threat to the government, and that the government arrests and trials of the Islamists will end the problem. Others believe that a majority of Egyptians are disillusioned with government corruption, cronyism, and the worsening economic situation, and that the Islamic reform movement will capitalize on the growing anti-government feelings to launch a popular uprising that will displace the current government. But many expect that before a popular uprising occurs, the Egyptian military will intervene and remove the present government in a coup d'etat.
Some believe that another question affecting stability is the line of succession of the presidency. Some fear that President Mubarak's failure to name a Vice President may lead to chaos if the Presidency should become vacant. Under the Egyptian system of government, the People's Assembly elects the President for a 6-year term; the election is then approved in a popular referendum. The President appoints one or more Vice Presidents (Art. 139 of the Constitution), one of whom may be designated to assume presidential duties if the President is unable to carry out his functions (Art. 82 of the Constitution). But if the office of President becomes vacant, the Speaker of the People's Assembly, not the Vice President, becomes the acting President until the People's Assembly elects a new President (Art. 84). On July 11, 1993, 441 of the 454 members of the People's Assembly signed a petition to nominate Husni Mubarak for a third 6-year term as president. On October 3, 1993, Mubarak received over 94% favorable vote in a referendum approving his third term.
According to the State Department human rights report for 1995, there is "convincing evidence" that the Egyptian police use torture to extract confessions, and detain suspects without charge or trial. Freedom of assembly has been constricted because the government fears violence associated with some public demonstrations. Many newspapers are government-owned and tend to follow the government line, although even some government-owned newspapers will voice anti-government opinions. Journalists oppose a 1995 law that places a greater burden on the press in libel cases, which in their view restricts the press even more. According to the State Department report, some judges are becoming more independent and are deciding cases against the government, but cases against the Islamic militants are held in military courts where the government prevails and opportunity for appeal is nil. There appears to be little restriction on freedom of religion, speech, movement, occupation, or trade union association.
Some Government officials imply, although they do not say directly, that they will stop the Islamic reformer attacks by using effective measures, including some methods that outsiders, such as the United States, may not find in keeping with human rights practices. It is suggested that Egypt might relax police restrictions, use torture, waive some rules of evidence or arrest procedures, detain without charge, and try suspects in more expeditious military courts, to suppress the Islamic reformers. A May 26, 1993 Amnesty International report said the Egyptian Government gave the police a "license to kill" and that police actions against Islamic terrorists led to human rights violations and to the police killing suspects and detainees.
In keeping with a goal of the 1952 revolution, Egypt has been moving away from the totalitarian regimes of the monarchy and the early years of the Revolutionary Command Council toward democracy, although some would argue that the progress toward democracy has been slow. Under Egypt's parliamentary system, the President appoints the cabinet, who in turn draft and submit legislation to the legislature, the People's Assembly (lower house) and the Shura Council (upper house). The People's Assembly debates legislation proposed by Government Ministries, calls for amendments to Government-sponsored bills, but rarely initiates its own bills. The Shura Council is an advisory body, offering reports and recommendations on important subjects, but the Shura Council does not introduce, consider, or vote on legislation.
444 members of the People's Assembly are elected and 10 are appointed, and 140 members of the Shura Council are elected and 70 are appointed. One half of the elected members of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council must be farmers and laborers (Art. 87 and Art 196 of the Constitution). People's Assembly members are elected for 5 year terms, and Shura Council members for 6 year terms (one-half the Council members are elected every 3 years). The National Democratic Party (NDP) controls 416 seats in the People's Assembly, independents control 15 seats, opposition parties control 13 seats. NDP members hold all 140 elected seats in the Shura Council. Another 10 political parties either boycotted the November 1990 elections or did not receive enough votes for a seat. Political parties based on religion, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are illegal.
Egypt comprises 387,000 square miles (about the size of Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee combined), but of that total only 3% is arable (or 11,600 sq. mi., a little less than Maryland). There are 60 million people, growing at a rate of 2.3% per year. Cairo is estimated to contain between 12 and 20 million people, one of the most populous cities on Earth. Forty-two percent of the people are engaged in agriculture, but Egypt cannot feed itself and must import two-thirds of its food. The official unemployment rate for 1992 was estimated at 15%. The per capita income is about $700 per year. There are 1 million Egyptians working in Europe and another 1 million in the Persian Gulf, according to Egyptian officials.
Economic Reforms. The transition from a centrally controlled socialist economy to a free market economy has created difficult decisions for the Egyptian Government, and hardships for the Egyptian people. Egypt signed agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1991 stipulating that Egypt implement a series of economic reforms in order to qualify for a structural adjustment loan and for debt reductions. Among the IMF/IBRD reforms are eliminating subsidies and liberalizing prices on consumer goods, eliminating export/import non-tariff barriers, privatizing Egyptian Government-owned industries, reducing budget deficits, deregulating some industries, implementing fiscal and monetary reforms, and developing human resources.
Egypt eliminated subsidies on essential consumer goods, such as sugar, cooking oil, or dairy products -- only the subsidy on bread remains -- and allowed other prices to rise to world market levels (for example, petroleum product prices went from 67% of the world market price to 80%, and cotton prices went from 66% of the world price to a free market price). Egypt reduced the budget deficit from 24.7% of GDP in 1981 to 2.6% in 1994 (total budget for 1993/94 = $20 billion). Egypt reduced many non-tariff barriers, and deregulated some industries (cement and fertilizer, for example). Some 40 government-owned companies have been designated for privatization, but most of the companies still seek buyers. The number of state holding companies has been reduced from 27 to 17, thus realizing savings in overhead and increased efficiency but at a cost of employment. The Egyptian Government has contracted public credit and expanded private credit, floated the Pound, increased taxes, and witnessed a decrease in inflation from 22.5% in 1988 to 9.7% in 1993. The IMF and the IBRD convinced Egypt's debtors to reduce Egypt's $30 billion external debt by 15%, and have targeted another 15% reduction. Also, the reforms have placed Egypt firmly on the road to a free market economy.
There are other indications of Egypt's economic progress, as spelled out in a July 1994 Government publication, Egypt 1981-1994, Achievements and Expectations. All agricultural production increased fivefold between 1981 and 1994; wheat production per feddan (1 feddan=1.038 acres) increased 53%, maize production increased 50%, and rice production increased 45% between 1981 and 1994. In the 1981-1994 period, the amount of reclaimed farmland doubled, the port capacity doubled, rail lines doubled, and industrial production increased 700%. Egypt has built an average of 134,000 housing units each year since 1981.
Some Members of Congress hold that U.S relations with and assistance for Egypt guarantees continued Egyptian adherence to the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, thereby helping to secure Israel. Other Members of Congress believe that U.S. assistance for and good relations with Egypt extend U.S. influence in Egypt and among Egypt's moderate Arab, Islamic, and African friends, which contributes to regional stability. And, some Members of Congress view U.S. aid to Egypt as a key to continued access to the region's oil reserves, trade opportunities, or military bases. For these and other reasons, a majority of the Members of Congress approve aid to Egypt. Members opposed to U.S. aid to Egypt often base their opposition on their belief that Egypt has failed to establish the close economic, political, and cultural relations with Israel expected after the 1979 peace treaty, or because they believe that the U.S. is financing the wrong kinds of projects. U.S. aid to Egypt has totaled $28.8 billion since 1979, averaging just over $2.2 billion per year.
During his April 1995 visit to Washington, President Mubarak appealed for parity in aid levels between Israel and Egypt. The President stated that Egypt appreciated the U.S. budget dilemma, and accepted the fact that aid to Egypt might be reduced, but added that aid to Israel should be reduced at the same rate to sustain the perception that the United States maintained equality in its Middle Eastern relations.
U.S. Economic Assistance. For FY1993, Congress earmarked $815 million in Economic Support Funds (some of which may be direct cash transfer not attached to any projects, $200 million of which is designated for the Commodity Import Program, and $15 million of which in local currencies shall be for antiquities preservation). It was expected that Egypt would receive another $200 million in P.L. 480 Food for Peace sales for FY1993. For FY1994, Egypt requested $815 million in ESF (of which $200 million in direct transfer, and $200 million in CIP) and $200 million in P.L. 480 aid (of which $150 million in Title I and $50 million in Section 416). The Administration requested and Congress appropriated $815 million in economic assistance (P.L. 103-87, September 30, 1993). The aid levels remain the same for FY1995, FY1996, and FY1997; $815 million in ESF, of which $200 million is CIP (P.L. 104-208, September 30, 1996).
U.S. Military Assistance. The United States has provided $4.6 billion in military loans, $12.6 billion in military grants, and over $20 million in International Military Education and Training funds over the past 15 years, an average of $1.1 billion per year. Because of cash flow financing, all but $700 million of $3.9 billion in U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid anticipated over the next 3 years is already committed to payments on previous year sales.
On September 14, 1990, President Bush asked Congress to transfer Egypt's $6.7 billion military debt from the Federal Financing Bank of the Treasury Department to the Department of Defense, and to cancel the debt. President Bush was rewarding Egypt for cooperating with the Desert Shield operations against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and was relieving Egypt of part of its debt repayment burden. Section 592 of P.L. 101- 513, signed into law on November 5, 1990, provided for canceling Egypt's military debt to the United States.
Egypt has requested more excess defense articles, U.S. military equipment considered obsolete or being phased out as the United States reduces its Armed Forces. Egypt previously received excess defense articles, such as trucks, jeeps, 700 M60-A1 tanks, etc, and seeks more tanks, armored personnel carriers, transport vehicles, anti-tank missiles, F-16 aircraft, 2 frigates, 6 minesweepers, and other equipment. Egypt seeks U.S. equipment as replacements for its old Soviet equipment, which will facilitate U.S.- Egyptian interoperability and cooperative actions, as happened in Desert Storm. P.L. 103-87, signed on September 30, 1993, provided $1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt for FY1994, and similar amounts of, FMF were provided for FY1995 (P.L. 103-306, August 24, 1994), for FY1996 (P.L. 104-107, February 12, 1996), and for FY1997 (P.L. 104-208, September 30, 1996). On 2 April 1996, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry announced during his visit to Egypt that the United States would provide 21 F-16 aircraft and a third frigate to Egypt, to be paid for out of U.S. aid beginning in 1999.
Questions About U.S. Foreign Assistance for Egypt. There are several recurring questions about U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt.
1. Is U.S. aid to Egypt tied to U.S. aid to Israel and/or to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty? There is no mention of U.S. foreign assistance in the Camp David Accords or in the peace treaty. State Department officials have maintained since 1978 that there is no direct link between U.S. aid to Egypt and the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, although some Egyptians have claimed that the United States promised at the time to maintain aid to Egypt at a level consistent with U.S. aid to Israel.
2. Is too much U.S. aid to Egypt stuck in the pipeline? Members of Congress have questioned why some $2 billion in U.S. aid funds have been committed to projects but have not been spent; hence are "in the pipeline." U.S. A.I.D. officials claim that many U.S.-supported projects are multi-year, and that funds committed for future years must be held "in the pipeline."
3. Does cash-flow financing commit the United States to high aid levels in future years? Under the cash-flow financing arrangement, Egypt makes payments due on multiyear projects for the current year only, and does not set aside funding for future year payments. Egypt postpones future payments on projects and relies on next year's U.S. aid for next year's payment. Advocates concede that cash-flow financing commits the United States to future aid programs, but suggest that the Egyptian aid program is in the best interests of the United States. Also, the advocates point out, Israel and other nations also use cash-flow financing. Critics suggest that cash-flow financing commits the United States to future years of high aid levels, contradicts the United States' pressure on Egypt to implement economic reforms, and encourages other countries to seek similar benefits.
U.S.-Egyptian Military Industrial Cooperation. In addition to the FMF purchases and excess defense articles, Egypt co-produces the U.S. M1A1 "Abrams" tank under a 1988 Memorandum of Understanding. Beginning in mid-1992, Egypt started assembling M1A1 tank components imported from the United States. Eventually, Egypt will manufacture about 40% and import 60% of the components for the planned 524 tanks. Egypt also repairs and overhauls U.S. M60-A3 and M60-A1 tanks, trucks, jeeps, armored personnel carriers, and is involved in a rehabilitation program to re-fit some older Soviet T-62 tanks. The Egyptians propose contracting for depot level maintenance and repairs for U.S. and NATO armored forces and some cargo aircraft. A U.S. General Accounting Office report released on August 19, 1993, suggests that the Egyptian tank plant is inefficient and uneconomical.
"Bright Star" and other Joint Military Operations. The United States and Egypt conducted the first "Bright Star" joint military exercise in August 1983, and continue to hold periodic "Bright Star" exercises for infantry, airborne, artillery, and armored forces. The 1983 Bright Star was more than a training exercise: President Mubarak asked the United States to send Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Libya's activity toward Sudan in February 1983. President Reagan sent AWACS planes and crews to monitor Libyan flights and the AWACS remained to take part in the first Bright Star. AWACS returned to Egypt in March-April 1984 to monitor Libyan flights toward Sudan after an incident in which a Libyan plane allegedly bombed Khartum.
Egypt and the United States conducted their first joint naval exercise in August 1986. Earlier, in August 1984, the U.S. Navy cooperated with the Egyptians in clearing Libyan mines from the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, and the Red Sea. And in 1974, the U.S. Navy and private U.S. companies had assisted in clearing the Suez Canal of sunken ships, military ordnance, and other obstacles from the 1967 and 1973 wars. Egyptian and U.S. Navies conducted a joint naval exercise in June 1995, September 1995, and May-June 1996.
"Desert Storm". In the week prior to the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak traveled to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis. After the invasion, Mubarak advised President Bush to withhold sending armed forces to allow Egypt more time to work out a peaceful resolution. On August 7 when the United States announced that it was deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, Mubarak denied a U.S. request to allow U.S. forces use of Egyptian military bases on their way to the Arabian Peninsula so that he would have time to negotiate (he later granted the request). Mubarak and other Egyptian officials continued their peacemaking efforts in the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), and on personal contacts and visits with Arab leaders. On August 10, Egypt voted for an Arab League resolution to send armed forces to defend Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion. The first contingent of Egyptian troops, a commando unit and a paratrooper unit, joined U.S. forces along the Saudi- Kuwaiti border the next day, on August 11. Egypt stated that its forces would assist in liberating Kuwait but would not attack or occupy Iraq. In February 1991, an Egyptian reinforced infantry division of some 30,000 troops took part in Desert Storm, advancing into western Kuwait in a corridor between U.S. Marines to the east and U.S. Army forces to the west in Iraq. Egypt lost 9 killed in action and 74 wounded in action in Desert Storm.
Egyptian and U.S. military officers state that cooperation in Bright Star exercises facilitated the U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in Desert Storm, and Egyptian officers claim that Bright Star and Desert Storm serve as precedents for future U.S.-Egyptian cooperative ventures. Egyptian troops currently serve as peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Yugoslavia, and an Egyptian contingent has been designated to serve with the Gulf Cooperation Council armed forces.
Bases. United States interest in a military base in Egypt followed the renewed interest in the late 1970's in a "Rapid Deployment Force" (now Central Command) and the need for overseas staging, support, and material storage areas. According to press reports, the United States has shown an interest in an air facility, such as Cairo West or the air base near Nag Hamadi, or an air and sea base, such as the small Egyptian base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. In 1981, Egypt agreed to allow the United States use of Ras Banas if an Arab state were threatened, but the negotiations to upgrade the facility collapsed in 1984 because of disagreements over managing the facility and the U.S. Congress' insistence on a formal agreement. Under a reported but unconfirmed understanding, Egypt will allow U.S. access to military facilities after mutual discussion and agreement in time of crisis. Egypt denied rumors that the United States used Egyptian air fields during the April 1980 attempted hostage rescue in Iran.
In addition to playing a host and mediating role in the Middle East peace process, Egyptians serve as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, and the Chairman of the International Parliamentary Union.
In early January 1993, Egypt announced that it would cooperate with Tunisia and Algeria in combatting militant Islamic reformers operating in the 3 countries. Egyptian officials state that contacts with other Islamic states and discussions on combatting militant Islam continue. President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials claim the Islamists attacking Egyptian tourist and police facilities are financed, trained, and directed from Iran and Sudan, and that many of the terrorists are Egyptian veterans of the Afghan war, where they were in contact with Iranians. Many Egyptian officials maintain that the Islamic threat to Egypt is minimal, and that only a few militant terrorists are attacking tourist and police facilities, but other Egyptians maintain that the Islamists are the core of a wider public dissatisfaction that will lead to the overthrow of the current Egyptian Government. Others in the region recognize that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood is the parent of Muslim Brotherhood groups in Jordan, Syria, and other countries, and could lead a regional movement to replace current regimes with Islamic ones.
Following Desert Storm, Egypt and Syria joined the 6 members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, in the Damascus Declaration signed on March 6, 1991, stating that the 8 countries would cooperate militarily to defend the Persian Gulf region. Egypt pledged an infantry division to the "6+2" group, but the talks stalled, Egypt withdrew its military contingent from the Gulf, as did Syria, and the force was never formed. Discussions continue among the 8 countries to create a regional military and economic cooperative, although with reduced prospects for success.
Egypt, because of its central position, large population, and national and intellectual voice, had been the modern leader of the Arab world until March 1979, when the Arab League voted to expel Egypt because it had signed the peace treaty with Israel. Egypt remained isolated from the Arabs, except for Sudan and Oman, because of the Israeli treaty, until Egypt opposed the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Iraq, the PLO, and Jordan reopened contacts with Egypt, and Jordan restored diplomatic relations with Egypt in September 1984. In May 1989, Arab League members voted to restore Egypt to membership, and in August 1990, returned the Arab League headquarters from Tunis to Cairo. Egypt's return to the Arab League, the end of Soviet patronage for several Arab states, Egypt's role as a facilitator for the peace talks, and Egypt's traditional central position have restored Egypt as the Arab leader.
Israel complains that Egypt is engaged in a "cold peace" and has not established the close economic, political, and diplomatic relations that Israel envisioned would emerge from the peace treaty. Despite close Egyptian-Israeli cooperation on the peace process, recent relations soured in early 1995 when Egypt pushed for an Israeli signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Relations remain strained since the August 1995 disclosures in Israel that Israeli soldiers murdered Egyptian prisoners of war and civilians during the 1956 and 1967 wars.