![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
The Clinton Administration has emphasized forging closer and better-coordinated U.S. relations with Russia and the former Soviet republics, including those of Central Asia. U.S. policy goals include fostering stability, democratization, free market economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. This is supplemented by another U.S. priority: discouraging attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals. While continuing to support reforms in Russia, U.S. policy toward Central Asia aims to strengthen the independence of the states, integrate them into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and discourage xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threaten regional and international peace and stability. U.S. foreign policy goals in Central Asia reflect the different characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included promoting the removal of strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory and the security of other nuclear materials. The United States has some economic and business interests in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, and potentially in Uzbekistan. Because Kyrgyzstan has adopted prospective democratic and economic policies, the United States seeks an expanded relationship with this state. The United States also continues to be concerned about human rights and civil liberties problems in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan and other Central Asian states, concern also focuses on populations displaced by civil war and strife, and other humanitarian needs.
While most policymakers in Congress and elsewhere support the current U.S. policy in Central Asia, others call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement. Some have called for strengthening aid conditions on progress in improving human rights conditions or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some argue that developments in these states since they regained their independence remain marginal to U.S. interests. Others point to civil and ethnic conflict in Tajikistan and elsewhere as another reason for the United States to eschew involvement beyond a minimal diplomatic presence in states where U.S. lives could be threatened. Still others argue that the United States should be more involved in supporting the sovereignty of these states, as an exemplar and counter to Russian moves in the region.
Central Asia, consisting of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most Central Asian peoples are closely related historically and culturally.
By the late 19th century, Russian Tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. After the breakup of the Tsarist empire, Central Asia was at first included within Russia, but by 1936 five Central Asian "union republics" had been delineated. Authoritarian Communist Party rule was imposed, resulting in massive loss of life from collectivization, purges, and famine. The disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 caught these republics by surprise and was not welcomed by their leaders. They quickly demanded that their new states be included as "equal partners" in the Slav-formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and were admitted on December 21, 1991. (For basic facts, see CRS Reports 95-497, Kazakhstan; 96-890, Kyrgyzstan; 94-697, Tajikistan; 96-719, Turkmenistan; and 95-520, Uzbekistan).
The major goals of U.S. policy toward the NIS, including Central Asia, entail fostering stability, democratization, free market economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. These positive goals of U.S. policy are supported by another priority of U.S. policy -- to discourage attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals. In the Central Asian context, the general goal of U.S. policy is integrating these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and discouraging xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threaten regional and international peace and stability.
While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on the general desirability of these goals, others urge different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement. Many of those who endorse current policy or urge enhanced U.S. aid for Central Asia support the view that political instability in Central Asia can produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey. They also point out that, although Kazakhstan is now free of nuclear weapons, the presence of nuclear weapons-related materials and facilities, and other elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in the region still raises the danger of proliferation to radical Third World regimes or terrorist organizations. U.S. interests, they maintain, are served by assisting the Central Asian states in preventing such proliferation. They also argue that the United States should continue to emphasize other ties with the Central Asian states. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights in the new states. They point out that the United States has committed itself to fostering these goals worldwide, and urge that these objectives should not be neglected in Central Asia. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a major role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthens the independence of the states and acts as a counter and exemplar to Russia.
Those who object to current U.S. policy toward Central Asia argue that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and that developments there remain marginal to U.S. interests. They suggest that limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies will ensure U.S. interests. They discount fears that an anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism, such as that fostered by Iran, will make any headway. Some also criticize aid for democratization among cultures they view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Others urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments, arguing that by providing aid, the United States supports their continued existence, and may even unwittingly encourage a countervailing rise of Islamic fundamentalism as the only channel of dissent. Some, pointing to reports of human rights abuses in Central Asia, argue that Congress should strengthen conditions to cut U.S. aid to such states. They also suggest that the oil and other natural resources in these new states are not vital to U.S. trade and security and are, in any event, unlikely to be fully developed and available to Western markets for many years. Some point to civil and ethnic conflict in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew major involvement that might place U.S. personnel and others in danger. Some are ready to concede to Russia's reassertion of control over its "sphere of influence," providing little scope for U.S. involvement.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and offered diplomatic relations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were viewed as following responsible security and democratic policies. Citing the dangers the Central Asian states faced from Iranian-supported Islamic fundamentalism, the United States established diplomatic relations with the remaining states by mid-March. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration devise a policy on assistance to the NIS, President Bush sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress in April 1992, approved by Congress with some changes and signed into law on October 24, 1992 (P.L. 102-511). The change in the U.S. Administration at the beginning of 1993 witnessed an enhanced emphasis on forging closer and better coordinated U.S. relations with the NIS. Administration officials have mentioned fostering democracy in the NIS as a top priority of U.S. foreign policy. (For details on aid, see CRS Report 95-914F, U.S. Assistance to the Soviet Union and its Successor States 1991-1994).
In a speech in October 1996, Ambassador at Large to the NIS and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State James Collins stated that the United States has "new and growing interests at stake in Central Asia," and that it is "vital" that the United States continue to promote its interests there. He outlined six main U.S. objectives "tailored to meet the specific needs" of the Central Asian states: (1) support for their independence and security ; (2) assistance in the establishment of free markets and democratic governments; (3) integration of the states into the world community of political and financial institutions, and participation in the Euro-Atlantic security dialogue; (4) encouragement of regional cooperation and the settlement of disputes with international mediation; (5) prevention of trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and other transnational threats such as terrorism, drugs, and environmental degradation; and (6) enhancement of U.S. commercial interests and the diversification of world energy supplies.
Elucidating these interests, Collins noted that the United States had been among the first to recognize and establish relations with the Central Asian states. While highlighting multi-candidate presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, he admitted that progress in democratization in the region "has been much slower than we would have liked." He praised the introduction of monetary systems in all the states and other economic reforms, but noted that "we need to do more to encourage the creation of an investor-friendly climate" benefitting these states and U.S. business. He stressed that the United States had supported the entry of the Central Asian states (except Tajikistan) into NATO's Partnership for Peace. The United States supports U.N. and OSCE mediation and the U.N. observer presence in Tajikistan to end this regional conflict. He hailed the removal of all nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan with U.S. aid. He also noted that "Central Asia will be a significant energy producer in the next century," and stated that the United States supports private investment in the rapid development of energy and the construction of "additional and multiple export routes."
Among other Administration statements of U.S. policy interests, Defense Secretary William Perry stressed during his visit to Uzbekistan in April 1995 that it was strategically located at the crossroads of Central Asia and was a potential regional economic power, and pledged U.S. support to foster its emergence as a pillar of democratization and stability in the region. During a March 1996 visit by Collins and other U.S. officials to Turkmenistan, he discussed creating favorable conditions for foreign investment, promoting progress on human rights, and admitting Turkmen officers to study in U.S. military schools. In Tajikistan, he reaffirmed U.S. support for settling the civil war. In Uzbekistan, he reportedly gave President Islam Karimov as message from President Clinton calling for Uzbekistan to play a major role in advancing regional cooperation in Central Asia, promoting peace in Tajikistan, combatting the drug trade, and cooperating with NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP).
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, and supported their admission to the OSCE, NATO bodies, and other Western organizations. As stated by Talbott on October 6, 1993, U.S. policy envisages the NIS countries eventually joining "the political and economic culture of the industrialized democracies." The Administration has supported these integrative goals through bilateral assistance and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. The Administration has used these and other means to supplant or discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists -- who use repression or violence to oppose democratization -- from attempts to gain influence in Central Asia. (See also CRS Issue Brief 93033, Iran).
Upon independence, all the Central Asian states professed desires for good relations with the world's states, and were eager to join myriad international and regional bodies, ranging from Western organizations such as the OSCE and NATO's Coordinating Council and PFP to Third World organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Relations with both East and West were pursued as a means of demonstrating the independence of the new states, and a certain opportunism was evident in the quest for relations with large aid donors. In all the Central Asian states, the ruling elites displayed hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, most of the states initiated relations with Iran for trade and aid purposes. While the Central Asian states have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, many observers note that special ties are developing with other Asian or Islamic states. They argue that, in the long run, Central Asian foreign policy will probably not be anti-Western, but may be more oriented toward Asian and Islamic states.
Russia's Role. The Clinton Administration has generally viewed a democratizing Russia as able to play a stabilizing role in Central Asia, though stressing that Russia should not seek to dominate regional economics and politics or otherwise exclude Western and other involvement. At the U.S.-Russian Summits and other venues, the United States has emphasized that Russia should follow peacekeeping policies that accord with international law. The United States has also recognized Russian concerns about human rights conditions of ethnic Russians residing in the new states, while cautioning that Russia should respect the independence of these states. Some observers warn that Russia might soon reabsorb Central Asian states into a new empire. Most, however, discount such plans by a Russia facing immense internal economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder, while cautioning that Russian influence activities that might infringe on the independence of the states should be closely monitored.
Russian officials have emphasized that Russia retains major interests in Central Asia, expressed in terms of strategic security , economic interests, and concern over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Russian influence has been greatest in the security sphere, moderate in the economic sphere, and minimal in the political sphere, except for obtaining assurances on the treatment of ethnic Russians. Russian strategic concerns have focused on the region as a buffer to Islamic fundamentalism, to criminal activities including drug production and trafficking, and to civil conflict emanating from the region and beyond. Russia has endeavored to meet its strategic concerns by concluding bilateral military cooperation, basing, and border security agreements, as well as multilateral agreements such as on CIS Collective Security and the 4-member Customs Union (see below). Russian border troops defend outer borders in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. On July 29, 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov rationalized Russia's military presence in Tajikistan as guarding against "waves of Islamic extremism" emanating from Afghanistan threatening "a domino effect" on other Central Asian states. Russia pointed to the taking of Afghanistan's capital Kabul by the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban in September 1996 as evidence of such a threat (see below). Many analysts argue that Russian fear of "Islamic fundamentalism" actually reflects their dread of a loss of influence in the region.
Economically, Russia seeks to gain substantial control over oil resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that oil pipeline routes transit Russian territory to Russian Black Sea ports (see below, Trade). At the same time, Russia has tried to avoid large economic subsidies to the region. In August 1993, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to join a prospective common monetary union or "ruble zone" with Russia, but backed out in November when Russia imposed onerous conditions. Civil war-torn Tajikistan was the only Central Asian state to subordinate its economy to Russia in exchange for subsidies, while the other Central Asian states introduced or proclaimed their own sole currencies. Even Tajikistan, however, has been forced by interminable delays by Russia in providing rubles to introduce its own currency, the Tajik ruble, in May 1995. In April 1996, Kyrgyzstan agreed to offer Russia majority shares in several major industries as partial payment for its debt to Russia, though Russia reportedly balked at taking charge of the ailing plants. In October 1996, Uzbekistan transferred property on the Black Sea to Russia to repay debts, and Kazakhstan agreed to supply grain to Russia to repay electricity debts. Russia, in turn, has balked at paying rent due on its Baikonur launch site in Kazakhstan and funds it owes Turkmenistan for gas shipments.
While seeking ties with Russia to provide for security and economic needs, at least in the short term, the Central Asian states have tried with varying success to resist or modify various Russian policies viewed as diluting their sovereignty, such as Russian calls for dual citizenship, military basing rights, and closer CIS security ties. Karimov has been a harsh critic of what he has viewed as Russian tendencies to treat Central Asia as an "unequal partner," although he has also acknowledged an important economic and security role for Russia in the region. While Kazakh and Kyrgyz leaders in late March 1996 affirmed or reaffirmed their membership with Russia and Belarus in a customs union (part of a "Treaty on Deepening Integration"), they (along with Presidents Rakhmonov and Karimov) criticized the April Belarus-Russia Treaty as endangering principles of sovereignty and independence. Karimov and Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov also were critical of the customs union accord, while Rakhmonov voiced eagerness to join. Some observers argue that a heavy handed approach by Russia in pursuing interests in Central Asia, as well as damaging Russia's ties with the West, may well backfire among increasingly nationalistic populations and elites and harm Russia's longer term influence.
The safety of ethnic Russians (or even more broadly, "Russian-speakers") in the "near abroad" (a Russian term designating the former Soviet republics) has been of widespread popular concern in Russia and has been an element of the political struggle. This issue has served to some degree as a stalking horse for those in Russia calling for greater control over "former Russian lands." To reduce ethnic Russian emigration from Central Asia, the Russian government has urged the new states to enact legal protections for ethnic Russians, provided some aid to ease economic distress, and encouraged political, military, and economic integration with Russia. Turkmenistan accommodated the Russian government in early 1994 by allowing ethnic Russians to obtain dual citizenship, though other Central Asian states have resisted to varying degrees. In January 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed on added protections for ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan short of dual citizenship. In June 1996, Kyrgyzstan amended its constitution to make Russian an official language.
Ethnic Russians constitute a rapidly declining minority in Central Asia. According to the 1989 Soviet census, nearly ten million ethnic Russians resided in Central Asia, constituting about 40% of all ethnic Russians residing outside of Russia (25.3 million). Six of the ten million reside mainly in northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan, and many Kazakhs fear potential separatism in these regions. Ethnic Russian fears are raised by employment, language, or other policies or practices they deem as discriminatory, and interethnic violence not usually involving ethnic Russians, though attacks on ethnic Russians appear to be increasing. These factors, combined with others such as relatively high birth rates among the Muslim peoples (and an active policy in Kazakhstan to woo back diaspora ethnic Kazakhs from Iran and elsewhere), have led to rapidly decreasing numbers of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. Remaining ethnic Russians tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In conflict-torn Tajikistan, of 387,000 Russians residing there in 1989, reportedly no more than 70,000 remain. The demographic decline of ethnic Russians is graphically demonstrated in Kazakhstan, where ethnic Kazakhs are projected to again become a majority around the year 2000.
The United States has fostered stability necessary for the NIS to successfully implement pro-Western reforms. In congressional testimony on November 14, 1995, Collins stressed that the emergence of the NIS at the end of 1991 brought with it a legacy of ethnic problems and other interstate differences, including the problem of Russia's adjustment to nonimperial ties with the new states. Instability in some of the NIS, he noted, has affected stability in other NIS. The United States has endeavored to foster stability in the NIS by encouraging Russia to respect the sovereignty and independence of the other NIS, and by using "quiet" diplomacy to assist in NIS conflict resolution. In Tajikistan, he noted, the United States has worked closely with the U.N.'s envoy for Tajikistan and the contending Tajik parties to try to reach a peace settlement. U.S. efforts to help resolve conflicts in the NIS have included naming a State Department Coordinator of Regional Affairs. As another means to foster stability, international military education training (IMET) grants and other military-to-military contacts have been pursued with all the countries except Tajikistan. During his February 1994 U.S. visit, Nazarbayev signed a memorandum on U.S.-Kazakh defense cooperation, including talks on defense doctrine, training, and budgets, and Perry visited Kazakhstan the next month and in April 1995 to implement this cooperation. Efforts to foster military cooperation were also furthered when all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) by mid-1994. Perry noted in testimony on February 8, 1995, however, that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other former Soviet republics would not qualify for NATO membership. Kyrgyz and Uzbek officers and troops participated in PFP exercises in Louisiana in August 1995, and Kazakhstan's joined them in exercises in North Carolina in September 1996.
The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the Central Asian states. During the Soviet period, central authorities used propaganda and education in attempts to inculcate an overarching and transcendent "Soviet" identity, but this found only modest appeal among most Central Asian peoples. More significant was the spur, given by the delineation of republics, to the growth of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek national identities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, most in Central Asia support redefining but basically retaining these national identities, while others are reemphasizing primary identifications with tribe, clan, family, and region. Islamic religion also provides a significant and growing sense of identity, differentiating Muslims from non-Muslims. This is particularly salient to growing prejudice against ethnic Russians. Most experts, however, do not expect Islamic fundamentalism to be a compelling political force in Central Asia for many years, if ever. Some in Central Asia promote a transcendent pan-Turkic identity among the four states where Turkic languages are spoken (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Most analysts conclude, however, that in the foreseeable future Central Asia will refer more to a geographic area than denote a region of shared identities and aspirations.
In many cases, a return to primary identification with tribe, clan, family, and region increases the potential for conflict. In Tajikistan, ethnic and regional divisions including between the Khojent, Kulyab, Garm, and Pamiri groups have contributed to civil war, while in Kazakhstan, animosity has resurfaced between the Large Horde (a tribal confederation), in power for several decades, and the Middle Horde. In Turkmenistan, viewed by many analysts as a tribal confederation rather than one nation, tensions have grown between tribes and clans based in the Merv (Mary), Ashkhabad, and Chardzhou regions, possibly threatening its future integrity. In Kyrgyzstan, tensions have increased between northern clans currently in power and southern clans, and in Uzbekistan, between the Bukhara, Ferghana (Kokand), Samarkand, Khorezm (Khiva), Karakalpak, and Tashkent regions (partially tribally reinforced). National majorities asserting their new-found independence have adopted policies viewed by many ethnic Russians -- many of whose ancestors settled in the region a hundred years ago or more -- as discriminatory or threatening.
Central Asia's borders, described as among the world's most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and natural boundaries, hence contributing to the potential for interethnic and territorial conflict and dampening prospects that an effective regional economic and security alliance might emerge. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and especially Tajikistan, where they make up almost one-fourth of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan -- more than three million -- than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in the historic cities of Bukhara and Samarkand in Uzbekistan, and a million or more in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China's Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was arbitrarily divided up among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, although these peoples are widely intermingled throughout the valley. Crisscrossing mountains thwart Tajikistan's integrity. Some in Central Asia have demanded that national borders be altered to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics. Some in Tajikistan have called for incorporating co-ethnics and territory in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan and the "lost lands" of Samarkand and Bukhara. Some in Uzbekistan have called for incorporating Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajik, and Afghan lands. In April 1996, Presidents Nazarbayev, Rakhmonov, Boris Yeltsin of Russia, and Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan travelled to Shanghai to sign a treaty with Chinese President Jiang Zemin pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of borders. China has used the Shanghai treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting Uighur separatism in Xinjiang province.
Civil War in Tajikistan. U.S. State Department officials have observed the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks, an example of the Administration's offer to assist in diplomacy to head off or ease ethnic and civil tensions in the NIS. The United States is the major humanitarian and developmental aid donor to alleviate the aftereffects of the civil war in Tajikistan. The United States also supported the sending of U.N. observers to Tajikistan, and urges CIS "peacekeeping" forces to cooperate fully with U.N. peace efforts and abide by international law.
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence. It is riven by geographical, ideological, political, and clan divisions that frustrate nation-building. Its communist-dominated elite, largely composed of members of the Kulyabi regional clan (who have forced out former allies from the Khojenti regional clan and many ethnic Uzbeks), has endeavored to rebuild traditional ties with Russia. In September 1992, opposition groups largely composed of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional clans who had long been excluded from political power, some of whom were supporters of the Islamic Revival Party (IRP), forced the sitting president from office and tried to consolidate power. Hardline communists resisted these efforts, and by December 1992 had routed the oppositionists from the capital and launched a country-wide offensive, resulting in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan contributed arms and troops to this offensive, and evidence points to an active Russian role, particularly in the last stages of the civil war. Tajik government control over its territory remains incomplete, particularly over the relatively inaccessible Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region in southeastern Tajikistan, where most Pamiris live.
Since 1993, many Tajik refugees in Afghanistan have been repatriated, although up to 30,000 remained in early 1996, according to the State Department. Some reportedly receive training and aid from Afghan Mujahedin and Iranian and other Mideast groups that foster Islamic fundamentalism among the refugees. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) special mission for Tajikistan, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have sponsored four refugee camps in northern Afghanistan and repatriation efforts, with over $8 million in U.S. support and humanitarian aid. (Arab nongovernmental organizations and the Iranian Red Crescent also give aid, but do not cooperate with UNHCR and other international organizations.) The World Bank in August 1994 estimated that the conflict had resulted in $7 billion in economic damage.
The CIS Summit of Heads of States in January 1993 endorsed a decision to send joint Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek "peacekeeping" contingents to Tajikistan. Even some pro-government Tajiks have raised concerns about Uzbek deployments and increased dependence on Uzbekistan for food, fuel, and other aid, viewing Uzbekistan as seeking to establish hegemony over Tajikistan (some ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan welcome Uzbekistan's aid). A July 1993 opposition offensive led the CIS leaders in September 1993 to endorse sending added troops to Tajikistan under the auspices of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF) treaty to protect what Yeltsin termed "CIS borders." The CIS troops in place proved inadequate to contain the conflict, and in October 1993, Russia announced that they would be increased to 25,000.
The actual number of CPF and border troops in Tajikistan are less than 15,000, according to the State Department, and these forces include many ethnic Tajik draftees. "Peacekeepers" consist of Russia's 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kazakh and Kyrgyz troops are mainly detailed to border patrolling). Col. Gen. Viktor Zavarzin is the CPF commander in Tajikistan. Border troops consist of up to 6,000 Russians and Tajiks, and between 500-1,000 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks. Manpower and financing problems have bedeviled efforts to increase force levels. Lt.Gen. Pavel Tarasenko is the Russian border troop commander.
Yeltsin and other Central Asian leaders repeatedly appealed to the U.N. Security Council to authorize U.N. observers along the Tajik-Afghan border, and called for it to sanction the CPF as regional "peacekeepers." The United States and other U.N. Security Council members resisted granting the CPF status as a regional peacekeeping force, citing as grounds the involvement of Tajik troops, inclusion of border defense as a role, and that the CPF was not involved in separating combatants (after April 1994, Tajik troops were formally dissociated from the CPF). U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, instead, appointed a special envoy who worked for a settlement of the conflict and set up a tiny U.N. observer mission based in the capital of Dushanbe. Gerd Merrem is currently the special envoy. An Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) office of less than 10 staffers was also set up. The first two rounds of talks under U.N. auspices, in April and June 1994, made some headway, though the Tajik government did not fulfill some commitments. At a U.N.-sponsored meeting in Tehran, Tajik government and opposition emissaries agreed on September 17, 1994, to a cease-fire, to begin when U.N. observers were in place along the Tajik-Afghan border.
In October 1994, the sides agreed to extend the cease-fire (the first of repeated extensions). Because of this progress, the U.N. Security Council formally established a U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) on December 16, 1994, to monitor the cease-fire. Total personnel of 96 in December 1996 includes 44 military observers from Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Denmark, Jordan, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Brig. Gen. Hasan Abaza (Jordan) is the chief of UNMOT. Boutros Ghali has reported that the CPF are generally cooperating with UNMOT. Although intense fighting continued in the town of Tavil-Dara central Tajikistan, the two sides agreed after a four month hiatus to reconvene talks in Turkmenistan July 8-19, attended by Merrem. The sides agreed on a reinstated and enhanced cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan border and throughout Tajikistan, and a prisoner exchange. Ongoing conflict continued in Tavil-Dara, spoiling the agreement, and reportedly contributed to a new wave of over 16,000 displaced persons and hundreds of casualties. On September 17, 1996, oppositionists and the Tajik government agreed to a U.N.-brokered cease-fire limited to part of the Karategin Valley in central Tajikistan (along the Surkhob River, from Garm to the Kyrgyz border) that recognized substantial opposition gains. The opposition agreed to keep the major east-west highway open, while the government removed most checkpoints. On December 1, 1996, the opposition shattered the Karategin Valley casefire by launching a surprise attack to take Garm, which is strategically situated on the Dushanbe-to-Kyrgyzstan road. In August 1996, former Tajik prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajanov announced the creation of the National Revival Bloc, composed mainly by Khojentis, to seek representation of northern interests in the Tajik government and in peace talks. The bloc is supported by Moscow, marking its dissatisfaction with Rakhmonov's conciliatory stance. The Tajik opposition has called for the bloc to play a role in its proposed National Reconciliation Council to rule Tajikistan.
A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies. Technical assistance and training programs supporting democratization in Central Asia include those dealing with the division and balance of governmental powers, political parties, voter education and electoral laws, election administration, civic education, legal and constitutional reform, respect for human rights, independent media, diplomacy, university administration, and parliamentary and educational exchanges.
Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the states by ex-Communist party elites who are to lesser or greater degree dependent on Russia, gradual transitions to more nationalistic and independence-minded elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or fundamental and perhaps violent transitions to elites termed Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic. At present, Central Asian elites are heavily dominated by former Communist party officials. The Presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are former republic Communist party leaders, while the presidents of Tajikistan, and even of more liberal Kyrgyzstan, were lower-level Communist party officials. The communist parties in these states continue to operate, most under new names, and their members hold many positions in the political and economic systems. Tajikistan, where oppositionist elites briefly usurped power in 1992, returned to ex-communist elite control by the end of 1992 and a dependency relationship with Russia.
The United States and other Western countries have worked with the existing leaderships and elites in Central Asia, recognizing that these elites may continue to hold power for some time. At the same time, the United States and other Western states hope to foster gradual transitions in these states to democracy and full independence, to discourage a transition to fundamentalist and xenophobic rule. There are a few positive signs of democratization. All the Central Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would pursue democratization. They also pledged in joining the OSCE in early 1992 that they would abide by international human rights standards. All of the Central Asian states have adopted new constitutions, many with legal assistance from U.S. groups, that embrace many liberal democratic principles. During Nazarbayev's February 1994 U.S. visit, he and President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership, that recognized Kazakhstan's commitments to democratization, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reforms. On February 5, 1995, 1,021 candidates competed in the first round of balloting for a new 105-member Kyrgyz legislature. Run-off elections were held later in the month or in April, in a process viewed by most international observers as free and fair, though with some irregularities (see below).
In general, however, the majority of Central Asian states appear more authoritarian than during the Gorbachev period, according to many observers, and commit many human rights abuses. Turkmenistan has put in place the most authoritarian political system, closely followed by those of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. No opposition parties are allowed in Turkmenistan, the press is rigidly censored (or self-censored), and dissenters are subject to loss of jobs, arrest, and violence. The human rights record in Uzbekistan worsened during the 1990s, including censorship and widespread arrests and violence against many parties and groups, though some improvement may have begun in 1996. The Tajik civil war and its aftermath has resulted in massive human rights violations by both sides.
The development of electoral democracy has faced myriad challenges, though some observers have stressed the relative progress of some of the states in holding multiparty or, at least, multicandidate elections. In presidential races, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, the leaders were elected in noncompetitive elections, while in Uzbekistan one opposition party was allowed to field a candidate. A government orchestrated Turkmen referendum in January 1994 extended Niyazov's presidential term to ten years. A similar referendum was held in Uzbekistan on March 26, 1995, to extend Karimov's presidency until the year 2000, and another in Kazakhstan on April 29, 1995. A November 6, 1994, presidential election and constitutional referendum in Tajikistan were judged by many observers as not free and fair. The referendum recreated a presidential system of rule (it had been abolished in late 1992), and Rakhmonov was elected president in a two-person contest. Akayev's supporters were blocked by widespread opposition to a proposed referendum extending his rule, so he opted to hold an election on December 24, 1995. Three presidential candidates, including Akayev, ran. He won about 75% of the vote in a race generally viewed as "free and fair" by international observers, though they questioned the elimination of most candidates and media dominance by Akayev.
All the Central Asian leaders have endeavored to create pliant legislatures filled with supporters. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev fostered the dissolution of regional soviets and the Kazakh Supreme Soviet in late 1993, prior to the March 7, 1994 elections for a new Kazakh legislature. On March 6, 1995, the Kazakh Constitutional Court ruled that the election was invalid because it violated principles of "one person, one vote." Nazarbayev disbanded the legislature and called for rewriting the constitution. Elections to a new, weaker, two-house, 114-member legislature were finally held on December 5 and December 9, 1995. The 47 deputies of the upper chamber were indirectly elected by regional legislatures, except for seven appointed by Nazarbayev, while deputies in the lower chamber were directly elected by district. The two opposition parties allowed to campaign alleged government harassment and voting irregularities. Nazarbayev's power over the legislature was graphically illustrated in June 1996, when the legislature reversed an earlier vote and decisively approved an unpopular bill reforming the massive pension system.
At the beginning of September 1994, Akayev engineered the early dissolution of the legislature, and issued decrees on holding an October referendum on constitutional changes to approve creation of a two-chamber, 105-seat legislature. He argued that amendments to the new, Western-style constitution were necessary because Kyrgyzstan was not yet ready for full democracy. Still dissatisfied with the scope of his presidential powers vis-a-vis the legislature, in December 1995 Akayev ordered another constitutional referendum to be held on February 10, 1996. In Tajikistan, most opposition parties were not allowed or declined to participate in the February 26, 1995, elections to a new 181-seat legislature. The OSCE refused to monitor the election. In Turkmenistan, only the renamed communist party was permitted to field candidates in December 11, 1994 elections to a 50-seat legislature, judged by many international observers as not free and fair. These legislators are part of a larger rubber-stamp People's Council led by Niyazov. In December 25, 1994, elections to a 250-seat Uzbek legislature, judged by some observers as democratic in form, only the renamed communist party and one other were allowed to participate.
Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. After the Soviet breakup, independent Kazakhstan was in theory one of world's major nuclear weapons powers, though in actuality these weapons were tightly controlled by Russia. Though some Kazakh elites urged that Kazakhstan "retain" its status as a nuclear power, the reality of Russia's control, international pressure, and Kazakh popular opposition led the leadership to sign the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) on May 22, 1992, pledging to become a non-nuclear weapons state. The Kazakh legislature ratified the Lisbon protocol and the START Treaty in July 1992, and on December 13, 1993, ratified the NPT (Kazakhstan formally acceded in February 1994). All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (nuclear warheads were either stored or returned to Russia). On March 28, 1994, Nazarbayev and Yeltsin signed an agreement on removing nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan within 14 months and destroying all Kazakh missiles and silos within three years. On April 21, 1995, the last of approximately 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and the dismantlement of the SS-18 missiles and silos had begun. Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin announced that it was now a nuclear weapons-free state. (See also CRS Issue Brief 91144, Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union.)
Vice President Gore and Nazarbayev in December 1993 signed a U.S.-Kazakh umbrella agreement on obligating $85 million in initial funds for the "safe and secure" dismantling of approximately 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes. As part of the Trilateral Statement signed by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine at the U.S.-Russian Summit in January 1994, the parties recognized that Kazakhstan (and Ukraine and Belarus) should be compensated for the value of the highly enriched uranium contained in nuclear warheads located on Kazakh territory or already transferred to Russia and other costs of nuclear disarmament. Nazarbayev discussed compensation arrangements during his February 1994 U.S. visit. As of June 30, 1996, $88.9 million in Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) funds for denuclearization, demilitarization, and enhancing the "chain of custody" had been obligated to Kazakhstan.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are nuclear research and power reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan has a milling facility and closed uranium mines; Tajikistan's mines and milling facility may be closed. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world's uranium reserves, and mines and mills most of the uranium used in nuclear reactors in the NIS. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous radioactive waste dumps. Kyrgyzstan in October 1996 reported radioactive pollution of rivers flowing into the Syr-Darya River, threatening the multinational Fergana Valley watershed. Kazakhstan is also the site of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test site. Reportedly, many of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Central Asia are under Russian guardianship. Western and NIS media reports of alleged diversions on nuclear materials to radical Third World regimes or criminal groups have raised concerns over inadequate safeguards at these facilities. Easing some concerns, Uzbekistan acceded to the NPT in mid-1992, accepting international safeguards that are being implemented. Kyrgyzstan acceded to the NPT on July 5, 1994. About $14.5 million in U.S. funding was obligated as of June 30, 1996, to enhance the Kazakh "chain of custody" over nuclear materials. In November 1994, the United States repackaged and removed about 600 kilograms of highly enriched, nonirradiated uranium from an inadequately safeguarded warehouse in Kazakhstan, shipping it to the United States. This "Project Sapphire" operation occurred at the behest of Kazakh authorities and with the approval of Russia, under compensation arrangements broadly covered by the Trilateral Agreement. In October 1995, the U.S. Defense Department agreed to assist Kazakhstan in sealing tunnels at the Semipalatinsk site to enhance security over nuclear wastes.
Support for private sector development has been a major component of U.S. aid efforts in the NIS. Technical assistance and training programs supporting privatization and the creation of market economies have included those dealing with entrepreneurship, agribusiness, small business development, telecommunications, banking, housing, defense conversion, tax policy and administration, bankruptcy, consumer protection, and labor management. U.S. aid for economic restructuring in Uzbekistan has been less than for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan because of Uzbekistan's hesitant reform efforts. A Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund, similar to those in Eastern Europe and Russia, was established in July 1994, to be capitalized with $150 million over five years. Stephen Solarz was named to head this fund. With offices throughout the region, it disburses loans to help encourage small- and medium-size enterprise privatization. A memorandum on U.S. advice for Kazakh defense industrial conversion was signed during Nazarbayev's February 1994 U.S. visit, and follow-on agreements were signed during Perry's March 1994 and April 1995 Kazakh visits. Defense conversion aid to Uzbekistan was discussed during Karimov's June 1996 U.S. visit, and during Perry's April 1995 and Collins' March 1996 visits to Uzbekistan. Joint committees for defense conversion have been set up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to plan U.S. aid in converting state enterprises to privately held, non-defense firms.
The Central Asian states, the least economically developed part of the former Soviet Union, witnessed steep declines in gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita income after they gained independence. The declines were greatest in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, because of Kyrgyzstan's defense industry conversion problems and Tajikistan's civil conflict. Per capita incomes in the region declined from an average of $3133 in 1991 to about $2000 in 1995 (compared to a Russian per capita income of $4500 in 1995; Planecon consulting firm estimates). In Tajikistan, per capita income plummeted the most, from $1200 in 1991 to $500 in 1995, placing most of the population in desperate straits and contributing to brigandage and drug activities. In all the Central Asian states, economic reforms, particularly privatization, have proceeded slowly even when endorsed in principle. After failing to get three successive Kazakh legislatures to enact a law, Nazarbayev in January 1996 issued a decree allowing some private land ownership. Economic prospects are best in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, because of export potentials and policies, while short and medium-term prospects for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are less favorable.
As stressed by President Clinton and others, U.S. support for privatization and the creation of free markets directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. trade and investment in Central Asia has so far been minimal, ranking well below that with Russia, reflecting the relatively isolated nature of these states, their lagging behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties, and the need for massive investments to exploit potential resources. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Bilateral Investment Treaties providing national treatment guarantees are in place with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Duty free access to U.S. markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in effect for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Defaults by the Kazakh government led to the suspension of Eximbank activity there. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. During Karimov's June 1996 Washington visit, OPIC announced financing worth $400 million for a U.S.-Uzbek natural gas joint venture. All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan are observers to the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Foreign Commercial Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce opened offices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in August 1993, and co-located American Business Centers were opened in 1994. Peace Corps volunteers, teaching small business development and English language, are now serving in all of the Central Asian states except Tajikistan.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess valuable export commodities, mainly oil, coal, and natural gas, that could improve their economic prospects. However, they are being pressured to yield substantial portions of this wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls existing pipeline routes to export markets. Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field, reportedly the world's largest known untapped field, began to be exploited by U.S. Chevron and Kazakhstan in a joint venture during 1993, though Chevron cut back investment after May 1994 in the face of spiralling Kazakh and Russian demands for pipeline financing and other extortion. Kazakhstan sold half of its interest to U.S. Mobil Oil in April 1996. Russia's heavy restrictions on Tengiz oil exports were eased in April 1996, allowing much more oil to be transported through its pipelines to Europe. Yeltsin also visited Kazakhstan in late April 1996 and reportedly signed an accord that may help resolve the imbroglio over building a pipeline from the Tengiz fields to Black Sea ports, and another possibly easing the dispute over exploitation of Caspian Sea resources. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium protocol grants Russian interests the largest share, 44%, while adding U.S. and Western partners. Nazarbayev also reportedly signed oil export and Caspian Sea utilization accords with Iran in May and June, 1996. Kazakhstan will ship oil to northern Iran, beginning in November 1996, while Iran will in exchange ship oil from Persian Gulf ports. In another initial oil swap, Kazakhstan shipped some Tengiz oil to Azerbaijan, which transported some of its own oil in turn to the Georgian Black Sea in October 1996. This experiment may result in regular transport (rather than swapping) of some Tengiz oil to the Black Sea for export to Western markets (pending completion of Russian and Black Sea pipelines).
In the late 1980's, Turkmenistan was the world's fourth largest natural gas producer; it has large oil and gas reserves. It is currently dependent on Russian export routes. Reflecting this, in November 1995 Niyazov signed an agreement with Russia's Gazprom firm giving it the right to sell Turkmenistan's entire 1996 gas exports, along with other concessions. Seeking alternative export routes bypassing Russia, Turkmenistan opened a significant rail link with Iran in mid-May 1996, and has indicated interest in the planned pipeline from Azerbaijan to Georgia's Black Sea ports. Iran is fully financing the building of a 130 mile natural gas pipeline to link a Turkmen gas field to the Iranian pipeline system. Construction began in October 1996, with completion expected by the end of 1997. Then, a small amount of Turkmen gas will be transported to northern Iran, or perhaps to international markets, bypassing Russia. Added motivation to develop alternative routes came during Niyazov's meeting with Chernomyrdin in Moscow in mid-October 1996, where the Russians refused to repay a $500 million natural gas debt while demanding added supplies at low prices.
To combat Russian and Iranian influence, in July 1995 the U.S. Department of Energy signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to assist it in planning a pipeline to Pakistan via war-torn Afghanistan, bypassing Russia and Iran. Collins answered in response to a congressional inquiry in November 1995 that "the U.S. Government advocates the development of additional export routes [not transiting Iran] for oil and gas from the Caspian region in order to ensure the independence and sovereignty of countries such as Turkmenistan." The Conference Report on H.R. 3610 (H.Rept. 104-863; P.L. 104-208, Omnibus Appropriations for FY1997, including foreign operations) calls for the Secretary of State to prepare a report to Congress by March 1, 1997, "containing a plan of action for the U.S. Government to assist and accelerate the earliest possible development and shipment of oil from the Caspian Sea region to the United States and other Western markets." On October 19-21, Karimov and Pakistani President Faruk Ahmad-khan Leghari discussed a proposed trans-Afghan oil and gas pipeline, with Karimov suggesting that all sides cooperate in planning a pipeline via Uzbekistan, through ethnic Uzbek and Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan, to Pakistan's Karachai seaport. Turkmenistan also held talks with Taliban on a proposed pipeline linking Turkmenistan to Pakistan.
Although the other states of the region possess some potential sources of export earnings, in most cases major investments are needed to revamp, retool, develop, or market these resources. Uzbekistan's cotton and gold production rank among the largest in the world and some is exported. Kyrgyzstan possesses major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, and is a major wool producer. Tajikistan has the world's fourth largest aluminum processing plant (though it is now operating far below capacity) and is a major cotton grower.
Among the former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic states), Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in cumulative U.S. government aid obligated as of June 30, 1996, with most Central Asian states receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and aid for nuclear weapons disarmament and safeguards for Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were exceptions, with Kazakhstan ranked at fifth ($366.44 million) and Kyrgyzstan at seventh ($289.08 million). In FY1996, the Administration planned to spend at least $17.6 million in humanitarian and technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan, which would rank fourth in such aid per capita among the NIS. Urgent humanitarian and health care aid for Tajikistan has been mentioned by the Administration as a special concern since FY1994, including for refugee repatriation. The Administration request for FY1997 includes modest increases for all the Central Asian states over FY1996 funding. P.L. 104-208 (Omnibus Appropriations for FY1997) slightly reduced the Administration request for the NIS, setting it at $625 million for FY1997, which is not expected to affect planned aid for Central Asia. In response to a congressional question on November 14, 1995, Coordinator of U.S. Aid to the NIS Richard Morningstar indicated that the Administration was planning for a phaseout of Freedom Support aid to Central Asia by the year 2001, though other aid would continue. Besides bilateral aid, the United States contributes funds to international financial institutions (IFIs) and nongovernmental relief organizations that aid the Central Asian states. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief 95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.)