![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
-A vibrant but sometimes overheated economy. The economy seems poised to continue to grow substantially in the years ahead, although there are many major difficulties, including inflation, energy shortages, inadequate transportation, incomplete reform of state enterprises, and regional inequities in income, resources, and standards of living;
-A less divided central political leadership. Chinese leaders are less at odds than in the past over issues of policy (i.e. economic reform and political repression) but seem to face major uncertainty over how to reach decisions following the anticipated passing of senior leader Deng Xiaoping. Economic reforms have created serious political frictions between the central and local authorities;
-A society with apparently few strong advocates for the prevailing political system and with many segments resentful or anxious about significant aspects of government policy. The regime's ability to deal effectively with such societal discontent is markedly weaker than in the past, especially because of widespread corruption and cynicism among officials at all levels;
-A military more streamlined, professionally inclined, and less tied to local political interests than in the past. The People's Liberation Army remains the center's ultimate coercive lever against social discontent and resistant local authorities, and it could provide the margin of decision in the event of a serious political struggle for power among civilian leaders in Beijing;
-A foreign policy premised on cooperation with China's neighbors and important developed countries (including the United States -- despite recent events) as a key ingredient in the regime's economic modernization program -- the main determination of political success or failure of the Beijing government.
Possible outcomes and implications for U.S. interests vary. For example, increasingly effective political administration and reform with continued successful economic modernization would be generally compatible with U.S. interests in greater economic opportunity, foreign policy cooperation, and political liberalization in China. Alternatively, Chinese administration, economic vitality, and internal cohesion could degenerate, limiting U.S. economic opportunities, challenging U.S. interests in stability in East Asia, but also diminishing potential threats from a strong China. Finally, China could develop formidable economic power while retaining authoritarian political control, with China emerging as a world power less interested in accommodating U.S. interests than in opposing them.
After the Chinese government's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators around Beijing's Tiananmen square and other Chinese cities in June 1989, Congress remained keenly interested in U.S. policy toward China. For several years, a bitter U.S. policy debate flared over whether to legislate conditions on U.S. most-favored nation (MFN) tariff treatment for Chinese imports (see CRS Issue Brief 94002). At the same time, congressional Members have been showing much greater interest in assessing for themselves the conditions in China. Congressional interest in China's vibrant economy has been particularly acute.
Mid-1995 saw new tensions in relations as Beijing cut off a number of official connections in protest over the U.S. decision to allow Taiwan's president to make a private visit to the United States. The Chinese government's arrest and detention of Chinese-American human rights activist Harry Wu prompted strong U.S. criticism. Wu was expelled in August 1995 amid some signs of a thaw in U.S.-PRC contacts. A summit meeting between the PRC and U.S. Presidents was held in New York on October 24, 1995. Relations took a downturn as a result of a U.S.-Chinese military face-off in the Taiwan area in March 1996, but began to improve later in the year.
The communist government in Beijing is now seen to have survived the immediate fallout of the Tiananmen incident better than some American observers had expected. But the regime's political future has remained in doubt. Many anticipate a struggle for power to follow the passing of senior leader Deng Xiaoping, 92 years old, with considerable uncertainty regarding how stable a future regime likely will be. This issue brief highlights recent economic, political, social, military, and foreign policy trends in China, shows how events could lead to alternative outcomes for China, and reviews possible implications for U.S. interests.
Economic modernization remains a fundamental determinant of the future of China. Post-Mao leaders have recognized that their hold on power rests heavily on their ability to achieve concrete economic success and to make life materially better for the vast majority of the Chinese people. They are aware that they have little of Mao's prestige as a successful revolutionary and nationalist leader, and that the hold of communist ideology on the minds of the Chinese people is a thing of the past. Performance is seen as what counts, and economic performance is the linchpin of the continued political legitimacy of the communist leaders in China.
Bad statistical reporting notwithstanding, Maoist China had quite respectable (over 8% annually) rates of economic growth, on average. It achieved much in bringing China from its largely agrarian roots and produced an impressive array of industrial and technological establishments. In the course of these efforts, however, tens of millions lost their lives. Waste and inefficiency reached a point in the late 1970s that a consensus was reached among post-Mao leaders on the need to move away from statecontrolled development and to open China more to the outside world. What followed was basically a pragmatic, trial-and-error approach to building China into a more modern and efficient market-centered economic power.
Efforts focused first on rejuvenating the stagnant rural economy, resulting in several years of rapid growth which, by the mid-1980s, had doubled the income of the average farmer. Dominated by large state-controlled enterprises, the urban economy posed a more difficult management problem. Nonetheless, progress in the direction of greater decentralization and reliance on market forces has been evident since the 1980s. Chinese officials now claim that roughly 80% of commodities in China are distributed through market channels at prices largely set by market forces.
Reliance on decentralized decision-making -- a feature of economic reform efforts -- has given local authorities a greater say in economic matters. Prior to the reform, economic policies were largely inflexible and dictated from Beijing or from provincial capitals. Reforms have given local officials greater leeway to adapt policies and implementation to fit their conditions.
This combination of decision-making autonomy and entrepreneurial incentives has been a key to the success of the economic reform effort. Investment trading connections and management expertise from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other overseas Chinese communities also has been a major factor. Since the early 1980s, China's economy has grown at an average of nearly 9% a year in real terms. Living standards for much of the Chinese population have improved steadily over the past decade and a half, and consumer goods and food supplies are abundant throughout much of the country.
Beijing's trial and error approach to economic reforms has not been without significant drawbacks. For instance:
In 1992, Beijing registered a booming 12.8% growth rate. The boom continued in 1993 at a rate of 13.4%. Growth in 1994 was 11.8%. In 1995 it was 10.2%. With such rapid growth came dislocations and renewed inflation. Inflation reached 21.7% in 1994. It was 14.8% in 1995. Some key sectors became starved for cash -- primarily because funds were channeled into higher profit and speculative ventures. In rural areas, cash shortages forced grain stations to pay many farmers in IOUs for their crops. Some key infrastructure projects and enterprises could not obtain needed funds.
To deal with the inflation, dislocation, and other consequences of overheating, Beijing decided in mid-1993 to strengthen earlier measures to cool the economy. Under the direction of Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, a 16-point plan was launched in July. It included administrative measures -- ordering localities to stop constructing new development zones and ordering government banks to recall inappropriate loans.
The cooling plan proved to be not as sweeping and Draconian as past government efforts to curb inflation during previous "boom-bust" cycles associated with Chinese reform. Beijing still wants to see economic growth at a more sustainable, less disruptive level of around 9% a year. Its main problem reportedly comes from local officials bent on pursuing entrepreneurial endeavors with sources of capital outside central control. Stern government measures have brought these enterprises into line in the past, but at the expense of overall growth and needed reforms in many inefficient parts of the economy.
At a Communist Party plenum on November 11-14, 1993, it was decided to push forward with greater growth and reform and moderate the earlier measures to dampen growth and inflation. Beijing attempted with mixed results to remedy some of the negative consequences of rapid growth while continuing to move the economy toward greater market reform. In particular, tax and banking reforms gave the more cautious central authorities more control over the sometimes irresponsible growth policies of local officials. Beijing also tried to meet the needs of rural residents for better terms of trade -- needs that had worsened rural/urban differences in recent years. Concern over inflation has dominated economic policy since late 1994.
On balance, the economic fundamentals in the Chinese economy are bullish. China has the natural resources, the human capital, and access to foreign technology and capital to sustain growth rates of the past decade into the next century. It is also at the geographic center of the world's most dynamic economic region. But China continues to face major economic impediments, including inadequate transportation and electric power systems, large population growth, an emerging business law system, and inadequate fiscal control mechanisms.
Political problems, especially perceived differences among the leadership elites in Beijing, have traditionally been given pride of place in Western analyses of contemporary China. During the Maoist period, Chinese leadership differences often were wide ranging and had broad implications for China's internal and foreign policies.
Following the death of Mao and the rise of more pragmatic Chinese leaders bent on economic modernization and reform in the late 1970s, debate among Chinese leadership elites focused more on the dynamics of nation building. Some groups favored the central government's retention of considerable control over the economic development process. This strategy would result in slower economic growth in the interest of avoiding socially disruptive developments. Others favored greater reduction in state control in order to spur economic growth. They argued that more rapid economic growth over the long run would help Chinese authorities deal more effectively with social and other dislocations stemming from economic and other changes.
Over time, the range of this debate over nation building and economic reform has narrowed. Indeed, the results of the Communist Party's 14th Congress in late 1992 and subsequent party and government meetings have reflected an unusual degree of leadership consensus on how to carry out reform. The new consensus supported the more activist approach to economic reform noted above. It also reflected caution over political change seen in Chinese decisions since the crackdown on political dissent in 1989.
All of the above does not imply that Chinese leaders will remain unified in the period ahead. In particular, it remains to be seen exactly how central leaders will handle their continuing differences once the elder statesmen headed by Deng Xiaoping pass away. Nervousness over Deng's failing health and potential dissident activity caused Chinese leaders to reinforce political controls since 1994. Perceived signs of leaders' jostling for power since 1995 included an unusual spate of attacks on high-level administrative corruption, overt dissent in China's annual session of the National People's Congress in March 1995, and prominent activity by or on behalf of senior leaders thought to have been retired from politics. Also, a corruption scandal forced the resignation of Beijing's party chief and was probable cause of his top aide's suicide in April 1995. President Jiang Zemin has appeared to progress in establishing his leadership position. In the process, he has endeavored to accommodate the interests of important political groups, including the military.
Local Politics. Economic reforms have been accompanied by a large-scale devolution of authority from the central party and government organs to provincial and other local authorities who are taking the lead in promoting flexible schemes to foster economic growth. There is a danger that local authorities will become so influential as to undermine and eventually challenge central authority.
Provincial authorities have been given greater control over personnel appointments in their jurisdictions; greater authority to approve imports, exports, and foreign investment projects; greater access to tax revenues and to the profits of state enterprises; and greater power over domestic investment decisions. Provincial leaders, always able to lobby the center on matters of policy and resource allocation, are sometimes able to evade or even defy decisions they disagree with.
The decentralization of political power in China recently has been a disorderly process. It poses serious difficulties for Beijing leaders trying to cool down the currently overheated Chinese economy. Yet it is easy to exaggerate the implications for China's future. In particular, prospects for the political fragmentation of China -- often cited in Western press reporting and some China experts' analysis about China -- appear fairly remote. The central government still controls the allocation of economic resources that are critical to most of the country's provinces. The Party's central personnel apparatus appoints the top officials at the provincial level, and central leaders still control the People's Liberation Army and the Public Security apparatus. Alongside these political factors for unity must be placed the emergence of an economic system that is more highly integrated nationally than ever before and the popular nationalistic ideal of China as a nation-state.
A focal point of analytical concern in the West recently has been the nature of regimesociety relations in China. If there is going to be a big change in direction in Chinese policy and practice, many analysts believe it will be ignited by friction between the regime's injunctions and conflicting trends in society. Exacerbating this is widespread discontent with growing official corruption.
There has been considerable evidence of discontent in both rural and urban areas. Many city-dwelling intellectuals, workers, and others were thought to have been seriously alienated from government authority following the repression of the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989. Urban dwellers also contain the largest groups in society whose benefits are being fundamentally challenged by the economic reform policies. In the countryside, the terms of trade and government procurement practices for agricultural goods have taken a disadvantageous turn for farmers after the high growth in peasant income fostered by government policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Chinese and Western media report that local officials responsible for purchasing grain and other mandated crops have sometimes used their allocations of cash to speculate in real estate or local enterprises. They have provided peasants with "IOUs" for their crops -- a practice that has set off a number of peasant demonstrations and riots. In August 1994, the Chinese press said that in 1993 there were 830 violent rural incidents involving more that 500 people each. In all, a total of 8,200 people were injured or killed.
In the past, the center could endeavor to deal with such problems through party channels, to weed out corrupt or abusive local officials in order to ensure continued effective government. Current conditions in China make such an approach less likely to succeed. Reformers in Beijing are following policies that tacitly endorse the widespread entrepreneurship shown by local officials. The scope of corruption and misuse of funds has reportedly become so widespread that there may not be enough untainted cadre or local officials uninvolved in these practices to replace or sanction the errant local cadre.
Behind this state of affairs rests a widespread cynical view of power and politics in China. In the past, the Marxist-Leninist vision had created an important incentive to motivate party-government cadre to ensure their loyalty to central discipline. Today that ideology is widely viewed as bankrupt and has often been replaced by a more selfserving mentality. Against this backdrop, Chinese officials have appeared nervous about social order and have clamped down on political dissent.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) remains the ultimate instrument of central control over society and an important potential lever to be used by central authorities to impose their policies on possibly resisting localities. At the same time, the PLA remains important as a possible arbiter should central, civilian policymakers reach an impasse on sensitive decision points involving domestic or foreign policies. (For background, see CRS Report 96-66 F, China's Rising Military Power and Influence --Issues and Options for the U.S..)
The Army today is leaner, led by more professionally competent officers, and less inclined to identify with local interests than in the past. The PLA has gone through a series of important changes and reforms under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. At the 14th party congress in 1992, PLA leaders thought to have strong political ambitions were demoted in ways designed to firm up the principle of civil control of the military and reduce the chances of the emergence of a rival base of power. The consensus on the policies of economic reform and political authoritarianism reached at the congress and later leadership meetings also suggests that the PLA leadership is prepared to adhere to and support current policies.
Analysts remain unwilling to rule out military involvement in politics. It seems likely that the death of Deng Xiaoping will remove the leader with the most civilian and military prestige and create a power vacuum that will be difficult to fill. Politically ambitious PLA leaders may try to revive their political fortunes following Deng's death.
Chinese foreign policy changed markedly during the Maoist period (1949-1976). It moved from reliance on the USSR and strident opposition to the United States to a posture of strong opposition to both the U.S. and the USSR; and finally to an approach that relied strategically on reconciliation with the United States to deal with the danger posed by the Soviet threat. After Mao died, Chinese leaders emphasized domestic policies of development that required markedly increased economic interaction abroad and gave added impetus to Beijing's desire to sustain good relations with the West and to avoid disruptions around the periphery of China that would complicate the Chinese drive toward modernization. (For details, see CRS Report 95-265 S, China in World Affairs: U.S. Policy Choices.)
Major changes have taken place in the international power configuration since the late 1980s (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist world system centered on it) and in China (e.g., the Tiananmen incident), but Chinese foreign policy continues to adhere to the general outlines established in the years after Mao's death. As long as China remains preoccupied with internal developments and international actors avoid initiatives seen as posing fundamental challenges to the Chinese leadership, Beijing seems likely to continue following the relatively narrow range of policies that it has adhered to for 15 years.
Several trends have characterized the Chinese approach to foreign affairs in the postMao period:
Beijing's heated reaction to the Taiwanese president's visit to the United States in June 1995 saw the suspension of important communications with Washington and Taipei. Some believed that China's detention of prominent U.S. human rights activist Harry Wu was related to PRC unhappiness with U.S. policy, whereas others saw it related to an ongoing crackdown by PRC leaders on possible sources of dissent. Beijing leaders continued during 1995 and 1996 to voice a hard line on some foreign policy issues, especially against alleged U.S. "interference" with escalating PRC military pressure on Taiwan. This was backed by a nation-wide campaign in China fostering patriotism and nationalistic virtues that made Chinese leaders and people less flexible in dealing with the United States and others over sensitive foreign policy issues.
In the early years after the Tiananmen incident and subsequent collapse of communist regimes in Europe and elsewhere, it was common to hear that the communist regime in China was destined for collapse. Other observers warned of major retrogression in Chinese economic reforms, speculating that Beijing would feel compelled in the face of domestic and foreign pressure to revert to autarchic development policies of the Maoist past. These would reduce Chinese interdependence with other countries and substantially reduce China's incentive to avoid disruptive behavior in interaction with its neighbors and other world powers.
On balance, China's record in recent years has undercut the more extreme near-term predictions of collapse or retrogression. The regime in Beijing has presided over a period of unprecedented growth in the Chinese economy. This growth has not only benefitted many in China, but has come at a time of general lackluster growth in other parts of the world. The result has been a period of unprecedented international investment in and interaction with the Chinese economy. When combined with Beijing's general avoidance of major controversy and selectively accommodating posture in world affairs in recent years, the result has been to erode foreign sanctions and to enhance the international legitimacy of the Chinese leaders. The success of China's continued economic reform has undermined the arguments of those conservative Chinese leaders who might be inclined to press for a more autarchic development strategy and a more assertive, less accommodating posture in world affairs.
Nevertheless, analysis of key determinants shows a wide range of possible outcomes for China over the next few years. A positive scenario posits increasingly effective political administration and reform along with powerful economic modernization. Alternative outcomes are of two kinds. One sees a series of developments leading to degeneration of government effectiveness and authority with a number of negative effects on China's economic and social development. Another sees China developing formidable economic power while retaining strong authoritarian political control. This raises the possibility of an emerging Chinese economic and military superpower, less interested in accommodation with the outside world and unfettered by the political checks and balances that accompany less authoritarian political structures.
In this scenario, the decentralization of political and economic decision-making power is managed effectively, enabling continued development and stability. China may adopt aspects of the federal political system, where the federal and state governments share revenue, power, and the tasks of governance. The revenue base and macroeconomic control of the central government would improve with an overhaul of the financial and taxation system. Price reform and return to private property stir greater rural and urban productivity. In the "best case," the political system might shift towards strengthening the legislature and increasing press freedom, though historical antecedents are few. In the long term, there is also room for reconciliation between the government and society as human rights are respected and rule of law is established to check arbitrary abuses of power. As economic power of the individual grows in China, the groundwork for a civil society and pluralistic politics is strengthened. Expansion of foreign trade and investment could lead to China's integration with the international community.
Implications for U.S. Interests. Continued economic modernization and emerging political reform would provide growing opportunities for U.S. investors and traders, while holding promise of political change compatible with U.S. values. The expansion of foreign economic contacts could also lead to greater consensus and cooperation on strategic and foreign policy issues such as weapons non-proliferation, technology transfer, and regional security. A China focused on domestic stability and economic development might more often than not pursue policies to reduce regional conflicts important to the United States, including tensions on the Korean peninsula, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Chinese observers and Western analysts often judge that Beijing under this scenario would still have the greatest difficulty in meeting U.S. interests regarding political values, such as human rights. The political reforms accompanying economic changes are seen likely to be slow in developing.
Leadership in Beijing could engage in a prolonged power struggle that cripples the government. Delay in needed economic and political reforms could produce greater decay, discontent, and difficult problems in the longer run. Major economic problems could grow, widening income gaps and fueling inflation, leading to rampant social instability. Corruption could swell to distort development and breed organized crime. Environmental problems, national disasters, infrastructure and energy bottlenecks, and fiscal crises could also lead to economic breakdown. Continued repression or brute coercion could contribute to social apathy or hostilities. Weak and divided civilian as well as military authorities could also induce separatist protests in areas like Xinjiang and Tibet, provoking ethnic conflicts. An insecure Chinese government would be unable to responsibly participate in the United Nations or credibly negotiate international agreements.
Implications for U.S. Interests. Such economic and political conditions would substantially reduce trade and investment opportunities for the United States. The danger of possible large-scale Chinese refugee flows to neighboring countries and China's overall strategic weakness would pose major problems for the countries in the region and for U.S. interest in regional stability. U.S. interests in human rights and economic progress for the people of China would be substantially set back.
Some would argue that this negative transition for China might ultimately be in U.S. interests. It could so undermine the communist regime in China as to foster its overthrow, leading presumably to a more effective, representative regime or to two or more such regimes.
This outcome assumes that authorities in China will be successful in modernizing the Chinese economy and use that success to shore up political authoritarian structures at home. Not only would this result in continued political repression and human rights abuses, China's economic power would be of such size and scale as to make most foreign powers unwilling to confront Beijing on most issues. Thus, Chinese leaders inclined to more assertive, nationalistic policies would have a freer hand to pursue their objectives, less concerned that Chinese trading partners would shun economic opportunities in China if Beijing violated international norms. The continued strong state direction of the massive Chinese economy would presumably give Beijing strong incentives to use its economic power to manipulate terms of trade and investment in critical economic sectors in international commerce.
Implications for U.S. Interests. Chinese economic prosperity would continue to attract important world attention, including that of the United States. Beijing would be in a position to mobilize this economic power against American interests. Chinese leaders would presumably continue the repressive authoritarian measures of the past. In international affairs, Beijing would likely be less deferential to U.S. and allied concerns regarding security issues, trade practices, and the like. Over the longer term, an economically powerful and politically authoritarian China could hold sufficient power and harbor substantial differences with the United States to pose the most serious single international threat to U.S. interests in Asian and world stability in the twenty-first century.
P.L. 104-99, H.R. 1868
Foreign operations appropriations bill, 1996. Contains provisions barring U.S. funding
for U.N. Population Fund until it stops work in China, and provisions sharply critical
of human rights conditions in China and Tibet. Final version of bill passed Congress
and signed by President on January 26, 1996.
P.L. 104-106, H.R. 1530
Defense Authorizations for 1996. Contains a provision barring U.S.-defense conversion
cooperation with China's PLA. Passed the House June 15, 1995. Substituted by revised
version S.1124 which passed Congress on January 26, 1996 with a provision requiring
semi-annual reports on U.S.-PRC defense conversion cooperation. Signed by President
February 10, 1996.
P.L. 104-201, H.R. 3230
Defense Department Authorization for FY1997. Contains provisions critical of Chinese
government nuclear weapons proliferation and Chinese companies exporting military
equipment to the United States. Conference Report issued July 30, 1996 contained
sections 1305 and 1306 requiring detailed unclassified and classified reports on China's
military capabilities and on China's weapons proliferation. Passed Congress September
10, 1996.
H.Res. 461 (Cox)
Regarding U.S. concerns with Chinese government policies and practices. Passed House
June 27, 1996.
H.R. 2058 (Bereuter)
China Policy Act of 1995. Introduced July 19,1995; passed House July 20, 1995.
S.Res. 97 (Thomas)
Expresses sense of the Senate regarding conflicting claimants in the South China Sea.
Introduced March 30, 1995; passed Senate June 22, 1995.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. China's Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy. 104th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1996.
12/01/96 ---President Jiang Zemin ended a four-day official visit to India.
10/30/96 ---A Beijing court sentenced prominent dissident Wang Dan to 11 years in prison.
10/10/96 ---Chinese Communist Party leaders ended a four-day meeting in Beijing.
09/02/96 ---News reports disclosed a prolonged crackdown on muslim separatists in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang.
08/22/96 ---August 22, 1996 marked Deng Xiaoping's 92nd birthday.
07/29/96 ---China conducted what it said would be its last nuclear test.
07/19/96 ---Beijing reported growth and inflation rates of 9.8% and 9.2% for the first half of 1996.
07/04/96 ---A massive anti-crime campaign highlighted by numerous public executions got underway in China
06/08/96 ---China conducted a nuclear test.
05/20/96 ---It was reported that China was seeking advanced ICBM technology from Russia.
05/08/96 ---As part of a PRC diplomatic offensive reportedly directed in part to counter Taiwan's more assertive foreign policy, PRC President Jiang Zemin began a six-nation tour of Africa.
04/28/96 ---China reported $80 billion in foreign exchange reserves and expected to have $90 billion by the end of the year.
04/26/96 ---Russian President Yeltsin ended several days in China by signing a treaty with Chinese and other leaders on military confidence building in central Asia.
03/19/96 ---China announced an official defense budget for 1996 that was 10% more than that for 1995 -- ostensibly reflecting the inflation rate for that period.
02/07/96 ---The New York Times said China and Russia had secretly concluded a deal involving the transfer of 72 high-performance SU-27 fighters to China.
02/04/96 ---Beijing issued regulations governing Internet use in China.
01/20/96 ---Western media and opinion leaders were sharply critical of China's decision to "supervise" foreign news services providing economic data in China, and of reported inhumane practices in Chinese orphanages disclosed by Asia Watch.
12/27/95 ---The Chinese Government issued a lengthy report, "The Progress of Human rights in China."
12/13/95 ---Wei Jingsheng was convicted and sentenced to 14 years in prison.
12/08/95 ---Beijing's choice as the 11th Panchen Lama was installed in Tibet. Beijing spurned the Dalai Lama's choice for the post.
11/16/95 ---Beijing released a lengthy "White Paper" on China's arms control policy.
10/24/95 ---Presidents Clinton and Jiang met in New York.
08/17/95 ---China conducted an underground nuclear test.
05/30/95 ---China reportedly tested a newly developed road mobile ICBM with a range capable of hitting targets throughout Europe and the western U.S.
05/15/95 ---China carried out an underground nuclear test.
04/10/95 ---Chen Yun, China's most senior statesman after Deng Xiaoping and a frequent critic of Deng's free-wheeling market reforms, died.
02/09/95 ---The Wall Street Journal reported that China had purchased four modern diesel-powered submarines from Russia $1 billion.
10/07/94 ---China conducted a nuclear test.
10/04/94 ---China agreed to work toward a ban on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons.
06/10/94 ---China conducted a nuclear weapons test.
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief 94002. China-U.S. Relations, by Kerry Dumbaugh. (Updated regularly)
CRS Reports
CRS Report 95-465. China After Deng Xiaoping -- Implications for the United States, by Robert Sutter and James Casey Sullivan.
CRS Report 96-889. China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), by Shirley Kan.
CRS Report 96-38. China Economic Reform: Current Issues -- The View From Beijing, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 95-265. China in World Affairs -- U.S. Policy Choices, by Robert G. Sutter.
CRS Report 94-422. China's Rising Military Power and Influence -- Issues and Options for the U.S., by Robert Sutter with the assistance of Peter Michener.
CRS Report 96-543. China-U.S. Problems: Views from Beijing, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report 94-422. Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options for the United States, by Robert G. Sutter.
CRS Report 96-767. Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Shirley Kan.
CRS Report 96-566. Europe and China -- An Emerging Relationship, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-572. Iran: Military Relations With China, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS Report 96-369. World Bank Lending to China, by Jonathan Sanford.
American Enterprises,"The Stealthy Advance of China's People's Liberation Army. JanuaryFebruary , 1994.
Asia Watch. Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners. 1994. 688 p.
Christensen, Thomas. "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, September - October 1996, pp. 37-52.
Fewsmith, Joseph. Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate. M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
Goldman, Merle. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era. Harvard, 1994.
Hornik, Richard. "Bursting China's Bubble." Foreign Affairs, May-June, 1994.
Lin Chong-pin. "The Deng Linchpin Debate." International Economy, July-August, 1993.
Naughton, Barry. Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993. Cambridge, 1995.
Overholt, William. "China After Deng," Foreign Affairs, May-June, 1996.
Segal, Gerald. "China's Changing Shape: The Muddle Kingdom." Foreign Affairs, May-June, 1994.
Shambaugh, David. "Losing Control: The Erosion of State Authority in China." Current History, September 1993.
Silk, Michael. "Cracking Down on Economic Crime." China Business Review, May-June 1994.
Silverberg, David. "China: The Paper Dragon." Armed Forces Journal International, February 1994.
Swaine, Michael. The Military and Political Succession in China. Rand Corporation, 1992.
Thurston, Anne. "A Society at the Crossroads." China Business Review, May-June, 1994.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. China's Economy in 1994 and 1995: Overheating Pressures Recede, Tough Choices Remain. December 1995.
Wortzel, Larry M. "China Pursues Traditional Great Power Status." Orbis, spring 1994.