![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
U.S. policymakers also continue to face contentious annual debate over renewing China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status -- the request for which the President must make by June 3 each year. On May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced that he was "delinking" human rights from China's MFN status and extending MFN despite Beijing's failure to meet the human rights conditions set out in his Executive Order of 1993.
In addition to these problems, other issues involving Taiwan have caused serious problems in U.S.-China relations. The Administration's September 7, 1994, Taiwan Policy Review made modest upgrades in U.S. contacts with Taiwan; these were protested vigorously by Beijing.
Beginning in April, 1995, Congress considered legislative initiatives providing more support for Taiwan and a tougher policy toward Beijing in several sensitive policy areas. In May, President Clinton bowed to intense congressional pressure in allowing Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, to make a private visit to the United States. After that visit, the PRC tried to suspend contacts with the United States and to discredit President Lee's policies in Taiwan. On March 8, 1996, weeks before Taiwan's presidential elections, China began ballistic missile tests and live-fire exercises off the Taiwan coast. The United States responded to these by sending two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits. Late in March, 1995, China suspended its military exercises in the Straits, and the United States withdrew its carrier battle groups; but the episode left sensitivities and mistrust in U.S.-China relations that continue today.
Although U.S. optimists judge that China's growing economic and military power and more assertive policies will be moderated by an ever-widening web of international interdependence, U.S. skeptics suspect that acquiring greater power will allow Beijing to be more assertive in backing nationalistic, territorial, or other demands.
There is general U.S. agreement that Washington should use its influence to encourage Beijing to conform to international norms, and over time to foster changes in China's economic, political, and security policies compatible with U.S. interests. At the same time, there remain major differences among three general approaches followed by U.S. officials and others as to how to achieve these objectives. As a result, U.S. policy may continue to develop case-by-case, sometimes accommodating Beijing, sometimes pressing Beijing to change its policies, and sometimes working toward a fundamental change in the Chinese government system.
At the outset of his term, President Clinton staked out a position on China that was markedly different from the policy of engagement pursued by the Bush Administration. President Clinton's initial policy was based on the theory that the United States should use its economic leverage actively to promote democracy and human rights in China. The first major test of this policy came in May of 1993, when the President had to make a determination about whether or not to extend Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to China for another year.
Under U.S. law, China's eligibility for MFN status is subject to an annual renewal, which the President must request by June 3, and which automatically goes into effect if Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval within 60 days. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton requested an extension of China's MFN status for another year (through July 1994), but also stated that in order to receive MFN status in succeeding years, China would have to begin meeting a series of conditions involving human rights and political freedoms. The immediate reaction in Washington to the President's MFN decision was positive. House and Senate sponsors of legislation conditioning the granting of MFN, both Democrats, expressed their support for the President's Executive Order over their own bills. In effect this suspended, for the remainder of 1993, what had become in the Bush Administration a rancorous annual congressional debate on MFN conditionality; no legislation concerning China's MFN was acted upon that year, and U.S. policymakers waited for China to make progress on the American human rights conditions.
U.S.-China relations over the next year were uneven. There were positive developments, including meetings between President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin and resumption of a meaningful U.S.-China military dialogue -- and negative developments, including the imposition of U.S. sanctions on China (on August 24, 1993) for China's export of M-11 missile technology and equipment to Pakistan, and continuing arrests of dissidents and political activists in China. By May of 1994, many observers were concerned that insufficient progress on human rights had been made to meet the U.S. conditions for another extension of MFN for China.
On May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced his decision to renew China's MFN trading status for another year despite Beijing's failure to meet the human rights conditions he had specified in 1993. Furthermore, the President stated that he was "delinking" human rights from China's MFN status, saying that the United States had "reached the end of the usefulness of that policy." Acknowledging that China continued to commit very serious human rights abuses, the President also announced that he was extending the Tiananmen sanctions imposed against China (see CRS Report 94-92 F, China: Current U.S. Sanctions); banning the import of munitions from China, principally guns and ammunition; and inaugurating a new program to support those working for human rights improvements in China. This program included: increased broadcasts for Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America; increased support for non- governmental organizations (NGOs) working on human rights in China; and working with American businesses to develop a voluntary principles for business activity in China.
The Administration's policy change reactivated congressional interest in pursuing legislation on China in 1994. On August 9, 1994, the House of Representatives considered three measures relating to China's MFN status, and enacted one which essentially codified the President's initiatives. On the same day the House defeated (75- 356) a joint resolution, H.J.Res. 373 (Solomon), which would have disapproved President Clinton's recommendation for an MFN extension.
The House also considered two alternative proposals addressing the issue of MFN for China. Under the rule, both measures were being offered as substitutes to the United States-China Act of 1994 (H.R. 4590, introduced by Representatives Pelosi, Bonior, and Gephardt). One substitute, also by Pelosi, was identical to the bill itself. It would have required the Secretary of State to encourage American businesses to adopt the voluntary code of conduct mentioned above. In addition, the substitute provided for alternative provisions which essentially would have limited the bill's punitive effects to goods produced by Chinese government entities, while protecting MFN status for goods produced by China's private-sector entrepreneurs or joint ventures with foreign partners.
The second substitute offered in 1994, by Representative Hamilton, in effect codified most of the President's May 26, 1994 decision recommending MFN be extended to China. The House adopted the Hamilton substitute by a vote of 280-152, and rejected the Pelosi substitute by a vote of 158-270.
After the May 1994 MFN decision, the Clinton Administration for the remainder of the year moved to solidify aspects of U.S.-China relations. Commerce Secretary Brown led a large business delegation to China in August 1994, signing $5 billion in contracts. China also agreed to resume the off-again, on-again human rights dialogue with the U.S. On October 4, 1994, China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, signed agreements which prompted the United States to lift the sanctions imposed in August 1993 because of China's sale of missile components to Pakistan. And in mid-October, Defense Secretary William Perry held four days of talks with senior Chinese military and government leaders in Beijing.
But developments since May 1994 have also reflected a number of continuing issues of contention in U.S.-China relations. Some of these, including economic and trade issues and human rights issues, have been plaguing U.S.-China relations for years. In addition, tensions have increased dramatically over one old political problem -- the issue of Taiwan -- that had remained dormant in U.S.-China relations for over a decade.
For a host of assorted reasons, the fabric of U.S.-China relations has continued to unravel over the past year. But while a number of problems have contributed to U.S.- China political difficulties, none has had the impact of the decision on May 22, 1995, to allow Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, to make a private visit to the United States to attend a reunion at his alma mater. The Administration made its decision after heavy pressure from Congress, which included the almost unanimous passage of separate House and Senate resolutions urging President Clinton to look past Beijing's objections and allow President Lee's visit. Beijing protested strongly. Since then, routine and smooth bilateral talks have become irregular and contentious; rhetoric on both sides has at times been heated and confrontational.
By mid-June, Beijing had cut off or suspended several important channels to the United States as a result of the Taiwan President's visit. It withdrew its ambassador, withdrew a visiting PRC air force chief, and postponed the visit of the Chinese defense minister, the visit of the U.S. Arms Control Agency director to China, and a senior State Department official visit to Beijing planned for July. Beijing also suspended ongoing U.S.-PRC talks on missile technology control and cooperation on nuclear energy. All this was accompanied by a steady drumbeat of harsh protests and invective from Chinese officials and official media. Chinese officials have said that they regard President Lee's visit to the United States as a violation of the 1979 Joint Communique on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China and thus an attempt to reestablish official U.S. relations with Taiwan -- a charge the Clinton Administration has strongly denied.
But there are deeper political problems in the U.S.-China relationship than President Lee's U.S. visit. In a trend of great concern to U.S. observers, some in the Chinese government and military have voiced their suspicions that the United States is trying to adopt a policy of "containment" toward China, this having been our official policy toward the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Chinese officials so inclined have interpreted a host of unrelated U.S. policy decisions -- such as U.S. decisions to permit the visit of President Lee, to improve relations with Vietnam, and to impose sanctions for IPR violations -- as directed specifically toward the goal of limiting China's economic and political influence and power in the region. U.S. officials have attempted to counter this view by reiterating -- in press conferences, informal bilateral discussions, and congressional hearings -- that U.S. policy toward China is one of engagement, not containment.
The United States and China have also been sparring regularly about a number of economic and trade difficulties in the relationship. These include allegations that China ships products to the United States that have been produced with prison labor, in violation of U.S. law; violates its U.S. textile import quotas by illegally transhipping textile products through third countries using false country-of-origin labels; maintains a wide range of unfair trade barriers that limit U.S. access to the Chinese market; and rampantly violates U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR). (See CRS Issue Brief 91121 China-U.S. Trade Issues.)
Continuing negotiations have resulted in a number of attempts at solutions for these problems. In 1992, the United States and China reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) supposedly settling the unfair trade barrier issue. Under the MOU, China agreed to eliminate a range of trade barriers over the next 5 years and make its trade procedures more transparent by publishing trade laws and regulations. On January 17, 1994, the United States and China concluded a new textile agreement setting new quotas on some Chinese textile products and providing for U.S. remedies should China violate the agreement by transhipping products.
The most current and intransigent U.S. trade dispute with China involves China's ongoing violations of U.S. intellectual property rights. After several years of negotiations, threatened sanctions, and periodic agreements, the United States on May 15, 1996, again announced its intention to impose sweeping sanctions (ultimately amounting to about $2 billion in import tariffs) on Chinese imports because of China's continuing failure to adequately enforce a 1995 bilateral IPR agreement. In that agreement, China essentially promised to take steps to stem IPR piracy, beef up IPR enforcement mechanisms, and provide greater market access in China to U.S. products. China has retaliated by threatening its own sanctions against U.S. firms. The issue was resolved at the last hour before the deadline, with China moving in the final days to close a number of pirating factories. As a result of Chinese actions, on June 17, 1996, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshevsky announced that the United States would not impose sanctions. U.S. trade experts estimate that U.S. businesses have lost approximately $1.8 billion per year to piracy of U.S. intellectual property by Chinese businesses. (See CRS Report 95-463 E, The China-U.S. Trade Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights.)
In other disputes, Beijing at various times has threatened retaliation unless progress is made on its application to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has long viewed U.S. opposition to its WTO accession as politically motivated, and the chief obstacle in China's failure to achieve this important goal. (See CRS Issue Brief 91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues.)
China's human rights abuses have been among the most visible and constant points of contention in U.S.-China relations since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Early in his term, President Clinton had supported linking China's Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status with its human rights performance, and in a 1993 Executive Order spelled out the human rights conditions China would have to meet. By May 26, 1994, the President had decided to "delink" human rights from China's MFN status, saying that the United States had "reached the end of the usefulness of that policy."
China's human rights record since then has presented a mixed picture, with both setbacks and minor improvements providing plenty of ammunition for policy debate. The U.S. State Department's report on human rights practices for 1995 states that the human rights situation in China was marked by "diversity" during the year -- that while well-documented abuses continued, China also took new and specific steps to improve its human rights record. Among the latter, in February 1995 the National Peoples' Congress (NPC) passed three new laws, effective July 1, designed to hold judges, prosecutors, and police officials to higher standards; in October the Ministry of Justice promulgated implementing regulations for 1994 legislation allowing citizens to sue government agencies for malfeasance and to collect damages. A recent Human Rights Watch/Asia report notes that human rights violations in China are continuing, but is silent on whether the situation is improving or growing worse. And the 1995 Amnesty International Report states that crackdowns in China have intensified over the past year, and that several new repressive laws have been enacted. Among the incidents in 1995 that bolstered this argument are Beijing's detention of Harry Wu, an American citizen traveling in China under a legitimate Chinese visa, and its arrest and conviction again of Wei Jingsheng, China's most prominent advocate for democracy.
A second ongoing issue in U.S.-China relations involves China's alleged proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For years China has been charged with selling weapons of mass destruction and medium-range ballistic missiles in the international market, primarily to Pakistan and to Middle East countries. In the last few annual debates over extending MFN for China, weapons proliferation has been one of the more contentious and visible issues.
On May 10, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced it would not impose sanctions on China for selling Pakistan "ring magnets" which can be used in the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium. In making the decision, Secretary of State Christopher stated that he had no hard evidence to dispute Chinese government claims that it had known nothing about the sale. Reportedly, the U.S. government received China's promise not to make such transfers in the future, although a subsequent press statement about the issue by a Chinese government spokesman did not refer to such a promise.
This was not the first time that controversial Chinese sales to Pakistan had been an issue, nor the first time that the Administration had waived or decided against sanctions. On November 1, 1995, the Administration lifted sanctions it had imposed against China on August 24, 1993 after determining that China had shipped to Pakistan M-11 missile-related equipment prohibited under the terms of the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. In waiving the sanctions, the President declared the waiver to be "essential to the security of the United States." The waiver resulted from a joint U.S.-PRC statement the previous month calling for both countries to work together, through a step-by-step approach, to promote both the nonproliferation of missiles and to endorse a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. China, for its part, agreed that once the sanctions were lifted, it would not export ground-to-ground missiles having a range of 300+km and a payload of 500+kg -- the parameters contained in the MTCR. (See CRS Issue Brief 92056, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.)
The 104th Congress pursued a number of legislative initiatives which were highly critical of China and generally critical of Administration policies on China. Among these were provisions in H.R. 1561 (S.908), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which was vetoed by the President on April 12, 1996, and which the House was unable to muster the two-thirds majority to override (it failed of passage by a vote of 234-188) on April 30, 1996. Had it passed, the bill would have:
For over a decade, Congress has engaged in heated debate on U.S. population assistance programs, particularly as they relate to China; the 104th Congress was no exception, debating and struggling with stalemates over these issues throughout both sessions. Ultimately, on September 30, 1996, Congress agreed to H.R. 4278, the Omnibus Spending Resolution for FY1997, containing the FY1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3540), and five other appropriations measures. In passing the measure, Congress provided $25 million for the United Nations Population Assistance Fund (UNFPA) and required that any amount UNFPA spends on programs in China be deducted from its total U.S. appropriation. The chances are good that Congress will be revisiting the population assistance issue early in 1997. (See CRS Issue Brief 96026, Population Assistance and Family Planning Programs: Issues for Congress.)
Finally, in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201), Congress enacted a number of reporting requirements on U.S. Government agencies with respect to China's military and defense establishments. Those reporting requirements are as follows:
1.Section 1305 requires the submission of a classified and unclassified report, by February 1, 1997, on China's military capabilities. These are to include reports on: future patterns of military modernization in China, including trends on surveillance and intelligence activities; China's cruise missile development; enhanced command and control systems; development of unmanned aerial vehicles; exploitation of Global Position System (GSP) technology; enhanced sea control capabilities; and "follow-on" forces, such as rapid air amphibious assault teams.
2.Section 1306 requires the submission of a classified and unclassified report, within 60 days of enactment of the legislation, on China's transfers to Pakistan. This report is to include: the justification for not imposing sanctions under 2(b)(4) of the Export- Import Bank Act of 1945 because of China's sale of ring magnets to Pakistan; the future commitments that the United States is seeking from China on its proliferation activities, including a description of China's pledges and assurances since January 1, 1991, on its nuclear sales policies; notification as to whether the President intends to certify and report on U.S.-China nuclear cooperation, as required by Section 902 (a)(6)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY1990 and 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note), and by P.L. 99-183; a description of the laws, regulations, and procedures now used by China to regulate exports of nuclear materials, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of these measures; and a description of the current policies of other countries regarding China's transfers to Pakistan and Iran.
3.Section 1307 prohibits funds for the Joint U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission for FY1997 until 15 days after the first semiannual report is submitted to Congress that is required by P.L. 104-106 (Section 1343 of the National Defense Authorization Act).
4.Section 3137 requires prohibits funds for the Department of Energy (DOE) for FY1997 for nuclear weapons programs cooperation with China, and requires that the Secretary of Energy submit a report, by January 15, 1997, to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee on all past and planned U.S. discussions with China on nuclear cooperation activities.
The President on May 20, 1996, announced that he would renew MFN treatment for China for another year. On June 27, 1996, the House failed to pass (by a vote of 141- 286) H.J.Res. 182, a joint resolution that would have disapproved the extension of MFN treatment for China. Instead, the House passed H.Res. 461 (by a vote of 411-8), a resolution calling on various congressional committees to hold hearings and, where appropriate, report legislation on issues with China, including trade, weapons proliferation, human rights, and military policy.
During the first session of the 104th Congress, on July 20, 1995, the full House tabled a resolution of disapproval for China's MFN status (H.J.Res. 96) by a vote of 321-107, thus effectively defeating it. But the House passed a second MFN-related bill, The China Policy Act of 1995 (H.R. 2058, Bereuter) by a bipartisan vote of 460-10. This legislation addresses many of the current issues in U.S.-China relations in some way. It criticizes China for its continuing human rights record; specifically criticizes the "unjustified and arbitrary arrest" of American citizens Harry Wu and calls for his unconditional release; and blasts China for its continuing unfair trade practices; and calls for reduction of China's tensions with Taiwan. In addition, the bill requires, within 30 days of its enactment, a detailed plan for the establishment and operation of Radio Free Asia, with the goal of beginning broadcasting in another 60 days. To date, the Senate has taken no action on the bill. (See CRS Issue Brief 92094, Most- Favored-Nation Status of the People's Republic of China.)
Despite recurring sometimes strong friction in U.S.-China relations, many in Beijing see the United States as the key link in the international balance of power affecting Chinese interests. This judgement goes far toward explaining why Chinese leaders in recent years have so avidly sought a visit to China by President Clinton. It would signal to all at home and abroad that the United States has muffled its opposition to and endorses cooperation with the Beijing government. Of course, some Chinese leaders remain deeply suspicious of U.S. motives. They believe the U.S. Government is conspiring to weaken and undermine the Chinese leadership and "hold back" China from a more prominent position in world affairs.
There is general agreement in the United States that Washington should use its influence to have Beijing conform to international norms and to foster changes over time in China's political, economic, and security systems compatible with U.S. interests. At the same time, there is little agreement in Washington on how the United States should achieve these objectives. In general, there are three approaches influencing U.S. China policy and little indication as to which approach will ultimately prevail.
First is a moderate, "engaged," and less confrontational posture toward China. This is favored by some in the Clinton Administration, Congress, and elsewhere. Some are concerned with perceived fundamental weaknesses in China and urge a moderate approach out of fear that to do otherwise could promote divisions in and a possible breakup of China, with potentially disastrous consequences for U.S. interests in Asian stability and prosperity. Others are impressed with China's growing economic and national strength and the opportunities this provides for the United States. They promote close U.S. engagement with China as the most appropriate way to guide the newly emerging power into channels of international activity compatible with American interests.
Underlying a moderate approach sometimes is a belief that trends in China are moving inexorably in the "right" direction. That is, China is becoming increasingly interdependent economically with its neighbors and the developed countries of the West and is seen as increasingly unlikely to take disruptive action that would upset these advantageous international economic relationships. In addition, greater wealth in China is seen as pushing Chinese society in directions that seem certain to develop a materially better-off, more educated and cosmopolitan populace that will over time press its government for greater representation, political pluralism, and democracy. Therefore, according to this view, U.S. policy should seek to work ever more closely with China in order to encourage these positive long-term trends.
A second approach encourages U.S. leaders to be less accommodating. This is held by some U.S. advocates inside and outside of the U.S. Government. Rather than trying to persuade Beijing of the advantages of international cooperation, the United States is advised to keep military forces as a counterweight to rising Chinese power in Asia; to remain firm in dealing with economic, arms proliferation, and other disputes with China; and to work closely with traditional U.S. allies and friends along China's periphery in order to deal with any suspected assertiveness or disruption from Beijing.
Proponents of this policy stress that Beijing officials still view the world as a state- centered, competitive environment where interdependence counts for little. China's leaders are seen as determined to use whatever means is at their disposal to increase China's wealth and power and as biding their time and conforming to many international norms as China builds economic strength. Once it succeeds with economic modernization, the argument goes, Beijing will be disinclined to curb its narrow nationalistic or other ambitions out of a need for international interdependence or other concerns.
A third approach is based on the premise that the political system in China needs to be changed before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive relationship with China. Beijing's communist leaders are inherently incapable of long- term positive ties with the United States. U.S. policy should focus on mechanisms to change China from within while maintaining a vigilant posture to deal with disruptive Chinese foreign policy actions in Asian and world affairs. This view is favored by some U.S. officials and others.
Given the continued wide range of opinion in the United States over the appropriate U.S. policy toward China, it appears likely that U.S. policy will continue its recent pattern of trying to accommodate all three approaches. On some issues, such as linking MFN treatment and human rights, the U.S. Government has seen U.S. interests best served by an approach that meets PRC concerns. On others, such as intellectual property rights protection and proliferation of missile technology, the United States Government seems prepared to continue to threaten sanctions or to withhold benefits until China conforms to norms acceptable to the United States. Meanwhile, although many U.S. officials would see as counterproductive any declaration by the U.S. Government that a policy goal was to change China's system of government, there is a widespread assumption that greater U.S. "engagement" will encourage such desirable changes.
P.L. 104-107, H.R. 1868
FY1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations. Contains a provision prohibiting funding
for U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) activities in China, which has been accused of
practicing coercive population control. Introduced February 6, 1995. Reported by
House Appropriations Committee on June 15 (H.Rept. 104-143). Passed House July 11,
1995 (333-89). Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee on September 14, 1995.
P.L. 104-107 was enacted, after a three-month impasse on family planning assistance
policy, when the House and Senate reached agreement on the population aid/abortion
issue by, in effect, deferring the debate to future authorizing legislation. Conferees
attached this compromise language and the Foreign Operations bill (H.R. 1868) to the
Continuing Resolution (H.R. 2880), which the President then signed on January 26,
1996. Under the compromise language, no U.S. population assistance funds or
contributions to UNFPA can be obligated before July 1, 1996, unless Congress approves
legislation authorizing such funds. After July 1, 1996, the U.S. can resume family
planning assistance and contributions to UNFPA, with restrictions.
H.R. 1561 (Gilman)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act. The House International Relations Committee
reported the bill on May 19, 1995 (H.Rept. 104-128, Part 1); the House passed it June
8, 1995, 222-192. On December 14, 1995, the Senate passed it (in lieu of S. 908), 82-16.
The final conference report to H.R. 1561 was filed in the House on March 8, 1996. The
President vetoed the bill on April 12, 1996. On April 30, 1996, the House sustained the
President's veto by a vote of 234-188.
H.R. 2058 (Bereuter)
The U.S.-China Policy Act of 1995. Criticizes China for its continuing human rights
record; specifically criticizes the "unjustified and arbitrary arrest" of American citizens
Harry Wu and calls for his unconditional release; and blasts China for its continuing
unfair trade practices; and calls for reduction of China's tensions with Taiwan. In
addition, the bill requires, within 30 days of its enactment, a detailed plan for the
establishment and operation of Radio Free Asia, with the goal of beginning broadcasting
in another 60 days. Passed House July 20, 1995, by a vote of 416-10.
H.Con.Res. 53 (Lantos)
Expressed the sense of Congress regarding a private visit of President Lee Teng-hui of
the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States. Introduced March 6, 1995;
reported favorably by Committee on International Relations April 5, 1995; passed
House May 2, 1995, by a vote of 396-0.
H.J.Res. 182 (Rohrabacher)
A joint resolution disapproving the extension of MFN treatment for China. On June
25, 1996, the House Ways and Means Committee ordered to be reported adversely
(H.Rept. 104-634) Rejected in the House on June 27 by a vote of 141-286.
11/19/96 ---U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to China.
10/30/96 ---China sentenced dissident Wang Dan to 11 years in prison.
09/02/96 ---News reports indicated that China had begun a serious crackdown on Muslim separatists in Xinjiang Province.
08/27/96 ---China sharply criticized the U.S. decision to sell Stinger missiles and other military equipment to Taiwan, saying the move would further damage U.S.- China relations.
08/25/96 ---Citing a classified National Intelligence Estimate, the Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence officials believe Pakistan is secretly building a medium-range missile factory with China's assistance in order to manufacture missiles modeled after the Chinese-designed M-11 missile.
08/23/96 ---The United States announced that it would sell $420 million worth of military equipment to Taiwan, including: Stinger missiles, guided-missile launchers, and Humvee vehicles.
07/10/96 ---U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrapped up a visit to China in the latest of what is considered to be a series of indicators that U.S.-China relations are improving.
06/27/96 ---On June 27, 1996, the House rejected (141-286) H.J.Res. 182, a resolution that would have disapproved the President's recommendation to extend China's MFN status for another year. At the same time, the House agreed to a compromise resolution requiring four House committees to hold hearings before September 1, 1996, about various ongoing problems in U.S.-China relations.
05/20/96 ---On May 20, 1996, President Clinton announced that he would be requesting an extension of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status.
05/15/96 ---The United States declared it would impose sweeping sanctions on China because of Chinese failure to adequately enforce the terms of its 1995 bilateral agreement on intellectual property rights.
05/10/96 ---The United States declared it would not impose sanctions on China because of Chinese sales of "ring magnets" to Pakistan.
03/23/96 ---In Taiwan's first popular election for President, Lee Teng-hui was elected by 54% of the vote in a four-candidate field.
11/29/95 ---China confirmed a 6-year old boy, Gyaincain Norbu, as Tibet's 11th Panchen Lama, rejecting the Dalai Lama's choice of another 6-year old.
09/04/95 ---The 4th U.N. International Women's Conference began in Beijing and Huairou, a suburb of Beijing.
08/24/95 ---China convicted Harry Wu of spying, sentenced him to 15 years in prison, and expelled him from the country.
07/20/95 ---The House passed H.R. 2058, The China Policy Act of 1995, by a vote of 460-10, and tabled H.J.Res. 96 (denying extension of MFN) by a vote of 321- 107.
06/19/95 ---Chinese authorities detained Harry Wu, although he had a valid U.S. passport and Chinese visa, at the Chinese border post of Horgas.
06/16/95 ---China withdrew its ambassador from the United States in protest over the Taiwan President's visit to the United States.
05/26/95 ---China postponed the planned visit of its defense minister to the United States.
05/22/95 ---President Clinton agreed to allow Taiwan's president to make a private visit to the United States. Beijing protested strongly.
03/27/95 ---Clinton Administration efforts to come up with a code of conduct for U.S. firms doing business in China and elsewhere were criticized by congressional and other U.S. human rights advocates.
03/22/95 ---A U.S. warship visited China for the first time in 6 years.
03/12/95 ---The United States and China signed an 8-point agreement to assist China's entry into the World Trade Organization.
02/26/95 ---A U.S.-Chinese agreement on intellectual property rights disputes was signed, averting a U.S.-China trade conflict threatening $2 billion in annual trade.
02/22/95 ---China protested U.S. support for a UN resolution critical of Chinese human rights conditions.
02/04/95 ---The United States imposed trade sanctions worth over $1 billion because of an intellectual property rights dispute with China; China immediately announced comparable sanctions against the United States.
02/01/95 ---The U.S. trade deficit with China grew in 1994 to almost $ 30 billion on the basis of total annual trade of about $ 39 billion.
01/15/95 ---Assistant Secretary Shattuck left Beijing after fruitless talks on human rights.
12/07/94 ---The Los Angeles Times reported that China had threatened to end commercial agreements with the United States if the Clinton Administration did not acquiesce in China's entry into GATT by year's end.
10/19/94 ---Defense Secretary Perry ended four days of talks in Beijing.
10/07/94 ---China conducted a nuclear weapons test, its second in 1994.
10/04/94 ---The United States and China signed an agreement allowing the export of U.S. high technology satellites to China that were halted as an August 23, 1993, sanction against Beijing's secret transfer of missile components and technology to Pakistan.
09/07/94 ---The Clinton Administration disclosed a Taiwan policy review that promised modestly increased contacts with Taiwan. Beijing issued an official protest.
09/02/94 ---Secretary of Commerce Brown left China after a visit marked by the signing of over $5 billion worth of contracts involving U.S. business.
08/17/94 --Secretary of Defense Perry met with a visiting deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army.
08/09/94 --The House passed legislation extending MFN to China and delinking it from human rights concerns, and rejected a bill by Representative Pelosi to limit the extension of MFN to China.
06/10/94 ---China conducted a nuclear weapons test. The United States expressed regret.
05/28/94 --The arms import embargo against China went into effect.
05/26/94 --President Clinton announced that he was recommending the renewal of China's MFN status, "delinking" it from China's human rights record, and imposing an embargo on arms imports from China.
03/11/94 --Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Beijing for three days of talks about human rights and China's MFN status.
01/06/94 --The United States announced it would slash China's textile quotas by 25-30% in retaliation for China's illegal textile shipments.
11/18/93 --Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States was dropping its opposition to the sale of an $8 million Cray supercomputer to China.
11/17/93 --270 Members of the House of Representatives signed a letter to President Clinton expressing their concern over China's lack of progress in meeting human rights objectives
11/03/93 --U.S.-China military talks in Beijing concluded with an agreement to a "modest" agenda of future dialogue and professional exchanges on such topics as international peacekeeping operations and conversion of defense industries to civilian use.
11/01/93 --Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman began two days of talks in Beijing; they were the highest-level military talks between the two countries since Tiananmen Square in 1989.
10/15/93 --Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy went to Beijing to discuss China's purchases of U.S. grains, especially wheat
10/12/93 --John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, visited Beijing to initiate a dialogue on human rights issues.
10/05/93 --China conducted an underground nuclear test, despite a U.S. call in July for an informal ban on such testing.
09/25/93 --National Security Advisor Anthony Lake met China's Ambassador to the U.S., Li Daoyu, to initiate efforts to restore high-level U.S.-China contacts across the board.
09/23/93 --The International Olympics Committee rejected Beijing's bid for the 2000 Olympics in favor of the bid of Sydney, Australia.
09/04/93 --An inspection, watched by U.S. observers, of the Chinese ship, the Yinhe, revealed no chemical weapons ingredients on board. The Chinese filed another strong protest after the search.
08/24/93 --The United States announced it would impose on China the sanctions required by U.S. law because of China's sale of missile technology to Pakistan. The Chinese government lodged a strong protest.
08/08/93 --Beijing lodged a strong protest accusing Washington of harassing a Chinese ship, the Yinhe. Washington said the ship was believed to be carrying chemical weapons bound for Iran.
05/28/93 --President Clinton requested authority to renew China's MFN status for another year, but indicated that he would consider new human rights criteria in considering the MFN renewal in 1994.
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief 91121. China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne Morrison.
CRS Issue Brief 92056. Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation, by Robert Shuey.
CRS Issue Brief 92094. Most-Favored-Nation Status of the People's Republic of China, by Vladimir Pregelj.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 93-894. China and Congress in 1992, by Kerry Dumbaugh.