![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton Administration has essentially continued this policy of isolating Cuba. The principal tool of U.S. policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were made stronger with the 1992 congressional approval of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) and most recently with the March 1996 approval of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. The CDA also consists of support measures for the Cuban people, a so-called second track of U.S. policy, which includes improvement in phone service between Cuba and the United States and private humanitarian donations. These and other so-called Track Two measures remain in place. Another aspect of U.S. policy is U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba, Radio and TV Marti, which provide the Cuban people information about Cuba and the world.
Although U.S. policymakers agree on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba - - to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Prior to legislative action in 1996 to strengthen sanctions on Cuba, five policy approaches could be discerned in the debate over U.S. policy. One approach consisted of a policy that would keep the embargo in place and would continue to isolate Cuba until reforms were enacted. A second approach would push for increased pressure on Cuba, and isolation of Cuba in the international community. A third approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, would continue the trade embargo, but would modify the punitive measures of the embargo, and move toward engaging Cuba on other issues of mutual interest. A fourth policy approach would move toward normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States by lifting the embargo. A fifth approach would focus on plans for providing support for Cuba once it begins the transition from communism to democracy.
Most congressional attention in the 104th Congress has been focussed on consideration of a comprehensive initiative, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, H.R. 927. The initiative combines a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba, including a provision that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. Federal court. Cuba's downing of two U.S. civilian planes on February 24, 1996, resulted in the President pledging to work with Congress to secure approval of H.R. 927. Both houses approved the conference report on the bill in early March 1996, and the President signed the measure into law, P.L. 104-114, on March 12, 1996. U.S. allies such as Canada and European Union nations oppose the measure because they deem it an extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
On November 20, 1996, EU members created a dispute settlement panel in the WTO to examine third country provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. The three-member panel is expected to complete its work by mid-1997.
On November 19, 1996, Cuban President Fidel Castro met with Pope John Paul II in Rome. The pope accepted an invitation to visit Cuba sometime in 1997.
On November 12, 1996, the U.N. General Assembly for the fifth straight year approved a resolution criticizing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The resolution was approved by the largest margin so far, 138 to 3, with 28 abstentions.
On November 7, 1996, Cuba announced that it had approved the establishment of a Cable News Network (CNN) bureau in Havana, which would be the first U.S. news bureau there in over 30 years. The Clinton Administration stated that it would study the request to see if it conforms to U.S. regulations regarding contact with Cuba.
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some minor improvement since 1994. Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range from 35-50%. The economy reportedly grew 0.7% in 1994. Cuban officials claim 2-3% growth for 1995, and are estimating 6-7% growth despite the damage to crops and factories inflicted by Hurricane Lili that struck in mid-October 1996.
Socialist Cuba has prided itself on the nation's accomplishments in health and education. For example, according to the World Bank, the literacy rate is 94% and life expectancy is 76 years, compared to 79% and 68 years average for other middle-income developing countries. According to United Nations statistics, the infant mortality rate is 14 (per 1,000 live births), one of the best rates in the developing world. But recent economic decline has reduced living standards and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies.
Given Cuba's dependence upon Soviet-bloc countries for trade and assistance, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union were serious blows to the Cuban economy. The Soviet bloc accounted for the lion's share of trade with Cuba, and importation of Soviet oil was critically important for Cuba. In 1989, the Soviet bloc accounted for 78% of Cuba's total two-way trade, which amounted to $13.5 billion, but 1992 estimates show that Russia accounted for only 10% of Cuba's total two-way trade, which had declined to just $4.1 billion. (In 1994, Cuba's total exports amounted to $1.3 billion, compared to $5.4 billion in 1989, and its imports fell to $2.0 billion, from $8.1 billion in 1989. Estimates for 1995 are for $1.5 billion in exports and $2.1 billion in imports.) In 1990, the Soviets provided about $3.5 billion in economic assistance and trade subsidies to Cuba, and about $1 billion in military assistance. Today, however, Russia states that it no longer provides economic or military assistance to Cuba and that its economic relations with Cuba are strictly on commercial terms. As a result, Castro in 1992 suspended construction of Cuba's nuclear power plant at Juragua being built with Russian assistance.
Until 1993, the Castro government showed little willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms. In 1993, however, faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba announced several measures designed to help stem the rapidly deteriorating situation. These included: allowing Cubans to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats; authorizing self-employment in more than 100 occupations, most in the service sector; and giving cooperative farms more autonomy. In 1994, Cuba continued to implement limited economic reforms, including the opening of farmers markets in September where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market. In 1995, the government: added 19 new self-employment activities in June; published regulations in June for private food catering, including home restaurants (in effect legalizing such activities that were already taking place); approved a new foreign investment law in September which allows fully owned investments in Cuba by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. The new law allows Cubans living abroad to invest in Cuba, although this provision had been criticized because it discriminates against Cubans living in Cuba who cannot invest. In 1996, Cuba: announced five new self-employment categories in April, bringing the total to 157 occupations; announced in early June plans to create free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such zones.
Foreign investment has been a significant part of Cuba's economic opening. According to the Cuban government, 240 joint ventures (from 43 countries) have been signed, with more than $2.1 billion in foreign capital. Observers maintain that the $2.1 billion figure represents intended or pledged, and the actual amount of investment in Cuba is much less, perhaps by as much as 50% or more. An important question for the future of foreign investment in Cuba is the potential impact of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114). That measure has provisions designed to reduce foreign investment in Cuba by providing U.S. citizens the right to sue in U.S. courts those involved in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. In early June 1996, the Mexican cement company Cemex (which provided marketing and technical assistance to a Cuban cement plant claimed by the U.S. company Lone Star Industries) announced that it would withdraw from Cuba in order to avoid U.S. sanctions. ING Bank, a Dutch banking group, announced in July 1996 that it would not renew $30 million in credits for sugar production, although it is not pulling out of Cuba, and is expected to continue financing other projects. A Spanish hotel chain, Paradores Nacionales de Turismo, had plans to open up eight hotels in Cuba, but the project has been put on hold in part because of the Helms/Burton legislation. Several other foreign companies, including the Spanish hotel chain Sol Melia, the Canadian mining company Sherritt International, and the Mexican company Grupos Domos, have announced that they would maintain their interests in Cuba.
Juragua Nuclear Facility. Some observers, including Members of Congress, have expressed concerns about reports that Russia is providing assistance to Cuba to complete the nuclear power plant at Juragua. The FY1996 foreign aid appropriations legislation (P.L. 104-107, H.R. 1868) contains a provision restricting U.S. assistance to any country if it, or any entity in the country, supports completion of the facility (see Legislation for details). A similar provision was also contained in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidary Act (section 111, P.L. 104-114) enacted in March 1996. Construction of the facility began in 1983, but was suspended in 1992 when Russia terminated its substantial support for Cuba. Critics argue that the plant's shoddy construction poses a threat not only to Cuba but to the wider Caribbean region and the United States. Press reports indicate that an international consortium of Russian, British, Brazilian, German, and Italian investors is being formed to complete the plant at a cost of $800 million. The Department of State has reiterated U.S. concerns about the quality of the plant's construction and about Cuba's ability to operate it safely. It noted that the United States feels strongly that sales or assistance to the Cuban nuclear program should not be provided until Cuba has undertaken a legally binding non-proliferation commitment, including a commitment to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all present and future nuclear facilities.
Cuba retains the trappings of a hard-line Communist state. Fidel Castro has ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power. Castro soon laid the foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcing moderates out of the government. In December 1961, Castro proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist, and representative democracy was abolished. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed by Fidel Castro), but the constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by Fidel Castro as President, serving as head of state and government. Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of Peoples Power which meets twice annually for about two or three days. While 589 Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. More recently, in July 1995, Cubans went to the polls to select more than 14,000 municipal officials.
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting basic rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement. Its vast network of neighborhood block committees (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution) sharply limit opportunities to express differing opinions. Although in 1987 and 1988 the government tolerated domestic human rights groups and freed many political prisoners, in the last few years it has taken a more hard-line position. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and black marketeers, and staged demonstrations against critics. In another example, on July 13, 1994, Cuban authorities sank a tugboat known as the "13th of March," which had been stolen by Cubans fleeing their island nation. About 40 people, including many children, drowned in the incident, and President Clinton condemned the sinking as an example of Cuban brutality. In 1995, Cuba freed a number of political prisoners, including several prominent dissidents, prior to the expiration of their sentences. Human rights groups welcomed the release, but noted that many were freed on the condition that they leave the country. Human rights groups also note that Cuba still holds hundreds of political prisoners. In November 1995, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso visited Cuba and presented Castro with a list of over 1,000 political prisoners and asked Castro to free them.
In the fall of 1995, a new umbrella organization of about 100 dissident groups, Concilio Cubano, formed and issued a declaration of its goals: a peaceful transition toward a democratic state; unconditional amnesty for political prisoners; changes in the Cuban judicial system to guarantee respect for human rights; and the participation of all Cubans, without exclusion, in the peaceful transition. The group applied to the government for permission to hold a meeting on February 24, 1996, but the government rejected the Concilio's petition, and beginning on February 15, 1996, began a harsh crackdown on its members, including arrests (with two members sentenced to long prison terms), harassment, and intimidation. The U.S. State Department criticized Cuba's actions and stated that "this wave of repression dramatically demonstrates the Castro regime's unwillingness to engage in a process of political reform and its determination to maintain absolute control over Cuban society."
In addition to cracking down on members of the Concilio, the Cuban government has also cracked down harshly on independent journalists, including members of Cuba's three small independent news organizations, Cuba Press, Havana Press, and the Independent Press Bureau of Cuba (BPIC). In late February 1996, Rafael Solano of Havana Press was imprisoned for six weeks. After his release, he was faced with the choice of exile or reimprisonment. He chose exile, and arrived in Spain on May 9, 1996. In early May 1996, Cuban authorities reportedly ordered the shutdown of the BPIC.
On March 23, 1996, the Communist Party's Central Committee approved a report presented by Army head Raul Castro that appeared to signal an ideological crackdown on reformers in Cuba. The report warned against "so-called nongovernmental organizations" in Cuba that serve as "a Trojan horse to foment division and subversion." The report singled out Cuba's Center for the Study of the Americas for criticism, asserting that several members, tempted by travel and the publication of articles and books, became caught up in a "spider's web spun by foreign specialists on Cuba, who were really working for the United States in its strategy to create a fifth column."
Since 1991, the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has called on the Cuban government to cooperate with a Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the Secretary General to investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba has refused to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, and the UNHRC has annually approved resolutions condemning Cuba's human rights record. Most recently, on April 23, 1996, the UNHRC, by a vote of 20 to 5 with 28 abstentions, approved a resolution sponsored by the United States that regretted profoundly Cuba's violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and expressed "particular concern at prevailing intolerance for freedom of speech and assembly in Cuba." The resolution criticized Cuba for not cooperating with the U.N. representative or allowing him to visit Cuba.
Observers are divided over whether the Castro government will endure. While some believe that it is only a matter of time for its demise, there is considerable disagreement over how it may occur or when. Varying scenarios range from a coup or popular uprising, possibly with support from or acceptance by the Cuban military, to the voluntary resignation and self-exile of Castro. Other observers maintain that reports of the impending collapse of the Cuban government have been exaggerated and that Castro may remain in power for years. They point to Cuba's strong security apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popular support. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba's elite has no interest in Castro's overthrow, and that Castro still enjoys some support, in part because of the social benefits of the Cuban revolution, but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro. Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the possibility or viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out that the Castro government has successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with no private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political opposition. For this reason, they contend that building a democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance from many Cubans.
The Clinton Administration has essentially continued the policy -- in place since the early 1960s -- of isolating the island nation diplomatically, politically, and economically. The objective is to ensure that basic human rights are respected and democratic reforms enacted. The principal tool of U.S. policy remains the comprehensive trade embargo, which was made stronger with the 1992 congressional approval of the Cuban Democracy Act. The CDA prohibited U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibited entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Act also included measures of support for the Cuban people, including improvement in phone service between Cuba and the United States. According to the Administration, the twotrack policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people, meets both U.S. strategic and humanitarian interests. In addition, Radio and TV Marti continue to provide the Cuban people with information about Cuba and the world (although TV Marti reportedly has not had a wide audience and has experienced significant technical problems) and the United States continues to maintain a naval base at Guantanamo.
In August 1994, amidst a dramatic escalation in the number of Cubans fleeing to the United States, President Clinton announced a major change in U.S. migration policy toward Cuba and also announced two new measures designed to increase pressure on the Cuban government. The President announced that Cubans fleeing to the United States would be interdicted and sent to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. (This change of policy was followed by two U.S.-Cuba migration agreements in September 1994 and May 1995. For details, see section on "Migration.") The President also announced two measures designed to limit the ability of the Cuban government to accumulate foreign exchange. First, cash remittances to Cuba would no longer be permitted. Previously, U.S. citizens could provide up to $300 quarterly to their relatives in Cuba. Some reports estimate that these remittances have amounted to as much as $400-500 million annually and were an important source of hard currency for the Cuban economy. Second, charter flights between Havana and Miami would be restricted to those designed "to accommodate legal migrants and travel consistent with the purposes of the Cuban Democracy Act."
In early October 1995, President Clinton announced several measures to ease some U.S. restrictions on travel and other activities with Cuba, with the overall objective of promoting democracy and the free flow of ideas. The new measures included: authorizing U.S. news media to open bureaus in Cuba; licensing U.S. nongovernmental organizations to provide assistance to Cuban nongovernmental organizations; and authorizing general licenses for transactions relating to travel to Cuba for Cuban Americans to visit close relatives once a year in humanitarian cases. Since the August 1994 restrictions, Cuban Americans wishing to travel for emergency reasons had to apply for a specific license from the Department of the Treasury, and an extensive backlog of cases had developed.
Cuba's Downing of Two U.S. Civilian Aircraft. On February 24, 1996, Cuban Mig-29 fighter jets shot down two Cessna 337s in the Florida Straits flown by four members of the Cuban American group Brothers to the Rescue. The group was known primarily for its humanitarian missions of spotting Cubans fleeing their island nation on rafts, but recently had become active in flying over Cuba and dropping leaflets. While the four crew members shot down were killed, two crew members from another plane with the group returned to Miami and claimed that their comrades had been shot down over international waters. Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the attack on a civilian plane a blatant violation of international law, and the United States called upon the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions. Cuban spokesmen claimed that the incidents occurred within Cuban airspace and that the pilots were warned on this and many previous occasions. They claimed to have unequivocal proof in the form of debris from the wreckage, radio recordings, and information from Juan Pablo Roque (a former pilot with the group) that would demonstrate that the planes were in Cuban airspace. The Clinton Administration produced documents made by radar readings that the two Cessnas were over international water when they were shot down.
Cuba's downing of the two U.S. airplanes had an immediate and perhaps long-lasting impact on U.S. policy toward Cuba. President Clinton condemned the downing and the Administration worked to secure a February 27, 1996 U.N. Security Council statement strongly deploring Cuba's action. The statement noted that international law requires that states must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and must not endanger the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft. It also requested the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to investigate the incident and reports its findings to the Security Council. (The ICAO completed its investigation in late June 1996, and concluded that the two planes were shot down over international waters.) Additionally, the President suspended all charter flights to Cuba indefinitely, imposed additional travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats in the United States, and limited visits by Cuban officials to the United States.
Helms/Burton Legislation: Major Provisions. Most significantly, Cuba's downing of the airplanes resulted in the President pledging to work with Congress to secure passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, H.R. 927, that imposes additional sanctions on Cuba. On February 28, the Clinton Administration reached a compromise with a conference committee on provisions in the bill. Both Houses approved the conference in early March and the President signed the measure into law, P.L. 104-114, on March 12, 1996.
As enacted into law, P.L. 104-114 contains three significant provisions. First, in Title III, the law allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. Federal court those persons that traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the right to sue to Cuban Americans who became U.S. citizens after their properties were confiscated. The President has authority to delay implementation for a period of six months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in the national interest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. The title would become effective August 1, 1996, and the President has until 15 days before that date to make a decision on implementation. Once the title becomes effective, claimants would not be able to file suit until after a three-month grace period, in effect allowing those trafficking in confiscated U.S. property to cease their activities. Even after the title becomes effective, the President still has the authority to suspend the right to bring legal action under the title for a period of six months if he determines at least 15 days before the suspension that such action would be in the national interest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Such a suspension would not affect suits that had already begun.
Second, Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provision is mandatory, and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for humanitarian medical reasons or to defend themselves in legal actions regarding confiscated property. In early August 1996, legislation was introduced, H.R. 3980 (Frank), that would amend the Helms/Burton legislation to eliminate the U.S. exclusion of a spouse or minor child.
Third, a new provision in Title I, section 102(h), was added to the law that codifies all existing Cuban embargo Executive Orders and regulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo provisions. This provision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. In effect, the Clinton Administration and subsequent administrations will be circumscribed in any changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
In addition to the three provisions mentioned, Title I of the law has three other notable provisions. Section 103 of the law prohibits loans, credits, or other financing by any U.S. national, U.S. agency, or permanent resident alien for financing transactions involving any property confiscated by the Cuban government, the claim to which is owned by a U.S. national. Section 106(d) withholds U.S. assistance from Russia by an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits provided (on or after the enactment of this provision) in support of the Russian intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. However, the provision includes a presidential waiver if such assistance to Russia is in the U.S. national security interest, and if the President certifies that Russia is not sharing intelligence data collected at Lourdes with officials or agents of the Cuban government. Section 104 requires the United States to vote against Cuba's admission to the international financial institutions (IFIs) until a democratic government is in power. It also reduces U.S. payments to any IFI if it approves a loan or other assistance to Cuba over the opposition of the United States. Finally, Title II of the law contains numerous conditions for determining when a "transition" government and a "democratic" government is in power in Cuba, conditions which would qualify Cuba for various types of U.S. assistance and would lead to suspension of U.S. trade sanctions on Cuba.
Implementation of the Helms/Burton Legislation. On July 16, 1996, President Clinton announced that he would allow Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act to go into effect on August 1, 1996, but at the same time he announced that he was suspending, for a six-month period (until February 1, 1997), the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. According to U.S. officials, liability for trafficking would go into effect on November 1, 1996, and would put foreign companies in Cuba on notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United States. During the six-month period, President Clinton stated that his Administration would work to build support from the international community on a series of steps to promote democracy in Cuba. On August 16, 1996, the President announced that he had appointed Stuart Eizenstat, a Department of Commerce Undersecretary for International Trade, as a special envoy to engage U.S. allies over the next six months on concrete measures to advance democracy in Cuba. Eizenstat said the United States was looking for agreement on measures to pressure Castro to make political and economic reforms and respect human rights.
Republican supporters of the legislation in Congress strongly criticized the President's action in suspending the right to file lawsuits, maintaining that the President caved in to foreign companies benefitting from confiscated U.S. property. Some Democrats who supported the legislation expressed disappointment over the President's decision, but noted that the intent of the legislation to increase economic pressure on Cuba is largely in place. Other Democrats who opposed the legislation commended the President for his actions, although they would have preferred full suspension of Title III. Notably, the conservative Cuban American National Foundation maintained that the President's action was a step in the right direction.
With regard to Title IV of the legislation, the guidelines implementing its provisions were published in the Federal register on June 17, 1996, and stipulated that the admission sanction would not apply to persons solely having business dealings with persons excludable under the title's provision. On May 29, 1996, the State Department began sending advisory letters to foreign companies thought to be dealing in U.S. properties confiscated in Cuba. Three companies received letters: Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications company; and STET, an Italian telecommunications company. On July 10, 1996, the State Department sent letters to nine major shareholders and senior executives of Sherritt International, stating that they would be excluded from the United States, effective in 45 days. On August 19, the State Department sent similar letters to six executives of Grupos Domos.
Foreign Reaction to the Helms/Burton Legislation. Many U.S. allies -- including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union nations -- have strongly criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They maintain that the bill's provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international principles. U.S. officials maintain that the United States, which reserves to protect its security interests, is well within its obligations under NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On June 4, 1996, the Organization of American States approved a resolution against Helms-Burton legislation, and ordered the Inter-American Juridical Committee to examine the legislation and to reach a conclusion as to whether it is valid under international law. In August 1996, the Committee concluded that the law was not in conformity with international law. In mid-November 1996, Latin American nations, along with Spain and Portugal, criticized the legislation as striking "a blow against the principles of international co-existence."
In March 1996, Canada requested consultations with the United States under the dispute settlement procedures of the NAFTA, and consultations were held on April 26 and May 28. Canada has asserted that the law's visa restrictions in Title IV violate chapter 16 of the NAFTA regarding the temporary entry of business persons. Canada also announced June 17 that it would retaliate against the Helms/Burton legislation by amending its "Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act" to allow blocking orders against judgements from U.S. courts and to open U.S. companies in Canada to retaliatory suits.
The EU and individual European nations have threatened to take countermeasures in retaliation for the U.S. legislation. Formal U.S.-EU talks were held in early June 1996, and the issue was also raised by EU Commission President Jacques Santer, who strongly criticized the U.S. legislation after the June 12, 1996 U.S.-EU summit in Washington. While EU and other U.S. allies welcomed the President's action in postponing lawsuits under Tile III for a six-month period, concerns were still expressed about the possibility of future lawsuits and the visa restrictions in Title IV of the legislation. The EU said that it would continue with plans for countermeasures, maintaining that the legislation still had extraterritorial aspects. In October 1996, EU members agreed to call for a dispute settlement panel in the WTO, and the panel was created on November 20, 1996. The three-member panel is expected to complete its work by mid-1997.
Expulsion of Diplomats. On August 19, 1996, the United States announced that it would expel a Cuban diplomat in the United States, Jose Luis Ponce, in response to Cuba's action of expelling a U.S. diplomat in Havana. The U.S. diplomat, Robin Meyer, was the human rights officer for the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. She had close contacts with Cuban dissidents and human rights activists, and Cuba accused her of giving advice and support to the Cuban dissidents, including the distribution of antigovernment literature.
Although U.S. policymakers generally agree on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Prior to legislative action in 1996 to strengthen sanctions on Cuba, five policy approaches could be discerned in the debate over U.S. policy. (For the pros and cons of various U.S. policy options, see CRS Report 94-759, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Reexamine Its Policy? and CRS Report 95-618, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Increase Sanctions on Cuba?)
One approach would continue the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba politically and economically while reaching out to the Cuban people. A second more forceful policy approach called for increased isolation of Cuba in the international community through strengthened sanctions that would produce political and economic change in Cuba by fostering discontent with the country's dismal economic conditions. A third policy approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, would continue the trade embargo, although relaxing it in several areas, and would also move toward engaging Cuba on other issues of mutual interest. A fourth policy approach would move more quickly toward normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States by lifting all trade and travel restrictions. A fifth policy approach advocated by some observers -- and one that could be combined with any of the four approaches described above -- was to focus on plans for providing support for Cuba once it begins the transition from communism to democracy.
While these policy approaches are helpful in discerning the various schools of thought reflected in Congress, most of the more than 25 bills on Cuba introduced in the 104th Congress have fallen under two rubrics, increasing pressure or easing pressure on Cuba. (For a list, see "Legislative Initiatives in the 104th Congress" below.) Moreover, congressional action in the 104th Congress, has been limited to measures designed to increase pressure on Cuba. The most comprehensive legislation approved was the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidary Act (P.L. 104-114) a comprehensive initiative increasing sanctions on Cuba and providing for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy.
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba, begun in 1985 and 1990 respectively, have at times been the focus of numerous controversies, including adherence to broadcast standards. Over the years there have been various attempts to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Marti which has not had much of an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. (For background, see CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba.)
FY1996 Funding. After a series of short-term funding measures continued FY1996 funding for Radio and TV Marti until April 1996, Congress completed action on an omnibus spending measure, P.L. 104-134 (H.R. 3019), that continued funding through the rest of FY1996. The measure appropriated $24.809 million for Broadcasting to Cuba for FY1996, identical to the amount in H.R. 2076, the FY1996 State Department appropriations bill. Although H.R. 2076 had been approved by both houses, it was vetoed for reasons unrelated to the Cuba broadcasting provision.
During July 26, 1995 House consideration of H.R. 2076, efforts to eliminate funding for TV Marti and for the Presidential Advisory Board (PAB) for Cuba Broadcasting failed. A Serrano amendment to prohibit funds for the PAB was defeated (150-277). A Skaggs amendment to eliminate TV Marti funding was approved only after it had been amended by a Smith amendment which prohibited funding for TV Marti only when such funding would be inconsistent with a March 1995 Office of Cuba Broadcasting Reinventing Plan that would streamline operations. The Senate version of H.R. 2076 also contained the Smith provision. Significantly, the Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report to H.R. 2076 (S.Rept. 104-139), noted that the provision is "not intended to apply to persons affected by the restructuring plan who are determined to be whistleblowers or have otherwise allegedly been subject to reprisals and other prohibited personnel actions currently under investigation at the USIA."
Another provision regarding Radio and TV Marti included in P.L. 104-134 requires the relocation of the headquarters of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting from Washington D.C. to south Florida. The provision had been included in H.R. 2076. In March 1995, the PAB, chaired by Jorge Mas Canosa, endorsed such a move citing several advantages, including cost savings, greater resources for news and informational programming for Radio and TV Marti, and the ability to react to events inside Cuba. Critics of such a move maintained that the move to Miami would be a threat to the integrity of the stations and would result in the operations being dominated by one faction of the Cuban American community. Critics of the PAB have called for its abolishment, or at a minimum, for its renewal with broader representation.
In other legislation action in 1996, Congress included a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, P.L. 104-114 (H.R. 927) (section 107) directing the USIA Director to convert TV Marti from VHF to UHF broadcasting, with the objective of overcoming the jamming of TV Marti by the Cuban government. According to March 1995 congressional testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Alexander Watson, USIA Director Joseph Duffey already has authorized efforts to initiate UHF broadcasting.
FY1997 Funding. On September 30, 1996, the President signed into law an FY1997 omnibus spending measure (P.L. 104-208, H.R. 3610) which includes $25 million for Radio and TV Marti as requested by the Administration, $13.909 million for Radio Marti and $11.091 for TV Marti. On July 24, 1996, the House approved the FY1997 Commerce, Justice, and State Department appropriations bill, H.R. 3814, which provided $13.775 million for Radio Marti, but no funds for TV Marti. The House bill also included a provision from FY1996 legislation that prohibit funding for TV Marti only when such funding would be inconsistent with a March 1995 Office of Cuba Broadcasting Reinventing Plan that would streamline operations. On August 27, 1996, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out its version of H.R. 3814 (S.Rept. 104-353) which would provide $25 million for both programs as requested by the Administration. The Senate Committee report noted that the Broadcasting Board of Governors plans to complete the relocation of Cuba broadcasting to south Florida by March 1997, and that the Committee supports efforts to implement the move as expeditiously, efficiently and cost effectively as possible. (The move to south Florida remains controversial, however, with critics maintaining that the integrity of the stations would be jeopardized, and supporters citing such advantages as greater resources for news and informational programming.) In the end, the Senate provision of providing $25 million for both programs prevailed in the omnibus spending measure that incorporated USIA appropriations. The measure did not include the House provision prohibiting funding for TV Marti if the funding would be inconsistent with efforts to streamline operations.
USIA Investigation. In June 1994, USIA's Inspector General began an investigation of alleged management reprisals at the Office of Cuban Broadcasting. A July 22, 1995 Washington Post article asserted that the investigation was focussing on Jorge Mas Canosa's "pervasive influence" of Radio Marti in management and in news coverage that misrepresented U.S. policy toward Cuba. Several Members of Congress denounced the report, maintaining it was an attempt to cut funding for Radio Marti. On July 25, 1995, USIA Director Joseph Duffey stated he would file a complaint to the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency on the way the investigation was handled and made public. Press reports in late May and early June 1996 (Miami Herald and U.S. News & World Report) cited sworn testimony by employees of Radio Marti about allegations of Mas Canosa's extensive influence at the station. According to press reports, the two-year old USIA Inspector General investigation of Radio Marti is stalled because of the merging of the USIA's Inspector General's Office with the State Department. USIA Director Joseph Duffey believes that the investigation should be completed. (In mid-June 1996, the U.S. General Accounting Office released a report entitled "Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba Broadcasting" (GAO/NSIAD-96-110) that provides information on some of the issues raised here.)
Since the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States, a significant U.S. concern was another mass exodus resulting from severe Cuban political and economic instability. Castro's threats in early August 1994 to unleash an exodus of Cubans to the United States prompted U.S. officials to reiterate U.S. resolve not to allow another Mariel. On August 19, 1994, amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy toward Cubans and announced that "illegal refugees from Cuba" would not be allowed to enter the United States. Instead, the Coast Guard was directed to take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo while the Administration explored the possibility of other "safe haven" nations in the Caribbean Basin region (Panama ultimately agreed to allow up to 10,000 Cubans to be housed at U.S. military bases for a six-month period). Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks to resolve the migration crisis. The talks culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement that stemmed the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States will be a minimum of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In early May 1995, the Clinton Administration announced that it had reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort, and according to the Administration, "migrants taken to Cuba will be informed by United States officials about procedures to apply for legal admission to the United States at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana." Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. The new accord provoked protests in Florida's Cuban American community, and some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's new policy strongly.
On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United States. Since the May 1995 migration accord, over 300 Cubans fleeing their island nation by boat have been intercepted by the United States and returned to Cuba, while almost 100 who crossed into the U.S. base at Guantanamo have been returned.
Until the 1994 change in policy, most Cubans that arrived in the United States were able to adjust to permanent resident status after one year at the discretion of the Attorney General under the terms of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. Some Members have called for a repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act because it gives Cubans an advantage over migrants from other countries. Supporters of the Act, however, maintain that its repeal would send the wrong signal to one of the world's few remaining Communist government. In the 104th Congress, the immigration legislation included in the FY1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 104-208, includes a provision that would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act upon a determination by the President that a democratically elected government was in power in Cuba. When that provision was originally introduced in the Senate (as part of S. 1664/H.R. 2202) the repeal did not include the determination regarding democracy in Cuba. However, during April 30, 1996 Senate floor debate on the bill, Senator Graham offered an amendment, approved 62-37, that added the democracy determination. In effect, this scuttled attempts to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act while Cuba remains communist.
In 1996, the hijacking of two Cuban planes and the apparent acceptance of several Cubans fleeing their island nation into the United States increased bilateral tensions on the issue of migration. On July 7, 1996, a former Cuban Interior Ministry official hijacked a Cuban commercial plane to the U.S. base at Guantanamo and requested asylum, and on August 18, 1996, a hijacked Cuban plane crashed into the Gulf of Mexico, whereupon three Cubans requested political U.S. asylum and the pilot requested to return to Cuba. The United States plans to prosecute the three August 18 hijackers in the United States, while Cuba has called for the return to Cuba of all four hijackers from the two incidents for trial. In addition to the hijackings, on August 12, 1996, a boat with 29 Cubans overturned 25 miles south of Marathon, Florida; two reported U.S.-based smugglers escaped on a lifeboat and have not been found. Two Cubans, including a 16-month old girl, drowned in the incident. The United States repatriated 16 of the Cubans; three were sent to the U.S. base at Guantanamo to await emigration to a third country; and eight were allowed into the United States (four for medical treatment and four to bury their dead). Cuba has called on the return of the 11 remaining Cubans and stated that not doing so would be a flagrant violation of the U.S-Cuban bilateral migration accords. The Clinton Administration announced that it would continue to honor the migration accord. U.S.-Cuban migration talks, which were curtailed in the aftermath of Cuba's shootdown of U.S. planes in February 1996, are scheduled to resume in December 1996.
Measures Designed to Increase Pressure: H.Con. Res. 24 (DiazBalart ), introduced February 7, 1995, calls for the United States to propose and seek an international embargo against Cuba. H.R. 81 (Diaz-Balart), introduced January 4, 1995, directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. executive directors to the international financial institutions to oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of such groups until Cuba holds free and fair elections. H.R. 82 (Diaz-Balart), introduced January 4, 1995, denies visas to aliens involved with the foreign expropriation of property of U.S. persons. H.R. 83 (DiazBalart ), introduced January 4, 1995, provides for the withholding of contributions to certain organizations that assist Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Cuba. H.R. 84 (DiazBalart ), introduced January 4, 1995, prohibits the importation into the U.S. of sugar from countries that import Cuban sugar. H.R. 3974 (Zimmer), introduced August 2, 1996, amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit the provision of assistance to foreign governments that provide assistance (other than humanitarian assistance and assistance for refugees) to Cuba. Also see Legislation below for P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-114, and H.R. 3540.
Measures Designed to Ease Pressure: H.R. 367 (Serrano), introduced January 4, 1995, repeals the Cuban Democracy Act. H.R. 883 (Rangel) lifts the trade embargo and urges the President to take steps to conduct negotiations with Cuba on property claims of U.S. nationals and human rights. H.R. 1254 (Rangel), introduced March 15, 1995, amends the Cuban Democracy Act to limit provisions restricting trade in food and amends the Internal Revenue Code to terminate the denial of foreign tax credit with respect to Cuba. H.R. 1700 (Nadler), introduced May 24, 1995, makes an exception to the U.S. embargo for the export of medicines, medical supplies, instruments or equipment. H.R. 1703 (Serrano), introduced May 24, 1995, allows for news bureau exchanges between the United States and Cuba. H.R. 1704 (Serrano), introduced May 24, 1995, reinstates the authorization of cash remittances to family members in Cuba. S. 766 (Simon), introduced May 9, 1995, and H.R. 1702 (Serrano), introduced May 24, 1995, protect the right to travel to foreign countries. H.R. 2311 (Serrano), introduced September 12, waives certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball.
Other Measures: H.R. 611 (Menendez), introduced January 20, 1995, provides assistance to the people of Cuba once a transitional government is in power (see P.L. 104-114 below). S.269 (Simpson), repeals the Cuban Adjustment Act (see H.R. 2202 below). S. 925 (Mack), introduced June 15, 1995 and H.R. 1909 (Stearns), introduced June 21, 1995, impose congressional notification and reporting requirements on any negotiations or other discussions between the United States and Cuba with respect to normalization of relations. H.R. 3980 (Frank), introduced August 2, 1996, amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act to eliminate the U.S. exclusion of spouses and minor children of persons who have confiscated property of U.S. nationals or trafficked in such property. Also see Legislation below for P.L. 104-134 and H.R. 3814 on broadcasting to Cuba.
P.L. 104-107, H.R. 1868
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1996.
Reported by Committee on Appropriations June 15 (H.Rept. 104-143). House passed,
amended, July 11 (333-89). Reported by Senate Committee on Appropriations
September 14 (S.Rept. 104-103). Passed Senate amended (91-9) September 21, 1995.
Conference (H.Rept. 104-295) reported October 26, 1995. House approved conference
October 31, 1995 (351-71) with one amendment in disagreement on family planning.
Senate approved conference November 1, 1995 (90-6) with one amendment in
disagreement. Conference report enacted by reference in Title III of P.L. 104-99 (H.R.
2880), signed into law January 26, 1996. H.R. 1868 signed into law February 12, 1996.
Section 563 of the law withholds assistance to countries supporting the completion of
the Cuban nuclear facility at Juragua. Exceptions are provided for withheld assistance,
including for: humanitarian needs; democratic political reform and the rule of law; the
creation of private sector and nongovernmental organizations that are independent of
government control; the development of a free market economic system; and assistance
described in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993.
P.L. 104-114, H.R. 927
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995. Strengthens
international sanctions against the Cuban government, develops a plan to support a
transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and
protects American property rights abroad. H.R. 927 introduced February 14, 1995;
House International Relations Committee approved (28-9) H.R. 927 and ordered
reported July 11, 1995 (H.Rept. 104-202, Part I); House approved (294-130) H.R. 927,
amended, September 21, 1995. Senate approved (74-24) H.R. 927, amended, October 19,
1995. Conference report (H.Rept. 104-468) filed March 1, 1996. Senate approved (74-
22) conference March 5, 1996; House approved (336-86) March 6, 1996. Signed into law
March 12, 1996.
P.L. 104-134, H.R. 3019
Omnibus FY1996 Appropriations bill. Introduced March 5, 1996. Passed House (209-
206) March 7. Passed Senate (79-21) March 19. Conference report (H.Rept. 104-537)
filed April 25. House agreed to conference (399-25) April 25. Senate agreed to
conference (88-11) April 25. President signed into law April 26, 1996. Includes $24.809
million in FY1996 funding for Broadcasting to Cuba. Provides for the headquarters of
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting to be relocated from Washington to south Florida. Also
provides that funds for TV Marti may not be provided if such use would be inconsistent
with the March 1995 Office of Cuba Broadcasting Reinventing Plan.
P.L. 104-208, H.R. 3610
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997. Introduced June 11, 1996 as Defense
appropriations bill. House passed June 13, 1996. Senate passed July 18, 1996.
Conference report (H.Rept. 104-863) filed in House Sept. 28, 1996, incorporating several
other appropriations measures and legislative initiatives. House agreed to conference
(370-37) September 28. Senate agreed to conference by voice vote September 30, 1996.
President signed into law September 30, 1996. As enacted, provides $25 million for
Radio and TV Marti (see H.R. 3814); and provides for the repeal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act upon determination by the President that a democratically elected
government in Cuba is in power, pursuant to section 203(c)(3) of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (see H.R. 2202).
H.R. 2202 (Smith, Lamar)
Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996. Introduced August 4,
1995. House passed (333-87) March 21, 1996. Senate passed (97-3) May 2, 1996 in lieu
of S. 1664. Conference report (H.Rept. 104-828) filed in House September 24, 1996.
House agreed to conference (305-123) September 25, 1996. In the conference, a
provision would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act (P.L. 89-732) upon a determination
by the President that a democratically elected government in Cuba was in power,
pursuant to section 203(c)(3) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1996. (For further action, see P.L. 104-208.)
H.R. 3814 (Rogers)
FY1997 Commerce, Justice, and State Department appropriations bill. Introduced July
16, 1996. House Committee on Appropriations reported (H.Rept. 104-676). July 16,
1996. House passed (246-179) July 24, 1996. Senate Committee on Appropriations
reported (S.Rept. 104-353) August 27, 1996. The House-approved version includes
$13.775 million for Radio Marti, but no funding for TV Marti, while the Senate
Committee version includes $25 million for both programs. (For further action, se P.L.
104-208.)
CRS Reports
CRS Report 96-138. Cuba-U.S. Relations: A Chronology of Key Events, January 1959 - February 1996, by Mark P. Sullivan with the assistance of Sandra Morales-Musta.
CRS Report 95-618. Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Increase Sanctions on Cuba? by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report 94-759. Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Reexamine Its Policy? by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report 95-248. Cuba: U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report 95-658. Cuban Migration to the United States: Trends and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report 94-701. Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba: Background and Current Issues, by Ronald O'Rourke and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report 94-636. Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Current Issues, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.