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On June 29, 1994, the Liberal Democrats regained power by aligning with the former Cold War rival Socialists and by letting Socialist leader Tomiichi Murayama become Prime Minister, while reserving for themselves 13 of 20 cabinet posts including the key foreign, trade, and defense portfolios. This was done to assure continuity in Japanese domestic and foreign policies.
In public opinion, initial support for the Left-Right coalition was among the lowest of any incoming cabinet. A major reason was the perception that the coalition was a "unnatural" marriage of convenience between conservatives and old-line leftists. In late 1994, the support level improved somewhat, as the quiet, unassuming Murayama sought to distance his party from its old pacifist, left-wing platform, but only to decline thereafter, as a result of growing perceptions that the coalition was weak and devoid of "leadership."
Until January 1996, Murayama was on the defensive because of his party's major setback in the July 23, 1995 upper house election. In August, Murayama reshuffled the cabinet in a bid to preserve its delicate political balance and to underscore his intention to energize Japan's sluggish economy. This did little to dampen the speculation that his days were numbered. On January 5, 1996, he resigned, apparently to give way to LDP leader Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was elected Prime Minister in a parliamentary vote on Jan. 11, by a lopsided margin over opposition challenger Ichiro Ozawa.
Japan is in the midst of an uncertain political realignment featuring two major conservative parties -- the LDP and the Ozawa-led conservative opposition New Frontier Party (NFP). The NFP's surge since the July 1995 upper house election--at the expense of the ruling coalition--seemed to move Japan a step closer to a bipartisan system that in time could make for a more transparent, issue-oriented politics. Arguably, a reformed Japan could become more responsive to Japanese as well as American concerns on such issues as deregulation, quality of life, trade, and Japan's greater global stature. In immediate terms, however, significant changes may be incremental, given the dominance of the bureaucrat-led power elite in the economic and political life of Japan. Analysts expect this situation to continue as politicians seem unable to rein in the bureaucratic elite long opposed to loosening its grip on regulatory machinery. The current wisdom is that Japan will have to go through two or more election cycles, or nearly 10 years, before it could restore political stability.
Japan's previous three-party ruling coalition (Jan. 1996-Oct.1996) was under the LDP leader/Prime Minister Hashimoto, who was minister of international trade and industry in the previous administration of Socialist Murayama (June 29, 1994-January 5, 1996). The coalition is made up of the conservative LDP, the leftwing Socialist party, and a small centrist called the Sakigake (Pioneers) party. The LDP-led coalition was inaugurated on January 11, 1996, when Hashimoto was elected Prime Minister in a parliamentary vote, easily defeating the opposition challenger Ichiro Ozawa. The three-party coalition held a comfortable majority in both houses of the Diet.
In his inaugural address to the Diet on the opening day of a 150-day regular session on January 22, Hashimoto pledged far-reaching changes in Japan's administrative and economic structures including further economic deregulation while reaffirming Japan's bilateral relations with the United States as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policy. He outlined a three-stage blueprint for Japan's economic rebuilding: achieving a full economic recovery by year's end; carrying out an economic structural reform in 3 years; and laying the foundation of "a creative economy" in 5 years. He also proposed plans for changes in Japan's troubled financial system and the opening of Japan's economy to international competition.
Initial polls showed the Japanese public strongly supporting the concepts of "reform" and "deregulation." The new administration was viewed by some as being potentially more "decisive" than its predecessor on domestic and foreign policies. It was seen as likely to be more innovative than the Murayama government, which had its share of difficulties stemming from its policy differences with the LDP, from factional/ideological infighting within the Socialist party, from a steady erosion of popular support due to its failure to jump-start the economy, and from Murayama's inept response to the devastating Kobe earthquake in January 1995.
Put in perspective, Hashimoto's ascent to power seems to set the stage for an open battle with Ichiro Ozawa, who was elected president of the opposition New Frontier Party in December 1995. It seemed to portend the renewal of the Ozawa-Hashimoto rivalry in the late 1980s. Disciples of legendary political fixer Kakuei Tanaka, Hashimoto and Ozawa were among the key figures in the LDP's factional politics before Ozawa bolted the scandal-tainted LDP in 1993 to launch a "politics of reform." Then and now, they are identified with a contrasting set of political styles and policies, Hashimoto is labelled a cautious "innovator" and Ozawa a proactive "reformer." Judging from Hashimoto's public statements so far, the new Prime Minister seemed to live up to his reputation. Even as Hashimoto is expected to be "firm" in dealing with a host of vexing economic issues, he is seen by some as a defender of the status quo. Viewed by many as a bolder exponent of political and economic reforms, Ozawa seemed certain to challenge his rival to a more open, aggressive debate over policy issues. By September 1996, however, the much anticipated political "duel" had not materialized partly because of discords among principals within Ozawa's New Frontier Party.
The LDP, the single largest bloc in the Diet, is the dominant group in the ruling coalition. It had a sobering experience after July 1993, when Liberal Democrats were voted out after 38 years of dominance and replaced by a seven-party coalition under former LDP maverick Hosokawa. That coalition had a difficult transition, beset by internal policy differences, but was able to steer top priority political reform bills through the Diet, setting the stage for a potentially significant change in the rules governing Japanese politics. Despite the historic feat, Hosokawa, who had initially enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings for his "Mr. Clean" image, had to abruptly resign on April 8, 1994, amid a looming personal financial scandal.
Ensuing infighting over succession ended on April 22, when the coalition partners picked Tsutomu Hata to replace Hosokawa. But only hours after Hata was confirmed as Prime Minister by the Diet on April 25, the Socialists -- the single largest bloc in the coalition -- walked out, complaining that other center-right groups were conspiring to freeze the Socialists out of coalition policymaking. The walkout not only left the coalition short of a parliamentary majority but also opened the door for Socialist alliance with the LDP, which had been plotting a comeback since August 1993.
Hata's minority cabinet resigned en masse on June 25, under threat of an LDP no-confidence vote, but continued to hold talks, in a caretaker role, with the Socialists. The negotiations broke down over tax reform and also over the Socialist demand for a greater voice in coalition decisionmaking, then dominated by Ichiro Ozawa who was "the power behind the power" during the Hosokawa and Hata administrations. Frustrated, the Socialists turned to the obliging LDP that offered to endorse Murayama for premiership in exchange for support of an LDP-dominated coalition (despite intraparty protests that premiership should be reserved for the LDP, not to mention objections by left- and right-wingers within the Socialist party that an "unprincipled alliance" would compromise their "progressive" identity). Former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (1989-1991) quit the LDP on June 29, in disgust. The Left-Right coalition muddled through until January 5, 1996, when Murayama announced his "sudden" resignation.
Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP is a loose coalition of several factions closely linked to the bureaucracy, farmers, shopkeepers and big business. Controlling the single largest bloc of seats in both chambers of the Diet, Liberal Democrats are collectively a formidable political machine with decades of experience in governance. Out of power in 1993, they had 11 months of sobering efforts to forge new images and shore up their demoralized organization. The party mulled over several changes including dissolution of much maligned factions, a new party name, redefining the party platform, and reorganization as a centrist/populist party.
Not much has changed, however. Before regaining the power in June 1994, the party's "new" policy was to make a break with its faction-dominated past; in reality, party executives reverted to the old way of power-sharing based on factional strength, despite months of intraparty finger-pointing to factions as a main reason for the LDP's low standing in public opinion. In any case, on November 24, 1994, LDP executives and faction leaders finally "agreed" to disband factions by year-end in a bid to promote a more democratic, transparent management of party affairs. Factions were formally dissolved but continue to function ostensibly in the name of "study groups." Indeed, in February 1995, these "study groups" resumed their thinly disguised factional activities. By late 1995, such activities had included fund-raising "parties" in anticipation of a new lower house election. In January 1996, the LDP's share of cabinet posts was distributed with the "parity" of its five factions in mind (Yomiuri Shimbun, January 9, January 12, 1996).
The LDP's alliance with the Socialists may not last long, analysts say, as many rightwing LDP members are said to favor a more ideologically cohesive government under an exclusive LDP leadership, or even a new "conservative-conservative" coalition with the like-minded Diet members now in the opposition New Frontier Party.
In 1995, the LDP's "dovish" leader and foreign minister Yohei Kono was expected to be challenged by the "hawkish" trade and industry minister Hashimoto in the September 22 party presidential election. On August 28, 1995, amid signs of weak party support behind him, Kono pulled out of a bid for a second term. This left Hashimoto unopposed for party leadership vote -- until September 10, when former posts and telecommunications minister Junichio Koizumi filed his candidacy. Hashimoto's victory was, however, never in doubt, because of his reputation as a tough, nationalistic negotiator in summer of 1994's tumultuous Japan-U.S. auto talks. In campaign statements, Hashimoto promised a more assertive diplomatic role commensurate with Japan's economic power, closer security and economic ties with Washington, new emphasis on ties with Asia, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and expansion of Japan's defense budget. On domestic issues, he called for tax reform and an aggressive pump-priming economic program. For his part, disdaining Hashimoto's economic program as "mild," Koizumi called for privatizing Japan's massive postal savings system and other forms of sweeping deregulation and vowed to pull the LDP out of the three-party coalition.
On September 22, Hashimoto won handily, winning four-fifths of votes cast by both the party's Diet members and the party rank and file. In a first official act as party president on September 25, he picked a new team of party executives. Named to the team were reputedly "dovish" Koichi Kato as the party's second most influential post of secretary-general (formerly defense minister, chief cabinet secretary, and chairman of the party's Policy Affairs Research Council); former defense minister Taku Yamazaki as chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council -- the LDP's influential policymaking body; and former education minister Masajuro Shiokawa as chairman of the top consensus-building Executive Council.
The Social Democratic Party. By early November 1995, the Socialist Party was to have created a new party out of the existing group. At a special convention on September 21, 1995, it had voted for a proposal to disband and regroup under a new "democratic" label, but intraparty discord continued over the future direction of the proposed party. Murayama, who was easily reelected as party leader on January 16, 1996, said that the party "aims" to change its name and platform at a party convention 3 days later. Not much happened, however, other than changing the name of the party in Japanese from "the Japan Socialist Party" (Nihon Shakaito) to "the Japan Social Democratic Party" (Nihon Shakai Minshuto). At the heart of the Socialist concern was the fear that regrouping would split the party and thereby weaken its political leverage in the tripartite coalition. Some analysts suggest that the Socialist party will become irrelevant in time, but that in the short run it is useful to the LDP because without the Socialists on board, the Hashimoto coalition, short of a parliamentary majority, will more likely collapse.
In the years after its founding in 1955, the Socialist party defined itself by its opposition to the pro-U.S. LDP; and by its "defense" of the constitution. The latter formed the basis for the Socialist platform that Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), or the military, was unconstitutional (Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates in part, "...land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained"). The Socialists also took issue with Japan's traditional national flag and national anthem as reminders of the country's prewar militarism. In addition, they opposed the Japan-U.S. security alliance and adopted a pro-North Korean policy on issues relating to the Korean Peninsula.
In recent years, however, the Socialists dropped their Marxist, anti-military and anti-U.S. positions. Shortly after becoming the Prime Minister in 1994, Murayama conceded that the SDF was "constitutional" and that the U.S.-Japan security treaty was legal, as were the national flag and the national anthem. To underscore his shift on Korea policy, Murayama went to Seoul (July 23-24, 1994) for summit talks with President Kim Young Sam and agreed to cooperate with Seoul and Washington in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue (Nonetheless, some Socialists remained defiant, apparently because of campaign contributions they received from pro-Pyongyang Korean groups in Japan).
Murayama's June 1994 decision to align with the LDP was divisive for the already fractious Socialists. Left-wingers supported Murayama, whereas centrist/right-wing elements rallied behind secretary general Kubo to press for the creation of an entirely new "liberal and democratic" party. Kubu's "rebel" faction asserted that a new party was needed to counter a growing conservative momentum under the two conservative "mainstream" parties -- the LDP and the New Frontier Party. For its part, the left-wing faction argued that a new start would undermine the Socialist party's standing in the coalition and probably doom the Socialists to a permanent out-of-power status.
The issue came to a head on May 27, 1995, when the Socialists endorsed a plan to form a new party at a later date. The same issue gained a sense of new urgency in the wake of the party's setback in the July 23 upper house election. On Nov. 30, 1995, the Socialists reaffirmed their earlier plan to make a fresh start, but without resolving the divisive issues on the party's ideology and platform. These issues were addressed at a party convention, January 19, 1996, when the party adopted a new Japanese name, Shakai Minshuto (literally, the Social Democratic Party). The newly adopted platform reflected no substantive break with the past, however. Public response was one of indifference, given the perception, within and outside the party, that the proposed "new party" would be no different from "old wine in a new bottle." On March 3, 1996, a group of left-wingers formed a breakaway splinter group called the New Socialist Party (Shin Shakaito), calling for, among other things, the eventual elimination of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.
Sakigake (Pioneers) Party. The Sakigake Party was formed in June 1993 by a group of LDP defectors and joined the Hosokawa coalition. In the current coalition, the party's policies are identified as "dovish" or "liberal." In an ongoing political realignment, the Sakigake party may find it difficult to project a credible, distinct identity. In late October 1995, Socialist Prime Minister Murayama went out of his way to endorse Takemura as "a strong candidate" to lead a reconstituted Socialist party. In November, Takemura showed little interest in any Socialist-proposed "round table" to discuss a possible Socialist-Sakigate merger. He seemed unsure whether the "new" Socialist grouping could make a complete break with its old-line leftist platform. On July 13, 1996, Takemura hinted at the possibility of forming "a new party" without mentioning the Socialist party.
Clouding the Sakigake's future was the departure of its Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama on August 30 in order to launch his own new party. His announced intention for his party, to be formed in late September, was to bring an end to Japan's "political stagnation" by replacing its "vested interest politics" as well as "bureaucracy-dominated policymaking with real democracy." Party leader Takemura resigned to take responsibility for Hatoyama's departure. On August 30, Shoichi Ide was elected to lead the Sakigake party, with Hiroyuki Sonoda serving as his deputy.
The distribution of cabinet posts reflects the relative strength of each coalition party (see Appendix II, The Previous Coalition Cabinet, October 30, 1996). In an attempt to assure continuity in Japan's basic policies, the key posts dealing with foreign affairs, trade, and defense are assigned to LDP members. The politically sensitive post of education was also kept by the LDP, out of concern that a Socialist minister could become embroiled in "patriotic" issues involving Japan's flag and national anthem.
Continuity and stability are two key words underlying the coalition policy stance since 1993. The Hashimoto coalition's platform was decided on January 7, 1996, as a broadly worded compromise among the three parties. The platform was based on two major premises: implementing "more drastic restructuring of Japanese politics, economy, and administration" and fulfilling "important responsibilities without causing political vacuum and confusion in the current difficult transition." The three parties vowed to carry out "new tasks resolutely" during this transition while "basically continuing policies" adopted under the outgoing Murayama administration. It is worth noting that these "policies" are not appreciably different from the platform first established by the Hosokawa coalition in 1993. In any case, the platform is no more than a statement of intentions if only because in the Japanese context, policies are drafted by bureaucrats and few bills get enacted without bureaucratic participation and assistance.
The platform called for reforms in the United Nations and in Japan's political and administrative structures and also pledged Japan's active participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations without becoming "a military superpower." Among the "new priority policies" were plans aimed at economic structural reform, "new comprehensive agricultural policy," relocation of "metropolitan functions" [building a long-awaited new national capital away from Tokyo], "review" of changes in Japan's financial system in the wake of recent scandals in banking and housing loan institutions, and the proposed reduction of the current account surplus to one percent of the GDP from the 1995 level of 2.1% within 2 years.
On foreign policy, the three-party platform and other policy statements since continue to affirm the importance of Japan's security alliance with the United States not only for bilateral cooperation but also for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. In his January 25, 1996 statement to the Diet, for example, Prime Minister Hashimoto reiterated that the "deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is essential," read by some as implying that he would demand neither a reduction of U.S. forces in Japan nor withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa. The platform also had the three parties pledging to help normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea while facilitating the implementation of the nuclear accord signed by the United States and North Korea in October 1994.
Policymaking is collective in theory but actually the LDP seems to have a far more influential role than the Socialists, given Liberal Democrats's decades of experience. Koichi Kato, the current secretary general of the LDP, was quoted as saying that "60 to 70%" of his party's input was brought to bear on policymaking (Yomiuri Shimbun, December 13, 1994).
The conventional wisdom was that "the iron triangle" of the LDP, the bureaucracy, and big business was the driving force behind Japan's extraordinary economic success in the postwar decades. That wisdom has increasingly been called into question, as the cozy triangle is believed to have engendered "money politics" scandals. In August 1993, then-Prime Minister Hosokawa vowed to dismantle the "collusive" triangle as well as "the politics of zoku Diet members" (zoku, literally, means tribe or clan). Hosokawa was alluding to those senior LDP Diet members who, aligned with bureaucrats and interest groups, traditionally influenced the policymaking process based on their expertise and practical experience in one or more areas of ministerial jurisdictions. Hosokawa's intent was to change the old way by making the Diet, not the bureaucracy, as the central public forum for policy initiation, open debate, and decisionmaking. In actuality, however, little has changed. Japan remains under the firm grip of the bureaucracy; some analysts suggest, however, that bureaucratic dominance will in time decline if public pressure for deregulation continues to mount. In any case, since the return of the LDP to power in June 1994, zoku Diet members seem to have reverted to form.
From June 1994 on, the ruling coalition was supposed to decide on policy in a more "transparent and democratic" manner than was the case under the previous administrations. Key coalition decisions are to be made by a 20-member "executive committee of the coalition parties" -- 10 Liberal Democrats, 7 Socialists, and 3 from Sakigake. Meeting weekly on Wednesdays and Fridays, the committee is to make decisions by unanimity. The meetings is to be open to any lawmaker from the ruling coalition. Some observers acknowledge that in theory the new system could minimize the potential for a one-party or backstage decisionmaking, but in actuality, Japan's major domestic and foreign policies are believed to be initiated more often by bureaucrats than political leaders.
On December 10, 1994, nine opposition parties and splinters (excluding the Communists) launched a new party, Shinshinto, or the New Frontier Party (NFP) as a conservative alternative to the LDP. Part of a long-awaited step toward political realignment, the NFP was expected to bring the Japanese party system closer to a bipartisan model featuring two main conservative parties. In the upper house election of July 23, 1995, the NFP fared very well, winning 40 seats, more than twice the 19 it had at risk.
Shinshinto (New Frontier Party). The New Frontier Party faced two major challenges: crafting a credible center-right platform different from that of the resurgent LDP; and staying united in the aftermath of a recent leadership battle between the party's two heavyweights. In the December 27, 1995 party election to fill its leadership post left vacant by the resignation of Toshiki Kaifu, Ichiro Ozawa easily defeated his long-time ally and former Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata (who in the December 1994 party election for leadership lost to Ozawa-backed Kaifu). In the 1995 election, Kaifu returned the favor by endorsing Ozawa, whereas Hata was supported by former Prime Minister Hosokawa. In an attempt to forestall the Hata wing of the party from splitting, Ozawa named Hata's key lieutenants to party executive posts but this did not prevent them from forming an "anti-Ozawa faction" in January 1996, within the party. The current indications are that the intraparty differences over personalities might be put aside long enough to prepare for the lower house elections likely to come in October or November 1996.
The NFP is made up of the four center-right parties that once formed the mainstay of the Hosokawa and Hata coalitions and, since June 1994, the core of the opposition to the LDP-led coalition. Several splinters also joined the NFP to make the new group the second largest parliamentary bloc after the ruling coalition (see Appendix I. The Political Lineup in the Lower House, October 20, 1996). The NFP is a loose coalition of parties, still groping for a coherent party platform. Projecting a new identity is a difficult task as many of its NFP members were formerly with the LDP. The irony of the party's situation was aptly stated at its inaugural convention in Dec. 1994, when a senior member was quoted as saying: "Our party cannot shape new policies to counter the LDP because it has no different policies" from those of the LDP. Another potential issue concerns the NFP's solidarity that some analysts regard as suspect because of a possible personality and generational conflict among its members.
The four major components of the NFP are as follows: The first is Shinseito (Japan Renewal Party), a conservative group formed in June 1993 by LDP defectors under former finance minister Tsutomu Hata and Ichiro Ozawa. The Shinseito favors extensive deregulation and Japan's enhanced role in global affairs. Of the party's 62 members, 52 voted for Hata against Kaifu in the December 9 balloting, suggesting that Ozawa has some fence-mending to do with Hata and that the unity of the NFP might be open to question. Some analysts argue that Hata and many of his backers would be invited (excluding the Ozawa camp) to join an LDP-led coalition if the LDP fails to capture a parliamentary majority on its own in the next lower house election. Perhaps the most cohesive, disciplined bloc in the NFP is the 52-member Komeito (Clean Government Party) founded in 1964 by a Buddhist lay group popular with largely urban, middle-class constituents. The Komeito component has both pro-military and pacifist elements and is generally supportive of a bipartisan party system, just as the Shinseito. Nihon Shinto (Japan New Party) is a 33-member group formed by Morihiro Hosokawa in May 1992 to press for a major political reform, deregulation, and devolution of power to local government. The party's rapid rise to prominence was credited to Hosokawa's "Mr. Clean" image, but his scandal-forced resignation left the party scrambling for a new identity. Minshu Shakaito (Democratic Socialist Party) was founded in 1960 as a right-wing offshoot of the Japan Socialist Party. Backed by private sector unions, this centrist party often cooperated with the LDP and Komeito.
Also joining the NFP were several centrist, reformist groups formed mostly by former LDP members. These included: the 7-member Liberal Party, the 5-member Reform Association, the 5-member New Party Mirai (Future), the 5-member Koshi Kai (High Aspirations Association), and the 2-member Liberal Association.
Japan Communist Party. Although spurned by other parties, the Communist party refused to compromise on "principles." It continued to maintain its commitment to a Marxist doctrine of "scientific socialism" but has no impact on domestic political dynamics. Its grass-roots support, based mostly in labor unions and dues-paying membership, is declining. Its membership as of July 19, 1994 was 360,000, down from 478,000 4 years earlier.
The political reform package passed by the Diet in January 1994 was a significant accomplishment of the Hosokawa coalition. It was the culmination of efforts begun in 1991 under then-Prime Minister Kaifu. On November 21, 1994, the Diet passed three supplementary bills designed to complete and implement the reform package enacted earlier in January. Key features of the 1994 package are as follows:
Public opinion is emerging as a significant factor in Japanese politics. Under the LDP's one-party rule, the only approval rating that really mattered for a Prime Minister was, as Japan's Nikkei Weekly (April 4, 1994) put it, "the backing of behind-the-scenes power brokers," or LDP's faction bosses. Since August 1993, however, public opinion seems to have become a more important factor. Hosokawa relied on high public approval ratings as a source of his political strength. But his leverage began to diminish in early 1994, as his approval ratings started slipping to below 50% in March 1994. This was a far cry from the first 4 months of the coalition rule during which time the approval ratings held steady at an unprecedented level of 70-76%.
Hosokawa's early popularity was attributed to his "clean" and "fresh" image. Gradually, however, the public seemed to judge him more in terms of job performance. The approval ratings began to drop in December 1993 amid growing public concerns over economic recession named by a majority of those polled as the most urgent issue for him to resolve. Adding to Hosokawa's problem were his disputes with the Socialists over a cabinet reshuffle, political realignment, and financing tax-cuts through offsetting hikes in consumption tax; Japan's trade tensions with the United States over its $59 billion trade surplus; and mounting charges that Hosokawa, for months touted as the symbol of reform and clean politics, was himself implicated in questionable financial dealings.
Hata's minority cabinet received an approval rating of 57% in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll taken after he took office in April 1994, the third highest rating since the 1950s. But Murayama's SDP-LDP coalition, derided by some as "a no-principle coalition," has fared poorly in a Kyodo News Service poll taken at the end of June 1995; the Kyodo poll showed an approval rating of only 33%, among the lowest for a newly installed government. Policy incompatibility and Socialist premiership were the main reasons for the decline in ratings. As the Socialists began to shift rightward in July-August 1994, the support for the Murayama cabinet rose to 43%, according to a Yomiuri poll conducted August 27-28, 1994.
In 1995, approval ratings declined steadily. A Yomiuri poll showed the support level down to 41% in February (after the Murayama cabinet's inept handling of the Kobe earthquake). An Asahi Shimbun poll on July 24-25, after the upper house ballot, showed 52% of respondents calling for a new government. A similarly negative view of the coalition was evident in other polls indicating a majority of Japanese craving for a new conservatives-led government. Many polls taken in November-December 1995 showed a record low 33-34% approval ratings. The drift was checked in 1996 with the advent of the Hashimoto government. A Kyodo news poll taken on January 12 and 13 showed public support for the new regime at 63%, the second highest level on record for a new cabinet. In this poll the most urgent issue for the new government to resolve was named as an economic recovery. Some 45% of pollees said that the Hashimoto government might last about a year.
In the last several years, Japanese opinion polls have revealed growing Japanese apathy toward political parties and politicians, with roughly 50% of respondents expressing "no support for any political party." In a Nihon Keizai survey taken in mid-December 1995, politicians and bureaucrats alike were distrusted by 70% and 64% of pollees, respectively; the same poll also found one in three respondents holding the view that Japanese politics was actually run by government bureaucrats. In the Kyodo poll taken in January 1996, 41% welcomed the return of an LDP premiership, whereas 47% showed neither approval nor disapproval, suggesting a "wait-and-see" attitude. A Yomiuri poll taken, February 24-25, 1996, showed 50% supporting the Hashimoto cabinet, a drop of 7% from a January survey. The decline seemed to reflect growing public antipathy toward Hashimoto's controversial plan to use public funds to wind up bankrupt mortgage firms, or jusen. Overall, however, Prime Minister Hashimoto faced no major opposition challenge, evidently because of his successful April 1996 summit with President Clinton; tentative though spotty signs of economic recovery; and the opposition's failure to articulate a set of credible policy alternatives.
The United States has a considerable stake in Japan's political stability -- particularly in its political leadership capacity to rein in the bureaucracy. However, both stability and leadership ability remain elusive since the LDP lost its one-party monopoly of power in the July 1993 election because Japan's ruling coalitions since then have been fragile and rent by internal differences. As a result, successive coalitions could produce only token results in efforts to institute political, economic, and administrative reforms. That is because the bureaucracy, with a substantial stake in the status quo, has more often stonewalled reform. It is worth noting that even in the days of the LDP's hegemony before 1993, politicians tended to tip-toe around the issue of regulatory reforms in order not to offend the bureaucracy.
To be sure, various reform measures unveiled since 1993 were designed to enable Japan to better deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, if implemented as intended, these reforms could lead to a Japan more transparent in its politics and policymaking and less protectionist in its trade and economic relations with the United States and others. Potential payoffs could be considerable, as Japan's success in cutting its trade surplus would soften the adverse impact of the high yen on Japanese industry and consumers -- and ultimately better serve Japan's own self-interest. Success could also produce a set of outcomes that could revolutionize Japanese politics to create a bipartisan realignment and a stronger, more responsive political leadership that could control the traditionally powerful, elitist bureaucracy.
Under Hosokawa, Hata, Murayama, and now Hashimoto, deregulation was seen as a win-win approach to curbing the bureaucratic power that derived as much from the vagueness of Japanese laws as from the maze of administrative guidance and regulations. Deregulation could potentially strike at the roots of the seldom challenged civil bureaucracy, however. If the LDP-dominated past is any clue, attempts to decontrol the economy and open Japan's closed markets may have only limited results in the face of the pro-status quo LDP and its ally, the bureaucracy. There are also powerful interest groups arrayed against deregulation -- farmers and small shopkeepers -- a key power base for the LDP. With the next election likely to come in late 1996 or before mid-1997, at the latest, the Hashimoto administration seems likely to shy away from any controversial issue. But this may not be easy as Hashimoto must resolve his highly unpopular, costly plan to bail out seven ailing housing loan lenders, or jusen, with tax money. This is a volatile issue which could affect the electoral fortunes of some LDP and other coalition politicians.
In the near term, the political situation seems certain to remain fluid, with the Hashimoto government trying to curry favor with the electorate without upsetting the status quo. Stalling for time can be politically expedient, but "playing politics" with key domestic and foreign policy issues could prove to be also counterproductive. Depending on the public perceptions of Hashimoto's job performance, opposition pressure could mount for a new election that some analysts say might not be held before mid-1997. Even in a best-case scenario, political stability may not be restored until after 1997, at the earliest. By then, the first post-reform cabinet will have settled in, but it is unclear whether such a cabinet will be under a single party or in coalition. In any case, political uncertainty seems likely to make for continued bureaucratic dominance in the political and economic life of Japan.
10/20/96 --Prime Minister Hashimoto's Liberal Democratic Party won a commanding plurality of 239 seats in an election to fill the 500-member lower house of the Diet, or parliament, but falling 12 seats short of a majority needed to control the powerful chamber. Failing to renew his outgoing three-party coalition, the Prime Minister reportedly agreed to form a loose alliance for "out-of-cabinet cooperation." Hashimoto will most likely head a minority government.
08/30/96 --The Sakigake (Pioneers), the junior member of the ruling coalition, elected a new leadership team as its deputy leader Yukio Hatoyama split to form his own new party in late September.
04/17-96 ---Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton issued a "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century" in Tokyo during Clinton's three-day state visit to discuss bilateral, regional, and global security cooperation.
01/11/96 ---LDP president and minister of international trade and industry Ryutaro Hashimoto was elected prime minister to lead a new three-party coalition coalition cabinet.
01/05/96 ---Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama announced resignation.
12/27/95 ---Ichiro Ozawa was elected president of the main opposition New Frontier in a landslide victory over long-time ally and former prime minister Tsutomu Hata.
09/25/95 ---Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto was inaugurated as new LDP president.
07/23/95 ---The ruling coalition parties fared poorly in the July 23 election to the upper house; Prime Minister Murayama's Socialist party in particular suffered its worst electoral defeat in the postwar era.
12/10/94 ---As part of ongoing political realignment, nine opposition parties and splinters launched a unified center-right New Frontier Party to challenge the Socialist-LDP governing coalition.
09/04/94 ---A special Social Democratic Party convention approved the party's rightward shift in key foreign and defense policy stance.
06/29/94 ---Social Democratic Party leader Tomiichi Murayama became prime minister in a deal with the LDP.
06/25/94 ---Hata resigned shortly before an LDP-filed no-confidence motion against Hata was to be voted on.
04/25/94 ---Tsutomu Hata was elected prime minister after 2 weeks of intense intra-coalition policy bickering between conservatives and Socialists over policy issues and formed a minority government minus the Socialist party.
04/08/94 ---Hosokawa stepped down from premiership amid public charges of his personal financial misdeeds.
01/29/94 ---Hosokawa's political reform package passed the Diet, made possible by his concessions to the LDP's pressure for compromise.
08/06/93 ---Morihiro Hosokawa was elected prime minister over his LDP rival Yohei Kono in a special Diet session; a coalition cabinet was unveiled 3 days later.
07/29/93 ---Seven noncommunist parties agreed to form a ruling coalition under a non-LDP prime minister.
07/18/93 ---LDP lost its 38-year-old majority in an election to the lower house.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 93-231. Japan-U.S. Relations: A Briefing Book.
CRS Report 96-117. Japan's January 1996 Leadership Change: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Richard P. Cronin.
CRS Report 96-405. Japan's Foreign Affairs Establishment, by Rinn-Sup Shinn.
The Political Lineup in the Lower House -- Oct. 20, 1996 Total Lower House Seats: 5001
Political Parties Leadership Seat s Won 7/18/1993 Seat s Held 10/07/96 Seat s Won 10/20/96
Coalition parties
Liberal Democratic Party: conservative, in power from 1955 to 1993. Leader: Ryutaro Hashimoto; sec. gen.: Koichi Kato 223 211 239
Democratic Party: liberal, formed on Sept. 27, 1996 Co-leaders: Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan 522 52
Social Democratic Party: leftist; long opposed to LDP; quit Hata's coalition on Apr. 26, 1994. Leader:3 Takako Doi; sec. gen.: Tadatoshi Akiba 70 30 15
Sakigake (Pioneers) Party: center-right reformist; split from Hata's coalition in Apr., 1994. Leader: Akiko Domoto 13 9 2
Opposition parties
New Frontier Party (Shinshinto): centrist-conservative, formed Dec. 10, 1994 Leader: Ichiro Ozawa; sec. gen.: Takeo Nishioka 160 156
Japan Communist Party: Marxist, pacifist, backed by unions Leader: Tetsuzo Fuwa; deputy: Kazuo Shii 15 15 26
Others
Independents, minor groups, and vacancies. 30 30 12
1 Number of lower house seats as of July 1993 was 511.
2 Until late Sept. 1996, Democratic Party members belonged to either the SDP or Sakigake party.
3 Former SDP leader Tomiichi Murayama is to remain as co-leader with a new title of "special representative."
SOURCE: Adapted from Yomiuri Shimbun, October 9, 19, 1996.
The Previous Coalition Cabinet, October 30, 1996
Portfolio Name Party
Prime minister Ryutaro HASHIMOTO Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Deputy prime minister/Finance Wataru KUBO Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Justice Ritsuko NAGANO No affiliation
Foreign affairs Yukihiko IKEDA LDP
Education Mikio OKUDA LDP
Health and welfare Naoto KAN Democratic Party
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries Ichiro OHARA LDP
Transport Yoshiyuki KAMEI LDP
International trade and industry Shunpei TSUKAHARA LDP
Posts and telecommunications Ichiro HINO Democratic Party
Labor Takanobu NAGAI SDP
Construction Eiichi NAKANO LDP
Home affairs Hiroyuki KURATA LDP
Chief cabinet secretary Seiroku KAJIYAMA LDP
National Land Agency Kazumi SUZUKI SDP
Management and Coordination Agency Sekisuke NAKANISHI SDP
Hokkaido/Okinawa Development Agency Saburo OKABE LDP
Defense Agency Hideo USUI LDP
Economic Planning Agency Shusei TANAKA No affiliation
Science and Technology Agency Hidenao NAKAGAWA LDP
Environment Agency Sukio IWATARE SDP