Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 94-79 F January 14, 1994 -ti- Regional Security Consultative Organizations in East Asia and Their Implications for the United States By Larry Niksch Specialist in Asian Affairs REGIONAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN EAST ASIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES SUMMARY In the uncertain security environment of the post-Cold War world, the Clinton Administration has expressed interest in proposals that would create forums for regional security consultations in East Asia. There have been a number of discussions about the formation of such groups. The creation of regional security consultative organizations could affect several issues in which Congress has direct interest, including the future U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific and the extent of U.S. involvement in disputes among the countries of the region. So far, substantive action has come from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose governments have agreed to create a new organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum. The Forum, which will meet on security issues, will convene for the first time in July 1994. The ASEAN Regional Forum likely will consider steps to convince non-ASEAN members of the Forum to adhere to previous ASEAN declarations calling for restraint by parties involved in regional disputes. The forum also may examine proposals for military confidence-building measures and to create mechanisms for negotiating settlements of regional disputes. The ASEAN governments view the ASEAN Regional Forum as important to influence Chinese policies in Southeast Asia. The creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum has spurred further discussions over proposals for a security consultative forum for Northeast Asia. The timing and source of a specific proposal is uncertain, however, because of a range of suspicions that exist among the countries of Northeast Asia. This creates a situation in which movement may hinge on a possible U.S. initiative. The scope of the membership of such a group is open to question, especially regarding Taiwan and North Korea. A Northeast Asia forum undoubtedly would examine military confidence-building measures and possibly schemes for arms reductions and limits on nuclear weapons. The Korean problem and various territorial disputes would constitute a difficult set of issues for a Northeast Asia forum to adopt on its agenda. The U.S.-hosted summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, held in November 1993, included individual meetings of government leaders in which security and political issues were discussed. This raises the possibility that APEC could evolve into an organization like the G-7 group or the Council on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, ASEAN governments and China oppose such a change in APEC's orientation. Creation of East Asian regional security consultative organizations pose some challenges for U.S. policies. The U.S. would need to define its roles and priorities in such groups and set a balance between using them to advance U.S. policy goals or employing bilateral channels and/or the United Nations. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION MOTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS END OF COLD WAR CONSTRAINTS FEAR OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL THE ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE AND ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM POSSIBLE AGENDA ISSUES CHINA'S ROLE IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM PROPOSALS FOR A NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY GROUPING FUTURE ISSUES AN APEC-SPONSORED SECURITY DIALOGUE? IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES APPENDIX REGIONAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN EAST ASIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES INTRODUCTION A dialogue has emerged among government officials and private policy advisers and experts in the East Asia-Western Pacific region over proposals to form regional organizations that would deal with security and political issues. Several private sector forums have been created, and proposals for official bodies are under discussion. Winston Lord, the Clinton Administration's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has stated that the Clinton Administration is willing "to explore first, consultations and dialogue" on security and political issues "which may lead eventually over time to new institutions."(1) Subsequent Administration statements have repeated this view. 1. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State-designate Winston Lord before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 31, 1993. This issue could affect several aspects of U.S. policy in East Asia and the Western Pacific in which Congress is interested and involved. One is the extensive network of U.S. bilateral defense relationships with allies and others, which involves U.S. financial outlays appropriated by Congress and general congressional oversight. A second could be the future U.S. military-force structure in the region, determined in part by the shape of the U.S. defense budget. A third could be U.S. involvement in disputes among the countries of the region. Finally, such regional groups would have an impact on the ability of the United States to promote its foreign policy objectives in East Asia. MOTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS END OF COLD WAR CONSTRAINTS The end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Western Pacific is the primary factor motivating the interest in regional organizations. During the Cold War period, most political and security issues drew intensive U.S. and Soviet interest and involvement. The two superpowers were able to encourage or discourage East Asia governments considering military and/or aggressive acts against neighbors, and could greatly influence the manner in which these countries negotiated with each other. Governments sometimes put aside territorial disputes with neighbors in order to form a common front in dealing with Washington and Moscow. Pro-U.S. and pro-Soviet governments banded together in opposing other groups or coalitions, such as the polarization between the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),(2) on the one hand, and Vietnam and its Indochina allies, on the other, in the late 1970s and 1980s. Non-communist governments reacted negatively to proposals from Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Gorbachev for the formation of an Asian collective security system. 2. China Admits Firing Shots at Japanese Ship. Kyodo News Service, July 21, 1992; Tokyo Protests Two Chinese Maritime Incidents. Kyodo News Service, February 12, 1993. The collapse of the Soviet Union has eliminated most, if not all, of these influences and constraints. Governments in the region have more freedom of action. But many East Asian leaders are concerned about this new regional situation for three related reasons: (1) Fear that other powers will step into any military vacuum left by the Soviet Union and the United States: East Asian governments are worried by pressures on Japan to increase military capabilities and take on new miliary responsibilities. Governments in Southeast Asia are wary of China's more assertive military posture in the South China Sea as well as its growing role in Burma. India's naval presence and military installations in the eastern Indian Ocean also is of concern in Southeast Asia. (2) Concern that regional disputes, especially territorial disputes, will intensify now that Cold War constraints have lifted: China and Japan have competing territorial claims in the East China Sea around the Senkaku islands; Chinese ships have fired at Japanese vessels on several occasions since March 1991. China and five Southeast Asian countries dispute sovereignty over the Spratly islands and the South China Sea basin, and the Chinese Government has reasserted China's claim of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea basin. The Senkakus and Spratlys are believed to be promising areas for oil exploration; any discovery of oil could intensify these disputes. The recent peace settlement in Cambodia remains on shaky grounds. Several competing territorial claims among the Southeast Asian states are a further cause for concern. Japan and Russia remain deadlocked over Japan's demand for the return of islands seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. (3) Concern that the more assertive roles of Japan and China; the greater emphasis on territorial disputes; and aggressive sales campaigns by European, American, and Russian arms companies are helping to propel an arms race in East Asia. Defense budgets and arms purchases by East Asian governments have risen rapidly in the 1990s. East and South Asia accounted for 33 percent of global-weapons imports in 1991.(3) 3. Asian Military Buildup Gaining Momentum. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 22, 1992. A close examination of recent arms purchases by individual countries indicates that most of them are part of military modernization programs that do not significantly increase power-projection capabilities. There are a couple of exceptions, however: Malaysia purchased frigates from Great Britain and U.S. F-18 and Russian MIG-29 fighter aircraft in order to strengthen Malaysia's combat capabilities in the disputed Spratlys. China's buildup of air and naval forces would increase Beijing's combat assets related to Taiwan and to China's territorial claims in the East and South China seas.(4) 4. Kristof, Nicholas D. China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous. New York Times, January 11, 1993. p. 1. Moreover, arms purchases are creating uncertainty over the intentions of governments. The Indian Government, for example, is suspicious over reports that China intends to build a naval base on Burma's Indian Ocean coast; and there is speculation that India will counter with a force buildup on the Andaman and Nicobar islands lying between Burma and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Of special concern is the perceived danger of nuclear proliferation emanating from North Korea's apparent attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Other governments and many independent experts are worried that South Korea and Japan would react to North Korean nuclear weapons by resorting to drastic defense moves, including a reorientation of their nuclear programs to give them a greater weapons-producing potential. In July 1993, Japanese officials enunciated a less than total commitment to support an extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, when it is up for renewal; and Foreign Minister Muto Kabun stated that Japan should have an option to develop nuclear weapons to counter a nuclear threat from North Korea.(5) 5. Japan Spells Out Nuclear Stance. Washington Post, July 29, 1933. p. A18. FEAR OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL The end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry has brought concern in East Asia that the United States may lower its involvement in regional security problems and reduce the American military presence to a level that would render the United States less capable of projecting credible military power and affecting future crises. Leaders in Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia, and even some in Russia assert that U.S. involvement and a U.S. military presence is essential for regional stability. Several of these leaders warn that U.S. disengagement would trigger moves by China and/or Japan to fill the vacuum and that this would set off new rivalries and a revival of historical animosities. They also warn that a U.S. withdrawal would make nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia more likely. Withall, there is an expectation that the United States will reduce its involvement to some degree. Some fear reductions in the American military presence. Others believe that the U.S. Government will keep forces in the Western Pacific but will not wish to be involved in territorial and other disputes between East Asian states. Although the East Asian region has remained peaceful in the immediate post-Cold War period, a number of East Asian governments view all these potential problems and dangers as arguments for confidence-building initiatives, including regional security consultative organizations. Governments that are supportive wish multilateral security consultative forums to accomplish at least the following aims: (1) Influence the United States to continue a strong level of involvement in the region. (2) Add a collective layer of diplomatic contacts and constraints to the actions of the larger regional powers. (3) Reassure countries of the region regarding the intentions and aims of their neighbors. (4) Build, in the longer term, an institutional framework for the negotiation of disputes among member states. These interests and aims, however, do not imply an endorsement of all the proposals made since 1989 for multilateral security forums. Individual governments place qualifications on their support for the idea and in their reactions to individual proposals. The aims envisaged for such organizations are countered by limits which many governments demand on the issues to be covered, the membership of such organizations, and the geographical scope. The differences in major proposals also produce varying preferences among governments and non-government proponents of such organizations. Most of the key proposals come from governments not within geographical East Asia but from the broader Pacific region, especially from Australia and Canada; this influences their attractiveness to East Asian governments. THE ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE AND ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) currently is the one functioning governmental regional organization that takes up security issues. It is composed of the six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)(6) and seven dialogue partners (the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the European Community, and Canada). ASEAN decided in early 1992 to add a security component to the ASEAN-PMC meetings after Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, at the July 1991 meeting, proposed that the ASEAN-PMC forum initiate discussions "to improve the sense of security" among East Asian countries and that it convene a meeting of "senior officials" to study and act on Japan's proposal. 6. The ASEAN countries are Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The ASEAN governments and their dialogue partners have established a new organization structure to deal with security issues. In May 1993, the first annual meeting of ASEAN-PMC senior officials was held. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord represented the United States. That meeting laid plans for a second step: the admittance of China, Russia, and Vietnam as dialogue partners. At the ASEAN-PMC foreign ministers conference in July 1993, the ministers decided to rename the enlarged grouping the ASEAN Regional Forum, which will meet in July 1994 at the foreign ministers' level to "promote consultations on regional political and security issues." China, Russia, and Vietnam have accepted membership in the regional forum. POSSIBLE AGENDA ISSUES The 1993 meetings among ASEAN governments and between ASEAN and its dialogue partners (including the United States), and statements coming out of these meetings, indicate the kinds of issues that could be on the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The Declaration on the South China Sea calls on the parties to the South China Sea territorial dispute to refrain from the use of force, cooperate in the joint development of the South China Sea, and show restraint in asserting claims. Furthermore, the ASEAN-PMC governments have endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which the ASEAN foreign ministers had issued in July 1992. ASEAN foreign ministers stated at their July 1993 meeting that ASEAN will seek to obtain statements by other countries subscribing to the Declaration.(7) Individual ASEAN government officials also have indicated that ASEAN would push hard to get China's endorsement of the Declaration. 7. Communique issued by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, July 24, 1993. The ASEAN foreign ministers also reportedly decided to seek new signatories from outside Southeast Asia to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. That treaty requires signatories to seek peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. ASEAN government officials stated that ASEAN would give first priority to securing adherence to the Treaty from Australia, New Zealand, and China--"China most of all," according to one quoted official.(8) 8. Pura, Rafael, ASEAN Directs Drive to Extend Security Ties. Asian Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1993. p. 1. The ASEAN-PMC senior officials agreed to conduct collective research on weapons proliferation, confidence-building measures, and conflict prevention and peacekeeping in order to facilitate future discussions on these issues.(9) At the ASEAN-PMC foreign ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher emphasized the Clinton Administration's goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. The Australian government's emphasis on the need for confidence-building measures apparently influenced the agreement to study these kinds of arrangements. The ASEAN-PMC senior ministers also agreed to conduct research on Northeast Asian security issues. 9. Chairman's Statement, ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference's Senior Officials Meeting, May 1993. CHINA'S ROLE IN THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM Many governments are involved in all of these issues, and consideration of them by the ASEAN Regional Forum will present new tests for these governments. However, China's response to the ASEAN Regional Forum will be especially important for several reasons. First, the Chinese Government has taken an especially ambivalent position toward proposals for regional security consultative groups. China is clearly the most powerful nation in the Southeast Asian region and apparently is wary of situations in regional security consultative organizations in which it might find itself confronted by alliances and on the diplomatic defensive. It likely will be suspicious of moves by the United States, Japan, or ASEAN that might have this effect. Second, most of the potentially dangerous disputes and military practices in Southeast Asia involve China. The Chinese Government has stated that the agenda of regional security consultative organs should be limited with regard to these issues. The Chinese Government places priority on dealing with other countries bilaterally, or only with governments actually involved in disputes with China. Chinese officials, for example, have said that China opposes any moves to "internationalize" the South China Sea territorial dispute by involving countries other than the claimants.(10) China's position will be tested if other members of the ASEAN Regional Forum try to place the South China Sea dispute on the organization's agenda. 10. PRC Envoy: PRC Opposes Spratlys Resort Plan. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), April 14, 1993; Pura, Rafael. China Seeks Closer Security Ties With ASEAN. Asian Wall Street Journal, July 22,1992. p. 1. Another early test of China's willingness to cooperate within the ASEAN Regional Forum could come in Beijing's response to proposals to negotiate military confidence-building measures in Southeast Asia. China is more secretive about its military budgets, force structure and deployments, bases, and military exercises than are the ASEAN countries and countries like the United States and Australia that maintain forces in Southeast Asia. It is uncertain how China would react to possible proposals within the ASEAN Regional Forum for outside scrutiny of military budgets, exchanges of data on force structures and deployments, notification of arms sales (China reportedly has supplied large quantities of arms to Burma), and notification and observation of military exercises. PROPOSALS FOR A NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY GROUPING The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum has raised the issue of whether a regional security consultative group for Northeast Asia should be formed. Private groups have created forums for Northeast Asian security consultations and have proposed a similar official organization. In 1991, Secretary of State James Baker spoke favorably of a Two-Plus-Four organization in his article in Foreign Affairs Winter 1991-1992). A two-plus-four group would involve the North and South Korea and four big powers (the United States, Japan, China, and Russia) in negotiations involving Korea. The South Korean Government has given the strongest official support for a Northeast Asia security consultative organization. South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sungjoo has proposed a mini-CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) for Northeast Asia. Han and other South Korean officials have not laid out details of the proposal, and South Korean officials indicate that thinking about such an organization is in a preliminary stage. Han has stated that a mini-CSCE organization for Northeast Asia would take up political and economic issues in addition to security problems. During President Clinton's visit to South Korea in July 1993, Han and Secretary of State Christopher agreed to start U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) discussions of a Northeast Asia security organization.(11) 11. Korea, U.S. OK Region Security Talks, Christian Science Monitor, July 13, 1993. p. 1. FUTURE ISSUES (1) From what source would a specific proposal for a Northeast Asia regional security consultative organization emanate? In Northeast Asia, there is no organization like ASEAN that could take the initiative to propose the creation of an official organization. None of the three big powers within the region appears likely to put forward a proposal in the near future. The Japanese Government has not spoken of a need for a Northeast Asian security consultative organization. Japan probably is reluctant to step forward because it fears that Russia and China--with whom Japan has territorial disputes--would be suspicious of any Japanese proposal. China, as stated previously, has had misgivings about regional security organizations. It undoubtedly fears that such an organization for Northeast Asia would complicate its attempts to balance its relations with North Korea with its dealings with the United States and Japan. Russia probably is too pre-occupied with its own internal problems to take the initiative on a Northeast Asia regional security consultative organization. The United States, assuming a wish to do so, would seem to be in a better position to make a proposal. Japan and Russia probably would support an American proposal. China no doubt would be more skeptical, given the current strain in U.S.-China relations; but like China's response to the ASEAN Regional Forum, China probably would not want to be left out of a Northeast Asia security forum. Some officials of East Asian governments, interviewed for this report, expressed the desire that any proposal for an official organization come from a government within the region rather than from the United States. If the Clinton Administration should defer to that view, the focus of a possible initiative might shift to South Korea. South Korean officials, in interviews, indicated that the South Korean Government is interested in playing such a role. However, North Korea and China might construe an initiative by Seoul as an attempt to place the Korean problem at the center of the agenda of a Northeast Asian regional security consultative organization. If South Korea encountered such a reaction, it might wish to proceed with a proposal. This, again, would leave the United States as the most effective source of any initiative to form an organization for Northeast Asia. Even here, some experts believe that it will be difficult to gain agreement to form a Northeast Asia forum until major progress is achieved in resolving the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. (2) Which countries would be the prospective members? A Northeast Asia regional security consultative organization undoubtedly would consist of the regional countries plus the United States and probably Canada. Some scholars and experts also have discussed the inclusion of representatives of the European Community and ASEAN, given the importance of Northeast Asian security relationships to Southeast Asian security(12) and to global security. 12. Southeast Asian leaders voice concern that the emergence of a Sino-Japanese rivalry in Northeast Asia would spread quickly to Southeast Asia. China would oppose Taiwan's membership. China has shown some flexibility regarding Taiwan's membership in regional economic organizations, but Chinese officials have indicated that this will not apply to regional security groupings. North Korea's decision on whether to join probably would depend on how the Pyongyang regime evaluated the organization's role on Korean issues. The North Korean Government has denounced proposals for regional security consultative groups as a U.S. plot aimed at "destroying socialist countries."(13) It no doubt would resist a situation in which a regional forum might put Pyongyang on the diplomatic defensive on questions of nuclear weapons and/or Korean reunification. 13. Aggressive Design for Domination in Asia. Nodong Sinmum (Pyongyang), May 12, 1993. (3) What would be the agenda of such a regional security consultative organization? There is a high probability that a Northeast Asia regional security consultative organization would focus on discussing and possibly negotiating military confidence-building measures. Many of the proposals from private experts have emphasized this. It would appear that the best prospect for confidence-building measures would be between Japan and Russia and between Russia and the United States. Success in negotiating such confidence- building measures could begin a process of reconciliation between Japan and Russia. Private scholars also mention conventional nuclear and conventional arms reductions as a potential agenda item for a Northeast Asia regional security consultative organization. They cite naval arms control and a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone as concepts that such a group could consider. Disputes between Northeast Asian states would constitute a more difficult set of issues for a Northeast Asian organization to consider. China no doubt would oppose any consideration of Taiwan's status and the military/security situation in the Taiwan strait. China also likely would object to proposals that the organization take up the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands. The Russian Government probably would oppose consideration of the Russian-Japanese dispute over the "northern territories." Korea also would be a difficult agenda item. North Korea likely would view such action as creating a new instrument of pressure against it. If China continues to voice opposition to international pressure on North Korea, it could be expected, at least, to seek limits on the scope of discussions and/or negotiations over reunification. Nevertheless, a strong framework for Korean reunification undoubtedly will have to involve agreements among the four major powers regarding their relations with a unified Korea. A regional security consultative organization would offer a forum to begin discussions on this aspect of reunification. All of the above issues have led several governments to consider another formula: creating a sub-group on Northeast Asia within the ASEAN Regional Forum. The organizational framework and core membership already are established in the ASEAN Regional Forum, thus potentially circumventing some of the problems in forming a separate group. AN APEC-SPONSORED SECURITY DIALOGUE? In November 1993, President Clinton hosted a summit meeting of the heads of government of most of the member states of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. The formal agenda of the meeting dealt with economic issues. Individual meetings between heads of government, however, took up political and security issues. President Clinton's meeting with China's President, Jiang Zemin, for example, covered a litany of issues in U.S.-China relations including human rights and Chinese missile sales. The summit raises the prospect of APEC including security issues in its operations. There are two questions that will influence whether this will occur. First, will the U.S.-hosted summit lead to the adoption of an annual APEC meeting of heads of government? The parties at the meeting did agree to a second summit in 1994. Annual summits might set a broader agenda for APEC similar to the manner in which the G-7 economic summit meetings have taken up security and other non-economic subjects. The Australian Government probably would favor this. However, within ASEAN, Malaysia is opposed; and Indonesia and Thailand have reservations.(14) Indonesia, as the host for the 1994 APEC meeting, will have a major voice in deciding how to conduct a second summit. 14. Awanohara, Susumu. US Tries to Please. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 1993. p. 18-19. Second, even if a G-7 format were adopted, there is the question of whether the APEC member countries could agree to set up an organizational structure to deal with security issues on a sustained basis. The prospects of such an agreement would appear to be slim. Australia and Canada might support this concept, since it would have similarities to their proposals in 1990- 1991 for the formation of a Western Pacific-wide organization modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Since then, individual politicians and regional policy experts have come out in favor of a CSCA.(15) A CSCA might develop the multiple missions of the CSCE, which have evolved since that organization was formed in 1975. These are: disputes between states, including territorial disputes; ethnic conflicts and self-determination movements; trade issues; human rights abuses; emigration and immigration; and military confidence- building measures. Since 1975, agreements negotiated at CSCE meetings have provided for steps to be taken by individual governments and have established the prerogative of the CSCE as an organization to intervene in individual situations.(16) 15. Ina, Hisayoshi. A New Multilateral Approach for the Pacific: Beyond the Bilateral Security Network. Washington, The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1993. p. 2-3. 16. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Role in a Changing Europe. CRS Issue Brief, prepared by Francis T. Miko. Washington, 1993. p. 1-6. However, there is general opposition among the East Asian governments to the idea of an East Asia-Western Pacific CSCA. No East Asian government has endorsed the proposal, and officials and policy advisers from several countries have spoken against it. The ASEAN states have adopted a common stance in opposition.(17) The ASEAN foreign ministers did not consider an all-region CSCA-type group when they proposed to ASEAN-PMC dialogue partners an ASEAN-centered Regional Forum in July 1993. Some East Asian officials and private experts believe that an all-region CSCA could emerge in the distant future, but it would have to be based on the successful development of other organizations.(18) The APEC, for example, grew initially out of private groups. One such private venture if the ASEAN-ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable, which is organized by several private policy research and advisory organizations in the ASEAN countries. Another initiative underway seeks to create a non- government Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP); sponsors include the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies and private institutes in Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea. 17. Interview with Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Saito Kunihiko, Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 1993. p. 2. 18. Singapore's Wong Rules Out Asian "CSCA." Kyodo News Service, April 8, 1993. The critics of the CSCA proposal generally state that the East Asian- Western Pacific region contains too many countries and is too diverse politically and culturally for a CSCA to be effective. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord has taken a similar stance in explaining the Clinton Administration's policy.(19) Since announcing the APEC summit, the Clinton Administration has downplayed notions of broadening the APEC into security issues. The East Asian critics have at least two other reasons for their opposition. First, they fear that the big powers would dominate a large, unwieldy CSCA; smaller groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum, on the other hand, would give the ASEAN governments and other regional governments more influence and even a directing role. 19. U.S. Signals Shift on Asian Security Links, Asian Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1993. p. 1. Second, the CSCE in Europe has been based on the sanctity of existing borders; East Asian governments, which are parties to border/territorial disputes, would not agree to this. Third, the CSCE has given priority to human rights issues. East Asian governments are adopting some positions on human rights that differ from U.S.-Western principles in important aspects; ASEAN governments are moving towards a unified ASEAN position. China generally rejects the Western position on human rights. Consequently, these governments fear that a priority to human rights on a CSCA agenda would be a divisive issue and would place several of them in a defensive and diplomatically embarrassing position.(20) Even the Australian Government has avoided human rights in discussing its view of regional security consultative organizations. 20. Cronin, Patrick. Perspectives on Policy and Strategy. Strategic Review, Spring 1992. p. 63-64. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES The nature of the proposals for regional security consultative organizations, their progression, and the attitudes of East Asian governments raise a number of issues for the Clinton Administration as it pursues its support of the concept of such groups. As stated previously, a U.S. initiative may be required to bring about the creation of a Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific security forum. Such an initiative would have to deal with the delicate questions of the scope of the group's functions and its attractiveness to China and North Korea. The Clinton Administration, too, will have to weigh carefully whether to or how to use its proposal for an APEC summit to bring about a security consultative role for APEC. The wariness and opposition of China and some ASEAN governments to the summit proposal itself suggests strong opposition to APEC assuming a security agenda. A second set of issues has to do with the impact of regional security consultative organizations on U.S. leadership in East Asia and the Western Pacific. The ASEAN Regional Forum and the proposals for other groups reflect changing regional circumstances that are affecting the American leadership role: the removal of security issues from the sphere of U.S.-Russian rivalry, the U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines, and the new strength and assertiveness of East Asian governments. These factors point to a future difference between the U.S. role in any Northeast Asia security consultative forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The United States would be in the position to take the leadership role in a Northeast Asia-Northwest Pacific group because of its military presence in Japan and South Korea and its direct involvement in nearly all the major security problems of the sub-region. The United States could expect to play the foremost role in setting the agendas for the group's meetings and in substantive discussions or negotiations over issues. This, however, probably will not be the case in the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ASEAN governments expect to exert a lead role on issues related to military confidence-building, arms reductions, territorial disputes, and internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. Japan may use the Forum as another vehicle to assert a greater influence in regional affairs more independent of the United States. The United States, with a limited military presence in Southeast Asia and less direct involvement in the chief security problems, will face pressures to operate in a more consensual mode. This suggests that U.S. diplomats will have to follow the lead of their ASEAN counterparts in setting agendas and in determining the method of dealing with issues. Within this more limiting framework, the United States can exert influence through private discussions with ASEAN governments; the issuance of proposals on a selective basis; and through supporting, opposing, or offering amendments to the proposals of other governments. The United States has knowledge of and experience in the negotiation and implementation of military confidence-building measures that it could contribute to deliberations on this issue by the ASEAN Regional Forum. It potentially could use the Forum to set out a more specific U.S. position on regional territorial disputes, such as the South China Sea controversy. Nevertheless, the potential limitations on U.S. leadership could open a debate in the United States over the priority to be given to the ASEAN Regional Forum in U.S. diplomacy in East Asia. There currently is little overt opposition to the United States joining the ASEAN Regional Forum or other regional security consultative organizations. However, the Bush Administration gave such proposed groups little priority in its East Asia policy, because it believed that they might erode U.S. leadership and the importance of the U.S. bilateral alliances and bilateral relationships.(21) The influence of regional security consultative organizations on U.S. human rights and weapons proliferations policies, and security commitments in East Asia has the potential to affect American attitudes towards these groups. 21. Pendley, William T. U.S. Security Strategy in East Asia for the 1990s. Strategic Review, Summer 1992. p. 7-15. Awanohara, Susumu. Group Therapy. Far Easter Economic Review, April 15, 1993. p. 10-11. Human rights may prove to be the most difficult issue for the United States to manage in the ASEAN Regional Forum. The United States would be able to raise human rights concerns and other controversial subjects in opening statements to ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, as Secretary of State Warren Christopher did with human rights at the July 1993 ASEAN-PMC meeting. However, Washington likely will have difficulty in including these on the substantive agenda unless it has the backing of several members of the Forum. The ASEAN governments and China could be expected to oppose any attempt by the United States to place a specific Asian situation of human rights abuses on the Forum's agenda. The Australian Government, too, has advised the Clinton Administration to follow a balanced approach in dealing with human rights in East Asian regional forums.(22) The United States conceivably could force specific human rights cases on to the agenda, but such a strategy would risk a loss of overall U.S. influence in the ASEAN Regional Forum. However, some ASEAN countries, Australia, and Japan might prove more willing to engage in a general dialogue on human rights aimed at defining what constitutes abuses and the means by which governments would react. Such discussions occurred at international conferences in Bangkok and Vienna in 1993. 22. Awanohara, Susumu. A Helping Hand. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 30, 1993. p. 13. Another problem would arise if East Asian governments used the ASEAN Regional Forum and other future regional security consultative organizations in attempts to restrain the United States from acting on certain security issues. The impasse between the United States and the NATO and CSCE countries over policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovinia points up the potential for disagreements as Cold War-based mutual interests decline. Four areas of U.S. security policy in East Asia would appear to be subject to potential differences between the United States and some East Asian governments: U.S. attempts to restrain Chinese missile and arms sales; U.S. policy toward Taiwan, especially if Taiwan-China relations should worsen; U.S. efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; and U.S. policy towards Japan's future regional and International military roles. The U.S. Government and friendly East Asian governments might agree on some basic objectives on these issues, but they may disagree on the strategies and tactics to employ. Regional security consultative organizations could be focal points for the airing of such differences. The United States undoubtedly will have to balance its role in regional security consultative organizations with a willingness to continue unilateral actions and initiatives on a bilateral basis or even through the United Nations if it is to have flexibility in pursuing vital policy aims on human rights and security. A final issue that will affect U.S. influence on regional security consultative organizations is the relationship between U.S. participation in these groups and changes in the American military presence in the Western Pacific. A key policy choice is whether the U.S. Government will view participation in these forums as a means of preserving the current a military presence or, to the contrary, view its role in these groups as providing a new form of regional involvement that would rationalize a substantial cutback of military strength. The Clinton Administration states that there will be no major reductions in U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific; but the question could be important if cuts in U.S. defense spending produce pressure for new decisions on additional reductions or shifts in the American overseas military presence. The American willingness to maintain sizeable military forces in the Western Pacific could also be influenced by the degree of cooperation or non-cooperation from East Asian governments that the United States experiences in regional security consultative organizations and other venues. APPENDIX PROPOSED AND EXISTING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ASEAN--Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines constitute the association. ASEAN promotes economic cooperation and integration among the member states and is a forum for diplomatic cooperation. ASEAN-PMC--ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. The conference is held annually between the six ASEAN states and the seven dialogue partners: the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European Economic Community, South Korea, and Canada. ASEAN-PMC serves as a forum for a discussion of common economic, political, and security issues. ASEAN Regional Forum--This is a recent organization established by the ASEAN-PMC countries at their July 1993 meeting. The ASEAN Regional Forum will meet for the first time in July 1994 and will discuss only security issues. Members will include all of the ASEAN-PMC countries, as well as Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. CSCA--Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia. This organization has been proposed but does not currently exist. Proposals would model it after the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which has been in existence since 1975. APEC--Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Formed in 1989, APEC seeks to support the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) process in world trade and examine means of promoting regional economic cooperation. The organization is composed of Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (designated as Chinese Taipei), Thailand, and the United States.