Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 95-1002 F September 26, 1995 -ti- U.S. Policy Toward the China-Taiwan Relationship: Summary of a CRS Workshop By Larry Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division U.S. Policy Toward the China-Taiwan Relationship Summary of a CRS Workshop Larry Niksch Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division SUMMARY A June 8, 1995, CRS Workshop on U.S. Policy Towards the China-Taiwan Relationship featured the enunciation of three themes in describing new problems and dilemmas in U.S. policy. One theme cited is the emergence or return of certain key actors on the Taiwan issue, such as the U.S. Congress, Taiwanese-American groups, and increasingly diverse political forces in both Taiwan and China. These actors, it was stressed, have their own agendas, which challenge the control over policy traditionally held by the U.S. Executive Branch and the Chinese Government. A second theme was the nearly inevitable damage to U.S. interests caused by adverse changes in the China-Taiwan relationship. Workshop participants differed over whether the United States should address this problem by continuing the traditional strategy of abstaining from measures to influence the China-Taiwan relationship, or whether the United States should adopt new strategies aimed at exerting influence. The third theme was the impact on the Taiwan question of a more complex, difficult U.S.-China relationship. It was emphasized that the perceptions of both Chinese and Americans regarding the Taiwan issue was influenced by a worsening state of U.S.-China relations. INTRODUCTION AND KEY FINDINGS Since 1972, U.S. policy towards the China-Taiwan relationship has been governed by three communiques negotiated by the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations with the Chinese Government and by the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979. Within this framework, the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. Washington maintains full diplomatic with the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.) and only "unofficial relations" with Taiwan. U.S. administrations limit contact with high ranking Taiwan officials. The P.R.C. Government participates in major international organizations, and Taiwan is excluded from such organizations, with a few exceptions. The United States also promised to reduce progressively the sale of arms to Taiwan, although it asserted an interest in Taiwan's security. Pressures for change in U.S. policy have emerged in the 1990s. Proposals call for the United States to support Taiwan's admission into the United Nations and other international organizations and upgrade the level of ---------- page 2 contacts with Taiwan officials. The issue of contacts became a problem in U.S.P.R.C. relations in 1995 when pressure from Congress resulted in a decision by President Clinton to allow Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States in an "unofficial" capacity. The Chinese Government accused the Clinton Administration of misleading it with regard to Administration policy towards proposals for Lee's visit and of violating past U.S.-P.R.C. communiques.[1] 1. For further information on these issues, see China-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief 94002; and Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, CRS Issue Brief 94006. On June 8, 1995, the Congressional Research Service held a workshop on U.S. Policy Towards the China-Taiwan Relationship. It consisted of two panels. The first covered the historical background and emerging challenges to U.S. policy; the second dealt with present and future U.S. policies. U.S. Government, academic, and private sector experts participated. Three key themes were enunciated, which depicted new problems and dilemmas for U.S. policy: (1) The emergence of multipolar actors after two decades in which the Taiwan issue fell almost exclusively within the bilateral relationship of the U.S. Executive Branch and the P.R.C. Government. (2) The nearly automatic damage to U.S. interests of any adverse change in the P.R.C.-Taiwan relationship within the context of the traditional U.S. position of abstinence from attempts to influence the evolution of the P.R.C.-Taiwan political relationship. (3) The Taiwan issue increasingly viewed within the broader context of a more complex, often difficult U.S.-P.R.C. relationship. MULTIPOLAR ACTORS The past, bilateral control of the Taiwan issue was portrayed as supportive of the policies of successive U.S. administrations. Illustrative of this bilateral control were the negotiations between the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations and the Chinese Government over the three communiques of 1972, 1978, and 1982. Congress was not involved in the negotiation of these communiques; the Carter Administration-P.R.C. negotiations was kept secret from most members of Congress. U.S. public opinion and public interest groups had practically no influence. The Taiwan Government also had little influence on these negotiations. The policies resulting from the communiques emphasized official U.S. relations with the P.R.C.; unofficial relations with Taiwan, mainly on economic issues; and non-involvement in P.R.C.-Taiwan political relations. The stability of the situation rested on mutual anti-Soviet interests of the United States and China during the Cold War. Workshop speakers stressed that, since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new actors has challenged the bilateral dominance of the U.S. Executive Branch and the P.R.C. ---------- page 3 Government on the Taiwan issues and other issues between the United States and China. Involvement of Congress in the 1990s was described as seeking to penalize China and provide greater support for Taiwan, thus challenging Executive Branch policy. The more assertive role of Congress has precedent in its writing of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. This act, it was pointed out, was a purely congressional initiative. It aimed to place U.S. security policy toward Taiwan into U.S. law, stipulate the mechanisms for the maintenance of U.S. relations with Taiwan following the termination of diplomatic relations, and stress a U.S. interest in democratization for Taiwan. Contemporary attempts by Congress to support Taiwan were described as the promotion of President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, efforts to pass a resolution endorsing Taiwan's attempts to gain membership in the United Nations (which China opposes), and support for stepped-up arms sales to Taiwan. In addition to support for Taiwan, speakers described most in Congress as having decidedly negative perceptions of P.R.C. domestic and foreign policies. Congressional attitudes were portrayed as influenced by other new or newly-assertive traditional actors: o Taiwanese-American groups that support independence for Taiwan. They are active in lobbying Congress and in presenting their view to the American public. The Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA) is an umbrella organization for such groups; it maintains branches in the United States and numerous other countries. In recent years, it has lobbied hard in the U.S. Congress. o Taiwan's government and political parties. In an emergent democratic environment attractive to Congress and American opinion, Taiwan's political structure has become dominated by ethnic Taiwanese. They demand a greater international role for Taiwan. They freely debate their national identity -- whether they are Taiwanese or Chinese. They also debate the pluses and minuses of declaring independence from China. They seek sovereign equality with the P.R.C. and more official relations with the United States and other countries. It was emphasized that Taiwan's electoral process makes Taiwan's future political course uncertain. o Elements within the P.R.C. establishment that are asserting themselves at a time of a generational change of P.R.C. leadership with the retirement and prospective death of Chinese leader Den Xiaoping. Such groups, including the military, sometimes adopt nationalistic positions on Taiwan and foreign policy issues and frequently criticize the United States. ---------- page 4 U.S. ROLE IN THE TAIWAN-P.R.C. RELATIONSHIP Workshop speakers described pressures coming from emergent actors as increasing difficulties for the United States in maintaining a "balanced formula" in dealing with the P.R.C.-Taiwan relationship. The United States, it was said, would be "inexorable drawn" into any worsening of the P.R.C.-Taiwan relationship. One expressed view held that the success or failure of U.S. policy would be determined largely by the actions and policies of the P.R.C. and Taiwan towards each other. The Clinton Administration was described as intent on maintaining the policy of previous administrations that the United States would not interfere in or actively influence future developments in the P.R.C.-Taiwan relationship. Views within the Administration were described as favoring a strategy of rejecting initiatives like the Lee visit because such initiatives damage U.S.-P.R.C. relations and because Taiwan is powerless to exact a price or penalize to such a strategy. It was predicted that the U.S. Executive Branch would experience more difficulties in maintaining such a strategy. Specially, after Taiwan's first open presidential election in 1996, the Executive Branch is expected to come under even greater pressure to establish official relations with Taiwan and support Taiwan's membership in international organizations. Apprehension was voiced that the P.R.C. would react with growing suspicion that the United States was supporting the Taiwan Government's aspirations of full sovereignty for Taiwan. Another view of the U.S. role in P.R.C.-Taiwan relations was slightly more optimistic, citing the deepening China-Taiwan economic and other nonpolitical relations as laying the groundwork for a successful management of the overall relationship. It was argued that, within this context, the United States could initiate selected measures to influence the P.R.C. and Taiwan governments. One suggested measures was to demonstrate more overtly U.S. support for the China-Taiwan dialogue in order to dissipate P.R. suspicions of U.S. intentions. Another suggested measure was to assist Taiwan in gaining membership in some international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and increase "non-official contacts" with Taiwan government officials. It was stressed that the U.S. Executive Branch should act quietly in order to avoid another confrontational situation with China like the Lee Teng-hui visit. This view held that such a strategy would exclude a public campaign for near-term United Nations membership for Taiwan as too confrontational and as excessively raising the sovereignty issue. TAIWAN IN A POTENTIALLY WORSENING U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONSHIP A number of speakers voiced concern that tensions over Taiwan were exacerbated by worsening U.S.-China relations on other issues. Other issues cited included human rights, trade, claims in the South China Sea, missile proliferation, and Tibet. Speakers described the frequently-voiced P.R.C. accusation that the United States was trying to limit and contain China ---------- page 5 through: support for Taiwan's sovereignty; intervention in the Hong Kong, Tibet, and South China Sea issues; establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam (China's adversary since 1975); and pressure on China to change its human rights policies. It was pointed out that the Chinese Government intends this "party line" to place the United States on the diplomatic defensive and pressure Washington to accommodate the P.R.C. in order to demonstrate that the United States is not engaged in an anti-P.R.C. strategic plot. It also was stated that some Chinese officials appeared to believe this "conspiracy theory" while others viewed it only as an official line. There was a general view that it would not be in U.S. interests if the official time became a deep-seated belief among a broad spectrum of P.R.C. Officialdom. Thus, despite the different opinions expressed on the amount of U.S. tactical flexibility in influencing the governments in Beijing and Taipei, there was a general consensus that U.S. policy should not forthrightly challenge China's position on the sovereignty issue related to Taiwan. However, one expressed view stressed that the United States should make unattractive to the P.R.C. its threatened option of using military force against Taiwan and that such a U.S. strategy ought to include the provision of arms sales to Taiwan.