Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 95-750 S June 26, 1995 -ti- China's Sinister View of U.S. Policy: Origins, Implications and Options By Robert Sutter, Senior Specialist in International Politics Office of Senior Specialists China's Sinister View of U.S. Policy: Origins, Implications and Options Robert Sutter Senior Specialist in International Politics Office of Senior Specialists SUMMARY Chinese officials and opinion leaders claim that recent U.S. actions contrary to the interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have convinced the Beijing regime that the U.S. Government is determined to do what it can to weaken and hold back China's growing power. Dismissing evidence of often fractious debate over China policy in the United States, Beijing leaders are said to see a consensus among policy makers in the United States that is directed at working against China's emerging strength and influence in world affairs. U.S. specialists are unsure if Chinese leaders are misguided but sincere in their views, or if Chinese leaders are using anti-U.S. themes for tactical advantage in boosting their political standing at home, in seeking concessions from the United States, or as a defensive strategy to deflect criticism of Chinese actions seen by many international experts as bordering on irresponsible. Regardless of Chinese motives, some Americans urge that the United States make concessions and take steps to reassure Beijing of U.S. intentions and restore the wide range of U.S.-China contacts cut off as a result of U.S.-Chinese friction in recent weeks. Other Americans judge that U.S. interests would be better served by a cautious approach that avoids unilateral gestures toward Beijing. INTRODUCTION The U.S. decision to ignore Chinese warnings and allow the Taiwan President to visit the United States reportedly has reinforced a strongly negative view of U.S. policy intentions on the part of Chinese officials, intellectuals and other opinion leaders[1]. This view of U.S. policy has been widely articulated in private by Chinese government officials, military officers, think tank experts, ---------- page 2 media persons and others in recent years [2]. It holds that U.S. Government officials are basically opposed to the rising power of China under Beijing's communist system and are taking a variety of measures in various policy areas, including Taiwan, in order to "hold back" China's power. Recent events cited by Chinese officials and other opinion leaders to support their view range from recent U.S. statements about the security environment in East Asia and the South China Sea that are seen as directed against China, to the pressure brought by the United States against China's trade practices, human rights policies and proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. 1. For details on China's breaking off of contacts with the United States and other reaction to the Taiwan President's visit, see China Policy: Managing U.S.-PRC-Taiwan Relations After President Lee's Visit to the U.S. by Robert Sutter. CRS Report 95-727S, June 19, 1995. 5p. 2. This report is based on interviews and in-depth consultations with 60 Chinese specialists during two visits to China in 1994; consultations with 30 Chinese specialists who have visited the United States over the last two months; and consultations with 25 U.S. specialists who have traveled to Beijing in recent years for consultations on U.S.-China relations. For background, see CRS General Distribution Memorandum Sino-U.S. Relations: Status and Outlook--Views from Beijing, August 15, 1994 (available to congressional offices by calling 707-4257). In general, Chinese officials and opinion leaders have maintained that despite lively debate in the United States over many issues in policy toward China, U.S. policymakers have reached a consensus that China's growing power poses a threat to the United States that must be countered by weakening China's strength through security, economic, political and other measures. Presumably because senior PRC leaders are as yet unwilling to confront the U.S. leadership directly on this question, the top Chinese officials and authoritative government commentary often refrain from directly accusing the United States of this conspiratorial intent. Nevertheless, Chinese officials and intellectuals repeatedly affirm in private conversations with U.S. observers that senior Chinese leaders do indeed harbor such sinister views of U.S. intentions. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S SINISTER VIEW Many Chinese officials and intellectuals trace the alleged U.S. desire to weaken and hold down China at least to the reevaluation of U.S. policy toward China following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the concurrent collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War. At that time, they claim that U.S. leaders took a number of measures in the form of economic, military and political sanctions against China that were designed to help bring down Beijing's communist system. U.S. leaders at this time were not seen as fearful of China's power under Beijing's communist rule; rather, they expected the Chinese regime in a few years time would be swept away by the same forces of history that had just removed their ideological comrades in Europe and elsewhere. This did not happen as anticipated and the PRC began to grow at a remarkable rate of economic development beginning in 1992 and continuing until the present. China's economic growth was accompanied by greater military power, successful expansion of China's foreign relations and greater self confidence and assertiveness by Chinese leaders both at home and in Asian and world affairs. In response, the Chinese claim the U.S. began to step up its efforts ---------- page 3 in a wide range of areas to curb the growth of China's power. Alleged evidence of such U.S. efforts include: o stronger U.S. support for Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong as entities separate of PRC control. U.S. support for the Taiwan President's visit and provisions on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet in recent U.S. foreign policy legislation (e.g. H.R. 1561, S. 908) are viewed as designed to keep the PRC preoccupied with tasks of protecting China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and less able to exert influence elsewhere. o pressure on Chinese trade and other economic practices. The past year has seen strong U.S. efforts to press Beijing to observe intellectual property rights, to open its markets to outside goods and services and to meet strict conditions before gaining entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chinese leaders apparently see these steps as being designed to help to keep the PRC economically weaker and less influential that it otherwise would be. o restrictions against military related and other high technology to China and pressure on China to restrict its sales of technology and equipment that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. For example, the United States maintains its own technology restrictions against China and warns others (e.g. Russia) about the dangers of military or military technology sales to China--steps interpreted by Beijing as designed to keep China from becoming militarily stronger. o warnings against Chinese assertiveness in Asia. The Clinton Administration's February 1995 statement about the security environment in East Asia [3] was seen in Beijing as implicitly critical of China's assertiveness and lack of transparency in flexing its military power in the region. At the same time, the Administration articulated a security approach to the region that gave renewed emphasis to Japan as the center of U.S. attention in the face of regional uncertainties--a statement also viewed with some suspicion in China [4]. In May, the Administration came out with a stronger position about U.S. interests in the South China Sea--a statement coming after China had caused serious concerns in the region by taking unilateral military action in South China Sea islands claimed by others. Meanwhile, Congress has been considering legislation (H.R. 1561, S. Res. 97) that takes aim at China's assertive actions in the South China Sea. Some in Congress have added that the United States should move ahead with full diplomatic relations with Vietnam as a way to counter PRC expansion [5]. 3. U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, February 1995, 32p. 4. Washington Post, February 19, 1995. 5. These latter events are reviewed in CRS Issue Briefs 94002 and 93081. ---------- page 4 IMPLICATIONS U.S. analysts differ on the importance of such a conspiratorial Chinese view for U.S.-China relations. On one side are those who judge that Chinese government leaders are deliberately and cynically manipulating Chinese opinion mainly for other motives. Thus, the critical Chinese line against the United States is seen as part of a broader effort by PRC leaders to use nationalism and nationalistic themes, which enjoy widespread support in China, to fill the ideological void caused by the collapse of world communism and to help shore up the sagging prestige of the PRC leaders in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre. In particular, by associating the policies and practices of the Beijing regime with Chinese nationalism, PRC leaders are able to portray criticism of those policies by the United States and others as affronts to the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. This could have the side affect of alleviating the need to deal with the substance of complaints. Meanwhile, another perceived ulterior motive of Chinese officials is to put the U.S. side on the defensive. In particular, U.S. officials anxious to restore a meaningful dialogue with China presumably would first be expected to "prove" their intentions with some gestures designed to show the Chinese that their conspiratorial view of U.S. policy was no longer correct. Of course, such gestures would involve unilateral U.S. steps of benefit to China. Chinese leader were said to have used similar techniques against Japan in the 1970s and 1980s-whipping up sometimes strident campaigns against Japan's alleged "militarist" designs against China and the rest of Asia until Japan agreed to several billions of dollars of grants or low interest loans for China. Once the money was promised, the charges against Japanese "militarism" subsided [6]. 6. See among others, Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan; Lee Chae Jin, Japan Faces China; and Lee Chae Jin, China and Japan: The New Economic Diplomacy. A very different view comes from U.S. analysts who see the Chinese leaders conspiratorial view of U.S. policy as misguided but genuine. They believe it reflects the mix of U.S. pressures on China, the suspicious view of the outside world of many Chinese leaders and the pressures of domestic Chinese politics during a period of leadership succession. The latter pressures are thought to incline PRC leaders to adhere to more narrow, somewhat chauvinistic views of foreign powers, especially those like the United States with an ability to threaten Chinese interests. They argue that it has now reached a point where PRC leaders are convinced that the U.S. Government is "out to get them" and will almost certainly interpret future U.S. policy actions toward China along those lines. OPTIONS Many Americans are anxious to restore a constructive dialogue in U.S.China relations following the suspension of a range of contacts by Beijing as a ---------- page 5 result of the Taiwan President's visit to the United States. Smooth running relations between such big powers as the United States and China are deemed of primary importance for U.S. interests in the view of this group. They are inclined to make gestures and take steps designed to reassure China of U.S. intentions. Whether or not the PRC leaders are manipulating Chinese opinion toward the United States or sincerely view the United States as conspiring against them may be of secondary importance to the broader goal of getting U.S.-China relations "back on track" after the break in relations caused by the Taiwan President's visit. Suggested gestures include an easing of U.S. conditions on China's entry into the WTO, a visit to China by Vice President Gore or President Clinton, a muting of criticism of Chinese military intentions in Asia or some other step long sought by Beijing. Other Americans judge that unilateral U.S. gestures at this time may do little good and could cause some harm to U.S. interests. Moreover, they tend to calculate that the break in U.S.-PRC communication following the Taiwan President's visit has not been so serious as to warrant unilateral U.S. action. They judge that China's interests in trade and other relations with the United States will eventually prompt Beijing to restore contacts with the United States. Some aver that if Beijing's hard view of U.S. policy is indeed influenced by the pressures of domestic Chinese politics in a period of leadership transition, the United States might be wise to wait until the passing of Deng Xiaoping and the rise of a successor leadership before making such positive moves. Meanwhile, unilateral U.S. gestures at this time could signal to Beijing and to those in Asia and the world who are watching closely how the United States deals with China, that Washington is now prepared to allow the PRC to have freer rein in such areas as the international trading system, the world proliferation regime and in the South China Sea.