![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
U.S. policy concerns center on easing tensions and striking a proper balance between the PRC and Taiwan. Despite extensive Taiwanese trade with, and investment in, the Chinese mainland, the two sides remain politically far apart and compete for international influence.
U.S. policy in this triangular U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship is complicated because:
-- Taiwan is moving away from past advocacy of one China to positions favoring an official status for Taipei that would complicate the U.S. "one China" policy and challenge Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the island;
-- Beijing is strongly nationalistic and remains adamant about its claim to Taiwan; and
-- Many in Congress favor formal efforts to go beyond Administration policy to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations in ways sure to antagonize the PRC.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials want to pursue investment opportunities and ease trade issues, notably Taiwan's large trade surplus. They also encourage political democratization even though it fosters separatist tendencies that complicate the official U.S. "one China" policy. In the 104th Congress, initiatives (see LEGISLATION, below) focused on Taiwan's entry into the UN and other international organizations, high-level Taiwanese visits, and greater U.S. arms sales. In May 1995, the House and Senate passed resolutions strongly urging President Clinton to allow Taiwan's president to visit the United States in a private capacity. President Clinton bowed to congressional pressure in deciding on May 22, 1995, to allow Taiwan's president to make a private visit to the United States. Beijing reacted with strong invective, cutting off, or suspending, talks with the United States and with Taiwan on important policy questions, and by repeated military exercises, including ballistic missile tests, near Taiwan. Beijing moderated its tone toward the United States and attended a bilateral summit meeting in New York on October 24, 1995. PRC military and rhetorical pressure on Taiwan continued.
The United States sent two carrier battle groups in response to PRC military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in March, 1996. The PRC exercises, which ended on March 25, 1996, were a vain effort to discredit Lee Teng-hui, who won 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in presidential elections on March 23. Tensions began to ease after the election. U.S. options include attempting to negotiate a new arrangement managing U.S. relations with Beijing and Taipei; and continuing to adjust to competing pressures from the two capitals, while deferring a solution of the Taiwan issue to the future.
In a move thought likely to presage a request from Lee Teng-hui for a transit visa to the United States, President Lee accepted an invitation on October 30, 1996, from Panama, to attend the World Congress on the Panama Canal in September 1997. Senior Taiwanese officials who travel to Central American countries having official diplomatic relations with Taiwan often ask to stop in the United States for rest and refueling.
U.S. involvement with the government of Taiwan has its roots in the World War II alliance with the Nationalist Chinese Administration of Chiang Kai-shek. U.S. military protection and over $5 billion in military and economic aid allowed Chiang and his one-party government to consolidate their position on Taiwan, to which they retreated following the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949.
Today, the United States is Taiwan's main foreign investor and trading partner. U.S. markets receive about 25% of Taiwan's exports. The United States supplies a much smaller percentage of Taiwan's imports. Overall, the imbalance in U.S. trade with Taiwan led to a $9.6 billion U.S. trade deficit in 1995 -- third largest for the United States after Japan and China. Meanwhile, many U.S. leaders are anxious to encourage Taiwanese enterprises to invest in the United States.
Taiwan's per capita income is over $13,000 per year. U.S. officials long criticized the perceived authoritarian excesses of the Nationalists' political rule and have broadly supported the progress toward democracy in Taiwan made since martial law was lifted in 1987.
In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. forces used Taiwan as a forward base against Sino-Soviet communism in Asia. After the Sino-Soviet split, President Nixon's opening to Beijing, and the major pullback of U.S. forces in Asia under guidelines of the "Nixon doctrine," U.S. officials viewed the mainland government more as a strategic asset against the U.S.S.R. than an adversary to be confronted in the Taiwan Strait. The United States in 1979 broke defense and other official ties with Taiwan to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. The United States subsequently affirmed its security interests in Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the continued supply of U.S. arms to Taiwan. But this reflected a moral commitment to a former ally rather than U.S. interest in using Taiwan's strategic position for broader policy ends. With the thaw in the Cold War in the late 1980s and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. interest in the PRC as a "strategic asset" in global politics declined.
On January 1, 1979, the United States switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the U.S.-PRC joint communique that announced the change, the United States recognized the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.
Also, at the time of derecognition, the United States notified Taiwan authorities of intent to terminate the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, effective January 1, 1980. In a unilateral statement released on December 16, 1978, the United States declared that it "continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, signed April 10, 1979, created domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan.
Since derecognition, the United States, in accordance with the TRA, has continued the sale of selected defensive military equipment and defense technology to Taiwan. These sales have often prompted strong objections from the PRC. On August 17, 1982, a U.S.- PRC joint communique addressed this point. In that communique, the PRC cited a "fundamental policy" of striving for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. The United States stated in the communique that
It does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan.
U.S. government arms sales levels slowly declined, but remained over $600 million a year. Taiwan's 1992 purchase of 150 F-16 aircraft (worth $5.9 billion) represented an exception to this trend. U.S. transfers of military-related technology have allowed Taiwan to develop advanced fighter aircraft and other military equipment to defend the island.
U.S. commercial ties with Taiwan have expanded since the 1979 derecognition. Taiwan continues to enjoy Export-Import Bank financing, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees, most-favored-nation status, and ready access to U.S. markets.
Beijing criticizes some aspects of continued U.S. support for Taiwan, including U.S. arms sales and political gestures such as high-level visits. It says they reduce Taipei's interest in negotiations on reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remain tense, although the danger of military conflict has subsided following the PRC military exercises held at the time of Taiwan's presidential elections in March 1996. Beijing adopted a notably harder line toward Taiwan, and especially Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, following Lee's personal visit to Cornell University in the United States in June 1995. It broke off high-level talks on cross-Strait relations, stridently excoriated Lee for allegedly attempting to split China and lead Taiwan toward independence, and began a series of military exercises designed to intimidate Taiwanese voters prior to island-wide elections for the legislature, in December, 1995, and the President, in March 1996.
Following a U.S. show of force in the Taiwan area and Lee's impressive victory with 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates, Beijing over time has moderated its criticism of the Taiwanese leader. The PRC has reiterated its adherence to an ostensibly flexible stance to cross Strait relations, and advised that a renewed PRC use of force would only come as a last resort in the face of egregious actions by Taipei and/or foreign powers designed to split Taiwan from the mainland. It nonetheless remains suspicious and critical of Lee, insisting that resumed dialogue in cross Strait relations and improvement in the current tense atmosphere depends on Taipei adherence to what Beijing calls the "principle of one China."
Despite PRC-Taiwan sparring on political issues, economic, cultural and other exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China grow. Taiwanese investment in the mainland has now reached a reported $28 billion. Bilateral trade, heavily in Taiwan's favor, amounts to about $25 billion a year. Since 1990, over 9 million visits have taken place from Taiwan to the mainland. Tens of thousands of mainland Chinese experts, entrepreneurs and others have traveled to Taiwan for consultations and exchanges. Exchanges of PRC-Taiwan scholars and experts for consultations on cross Strait and other issues provide, in the view of some Taiwanese officials, an active "second track" for PRC-Taiwan dialogue, at a time when high-level exchange between the two governments has been halted. Recent events in cross Strait relations have included the decision by oil companies in the PRC and Taiwan to explore jointly offshore areas for oil, the start of flights from Taiwan to the mainland with only a short stopover in Macao or Hong Kong, and Taiwan's opening to third country ships to carry cargo from Taiwan to mainland ports.
Beijing had been sharply critical of the United States over the June 1995 Lee Teng-hui visit, and the deployment of two U.S. carrier battle groups to the Taiwan area in March 1996 brought U.S.-PRC relations to their lowest point in many years. Since then, U.S. and PRC leaders have endeavored to reassure one another of their respective intentions and to establish improved communication. U.S.-China summit meetings are anticipated over the next year.
U.S. Policy Choices. The United States remains the foreign power most closely involved in PRC-Taiwan relations. It seeks to benefit from closer relations with both the PRC and Taiwan and favors the peaceful exchanges across the Taiwan Strait Cross-Strait tensions since mid-1995 challenge U.S. interest in stability in the region and raise the possibility of U.S. involvement in a potential conflict there.
U.S. policy faces major challenges in attempting to strike a proper balance in the U.S.- PRC-Taiwan triangular relationship:
Judging that the U.S. "one China" policy framework no longer works, some American experts favor U.S. negotiations with Beijing and Taipei to strike a new "strategic bargain." The alternative, in their view, is continued conflicting pressure from Beijing and Taipei and related U.S. domestic interests, leading to a passive U.S. policy toward increased confrontation and possibly military conflict.
Others judge that such negotiations would cause more trouble than they are worth, especially for what they see as a relatively weak U.S. Administration. Rather, the Administration can continue to adjust its "one China" policy to accommodate pressures from Taipei and Beijing and their U.S. domestic supporters. Not all trends in Taiwan and Beijing argue for increased confrontation. Indeed, Beijing and Taipei have moderated their respective political positions recently, while economic, social, cultural and other non-governmental interchange grows markedly. If both Taipei and Beijing can be persuaded that continuation of current trends is acceptable, then U.S. policy can continue deferring a solution of the Taiwan issue into the future.
U.S. policymakers also will need to respond to recent prominent calls from both sides of the Strait for the United States to "facilitate" or "mediate" a reduction in tensions. The governments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington state that the issue of Taiwan's reunification is to be handled by people on both sides of the Strait. The United States is not to mediate cross-Strait differences. Nevertheless, officials and nongovernment opinion leaders in both Beijing and Taipei are now forthright in urging the United States to take actions to ease cross-Strait tensions.
PRC officials want the United States to press Taiwan to avoid egregious efforts to achieve greater international recognition, and to limit arms sales to Taiwan so that Taiwanese leaders will not be able to use such U.S. support to resist PRC efforts to achieve reunification. Officials and observers in Taipei ask the U.S. to press Beijing to avoid intimidation, and to solidify U.S. ties with Taiwan so that Taipei can deal with the PRC on a more equitable basis. Some in Taipei point to Canada's recent offer to mediate the cross-Strait tensions and see U.S. unwillingness to do so as a sign of a "lack of moral courage."
Predictably, officials in Beijing and Taipei favor U.S. intervention that benefits their respective sides. There is little support for true mediation -- that is, efforts by a neutral party to get both sides to give up some significant parts of their respective negotiating positions in order to reach a compromise solution. Any U.S. efforts to press for such a compromise could be portrayed as outside interference and redound negatively for U.S. relations with both capitals.
Prospects for continued economic growth in Taiwan are reasonably good. The economy has grown rapidly (over 10% in 1986 and 1987, and 7% in 1988 and 1989; growth slowed to 5%-6% in the 1990s).
Taiwan's economy remains vulnerable to rises in oil prices, decline in the U.S. economy, and international protectionism, especially in the United States. Taiwan's GNP growth depends heavily on exports, and about 25% of these exports go to the United States. (Leading exports to the United States include wearing apparel and footwear, toys, and various electronic products.)
In recent years, Taiwanese government officials have attempted to accommodate increased U.S. pressure on trade issues. They met many U.S. demands for greater market access for U.S. goods and services and responded to U.S. complaints by taking stronger measures to protect U.S. copyrights and other intellectual property rights. In response to U.S. and other pressures, Taiwan in the late 1980s allowed the value of its currency, relative to the U.S. dollar, to rise over 30%.
The U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan reached $19 billion in 1987. It was $13 billion in 1988; $12 billion in 1989; $11.2 billion in 1990; about $10 billion in 1991; $9.4 billion in 1992; $8.85 billion in 1993; $9.6 billion in 1994; and $9.6 billion in 1995.
A different set of economic issues flows from Taiwan's large foreign exchange reserves and growing international economic power. On the one hand, this trend prompts United States and other foreign officials and business representatives to seek investment or financial support from Taiwan. On the other hand, it prompts some Americans to worry that Taipei enterprises may use acquisitions of distressed U.S. companies to gain quick entry into important markets heretofore dominated by the United States.
U.S. Policy Choices. Many Americans concerned with the large U.S. trade deficit call for strong action (possibly including limitations on foreign access to U.S. markets) to improve the U.S. trade balance. They recognize that such action could negatively affect the economic prosperity and related political stability of a number of important U.S. trading partners, including Taiwan. But they judge that the United States has little choice but to take firm measures to protect its own markets and economic advancement.
Concern with American industrial competitiveness also motivates Americans who question the sale of sophisticated U.S. industries to wealthy Taiwan enterprises. They favor strict review of such sales to insure that Taiwanese investors do not reap a large competitive advantage through investment in hard-pressed but technologically advanced U.S. companies.
An opposing view comes from U.S. supporters of the Nationalist government and the political opposition, Americans concerned with promoting greater political democracy and continued economic prosperity in Taiwan, and free trade advocates who tend to oppose measures designed to restrict foreign exporters' access to U.S. markets. They emphasize the potentially negative results in terms of U.S. investment in Taiwan, Taiwanese investment in the United States, and U.S. interest in the political and social stability long associated with economic prosperity in Taiwan. They also emphasize the negative results for U.S. interests in a free international trading system that they believe would come from restrictive trade legislation or administrative actions.
Under Chiang Kai-Shek's leadership, the Nationalist Party-dominated government ruled in a sometimes harsh authoritarian fashion. It pursued policies of a strong national defense against the communist mainland and export-oriented economic growth. It tolerated little open political dissent.
In the 1970s, the United States and most developed countries recognized the PRC and broke official ties with Taipei. Under international pressure, Taiwan lost the China seat in the U.N. and most official international bodies.
These international setbacks challenged a major source of the political legitimacy of the Nationalist regime. It was harder to argue that people on Taiwan should accept and pay for an elaborate central government administration that included a majority of representatives who were elected on mainland China prior to the Communist victory there and Nationalist retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Nationalist leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, emphasized other elements in support of the Nationalists' rule, noting in particular the leadership's successful supervision of Taiwan's dramatic economic progress. Chiang and his associates also were at pains to introduce to power more "Taiwanese" -- 85% of the island's population whose roots go back to Taiwan prior to the influx of two million "mainlanders" associated with the Nationalist regime at the time of the Communist victory on the mainland. The vast majority of the Nationalist party's rank and file were Taiwanese, and important Taiwanese dignitaries, including the current President, Lee Teng-hui, were raised to high positions.
A combination of international and domestic pressures accelerated the pace of political reform in the middle and later 1980s. In September 1986, a formal opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was formed.
President Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial law in July 1987. Following Chiang Ching-kuo's death in January 1988, the new President, Lee Teng-hui, reaffirmed a commitment to reform that would legalize opposition parties and restructure parliamentary bodies. Subsequently:
An opposing view comes from Americans who identify closely with the Chinese Nationalist administration and urge U.S. support for Taipei's gradual and incremental efforts to develop greater political liberalization on Taiwan. Meanwhile, these Americans and those keenly concerned with U.S. relations with the PRC warn of a possible serious problem for U.S. interests stemming from greater political liberalization in Taiwan. They judge that such liberalization might lead to overt moves like a plebiscite or other action that would establish a separate identity for Taiwan vis-a-vis the mainland. They see such separation deepening the already serious U.S.-PRC differences over Taiwan, and possibly endangering the stability in the Taiwan Strait. They aver that the current "studied ambiguity" of the one-China principle governing U.S. China policy provides little guidance on how to handle this kind of delicate policy situation, which many U.S. officials would prefer to avoid.
H.Con.Res. 53 (Lantos)
Expressing the sense of Congress regarding a private visit of President Lee
Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States. Introduced March
6, 1995; reported favorably by Committee on International Relations April 5, 1995;
passed House May 2, 1995. Passed Senate May 9, 1995.
H.Con.Res. 148 (Cox)
On U.S. support for Taiwan in the face of pressure and attack from mainland China.
Introduced March 7, 1996. Passed Committee on International Relations. March 14,
1996. Passed House March 19, 1996.
H.Con.Res. 154 (Funderburk)
Congratulating the elections in Taiwan. Introduced March 26, 1996. Passed House
May 21, 1996.
H.Con.Res. 212 (Solomon)
Endorsing a European Parliament resolution regarding the Republic of China on
Taiwan and international organizations. Passed House September 24, 1996.
H.R. 1561 (Gilman)
American Overseas Interests Act. (Contains provisions amending the Taiwan Relations
Act to supersede restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan seen in the 1982 U.S.-PRC
communique and other matters relating to Taiwan and China.) Introduced May 8,
1995. Passed House International Relations Committee May 15, 1995. Passed
House June 8, 1995. Conference report passed House March 12, 1996 and passed Senate
March 28, 1996. Vetoed by President; veto sustained in House April 30, 1996.
S.Con.Res. 43 (Thomas)
On PRC military pressure against Taiwan. Introduced March 6, 1996. Passed Senate
March 21, 1996.
11/27/96 ---Taiwan's foreign minister predicted that Taiwan's academic exchanges with the United States would not be negatively affected by recent controversy over a $3 million grant by the Taiwan-based Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation to the University of California at Berkeley.
10/30/96 ---President Lee Teng-hui accepted Panama's invitation to attend the World Congress on the Panama Canal in September 1997.
---A senior Nationalist Party official denied press reports that he had offered a $15 million donation to President Clinton's reelection campaign.
10/06/96 ---The Taiwan Independence Party, a new political party dedicated to seeking Taiwanese independence, was announced in Taipei.
09/18/96 ---Taiwan's bid for the UN to study possible membership for Taiwan was rejected for the fourth consecutive year.
08/21/96 ---Vice President Lien Chan left Ukraine after a short private visit. Beijing protested.
08/20/96 ---Beijing issued regulations to encourage shipping with Taiwan.
08/14/96 ---Lee Teng-hui suggested that Taiwan review its burgeoning economic ties with the PRC. Reaction in Taiwan was mixed.
07/20/96 ---Without the fanfare of past years, the Taiwanese media announced that its diplomatic allies have once again asked the UN to consider setting up a special committee to study Taiwan's UN membership.
07/11/96 ---Official oil companies of Taiwan and the PRC signed an agreement to jointly explore for oil in an offshore area near Taiwan and the mainland.
06/14/96 ---Taiwan's new representative in Washington, Jason Hu, met with Clinton administration officials amid press reports that Hu was focused on "improving communications with Washington."
06/08/96 ---A new cabinet was named. The Premier is Lien Chan, who also serves as Vice President.
05/20/96 ---President Lee Teng-hui was inaugurated. Beijing's reaction was muted.
03/25/96 ---Beijing ended its war games in the Taiwan Strait.
03/23/96 ---Defying months of PRC military and rhetorical pressure targeted at President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwanese voters gave Lee an impressive 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in Taiwan's first popular presidential election.
03/10/96 ---Amid repeated U.S. official condemnations of PRC missile tests and planned live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, the Pentagon disclosed that two U.S. carrier battle groups had been ordered to the area.
03/08/96 ---PRC forces began conducting ballistic missile exercises in two impact areas near Taiwan. The actions were condemned by the Clinton Administration and Congress.
01/24/96 ---The New York Times reported on a series of explicit warnings from Chinese leaders to the United States over the likelihood of military action in the Taiwan Strait.
12/02/95 ---In elections for the 164-seat Legislative Yuan, the Nationalist Party received 85 seats with 45% of the vote; the DPP, 54 seats; and the New China Party, 21 seats.
11/29/95 ---The State Department Spokesman voiced disapproval of PRC military actions in the Taiwan Strait.
08/15/95 ---PRC forces resumed military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.
07/26/95 ---Madam Chiang Kai-shek was feted by congressional leaders on Capitol Hill.
06/30/95 ---The United States lifted sanctions against imports of Taiwan wildlife products.
06/21/95 ---Taiwanese officials said that if allowed to enter the UN, Taiwan would set up a foundation to give $1 billion to less-developed countries.
06/21/95 ---Capping a trip to Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Taiwanese Premier Lien Chan met with Czech President Havel.
06/16/95 ---Beijing postponed cross-Strait talks with Taiwan in protest over Lee's visit to the United States.
06/11/95 ---Lee Teng-hui left the United States after visits to California, New York, and Alaska.
05/22/95 ---Yielding to congressional pressure, President Clinton decided to allow Taiwan's president to visit the United States.
04/08/95 ---President Lee Teng-hui responded to President Jiang Zemin's eight-point proposal on cross-Strait relations with a six-point proposal reflecting Taiwan's interests.
04/01/95 ---President Lee began a four-day, two-country (Abu Dhabi, Jordan) trip to Middle Eastern countries.
03/01/95 ---Taiwan allowed foreign-registered vessels to conduct direct trade between Taiwanese ports and mainland China.
01/30/95 ---China's leader Jiang Zemin issued a positive sounding 8-point proposal on Taiwanese-mainland relations.
12/05/94 ---U.S. Transportation Secretary Pena met with senior officials in Taiwan.
12/03/94 ---In island-wide elections, the ruling Nationalists won the posts of governor of Taiwan and mayor of Kaohsiung, while the opposition DPP won the mayor of Taipei post.
10/22/94 ---Japan's International Trade Minister and Taiwan's Economic Minister had an official meeting in Osaka -- the first ministerial meeting between Japan and Taiwan in over 20 years.
09/30/94 ---President Lee Teng-hui said he would be willing to meet with senior PRC leaders at international gatherings.
09/07/94 ---The Clinton Administration's Taiwan policy review called for modestly increased contacts with Taiwan. It was criticized, for different reasons, by Beijing, Taipei, and several in Congress.
01/29/94 ---In elections for numerous local councils and other posts, the Kuomintang dominated, winning over 60% of the vote, while the DPP won about 15%.
11/27/93 ---In Island-wide elections the Nationalists gained 13 seats but did poorly in the popular vote, falling under 50% for the first time (47%). The DPP received an unprecedented 41% of the popular vote, but party chairman Hsu Hsinliang resigned over the DPP's failure to gain more seats (6).
08/31/93 ---The PRC released a lengthy and unprecedented "white paper" on Taiwan.
08/25/93 ---The Chinese New Party was set up in Taiwan.
12/19/93 ---In legislative elections the Nationalist Party garnered 53% of the popular vote and the opposition DPP, 31%.
12/02/92 ---Trade Representative Carla Hills began a visit to Taiwan.
09/02/92 ---President Bush agreed to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.
12/21/91 ---In a National Assembly election, the DPP got less than 24% of the vote; the Nationalists received over 71%.
08/29/91 ---Using a compromise formula, Taiwan agreed to join the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), along with the PRC and Hong Kong.
12/02/89 ---In Taiwanese elections, the opposition DPP garnered over 30% of the popular vote and won several key races.
03/22/88 ---The New York Times reported about concern for the past two decades over Taiwan's alleged off-again, on-again efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
07/15/87 ---Martial law ended in Taiwan.
Buruman, Ian. "Taiwan's New Nationalists." Foreign Affairs, v. 75, July-August 1996. pp. 77-91.
Clough, Ralph N. Island China. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978.
----- Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1993.
Gold, Thomas B. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1986.
Kaplan, David E. Fires of the Dragon: Politics, Murder, and the Kuomintang. New York, Antheneum. 1992.
Kristof, Nicholas. "A Dictatorship That Grew Up." New York Times Magazine. February 16, 1992.
Simon, Denis Fred and Michael Ying-mao Kau. Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle. White Plains, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
Sutter, Robert G. and William Johnson (eds.). Taiwan in World Affairs. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994.
Tucker, Nancy B. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. New York, Twayne, 1994.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 95-727. China Policy: Managing -PRC-Taiwan Relations After President Lee's Visit to the U.S., by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 95-750. China's Sinister View of Policy: Origins, Implications and Options, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-498. China-U.S.-Taiwan Economic relations, by Wayne Morrison and William Cooper.
CRS Report 92-614. East Asia: Disputed Islands and Offshore Claims -- Issues for Policy, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 92-583. Japan-Taiwan Economic Relations: Implications for the United States , by Dick Nanto.
CRS Report 96-78. Taiwan: Crisis in the Strait and Taiwan Domestic Politics -- The View from Taipei, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-251. Taiwan's Economy in Transition, by Raymond Ahearn.
CRS Report 95-968. Taiwan-Mainland China Relations: Status, Prospects, Interests and Options, by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-943. Taiwan: Political/Economic Developments and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Raymond Ahearn and Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-246. Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the China Communiques by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS General Distribution Memorandum, Taiwan-Mainland China Relations: Status and Outlook, by Robert Sutter. July 17, 1996. (call 7-4257 for a copy.)