![[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]](iblogo.gif)
President Clinton had given initial approval to U.S. participation in the force, but a final deployment decision was never made as refugees returned and the rebellion widened. Some refugee advocates criticize the U.S. decision not to deploy, but U.S. officials believe that the proposed operation lacked a clear mission.
The Tutsi guerrillas were acting partly in reaction to an effort to expel Tutsi residents from eastern Zaire . Zaire alleges that the Tutsi-dominated army of Rwanda has assisted the guerrillas, which Rwanda denies. Rwanda's predominantly Tutsi government took power following an anti-Tutsi genocide in 1994, leading to the exodus of Hutu refugees. Rwanda has long sought an end to raids into its territory by Hutu militants based in Zaire ; and it has wanted genocide suspects in Zaire apprehended. The success of Tutsi forces in Zaire has now given Rwanda a buffer zone along its border.
The leaders of the rebellion in the east are not Tutsi, and they claim that their movement has the broader objective of ousting the Zaire regime and establishing a democratic system.
Zaire faces a related crisis in the illness of its president, Mobutu Sese Seko, 66, who has held power since 1965. Mobutu has returned to Zaire from France, at least temporarily, but appears frail after prostate cancer surgery. Press reports indicate that the cancer has spread. While Mobutu's rule has been noteworthy for breakdowns in governance and the economy, his absence during the eastern Zaire upheaval may have crippled decision-making in Kinshasa, Zaire's capital. Elections have been promised by July 1997, and U.S. policymakers, with others, had hoped that they would bring an era of more responsible government. Preparations for the vote, however, are far behind schedule, and postponement now seems almost inevitable.
The most promising scenario for Zaire's future would include a negotiated settlement in the east combined with free and fair elections that would bring a resumption of international aid and investment. Zaire watchers fear, however, that current difficulties could strengthen elements seeking autonomy for mineral-rich Shaba province as well the diamond-producing Kasai region.
U.S. policymakers took a strong interest in Zaire during the Cold War years because of its resources, size, and location bordering 9 other countries. In the post-Cold War era, human rights violations in Zaire and lack of progress in democratization have strained relations. U.S. options for helping Zaire solve underlying political and economic problems are limited, and policymakers may choose to await the emergence of a new political situation before becoming more engaged.
Preparations for the deployment of a multi-national refugee protection force in eastern Zaire were suspended on Dec. 13, and the Canadian troops who had been sent to the region as the initial component of the force are returning. Some 450 U.S. troops had been in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda to support relief efforts and prepare for possible U.S. participation in the force, but their numbers had been scaled back to 170-180, all in Uganda, by Dec. 16.
A Dec. 16 meeting of 8 African heads of state on the Central African crisis was boycotted by Zaire , which alleged an "Anglo-Saxon coalition" was attempting to destabilize the region. At the meeting, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa agreed to assume a larger diplomatic role in seeking to resolve the crisis.
Zaire is a vast, resource-rich country at the heart of Central Africa. It borders nine other countries, and events there can have an impact over much of the sub-Saharan region. If Zaire were a functioning member of the world economy, it could be a major western trading partner and investment site. As recently as the 1980s, Zaire was the world's largest producer of cobalt, and a leading producer of industrial diamonds as well as copper. It has petroleum deposits, much good farmland, and great hydroelectric potential. Yet Zaire's economy today is in ruins, following a prolonged breakdown in governance and periodic outbreaks of political unrest. Central government authority is weak everywhere, and some of the wealthiest provinces appear to be drifting toward virtual autonomy. In eastern Zaire , an advancing rebel force is demanding the ouster of the government, and the president is gravely ill in France.
Since winning independence from Belgium in 1960, Zaire has faced several serious political crises, but today, the accumulation of political, economic, and social problems over many years, combined with a series of damaging recent events, appears to have created a situation more serious than any past crisis. Indeed, some European diplomats reportedly believe that Zaire is headed for a national disaster or "meltdown" that threatens its continued existence.
Eastern Zaire is racked by rebellion and has slipped from central government control. This region was gravely destabilized in July 1994, by the arrival of an estimated 1.2 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda. The Hutu had fled Rwanda as the Tutsidominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) was consolidating its conquest of Rwanda. The RPF had been provoked into a military offensive in April 1994, when Hutu militants, including armed bands known as Interhamwe ("those who attack together"), launched an anti-Tutsi genocide. (For more background, see Appendix 1.) Many Interhamwe, as well as an estimated 40,000 armed Hutu from the defeated Rwanda army, were among those who fled into Zaire . In addition to the Rwanda refugees, most of whom are in the area around Goma, there have been -- at least until the recent violence -- perhaps 200,000 Burundi Hutu refugees encamped near the towns of Bukavu and Uvira. Some arrived as long ago as 1972, but their numbers have increased over the past three years because of renewed violent ethnic conflict in Burundi, where the Tutsi-led army seized power on July 25, 1996.
The situation in the region today is highly confused, but it is clear that the Zaire army has been dealt a humiliating setback. Armed conflict first broke out in South Kivu province in mid-October between the army and indigenous ethnic Tutsi. Known as the Banyamulenge, these Tutsi are descendants of herders who came to the area as long as 200 years ago and may number 300,000 to 400,000 or more today. They had been targets of increasing resentment from local peoples, which include many Hutu, in part because of Zaire's economic difficulties. The Banyamulenge were deprived of their citizenship by 1981 legislation, and a resolution passed by the transitional parliament in April 1995, ostensibly aimed at recent Hutu refugees, included the Banyamulenge among people to be expelled. In October 1996, Tutsi in South Kivu were ordered to leave by the region's deputy governor, and Zairian troops joined local civilians in trying to force the Banyamulenge out. Tutsi guerrillas, some of whom may have had experience in the Rwanda civil war, fought back with surprising effectiveness, capturing the town of Uvira on Oct. 29 and Bukavu, the provincial capital, on November 1. (See Appendix for background on the Tutsi and Hutu.)
In North Kivu, Tutsi guerrillas, acting in alliance with local, non-Tutsi militia, completed the capture of Goma on Nov. 4. Goma was surrounded by Hutu refugee camps housing 700,000 people and served as the center of international relief efforts aimed at helping these refugees. The Tutsi, who arrived in North Kivu during the colonial period, were motivated in part by anger over a local anti-Tutsi campaign, beginning in 1993, that had displaced large numbers of Tutsi and reportedly killed thousands.
The rebels call their movement the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), portraying it as a coalition of Zairian opposition parties. In view of their extensive territorial gains, it is clear that the rebels have some support among non-Tutsi. Local militias, known as the Bangilima and the Mai-Mai, have joined in the rebel offensive, perhaps out of concern that the huge Hutu refugee population was turning the region into a Hutu homeland. The Mai-Mai, who practice witchcraft and employ child soldiers, are probably also motivated by the desire for loot; and their reputation for violence has helped the ADFL frighten Zairian troops into fleeing.
The ADFL coalition leader, Laurent Kabila, 56, is a Lunda from Shaba province and a veteran of previous revolutionary struggles. His own Party of the Popular Revolution (PRP) has survived for years in the mountains around Uvira, and some regard Kabila more as a local warlord than a political leader. Kabila insists, however, that ADFL aims at liberating all of Zaire from Mobutu's rule and installing a democratic government through free elections. The Zaire government portrays Kabila as a puppet of the Tutsi, and of Rwanda.
The conflict in eastern Zaire is increasingly internationalized, and a war involving Zairian forces against the army of Rwanda -- and perhaps the armies of Burundi and Uganda (which Zaire sees as pro-Tutsi) -- seems possible, should Zaire's forces manage to regroup. Rwanda continues to deny participating in the current fighting, but covert some form of Rwandan support for the rebels is widely suspected. Rwanda has long been angry with Zaire for sheltering armed Hutu militants, and for its refusal or inability to prevent them from mounting raids into Rwanda. Moreover, Rwanda had unsuccessfully sought the arrest of participants in the 1994 genocide who were known to be in the camps. Zaire's Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo has accused Burundi and Uganda of joining with Rwanda in waging war on Zaire . Uganda acknowledges sending troops a few kilometers into Zaire to combat Sudan-backed Islamic guerrillas.
Events took a dramatic turn in eastern Zaire on the night of Nov. 14, when Tutsi guerrillas attacked the Hutu militants controlling the vast Mugunga refugee camp outside Goma. The Tutsi may have been prompted to act after various western officials said that the multi-national force would not attempt to disarm the militants. The militants fled deeper into Zaire , and thousands of the refugees may have accompanied them; but an estimated 640,000, freed of Interhamwe control, walked back into Rwanda.
The number of Hutu refugees remaining in eastern Zaire is a subject of controversy. Many relief organizations, as well as U.N. and European officials, among others, believe that there are as many as 700,000, but U.S. officials, basing their estimates in part on U.S. reconnaissance flights, put the number at 200,000 to 400,000. The ADFL has said that international relief organizations may enter eastern Zaire to search for and assist refugees, but the organizations report that their movements are being hampered by rebel forces. Thus there has been no reliable information from most of the east since early November, when the fighting forced international relief workers to withdraw. Many thousands of refugees could be under Interhamwe control in government held areas deep in Zaire . Relief workers have found that many of the refugees they do encounter are malnourished and suffering from various illnesses; but to date there have not been reports of mass starvation, perhaps because Zaire's rainforest affords some minimal food to foragers.
Many observers, including French officials and the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Emma Bonino, are outraged that the multi-national refugee protection force planned for eastern Zaire was not deployed. As recently as Dec. 2, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali urged the deployment of the military force, which had been authorized in Security Council Resolution 1080 of November 15. Critics tend to blame the United States for the non-deployment, since U.S. military transport aircraft were essential to the operation and the United States never made the final decision to participate. President Clinton had given an initial authorization, and planning had begun, but prospects for U.S. participation declined after the refugee camps in eastern Zaire were broken up. With hundreds of thousands of refugees returning to Rwanda, and an undetermined number moving into forests deep in Zaire , U.S. officials could not define a clear mission for U.S. troops or the multi-national force. Meanwhile, the widening rebellion in the area caused mounting concern about possible entanglement in a confused and violent situation, recalling the Somali conflict, which saw 18 U.S. soldiers killed in October 1993.
Deployment of the multi-national force faced many other obstacles, apart from U.S. caution. Rwanda was reluctant to cooperate on grounds that most of the refugees had already returned, and also because it feared that the presence of the force in Zaire might facilitate the return of the Zairian military and authorities to the region. Indeed, European Union representative Aldo Ajello said on Nov. 18 that Europe would not recognize the insurgents, and that the force should help Zaire recover total sovereignty in the east. Zaire , which at one point had favored the force for just this reason, strenuously opposed plans to base the operation at Entebbe airport in Uganda on grounds that Uganda was a Tutsi supporter.
Casualties in the Zaire conflict are difficult to determine, since outside observers cannot gain access to the region. U.N. aid workers report that 5,500 Hutu refugees seeking to flee the camps were killed by the Interhamwe before the camps were broken up. Amnesty International reports that it has documented human rights abuses not only by the retreating Zaire army, but also by the ADFL in eastern Zaire ; and U.S. State Department said on December 3 that there was "mounting evidence" of a "series of atrocities" committed by rebel forces. Amnesty International also reports the Zaire authorities are continuing to arrest political opponents in the capital, subjecting some to torture.
President Mobutu Sese Seko, a former journalist and military officer, has governed Zaire since he seized power in a 1965 coup. Born in October 1930, Mobutu has often been rumored to be ill and under treatment abroad -- but the rumors were never substantiated, and despite long absences, he always returned to Zaire . The Zairian government acknowledges that Mobutu underwent prostate surgery in Switzerland on August 22, 1996. His condition is shrouded in secrecy, but eyewitness report that the President appears frail. It is widely believed that his cancer has spread, but Zairian spokesmen consistently minimize his problems. Most press reports indicate that Mobutu is receiving chemotherapy, which Zaire denies. On November 4, he unexpectedly flew to France, where he rested at a seaside villa before returning to Zaire .
While Mobutu's domestic and foreign critics might once have welcomed his departure from office, even through death, his illness at this time has made critics and other experienced observers extremely uneasy. They worry that Mobutu's prolonged absence and potential demise are paralyzing the government in dealing with the upheaval in eastern Zaire . They are also concerned that Mobutu's illness could precipitate a power struggle at top levels of the armed forces, strengthen secessionist tendencies in some provinces, and exacerbate ethnic strife around the country. Much of the Zairian political class hopes that Mobutu's return will calm the nation, steady the army's nerves, and lead to the recovery of the eastern region; but journalists report widespread disillusionment among the country's poor as well as some hope that the rebellion will bring the Mobutu era to an end.
U.S. policymakers and others have hoped that the elections promised in Zaire by July 1997 could serve as a stabilizing influence, serving as a non-violent means of transition to the post-Mobutu era. If reasonably free and fair, they argue, the elections could create a government of recognized legitimacy, encouraging the western donors and the international financial institutions to resume economic assistance. (Most western aid has been suspended since the early 1990s.) Moreover, elections could help promote better governance by bringing parliamentarians into the national and provincial legislatures who would have a sense of obligation to the voters. Currently, the provinces are ruled by centrally appointed provincial governors, sometimes compared to "viceroys," who have little incentive to respond to the needs of the people.
Elections are proving extremely difficult to organize in Zaire , in part because the president's absence and the fighting in the east have apparently suspended decision-making in Kinshasa. Even without these problems, however, the July 1997 deadline probably could not be met. Zaire today has few roads or telephones, and lacks the technical means of distributing, collecting, and counting ballots on its own. Before the elections are held, a census is to be conducted in preparation for voter registration, constituencies must be delimited, and a draft constitution is to be put to a referendum. Elections are then to take place in stages, with the presidential, national assembly, and provincial assembly elections held on the same day, followed by a presidential runoff, if needed, and local as well other provincial elections. The elections are expected to cost between $265 million and $275 million to conduct, although donors, particularly the European Union, are expected to contribute much of this amount. Donor aid will not be forthcoming, however, until there is a credible prospect of a fair vote.
Zaire's difficulties result in part from the stunning rate of change it has confronted over a short span of history. Leading authorities note that in 1930, when Mobutu was born, Zaire was a rural, peasant-based society under the control of a tiny elite of Belgian bureaucrats assisted by a few senior Zairian clerks. Today, Zaire has a sprawling capital of 5 to eight million inhabitants, an overall population nearing 45 million (up from 20 million in 1970), and a complex social structure that includes a kaleidoscope of conflicting ethnic loyalties as well as sharp economic and social class divisions. (Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, 1985, p. 79.)
Zaire's initial upheaval broke out in July 1960, just after independence. The Belgian government had agreed to set a date for independence only in January, finally acknowledging that a small European country could not hope to maintain a large colony in Africa in the face of rising nationalism around the continent. Nonetheless, Belgian officers attempted to retain control of the Zairian army after independence, leading to a mutiny and attacks on Europeans. A United Nations peacekeeping force intervened in the resulting unrest in an effort to prevent the situation from becoming a Cold War crisis. In fact, however, the Congo, as the country was then known, did become a major Cold War issue after Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who enjoyed the sympathy and backing of the Soviet Union, was killed in 1961. The Soviets halted their contributions to U.N. peacekeeping, leading to a financial crisis that crippled the United Nations for years. Dag Hammarskjold, who had shown himself to be a strong and effective U.N. Secretary General, was killed in a suspicious plane crash as he flew to the area to attempt to negotiate an end to the secession of rebellious Katanga province, now Shaba. The U.N. force withdrew in 1964, leaving the country united, though politically unsettled, and facing continued secessionist threats in key regions.
General Joseph Mobutu, a former journalist who had risen to command the nation's armed forces, seized power in a bloodless coup in November 1965. The coup won ready acceptance in western capitals, where Mobutu already had many advocates, because of concern that the civilian regime was moving to the left. Over the next few years, Mobutu managed to neutralize his political opposition, thwart secessionist tendencies in key regions, and consolidate his power base. His methods, which included the arrest and humiliation of former allies and the elimination of independent labor unions, were authoritarian but not unusual among those of many other Third World leaders at that time.
In the 1970s, however, Mobutu began a series of disruptive political and economic initiatives that brought a prolonged decline in the nation's fortunes -- leading to eventual economic collapse and finally to the political crisis of 1991. His "authenticity" campaign, launched in 1971, in addition to requiring Zairians to abandon western styles of dress, included the banning of Christian forenames, the prohibition of religious broadcasts, and other measures that brought Mobutu into conflict with the powerful Catholic Church. In 1972, Mobutu's Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), the country's sole political party, was merged with the state; and in 1974, as the regime became increasingly personalist, the MPR adopted "Mobutuism" as its official ideology. Mobutu himself adopted a series of honorific titles, such as Guide, Helmsman, and Father of the Nation; and he took steps to reduce the powers of local and regional authorities. At the end of 1973, he launched his "Zairianization" campaign for the economy, which resulted in the seizure of foreign-owned properties and their redistribution to Mobutu loyalists. At the same time, Mobutu began a series of massive "white elephant" development schemes, including the costly Inga-Shaba hydroelectric project, which called for the construction of a huge dam near Kinshasa and 1,000-mile transmission line to Shaba province.
Many of the extreme measures undertaken by Mobutu in the first half of the 1970s had to be significantly eased or even retracted in subsequent years. But the confidence of foreign investors and lenders had been badly shaken, and the economy never recovered from the blow. A long era of negative growth set in, worsened by low world prices for copper and the high cost of oil imports. Moreover, even after attempting to rectify the excesses of Zairianization, Mobutu repeatedly provoked confrontations with major aid donors, notably Belgium and the World Bank. These confrontations contributed to the long-term economic decline that saw Zaire's road network and communications systems fall into disrepair. Reports that Mobutu had amassed a great personal fortune further undermined the credibility of his regime. (Today, Swiss press reports speculate that he has $4 billion on deposit in that country alone.) The Bank and the International Monetary Fund abandoned their support for Zaire's economy in late 1990, as the Mobutu government failed to meet requirements for reform. Meanwhile, the continued repression of dissent, the denial of press and electoral freedoms, and the repeated arrest and detention of opposition figures brought continued criticism from human rights organizations and complicated Mobutu's relations with western governments.
Nonetheless, some observers credited Mobutu's policies with maintaining stability and minimizing ethnic conflict. Indeed, opposition to tribalism was always a part of Mobutuism as an ideology. Critics argued, however, that in stifling political dissent Mobutu was only bottling up resentments that were bound to explode at some point. They also noted that despite his stated opposition to ethnic favoritism, Mobutu had brought individuals from his own Equateur province, particularly members of his own small Ngbandi group, into key positions throughout the bureaucracy and the armed forces.
Mobutu's political position deteriorated sharply in 1990, as domestic and international pressures forced him into major policy changes and concessions. The denouement of the Cold War reduced the incentives for western governments to offer him political or economic support. Meanwhile, an opposition movement, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), led by Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, joined with student groups to mount a series of protests and demonstrations. Police and military repression of these protests brought fresh international criticism. The elite Special Presidential Division (DSP, see below) intervened during student protests at Lubumbashi University in May 1990, and some witnesses put the death toll among students at between 50 and 150. The incident brought a sharp deterioration in Belgian-Zairian relations, which had been on the mend following a 1988 crisis over Belgian press criticism of Mobutu and corruption in Zaire .
Mobutu first responded to mounting pressure for change in April 1990, when he announced that a 3-party political system would be introduced. In October, after several substantial new parties had been formed, Mobutu accepted a full multi-party system in principle. The continued deterioration of the economy, however, was adding fuel to popular anger, and large demonstrations against the high cost of living broke out in November and December. Several people were killed as troops tried to suppress these protests, but there were new demonstrations at the beginning of 1991.
Mobutu initially failed in attempts to split the opposition by co-opting individual leaders into a transitional regime. Finally, in April 1991, he acceded to a key opposition demand by announcing that a national political conference would be convened -- but then he postponed the opening of the conference as anti-government protests continued around the country. The regime next attempted to convene the conference in August 1991, but the Sacred Union opposition alliance launched a boycott, alleging that Mobutu was trying to pack the meeting with his own supporters. The conference was suspended amid confusion and controversy over the accreditation of delegates.
Zaire's deepening crisis came to the world's attention on Sept. 23, 1991, when Zairian soldiers began looting in Kinshasa because they had not been paid. Rioting and looting quickly spread as disaffected and impoverished civilians joined in, and the death toll rose to an estimated 250. Nearly 2,000 French and Belgian troops intervened to assist in the evacuation of some 20,000 foreign nationals. Some Belgian troops were flown into Zaire aboard U.S. Air Force planes, which also flew French troops to forward positions outside Zaire . Some 3,000 Americans were among those who left.
The Sovereign National Conference finally reconvened in April 1992. Consisting of some 2,000 representatives of political parties, the government, and other institutions, the conference proclaimed itself Zaire's supreme decision-making body and chose Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, a leading critic of the regime, as its chairman. In August, the conference chose Tshisekedi as the country's new Prime Minister, and many observers were surprised when Mobutu accepted its choice. The outgoing Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, retreated to his native Shaba province and refused to recognize the Tshisekedi government.
For a time in August and September 1992, Mobutu appeared to be willing to tolerate a gradual transition to democracy. Many observers expected that he would eventually accept a figurehead presidency or step aside, perhaps going into comfortable exile in Europe. Rumors of an imminent coup circulated in Kinshasa, and it seemed possible that Mobutu would be forced from office by the military. At the end of 1992, however, Mobutu began to fight back, and showing some of his old flair for political maneuver, managed to score significant gains.
Mobutu was spurred to action by the November 1992 decision of the Sovereign National Conference to adopt a draft constitution that would have renamed the country the Federal Republic of Congo and established a largely parliamentary political system with a weak presidency. In December, the Conference dissolved itself and created the High Council of the Republic, a 453-member body claiming supreme executive and legislative power. Mobutu sought to suspend the HCR, which retaliated by finding him guilty of high treason on January 14, 1993. The President then set up a rival government, with its own prime minister, and reconvened the dormant national assembly, which his own party dominated.
Following months of stalemate, marked by widening divisions among the opposition, Mobutu engineered a merger of the two governments in January 1994. Legislative power was vested in the merged High Council of the Republic-Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT), an unwieldy body of 748 members; and in June 1994, the HCR-PT named Kengo wa Dondo, a moderate opposition figure acceptable to Mobutu, as prime minister. With time, it became clear that a pro-Mobutu alliance of parties known as the "presidential family" or "political forces of the conclave" commanded a majority in that HCR-PT on most issues. HCR-PT members are grateful for the reported $1,000 per month salary they receive, since this amount is a fortune in today's Zaire . Tshisekedi, meanwhile, has been effectively marginalized. He continues to claim the premiership, but only his staunchest supporters give this claim credence. Tshisekedi's UDPS has broken into factions, weakening its influence in the opposition alliance -- now known as the Sacred Union of the Radical Opposition and Allies (USORAL).
Before his illness, Mobutu was able to regain a major role in Zaire's domestic and foreign policy. Kengo, widely viewed as a pragmatist and a technocrat, wrested authority over the Central Bank from Mobutu and began a modest economic reform program. But Mobutu retained the loyalty of the DSP, the Israeli-trained military unit of an estimated 15,000 men which serves as his personal guard and as an instrument for exercising presidential power. The President also continued to be backed by supporters and confidants throughout the armed forces and the government, as well as in the business sector. Domestic political figures and foreign diplomats regularly visited the president at his luxury retreat at Gbadolite, on Zaire's far northern border.
Living conditions for the vast majority of Zaire's people are extremely poor. According to a U.N. publication, Zaire is a country "where formal economic activity is scarce and where much public sanitation, transport, and communications infrastructure has virtually ceased to exist." (Africa Recovery, May 1996.) Copper production, once the basis of Zaire's economy, fell by 90% between 1990 and 1994, while cobalt production fell by two-thirds.
The country's economic decline has undermined the urban middle classes and left a huge income gap that adds to political tensions. The vast poor majority in Kinshasa, the deteriorating capital city, must scramble for a living in the informal sector, while a tiny elite travels the streets in sleek European cars with darkened windows. Since the telephone and postal systems have collapsed, the elite communicate with cellular phones that are far too costly for the average Zairian . Statistics are not available for many basic indicators, but according to a press report, "many civil service salaries hover around $1 a month" following several years of astronomical inflation. (New York Times, September 13, 1996.) In such a situation, civil servants abandon their posts to earn a living by alternative means, or seek direct remuneration by selling birth certificates, business permits, or other essential documents. (Jeune Afrique, September 18-24, 1996) Soldiers, who may be unpaid for months at a time, sell their services as security guards or resort to robbery and extortion at roadblocks. Crime is rampant in Kinshasa, and contagious diseases, such as cholera, tuberculosis, and malaria take a heavy toll, particularly among children. HIV infection among young adults of both sexes has been a major problem for years.
Social strains arising from poverty are a factor in Zaire's rising ethnic tensions. Hundreds of thousands of Luba people were expelled from mineral-rich Shaba province after August 1992 and forced to return to their native Kasai region. The Belgian colonizers had regarded the Luba as hard-workers and high achievers, bringing thousands into Shaba to fill positions as skilled workers and clerks. In subsequent generations, many Luba rose to high positions in mining, industry, commerce, and education; but their success gave rise to jealousy among the native Lunda in Shaba as economic hardship mounted. Anti-Luba sentiment is also reported in the capital, where there is another large Luba population.
As the power of the central government has declined, regionalism has intensified, contributing to concerns over the possible breakup of Zaire . East Kasai and its capital, Mbuji-Mayi, are experiencing relative prosperity based on a black market diamond industry that exports to Europe and South Africa. Investments by South African companies are helping to re-orient the economy of mineral-rich Shaba province toward English-speaking southern Africa rather than Kinshasa. While beneficial for the local people, these developments have caused some observers to speak of "creeping independence" and "de facto republics" (New York Times, September 18, 1996). Should these comparatively wealthy provinces indeed split off from Zaire , the rest of the country would be left largely without resources and with little hope of development.
Despite many social and economic problems, some observers are encouraged by what they see as an emerging civil society in Zaire , often centered around churches and nongovernmental organizations. Student groups, human rights organizations, and political parties are increasingly effective and typically led by articulate, outspoken individuals. Meanwhile, with a loosening of economic controls, the private enterprise sector has grown stronger. Private airlines, for example, are helping to compensate for the collapse of road transportation by connecting cities around the country. Major business figures, however, including airline owners, tend to be closely connected to Mobutu.
Zaire has entered into an era of instability that seems unlikely to abate for some time to come. Foreign involvement in helping Zaire with its myriad problems is likely to be quite limited, in part because the scale of those problems is so great and in part because the end of the Cold War has reduced incentives for engagement. France, which sees itself as having a special mission in French-speaking Africa, may be more engaged in Zaire than others, but French capabilities are limited and it seems unlikely that France would be willing to bear the risks and costs of a major intervention. Most international efforts will focus on humanitarian relief, but efforts in this area will be complicated by Zaire's collapsed infrastructure, as well as ethnic and political strife. International donors, particularly the Europeans, would support the elections process should it begin to move forward.
In eastern Zaire , with the rebel capture of several airports, Zaire's armed forces have limited prospects for reinforcing their troops or regaining lost territory. Roads are badly deteriorated in Zaire , and it could take months for the Zaire army to redeploy in the east and mount a counteroffensive. Analysts speculate that Zaire would have to recruit military experts from abroad, undertake an intensive military retraining program, and possibly hire mercenaries to have any hope of recapturing the east in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, it appears that a counteroffensive may be attempted. Shipments of arms have reportedly been arriving at Kinshasa airport, and there are reports that Zaire has been seeking foreign military help.
Some analysts continue to discuss the possibility of a coup, and their attention focuses primarily on the DSP and its commander, General Nzimbi Ngbale, and on General Baramoto Kpama Kpata, acting Army General Chief of Staff and commander of the Civil Guard, another favored military unit used to put down civilian disturbances. Both have close ties to Mobutu, but with the military humiliation in eastern Zaire and the potential for a breakdown in law and order elsewhere, they or some other officers may be tempted to seize power. A coup would not necessarily restore national unity or stabilize Zaire , since it might ignite civilian protests and set off secessionist attempts. A military regime would face international isolation, although Zaire's riches and strategic importance might encourage some countries to oppose or circumvent any sanctions.
Kengo is particularly suspect in the eyes of many Zairians because his mother was -- according to conflicting reports -- either Tutsi or half-Tutsi. Tshisekedi at one point asked the armed forces to arrest Kengo. In late November, Tshisekedi visited Mobutu in France and claimed that the President has given him a mandate to form a new government. Tshisekedi also urged dialogue with Kabila. The government accused Tshisekedi of statements that "verge on treason," but it may be that Mobutu is beginning to play his traditional "divide and rule" game again and may appoint Tshisekedi prime minister. While Mobutu's aim would be to boost his own popularity, the move might create an opening for negotiations.
Observers are relieved that the fighting in eastern Zaire does not yet appear to be encouraging regionalist elements in Shaba, Kasai, or elsewhere to take advantage of the government's weakness and attempt to secede. Indeed, some noted an upsurge of Zairian nationalism early in the crisis, although this seems to have dissipated as government troops proved incapable of resisting the rebel advance. It is worrisome that each of Zaire's major political figures has an ethnic and regional base which they might exploit in a quest for security and power if instability worsens. Tshisekedi, for example is a Luba from Kasai, and probably more popular in his home region than in the capital, where he resides. He could well feel threatened during a worsening political crisis and be tempted to flee to his home area.
Clearly the best scenario for Zaire would be a negotiated resolution of the eastern Zaire fighting, perhaps including recognition of the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, a pledge to ban the activities of Hutu militants in the region, and the deployment of an international monitoring force. The country might then move forward with an elections process that would create a more responsive government and restore the confidence of donors and investors. Prospects for such an outcome are problematic, however, in view of Mobutu's illness and resistance to negotiations among top government officials. An alternative scenario might include the convening of a new national political conference to agree on new national leaders and new governing structures. The divisions among the opposition would make such a scenario difficult to achieve.
Zaire was a contentious issue in U.S. foreign policy from 1960 into the early 1990s. The Cold War and the emergence of a communist regime in Cuba were very much on the minds of policymakers in 1960, and lent a special urgency to their efforts to stabilize Zaire through a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Policy-makers saw this approach as the best available means for minimizing Soviet influence in Zaire . Some U.S. critics of this policy, however, regarded the United Nations itself as a leftist influence and thought that the United States should have fostered the secession of wealthy Katanga province as a bastion against communism.
The most controversial event of that era was the death of Prime Minister Lumumba in January 1961. Many American observers regarded him as a communist and Soviet agent; although others argued that he was essentially a nationalist and populist. Evidence developed at 1975 Senate hearings indicated that U.S. officials attempted to implement a plan to assassinate Lumumba through poisoning or exposure to a virus. This plot evidently failed, and Lumumba died in Katanga after falling into the hands of secessionist forces. Whether the United States played a role in this event was a matter of controversy, but it is widely believed among Zairian dissidents that the United States was indeed responsible. Today, opponents of the regime typically try to portray themselves as Lumumba's heirs to win popular support.
Mobutu enjoyed good relations with the United States in the first years of his regime. President Carter, however, was critical of Mobutu and pressed for human rights improvements as well as political and economic reforms. Nonetheless, Carter found himself lending air transport to the intervention by Belgium, France, and other countries during the 1978 Shaba uprising because of the fear that the Soviet Union was making further gains in Africa. Mobutu's relations with the Reagan Administration were close, and in 1983 Reagan described the Zairian leader as "a faithful friend to the United States for some 20 years." Mobutu was the first African head of state to visit President Bush in the White House. During the 1980s, officials often expressed reservations about Mobutu's human rights record and economic policies but suggested that no alternative leader appeared capable of maintaining stability or national unity in Zaire .
During the upheaval of the early 1960s, U.S. economic aid to Zaire amounted to between one-quarter and one-third of all U.S. economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Aid reached high levels again in FY1976 through FY1978 in response to perceived Soviet gains in Africa and the crises in Shaba province. Aid rose once more in the second half of the 1980s, reflecting Zaire's deteriorating economic situation and perhaps, as some observers maintain, Zaire's cooperative role in the Angola situation. Since the beginning of 1986, the executive branch had publicly acknowledged that the United States was giving covert assistance to the UNITA resistance forces, headed by Jonas Savimbi, in Angola. According to many press reports, important facilities for channelling this aid to UNITA were located in Zaire . The focus of U.S. Angola policy since 1991 has been on the implementation of Angolan peace agreements. (See CRS Report 96-786F, Angola Update.) Thus, Zaire has lost any value it might have had as a staging area for covert U.S. military aid to Savimbi.
The deteriorating situation in Zaire since the beginning of 1990, the end of the Cold War, and the Angolan agreements decisively shifted executive branch views of Mobutu. Then Secretary of State Baker visited Zaire in March 1990 and urged Mobutu to undertake reforms with respect to human rights, the economy, and democracy -- or risk being swept aside. Following the September 1991 unrest, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, called for elections in Zaire within a year. On November 6, 1991, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Cohen called for "power sharing" between the opposition and Mobutu. At the time, the Administration still saw a role for Mobutu in keeping the military in check while a transition took place.
The Clinton Administration increased pressure on Mobutu. When the term of the U.S. Ambassador came to an end, the Administration refused to appoint a successor until Mobutu facilitated a democratic transition. The Administration decided to deny visas to Mobutu and his entourage, as well as other Zairian nationals who impede the democratization process. It also imposed a unilateral arms embargo, which includes private sales, against Zaire . In late July 1993, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, George Moose, held two days of talks with a Mobutu representative and laid the blame for Zaire's crisis directly on the Zairian president. The State Department said that "We deplore the continuing crisis in Zaire and hold President Mobutu responsible for a situation which puts at risk the lives and welfare of millions of his countrymen and the stability of an entire region."
Administration officials were quietly encouraged by the selection of Kengo as prime minister in 1994, and urged his government to move quickly to deal with Zaire's "political, economic, social, and humanitarian crises." (State Department spokesman, July 12, 1994.) The Administration did not propose to resume aid to Zaire , but it did seek a voice in influencing the elections process. Consequently, the Administration appointed a new ambassador, career diplomat Daniel Simpson, who was confirmed in September 1995. Much of Simpson's work has consisted of discussions with Zairians across the political spectrum, including Mobutu, to encourage them to move forward with free and fair elections. Before the outbreak of violence in eastern Zaire , U.S. officials also met with Mobutu in Zaire to seek his cooperation on Hutu refugee issues.
U.S. policy on Zaire has been impeded somewhat by the weakening of policy coordination in the "troika" of major external actors -- France, Belgium, and the United States -- since the May 1995 election of Jacques Chirac to the French presidency. Chirac met personally with the Zairian leader in April 1996, and Paris has said it will resume aid to Zaire . In early November 1996, Chirac stated that "It is quite obvious that the international community cannot ignore that he is the man best placed to represent Zaire and find a solution to this problem...." Some Zaire watchers believe that the Chirac government sees France as a competitor with the United States for economic and political influence in Zaire ; and that it pushed for the deployment of an armed force in eastern Zaire to stabilize the country and win favor in Africa generally. Disagreement over Zaire has contributed to strains between the United States and France on a number of issues, and there has been much criticism of U.S. Africa policy in the French press.
Many in Africa believe that there is indeed a struggle for influence in Africa between the "francophone" (French-speaking) countries, backed by France, and the anglophone countries backed by the United States; although American analysts note that Africa ranks too low on the U.S. policy agenda to grant credence to such a theory. Zaire's information minister said on December 17, 1996 that an "Anglo-Saxon coalition" was "destabilizing Zaire and the African continent." French participation in the multi-national force could have proven problematic, since Tutsi widely view France as a supporter of the former Hutu regime in Rwanda. French officials resent this allegation, noting that France unilaterally dispatched a peacekeeping force (Operation Turquoise) to Rwanda during the genocide. Tutsi maintain that this force helped Hutu militants and former officials flee to Zaire -- a charge France strongly denies.
Current U.S. policy is focused heavily on relief, and on Nov. 18, the United States pledged $140 million in humanitarian and development assistance for the "Great Lakes region," as this troubled part of Africa is known. The U.S. Agency for International Development has set aside $20 million for FY1997 humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance inside Rwanda. Amid speculation on a U.S./French contest for influence, U.S. officials have sought to correct any impression that the United States is in some way backing a rebellion in Zaire . On December 4, the State Department spokesman said that "The United States will not support in any way, shape, or form any effort by the rebel alliance to try to create any kind of artificial state in eastern Zaire ...."
Congressional concerns over the Mobutu regime began to grow in the late 1970s. In subsequent years, a series of hearings and reports, sometimes growing out of Member and staff visits, focused on allegations of corruption, human rights violations, and shortcomings in the U.S. aid program in Zaire . In 1985, Congress imposed limits on military assistance to Zaire and restrictions on aid under the Economic Support Fund. Congressional interest in Zaire increased after the September 1991 violence, with several Members urging the Administration to insist that Mobutu cede power. The House enacted a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 238) that called on Mobutu to step down and asked the Administration to seek the creation of an international peacekeeping force to ensure stability in Zaire during the transition to democracy. A somewhat similar resolution (S.Con.Res. 80) passed the Senate. Members have often written to the President to express their concern over aspects of Zaire policy, and several have studied the situation directly through visits to the refugee camps around Goma. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997 (P.L. 104-208) prohibits military assistance to Zaire . Economic aid to Zaire has been suspended since June 1991 under the "Brooke amendment," which prohibits aid to any country more than one year in default on the repayment of past U.S. loans. (Sec. 512 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY1997, as incorporated in P.L. 104-208.) At a hearing on December 4, 1996 several Members expressed their concern over the eastern Zaire crisis.
U.S. options for dealing with the situation in Zaire appear to be limited. The United States can continue to encourage the holding of elections, perhaps helping Zairians develop simplified elections procedures that could allow a vote to take place in the nottoo -distant future. But it is not at all clear that the many obstacles to free and fair elections in the near future can be overcome. Otherwise, U.S. approaches to underlying political and economic issues in Zaire may be primarily long-term, as policy makers await the emergence of a new political situation, and perhaps a new generation of leaders. With respect to the violence in the east, policymakers will face continuing constraints in military deployment options arising from the negative reaction in Congress and the public to the Somalia operation. Operations focused on delivering humanitarian relief rather than military operations will be less controversial. Critics of U.S. policy believe that the United States should be more engaged in rescuing refugees, financing the elections process, and otherwise seeking long-term solutions to the problems of Zaire and Central Africa generally. Others argue that the risks and costs of deeper involvement in this distant and troubled region are too great. U.S. engagement, from their perspective, should focus on encouraging African leaders to negotiate regional solutions to the problems of Central Africa.