Jim Nichol, Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
August 30, 1999
| This report discusses the internal and external security concerns of the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Security concerns examined include social disorder, crime, corruption, Islamic extremism, terrorism, ethnic and civil conflict, border tensions, water and transport disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal narcotics. Efforts by the Central Asian states to bolster their security forces and regional cooperation are analyzed. The report discusses U.S. policy and assistance to enhance the security of the Central Asian states, and addresses issues concerning the appropriate level and scope of U.S. involvement. An appendix focuses on selected neighboring or closeby states affecting Central Asia's security. A table of basic facts concerning the Central Asian states and a map of the region are provided. This report will not be updated. Related products include CRS Issue Brief 93108, Central Asia's New States, updated regularly; and CRS Reports 971058, Kazakhstan; 97690, Kyrgyzstan; 98594, Tajikistan; 971055, Turkmenistan; and 971060, Uzbekistan. |
Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications
for U.S. Interests
Summary
The security of the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) is likely in near term to vary by country, since cooperation among them is likely to remain halting. Kazakhstan's and Tajikistan's futures are most clouded by ethnic and regional tensions. Turkmenistan's ethnic homogeneity and ample energy resources may put it in good stead, and Kyrgyzstan's capable leadership may help the relatively small nation to safeguard its independence, but both face potential regional and clan tensions. Uzbekistan is the most likely to become a regional power able to take the lead on policy issues common to Central Asia and to resist undue influence from more powerful outside powers, because of its large territory and population (24.5 million) and ample energy and other resources.
Internal political developments in several bordering or closeby states may have a large impact on Central Asian security. These developments include the possibility of a more authoritarian and hegemonial Russia, ethnic and political instability in China, political liberalization in Iran, or continued conflict in Afghanistan that presents Central Asia with increasing problems of drug trafficking and terrorism.
According to the Administration, U.S. interests in Central Asia include fostering democratization, human rights, free markets, and trade; assisting the development of oil and other resources; and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug production and trafficking, terrorism, and conflict. The United States seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies, materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional independence by Iran or possible Russian neoimperialism. Critics counter that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They argue that the region's energy resources are relatively small and will not greatly affect Western energy security.
Most in Congress
have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central Asia, but questions remain about
what should be the appropriate level and scope of U.S. interest and involvement in the region. Congressional attention
has included several hearings and legislation, the latter including sense of Congress provisions on policy toward
Central Asia and endorsements of aid for energy development. Calling for greater policy attention to Central Asia
and South Caucasus, the Senate and the House approved "Silk Road" initiatives in the 106 1h Congress.
The House approved a "Silk Road" bill on August 2, 1999 (H.R. 1152). In June 1999, the Senate incorporated
"Silk Road" language in Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2001 (S. 1234). On August 4, 1999, the
Senate struck all but the enacting clause of H.R.2606, Foreign Operations Appropriations, substituted the language
of S. 1234, and requested a conference.
Contents
The strategic Central Asian region 1 bordering regional powers Russia, China, and Iran is an ageold castwest and northsouth trade and transport crossroads. After many of the Soviet Union's republics had declared their independence by late 1991, the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia reluctantly followed suit. Since this largely unexpected beginning of independence, the Central Asian countries have taken some uneven steps in building defense and other security structures and ties. Except for Tajikistan, the states have made some progress in bolstering common national outlooks and goals. In some instances, the states have viewed their exposure to outside influences as a mixed blessing. While welcoming new trade and aid, the leaders of Central Asia face growing threats and have at least partly resisted Western calls for democratization and upholding human rights.
This report discusses
the internal and external security concerns of the Central Asian states. Security concerns faced by the Central
Asian states include social disorder, crime, corruption, Islamic extremism, terrorism, ethnic and civil conflict,
border tensions, water and transport disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal narcotics.
The Central Asian states have tried with varying success to bolster their security forces and regional cooperation
to deal with these threats. The United States has provided assistance for these efforts, but questions remain about
what should be the appropriate level and scope of U.S. interest and involvement in the region.
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Central Asia's states have slowly consolidated and extended their relations with neighboring and other countries and international organizations that seek to play influential roles in Central Asia or otherwise affect regional security, particularly the bordering or closeby countries of Russia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Turkey, and the South Caucasus states (see below, Appendix). Other countries with influential ties to Central Asia include the United States, Germany, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Ukraine. In terms of ties with closeby states, Turkmenistan may be concerned more about bordering Iran and Afghanistan than with nonbordering
China, while Kazakhstan may be concerned more about bordering Russia than with nonbordering Iran. While soliciting and managing ties with these states, the Central Asian countries also seek assistance from international organizations, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Economic Community Organization (ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and NATO (See below, Appendix). 2
Outside powers,
while sometimes competing among themselves for influence in Central Asia, have also cooperated in carrying out
certain goals in the region. Iran and Russia have cooperated in trying to block U. S. and Turkish involvement in
developing Caspian Sea oil resources. Similarly, Russia has increased efforts to forge a "partnership"
with China on Central Asia issues. Russia and China share interests in stability in Central Asia and in forging
energy and other trade ties. RussiaChina rapprochement might present the Central Asian states with more formidable
hegemonic efforts, while RussiaChina rivalry might allow them to play one off against the other, or some states
may support Russia and others China. Russia's efforts have appeared to go along with growing antiAmerican tendencies
within the Russian government during 19981999, and the withdrawal (opposed by Russia) of Uzbekistan from the CIS
Collective Security Treaty. The Russian and Ira.Han foreign ministers in July 1999 jointly condemned Turkmenistan's
support for the U. S. backed transCaspian pipeline, and pledged cooperation to block U.S. influence in the region. 3
Some observers warn that cooperation or similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and China in countering the
West and in attempting to increase their own influence could heighten threats to the sovereignty and independence
of the Central Asian states. Others discount such threats, stressing the limited economic capabilities of the three
states, their diverging interests, and Russia's weakened regional influence.
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Security Problems and Progress
The problems of ethnic and civil strife and tensions, authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, and terrorism jeopardize the security and independence of the new states of Central Asia to varying degrees. Kazakhstan faces severe potential threats to its security, particularly rising Kazakh nationalism that may fuel separatism in northern Kazakhstan where ethnic Russians are dominant. Tajikistan faces the uncertain resolution of its civil war and possible separatism, particularly by its northern Leninabad region. Turkmenistan faces possible clan and regional tensions. Uzbekistan faces rising dissidence among its large ethnic Tajik population and what President Islam Kafimov views as Islamic extremism. Ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz clashed in 1990 in the Osh region in Kyrgyzstan, and tensions remain high.
Despite these problems, Turkmenistan's oil and gas wealth may contribute to its longterm stability. Its location at a locus of the Silk Road may also increase its economic security. Uzbekistan's large population and many resources, including oil, natural gas, and gold, also may provide a basis for stable development and security.
The strong presidents of the Central Asian states remain in power by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by sharply limiting political freedoms. They range in age from 47 (Tajik President Imomali Rakhmanov) to 61 (Uzbek President Islam Karimov), which suggests they might rule for many more years. 4 Regional stability might also be enhanced by affinities among the leaders. All learned a common political language (Russian), received similar Sovietera ideological training, and were acquainted with one another as Communist Party officials. Their ties also include family links with the marriage of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's daughter and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayevs son. On the other hand, if the leaders die or otherwise leave office, there are no heirs apparent (vice presidents or strong opposition party leaders), raising the danger of succession struggles. These struggles to gain power may be violent, given the low levels of democratization in the states, Some observers also argue that these personal ties and affinities can contribute to regional disorder, if instability in one Central Asian state draws in others.
Social Disorder
Most of the people in the Central Asian states have suffered steep declines in their quality of life since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The gap has widened between the rich and poor, accentuating social tensions and potential instability. Per capita gross domestic product has declined in all the states except Turkmenistan since they gained independence, dropping by about onehalf or more in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and somewhat less in Uzbekistan. Social services such as health and education, inadequate during the Soviet period, have declined further. Efforts to combat massive environmental problems threatening health and hampering economic recovery have made little headway. Attempts in Turkmenistan to cushion the decline in living standards through subsidies for flour, salt, water, and electricity have been deficient because supplies are often unavailable. In Kazakhstan, the government has given low priority to social welfare and has instead requested that foreign investors pay pensions and wage arrears and support sports, medical, and educational facilities, thereby eroding popular trust in the government.
Increased poverty could exacerbate ethnic tensions and the appeal of extremism, although living standards were low during the Soviet period, and a large percentage of the population remains employed in the agricultural sector where economic gyrations are somewhat buffered. The Central Asian states have appeared to weather the recent collapse of Asian and Russian economies, and declines in world prices in oil and other commodities, without major political and social repercussions. 5
Crime and Corruption
Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the states. The increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of foreign oil and natural gas investments, drug trafficking, and other means, the low pay of most government bureaucrats, and inadequate laws and norms, are conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps most important, the weakness of the rule of law permits the Sovietera political patronage and spoils system to continue. 6 The Kazakh prosecutorgeneral in June 1999 denounced corruption that "has penetrated all areas of economic and political life and has taken firm root in the corridors of power," and revealed that during 1998 and early 1999 his office had successfully prosecuted over 500 officials, disciplined almost 16,000, and obtained dismissals of over 3,000 for corruptionrelated offenses. 7 Even so, corruption remains high in Kazakhstan, and in other Central Asian states, and supposedly corrupt high officials are seldom prosecuted. Organized crime networks have expanded in all the Central Asian states, and those involved in drug smuggling to Russia and Europe reportedly have established links with Pakistani, Afghan, Nigerian, and other groups. Reportedly, Russian and Tajik border troops gain major revenues from bribes from drug and consumer goods smugglers.
Islamic Extremism
Calls for politics to be based on Sharia (Islamic law) and the Koran are supported by only small minorities in most of Central Asia. Most of Central Asia's Islamic population appears to support the concept of secular government and has had scant exposure to religion, but interest is growing. Tajikistan's civil conflict, where the issue of Islam in political life contributed to strife, has been an exception pointed to by several other Central Asian states to justify crackdowns. They also point to Russia’s recent conflict against Islamic extremists in its Dagestan region as evidence of the growing threat. In some cases, crackdowns ostensibly aimed against Islamic fundamentalism have masked ethnic, political, and religious repression. In some regions of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley, many Uzbeks kept Islamic practices alive throughout the repressive Soviet period, and some now oppose the secularoriented Uzbek government. Islamic fundamentalist threats to the regimes may grow if economic distress continues or deepens. The heavy unemployment and poverty among youth in the Fergana Valley is cited by some observers as making youth more vulnerable to religious extremism. 8
The Central Asian states impose several controls over religious freedom though they differ somewhat in assessing the threat posed by radical Islam. All forbid religious parties such as the Islamic Renewal Party (Tajikistan's civil war settlement envisages legalization), and maintain Sovietera religious control bodies and official Muftiates.
Many in Uzbekistan believe that it is increasingly vulnerable to Islamic extremism, and Uzbekistan has been at the forefront in Central Asia in combating this threat. Reportedly, hundreds of alleged Islamic extremists have been arrested and sentenced and many mosques have been closed. Restrictions were tightened when the legislature in 1998 passed a law on "freedom of worship" banning all unregistered faiths, forbidding religious dress in public, and making it a crime to teach religion without a license. The Uzbek legislature also approved amendments to the criminal code increasing punishments for setting up, leading, or participating in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist, or other illegal groups. The Karimov government launched a Council of Spirituality and Enlightenment in August 1999 to foster "national ideology and universal values," though some critics argued that its purpose is to counteract religious and political competition for citizens' loyalties. 9
Uzbek officials have alleged that various outside forces foment extremism. They also are concerned that ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks residing in Afghanistan and Tajikistan will spread Islamic extremism to Uzbekistan through kinship and other ties. In February 1999, Karimov accused Hezbe Tahrir (Liberation Party, a puritanical Islamic movement) of infiltrating Uzbekistan to create an Islamic caliphate, and in March, he accused the United Tajik Opposition (UTO, now sharing power in Tajikistan) of working with Islamic extremists to overthrow him. 10
In May 1998, the Uzbek, Russian, and Tajik presidents agreed that their security agencies would coordinate work to combat Islamic extremism, and the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC; see below) similarly in June 1999 pledged joint action against terrorism and religious and political extremism. Tensions between the Central Asian states have arisen, however, over the issue of Uzbeks fleeing religious repression in Uzbekistan and entering Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In June 1999, Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri agreed with Uzbekistan that the government and UTO would cooperate in expelling several hundred Uzbeks who were staying in UTOcontrolled areas in eastern Tajikistan. Several efforts to gain control over this unregistered refugee inflow have foundered, since some UTO commanders in the field have sympathized with the religious goals of the refugees. Akayev has allegedly permitted Uzbek security forces to pursue socalled Uzbek "Wahhabites" (a puritanical subsect of Sunni Islam; the term is often applied by Karimov and others to other fundamentalists) who have fled to southern Kyrgyzstan, and his security agencies have accused "Wahhabites" of two bombings in 1998. Nonetheless, he has criticized Uzbekistan as unfairly persecuting Wahhabites as extremists and noted that Wahhabites had supported his rule. 11
Terrorist Activities
Terrorist actions aimed at overthrowing regimes have been of growing concern in all the Central Asian 7 states and are often linked to concerns about Islamic extremism. Some analysts caution that many activities the regimes label as terrorist such as hijacking, kidnaping, robbery, assault, and murder are often carried out by individuals or groups for economic benefit or for revenge, rather than for political purposes. Also, charges of terrorism may mask repressive actions against religious or political opponents of the regime. A top official of the Kazakh National Security Council in testimony to the Majlis (legislature) in May 1999 argued that Kazakhstan faced increased terrorism fi7om conflict "hotspots" such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya and that Uighurs in Kazakhstan were trying to form terrorist and extremist organizations. He warned that terrorist activities in Uzbekistan, Russia, and elsewhere could spread to Kazakhstan because of relatively unsecure CIS borders. Among other Central Asian states, terrorist actions had long been characteristic of the Tajik civil war, and continue during the fitful implementation of the peace accords. The Kyrgyz National Security Ministry announced in May 1999 that it had foiled plans by twelve terrorists to set off bombs in downtown Bishkek. 12
Uzbek authorities have cracked down on suspect groups such as the Hezbe Tahrir, sentencing twelve members accused of threatening the constitution and promoting an Islamic state to lengthy prison terms in May 1999. Other alleged Hezbe Tahrir members were jailed in other cities. In August 1998, Karimov singled out Afghanistan as a "test ground" for terrorism. He warned that the Taliban might try to meddle in Central Asian affairs, but dismissed rumors that they planned to march on Samarkand (an Islamic center in Uzbekistan). While in 1998 Rakhmanov accused Uzbekistan of harboring terrorists that had attacked government forces in Tajikistan's Leninabad region, in March 1999, the Uzbek government asserted that there were terrorist camps in mountainous parts of Tajikistan's Karetegin area. TaJik and Uzbek authorities agreed to set up joint police forces to combat "terrorism and extremism" along their borders. Joint forces also have carried out several operations in the Fergana Valley against "Wahhabites, "who were accused by Uzbekistan of being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan and as seeking to overthrow the government.
The Uzbek Bombing. On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent's governmental area killed fifteen people and left over 100 injured. Uzbekistan had largely escaped such violence in its capital, so the bombing created tremendous shock among the leadership and population. The motives for the bombing remain murky although some trials have occurred. Karimov denounced the bombing as an attempt to assassinate him and to "sow fear and panic among the population." He charged on February 23 that groups outside Uzbekistan had infiltrated the country to carry out the bombing and to recruit Uzbek youth, and warned that "a battle for minds is underway" that will determine Uzbekistan's future, whether secular or "fanatic. Nonetheless, he hastened to reassure the populace and foreign investors that Uzbekistan "remains a stable country where democratic reforms continue and favorable cot.1itions will be created for business. " Uzbek authorities implicated figures such as Mohammad Omar (leader of Afghanistan's Taliban), and terrorists Usamah binLadin and Khottab (a leader of insurrection in Russia's Chechnya and Dagestan regions). Aiming, at his major political opponent, Karimov accused exiled Erk Party leader Mohammad Solikh of being a chief conspirator of the bombing. 13
The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 described as Islamic terrorists belonging to Hezbe Tahrir who allegedly received training in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (Chechnya) resulted in six receiving the death sentence and the rest lengthy prison sentences. In August, a second trial of six more "accomplices" to the bombings (five of the six were opposition party members) resulted in lengthy sentences. A trial of sixteen hostagetakers, said to be trained in Chechnya and also bent on establishing an Islamic state, ended on July 7, with two sentenced to death.
Civil War in Tajikistan. Tajikistan's cohesion as a state is threatened by regional and ethnic divisions, as well as geographically isolated areas. Its government was fractured in late 1992 by conflict among regional elites. With Russian and Uzbek military assistance, Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites were able to soon rout other regional and democratic, nationalist, and Islamic challengers to their power, resulting in large numbers of casualties, refugees, and displaced persons. In 1993, the CIS endorsed sending joint Russian and Central Asian "peacekeepers" to Tajikistan to safeguard what Yeltsin termed "CIS borders." The U.N. Security Council formally established a U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 to monitor a ceasefire. In late 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), a coalition body with executive powers, and in inid1997 signed a comprehensive peace agreement.
Prospects for peace in Tajikistan remain uncertain. Virtually all refugees and displaced persons have returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan. Government and UTO military forces have made some progress in integrating. The Rakhmanov government has named several former oppositionists to ministeriallevel posts, and the two sides have set a date for a constitutional referendum. On the other hand, Rakhmanov and the UTO possess only partial control over many nominal supporters. Fighting in late 1998 heightened concerns by some observers about secessionist tendencies in Leninabad region, ethnic tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan, and relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. According to some observers, the UTO may well win free and fair legislative and presidential elections, raising questions about a peaceful transfer of power. Russia's large role in security in Tajikistan is viewed by many analysts as jeopardizing Tajikistan's independence, while failing to safeguard it from drug trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism, and other transborder criminal activity.
Border and Ethnic Tensions
Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated by 1936, based partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly on the exigencies of Soviet control of the region. Some in Central Asia have demanded that these borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by coethnics, or otherwise dispute the location of borders. Various problems complicate the full demarcation of borders, including surveying the extreme topography of most of the region. China has largely settled border demarcation with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but not with wartorn Tajikistan. The problem of ambiguous borders is most salient to Russia and Kazakhstan, since northern Kazakhstan has a large concentration of ethnic Russians. Neither Russia nor Kazakhstan wishes to push demarcation, Russia because it would concede that Kazakhstan's heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because demarcation may inflame separatism. Border demarcation among the Caspian Sea littoral states also is a contentious issue.
Uzbekistan's border claims have contributed to tense relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In October 1998, Karimov and Nazarbayev signed an "eternal friendship" treaty that called for opening talks to settle contentious border demarcation problems. In discussing ratification of the treaty in midMay, a few deputies in Kazakhstan's upper legislative chamber warned of Uzbek border encroachments in the Aral Sea and areas of southern Kazakhstan. Despite the treaty, irredentist claims by some in Uzbekistan created added concern in Kazakhstan in July - August 1999. 14
Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open or closed. Open borders within the CIS have been blamed by some in the CIS as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband. Others have supported open borders as encouraging trade. According to the Kazakh Customs Committee chairman on June 12, 1999, Uzbekistan in effect has created a visa regime for travel to Kazakhstan. He announced that the two sides had reached agreement on opening four border crossings and closing the rest, at Uzbekistan's insistence, sharply cutting down travel routes between the two states. He also stated that Kazakhstan would place border troops at these crossings and along Kazakhstan's borders with Uzbekistan, in line with Uzbekistan's actions. 15
In late February 1999, Karimov criticized democratization in Kyrgyzstan as destabilizing and made other statements interpreted by some Kyrgyz as maligning Akayev. The criticism heightened ethnic tensions along the contested UzbekKyrgyz border and led to calls by the Kyrgyz legislature to increase security along the border. The tensions along the border contributed to Kyrgyzstan's decision in February to pull its border troops back from the TajikAfghan border and redeploy them along its borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. An Uzbek airborne brigade is stationed in the Fergana Valley, near the Kyrgyz border. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in mid 1999 cut gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan because of payment arrears, while Kyrgyzstan in turn temporarily cut water supplies to Kazakhstan for similar reasons.
Neighboring Central Asian states have braced for a possible influx of refugees from Afghanistan associated with successful Taliban offensives in northern Afghanistan in 19981999, and also have moved to fortify borders against the spillover of conflict.. According to many observers, Central Asians are most concerned about the influx of refugees and displaced persons from Afghanistan, including armed bands, the increased smuggling of drugs and weapons, and the influence of Islamic fundamentalism.
Economic and Defense Security
The Central Asian states have worked to bolster their economic and defense capabilities by seeking assistance from individual Western donors such as the United States, by cooperating with each other, and by joining myriad international organizations, including the ECO, OIC, CIS, EU bodies, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), and GUUAM. 16 Regional cooperation has included the formation of the CAEC, including the U.N.sanctioned Central Asian Battalion (Centrazbat; see below). Regional cooperation has faced recent challenges from economic crises in Asia and Russia, differential economic development and hence divergent interests among the states, and more nationalistic postures. Cooperation also is undermined by what the states view as Uzbekistan's overbearing impulses. This has contributed to TaJikistan's countervailing ties with Russia, Turkmenistan's ties with Iran, and Kyrgyzstan's and Kazakhstan's ties with Russia and China.
All of the Central Asian states have been faced with creating small military and border forces and have had vexing problems with military financing and training. At first dependent on the contract service of Russian troops and officers in their nascent militaries, the states now rely little on such manpower (except for TaJikistan), but continue to depend on training and equipment ties with Russia. The capabilities of the military, border, and other security forces are limited, compared to those of neighboring states such as Russia, China, or Iran. Forces range from about 8,00010,000 troops in TaJikistan (excluding Russians) to nearly 100,000 in Uzbekistan.17 Karimov in February 1999 admitted that his security forces, the largest in Central Asia, had been "unprepared" to prevent the bombing of the capital. The states have variously solicited training and technical assistance from the United States, Turkey, China, and other countries, have forged security ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and NATO's PFP, and cooperated in regional bodies such as CAEC and GUUAM. Some analysts warn that if the Central Asian states become involved in conflicts among themselves, they might seek to draw in outside powers to bolster their small militaries.
The Central Asian states (except Tajikistan) have generally criticized the CIS as both ineffective and dominated by Russia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined Russia and Belarus in a CIS customs union, but it remains moribund. These states also reaffirmed the CIS Collective Security Treaty when it came up for renewal in early 1999. 18 Turkmenistan did not sign the treaty, citing its neutral status. Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999. In an interview on April 26, Karimov criticized CIS security agreements as jeopardizing Uzbekistan's independence, but also stated that Uzbekistan would accept military aid from Russia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participate in CIS (in actuality, Russian) air defense and air force programs and exercises.
Cooperation among the Central Asian states has been halting. A customs union formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in January 1994 (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have since joined) has achieved some modest success as a regional forum, but cooperation has been stymied by autarchic policies and tensions among the members, according to some observers. Renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in July 1998, it consists of an executive committee of heads of state and government, a Council of Foreign Ministers, Centrazbat, and a Central Asian Bank. The Central Asian Bank is underfunded. Uzbekistan retains some price controls and its currency is not freely convertible. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have placed tariffs on each other's goods. More successful has been Centrazbat, formed in 1995 under U.N. auspices, and envisaged by the U.N. as becoming a source for standby peacekeepers. Centrazbat fosters cooperation among regional states and training ties to the U.N. and NATO. Exercises undertaken under NATO's PFP have including settling border disputes. However, cooperation among the members is not great and the national armed forces appear to be following different paths as they move away from the Soviet model.
In another area of regional cooperation, the GUUAM states are share a common interest in securing energy transport and supply that is outside Russian control, and they are involved in joint efforts to guard the AzerbaijanGeorgia oil pipeline. Formed in 1997, GUAM admitted Uzbekistan as a member in April 1999 while leaders and officials were attending the Washington NATO Summit. Karimov stated that Uzbekistan joined the group to facilitate the delivery of its oil and gas resources to Western markets. It may be that the induction ceremony was timed to prod NATO to pay more attention to Central Asian and South Caucasian security issues. 19
Water Resources. Growing demand for limited water resources may threaten the stability of the region and hinder economic development (though more efficient water use would be ameliorative). River diversion and the overuse and misuse of water for cotton growing have drained the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers, so that little or no water reaches the Aral Sea, creating regionwide environmental problems. Regional cooperation on water management has foundered, replaced by ad hoc arrangements. The need for regional and wider cooperation was evidenced in early 1999 when China began construction to divert part of the Irtysh River into a new canal in its Xinjiang region. Kazakhstan and Russia, through which the river also flows, were concerned that the project might endanger their hydroelectric power generation and riverbased shipping, and urgently called for talks with China. In a meeting in midMay 1999, the Chinese assured the Kazakhs that their interests would not be harmed by the canal and pledged to exchange information, on further plans to divert water from the Irtysh and Ili transborder rivers.
Energy and Transport. Regional transport links include the railway from Druzhba in Kazakhstan to Urumchi in China, opened in 1992. China and Pakistan are assisting Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to upgrade the Karakaroum Highway from Urumchi to Pakistan. A railway link between Iran and Turkmenistan opened in 1996. The EUsponsored Transport Corridor EuropeCaucasusCentral Asia (TRACECA) program started in 1993, aimed at the recreation of the "silk road" linking East and West. The transport routes would bypass Russia and enhance the independence of the Central Asian states. A working group meets yearly and a major TRACECA conference was held in Baku in 1998. TRACECA and China are working on a road from Kyrgyzstan's Osh region to China. Another EU program, INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), focuses on rehabilitation, modernization, and extension of oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian region to the West. To a significant degree, Central Asia's energy security may depend on stability in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, if transCaspian oil and gas pipelines are built through these countries to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
The Central Asian states face pressures from Russia's energy corporations and government to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia and to sever ties with Western firms. These efforts include some freemarket moves such as building pipelines and obtaining shares in Central Asian consortiums, but Russia's firms and government lack investment wherewithal, leading them to sometimes pursue negative measures such as blocking Western investment and Central Asian exports. For instance, Russia cut off Turkmen gas exports to the West in 1994 and forced it to ship its gas to CIS states unable to pay, such as Ukraine. Russia placed strict quotas on oil shipments through its pipelines to pressure Kazakhstan to yield shares in energy projects. These quotas were raised somewhat in 1996 when Russian firms were granted shares in consortia developing oil fields. Russian interests hold a major share in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which is building a 930mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, planned for completion in 2001. The Russian government has sometimes been more reactionary than Russian oil firms, blocking investment in 1997 by Russian firms in a disputed Caspian Sea field, and working with Iran to raise legal obstacles to nonRussian energy projects in the Caspian Sea (See also below, Appendix, Russia). 20
Turkmenistan is currently largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1997, Russia cut off Turkmen gas shipments to other CIS members because of transit fee arrears and other problems. Turkmenistan called for Russia to lower its transit fees and to permit gas shipments to Europe, but talks with Russia's Gazprom natural gas firm and Russian officials were unsuccessful until late 1998, when Turkmenistan and Ukraine acceded to Gazprom's pricing demands for gas shipments to Ukraine. Seeking alternatives, Turkmenistan in late 1997 opened a 125mile gas pipeline from a Turkmen gas field to the Iranian pipeline system for use in northern Iran. A 1998 framework agreement and a May 1999 gas supply agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan envisage Turkmen gas flows to Turkey when a pipeline either traversing Iran or a transCaspian route through Azerbaijan and Georgia are built. 21
Perhaps marking growing dissatisfaction with Russian delays in opening pipelines, and Moscows use of pipeline pressure to extract economic concessions, in December 1997, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, Kazakh President Nazarbayev, and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to explore building an oil pipeline under the Caspian Sea to link up with the proposed AzerbaijaniGeorgian pipeline to Ceyhan. In October 1998, these leaders where joined by Karimov and the Turkish president in signing the "Ankara Declaration" endorsing the BakuCeyhan route with a transCaspian extension. Turkmenistan later endorsed this route. Kazakh officials have emphasized that the eastwest route will supplement its planned pipeline to Novorossiisk and perhaps others. (See also CRS Report 9886, Iran and Central Asia, and Issue Brief 95024, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.)
NonProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
International concerns over the proliferation risks posed by Central Asia's nuclear research and power reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities have been heightened by increasing Western, Russian, and Central Asian media reports of attempted diversions of nuclear materials to terrorist states or criminal groups. These elements of the nuclear fuel cycle are often only minimally secured, and personnel may be poorly paid, creating targets of opportunity. Kazakhstan is reported to possess onefourth of the world's uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world's top producers of yellow cake (low enriched uranium), 22 Major customers for Kazakhstan's yellow cake have included the United States and Europe. Kazakhstan's Ulba fuel fabrication facility provides nuclear pellets to Russia and other NIS. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at its Caspian port of Aktau, the world's only nuclear desalinization facility. Decommissioned in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Uzbek's Navoi milling facility exports yellow cake through the U. S. firm Nukem. Kyrgyzstan's Kara Balta milling facility ships lowenriched uranium to Ulba. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era, raising major concerns in these states about possible environmental and proliferation dangers. (See also CRS Issue Brief 93108, Central Asia's New States.)
Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking
The increasing production, trafficking, and use of illegal narcotics in Central Asia endanger the security, independence, and development of the states by stunting economic and political reforms and bolstering crime, corruption, and social problems. As a conduit, the region receives increasing attention from criminal groups smuggling narcotics from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere to markets in Russia and Europe. Afghanistan is the main producer state trafficking drugs through the region." Organized crime groups based in producer countries have been able to expand their influence in Central Asia because of poorly patrolled borders, lack of cooperation among the states, lawlessness, and corruption among officials, police, and border guards. Also, problems with traditional export routes for Asian drugs have encouraged the use of Central Asia as a key heroin transhipment route. Nigerian organized crime groups reportedly tranship some Pakistani heroin through Central Asia to Russian markets, and sell some in Central Asia. Even Latin American crime groups have reportedly smuggled drugs into Central Asia destined for Russia, such as cocaine from Brazil. These and other international organized crime groups are integrating Central Asian crime groups into their operations. 24
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have become major trafficking countries for illicit drugs fi7om Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, mainly because of their rugged and porous border terrain and the Tajik government's limited control over its territory. Kyrgyzstan is deeply concerned about rising drug trafficking from Afghanistan through its Osh Valley. The most common drug trafficked is opium, though the heroin trade is growing. Some drugs transiting Turkmenistan allegedly are sent to Kazakhstan! s Caspian Sea port of Aktau, for further shipment to Russia or the South Caucasus states. Drugs produced in or transiting Tajikistan enter Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan for shipment to Russia and the West. According to the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP), most of the heroin entering Russia is trafficked through Central Asia. 25
According to the State Department, Kazakhstan is increasingly a producer of illicit drugs, primarily cannabis. The State Department estimates an annual harvest of 500 metric tons of cannabis from the Chu Valley, which is perhaps the world's largest area of wild plants. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are not major world producers of illicit drugs, though reportedly there are opium processing facilities in Kyrgyzstan's Osh Valley and in Tajikistan's Gorno Badakhshan region. Tajikistan is the largest grower of opium poppies in Central Asia. Turkmenistan is a traditional cultivator and user of opium. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Samarkand) used to grow opium poppies for Moscow for medicinal purposes. In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, these crops have been largely eradicated.
Counternarcotics
efforts in the Central Asian states are just being organized and are hampered by inadequate budgets, personnel
training, and equipment. Tajikistan has an Administration for Control Over Illegal DrugTrafficking under the Interior
Ministry, and also a State Commission on Control Over Illegal Drug Trafficking. Tajikistan's antiterrorism directorate
in the Security Ministry also cooperates with other CIS in investigating drug smuggling. There has been little
effort in Turkmenistan to combat drug trafficking, though Niyazov has accused law enforcement and other officials
of colluding with drug traffickers. Kazakhstan set up a counternarcotics training facility in 1998. In
March 1998, Kyrgyzstan charged several police officers, including the head of the antidrug
police in Osh region, of operating a drug smuggling network. An antinarcotics meeting of law enforcement officials
of the Central Asian states, sponsored by the UNDCP, opened in Ashkhabad in March 1999.
They called for equipment and scientific literature. UNDCP
has sponsored training for police, most recently in August 1999
for sixty officers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
26
Implications for U.S. Interests
In congressional testimony on March 17, 1999, Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States Steve Sestanovich stated that the overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to secure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states of the region, and that much progress in this regard had occurred since the Soviet Union broke up. This goal is pursued by advocating democratization (because it is "the longterm guarantor of stability and prosperity"), adherence to international human fights standards, free markets (including support for U.S. trade and investment), cooperation within the region (including on building east-west pipelines and on defense), conflict resolution, and responsible security policies (including nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics). Although the Central Asian states may make halting progress in some areas, he stated, the Administration is committed to continue working with them.
These U.S. objectives, according to Sestanovich, are supported by another priority of U.S. policy to discourage attempts by other countries and groups to block or subvert progress toward these objectives or otherwise to threaten regional and international peace and stability. U.S. efforts to contain Iranian extremism and recrudescent Russian foreign policy are being partly played out in Central Asia. flighlighting these U.S. concerns, Sestanovich in testimony in 1998 stressed the "big stake" of the United States in assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South Caucasus into the world community, interests that are "strategic" and "vital.” 27
Among significant U.S. ties, all the Central Asian leaders except Karimov have visited the United States within the past two years. First Lady Hillary Clinton toured the region in 1997. U.S. business has invested more in Central Asia (and Azerbaijan) than in therest of the NIS. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan initially were focused on human rights concerns, but shifted to also include security concerns. ThenDefense Secretary William Perry stressed during his visit to Uzbekistan in April 1995 that it was strategically located at the crossroads of Central Asia and was a potential regional economic power, and pledged U.S. support to foster its emergence as a pillar of democratization and stability in the region. The State Department announced in late June 1997 that a U.S.Uzbekistan Joint Commission would be formed to expand all aspects of our bilateral relationship," because "in geopolitical terms [and] commercially, it is a very important country for the United States."
U.S. efforts to help resolve conflicts in the new independent states (NIIS) have included naming a State Department Coordinator of Regional Affairs, whose portfolio has included helping to settle the Tajik civil war. Similarly, US interest in Caspian oil and gas led in 1998 to the creation of the post of Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, to coordinate TDA, OPIC, Eximbank and other agency programs to ensure the "development of the Caspian and open commercial access to its energy resources."
U.S. Security Assistance
Besides diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reform aid, the Administration has backed modest U. S. security assistance to the region. All the states receive U.S. aid to combat narcotics trafficking and aid to enhance their export control regimes and border security to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security assistance to Central Asia amounted to over $184 million in cumulative obligations through FYI 998, mostly for Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) programs in Kazakhstan (see below). The U. S. foreign aid request for FY2000 emphasized boosting security assistance to all the Central Asian states (except Tajikistan, where fostering democratization and UNIMOT aid were emphasized), accounting for most of the increase in aid to these states from last year. The biggest boosts planned were in programs to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, part of the Administration's Expanded Threat Reduction initiative. Other increases were planned for foreign military financing for Centrazbat and national armed forces; INIET programs; combating international crime (law enforcement, customs and border training), and antinarcotics criminal justice training in forensics and investigation. Although the request appears not fully funded by Congress, aid for these Central Asian programs may not be affected as much as aid to some other NIS and programs. (See CRS Report RS20203, The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative; also below, Issues for Congress.)
According to Ambassador Sestanovich on March 17, 1999, the United States has a major security interest in eliminating the proliferation threats posed by Sovietera militaryindustrial assets in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that are 11attractive targets to countries, such as Iran, seeking to acquire advanced military technologies on the cheap." As of September 30, 1998, $175.75 Million in CTR program and Department of Energy funds for denuclearization, demilitarization, enhancing the "chain of custody," and materials protection, control, and accounting had been obligated to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (most went to Kazakhstan). Such material physical protection aid provided to Kazakhstan's Ulba Metallurgical Plant includes alarms, computers for inventory control, and hardening of doors. 28 Similar aid has been provided for Kazakhstan's Aktau reactor, and agreements were signed at the November 1997 meeting of the U.S.Kazakh Joint Commission to study how to safely and securely store over 300 metric tons of highly- enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel from the reactor. An accord on U.S. aid for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan was also signed. The Administration has requested funds beginning in FY2000 for an Expanded Threat Reduction program, some of which is planned for Central Asia.
At the U.S.Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR Implementation Agreement on securing, dismantling, and decontaminating the Sovietera Nukus chemical research facility. The extent and the cost of the efforts required remain to be determined. Other aid will help keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. scientists are also assisting in assessing dangers associated with a Sovietera CBW testing site and dump on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Western media in June 1999 reported the alarming discovery of live anthrax spores in the dump. Kazakhstan has received CTR funds for dismantling equipment and for environmental monitoring at several Sovietera CBW facilities. 29 (See also CRS Issue Brief 11394029, Chemical Weapons Convention.)
CounterNarcotics Aid. According to the State Department and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), drugs produced in or transiting Central Asia have not yet reached the United States in major quantities. However, there is rising U.S. concern, since Latin American and other international organized groups have become involved in the Central Asian drug trade, and European governments have begun to focus on combating drug trafficking through this new route. U.S. policy also emphasizes the threat of rising crime, corruption, and instability posed by illegal narcotics production, use, and trafficking in Central Asia. The FBI, DEA, and Customs have given training in counternarcotics to police, customs, and border control personnel in Central Asia as part of the AntiCrime Training and Technical Assistance Program sponsored by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In FYI 998, about 180 Kazak, 138 Kyrgyz, 22 Tajik, 64 Turkmen, and 91 Uzbek law enforcement officials participated in these courses, which included basic and advanced counternarcotics efforts. Some Tajik and Turkmen drug officials also have received training at the Budapest ILEA, and the U. S. Coast Guard provided officer training in 1999. Other assistance has included training materials and drug test kits for Kazakhstan. Other U.S. aid is provided through the UNDCP. 30 (For an overview, see CRS Issue Brief 88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Options, updated regularly.)
Military Aid. The United States and the Central Asian states (except Tajikistan) have signed defense cooperation accords providing frameworks for aid and joint staff and working group contacts. 31 A substantial portion of U.S. military assistance to the region has been provided under the aegis of NATO's PFP, which all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan had joined by mid 1994. Several military exercises involving U.S., Central Asian, and other NIS troops have been held, including Centrazbat exercises. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 1997 became eligible to receive FNIF grants through the PFP program for acquisition of U.S. military articles and services. FMF aid supports military interoperability with NATO and participation in PFP exercises, and has included communications equipment, computers, medical items, and English language and NCO training. They also will be eligible in FY2000 to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA), which will enhance interoperability with NATO. The IMET program supports PFP by providing English language training to military officers and exposure to democratic civilmilitary relations.
Safety of U.S. Citizens and Investments
The U.S. State
Department reports that all the states except Tajikistan are low risk for ethnic and political violence that might
involve foreigners. At the same time, in all the states, widespread corruption is an obstacle to U.S. firms seeking
to invest. Kazakhstan, though viewed as low risk for political violence, including insurrections, has had economic
protests that potentially could involve Western firms. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, U.S. firms have reported
that corruption is pervasive throughout the central and regional governments and most sectors of the economy, and
is an obstacle to U.S. investment. Uzbekistan has no known incidents of damage to Western firms or politicallymotivated
violence against U.S. personnel. Corruption is rampant in the government, with bureaucrats seeking bribes as business
“consultants.” Some
officials have been prosecuted for corruption. The risk of political violence in Tajikistan is high but declining.
Corruption is pervasive and is an integral part of the government. There are no programs to combat corruption and
anticorruption laws are inadequate.
In terms of crime, the State Department warns that Western investment property and personnel are not safe in Tajikistan, The international consulting firm Control Risks Group has concurred that crime poses unacceptable risks to the safety of foreigners in Tajikistan, and cautions that rising crime in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley and areas bordering Afghanistan pose growing threats to safety. 32
Embassy
Security. U.S. and Kazakh officials cooperated to avert potential
security threats against the U.S. embassy in 1998, and the two sides signed a statement in late 1998 pledging cooperation
to combat terrorism. During the Tajik civil war, U.S. personnel faced various threats and some embassy personnel
were evacuated during flareups of fighting. Two U.S. Embassy guards were killed in Dushanbe in February 1997 while
offsite but in uniform. After the bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, and intense
fighting in Dushanbe, U.S. embassy operations in Dushanbe were suspended in September 1998 and diplomatic staff
were moved to Almaty in Kazakhstan (some incountry personnel remain). U. S. officials stated that the U. S. Embassy
in Tajikistan was judged to be highly vulnerable to terrorism, that the security situation in Dushanbe was problematical,
and that operations would recommence in Dushanbe when secure facilities were obtained. Some in Congress have also
urged rebuilding the Uzbek embassy to make it more secure against terrorism. (See also CRS Reports 98771, Embassy Security; and
9873 3, Terrorism: U.S. response
to bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.)
Issues for Congress
Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central Asia and other NIS. Attention has included several hearings and legislation, the latter including earmarks at times for aid for Kyrgyzstan, sense of Congress provisions on U.S. policy toward Central Asia, and endorsements of aid for energy development. 33 Increased funding for the NIS region contained in the FY2000 foreign aid request has appeared to be scaled back by Congress. (On August 3, 1999, the House approved H.R. 2606, the FY2000 foreign operations bill. It provides $725 million for the former Soviet Union, 30% less than the Administration request and 14% less than FY1999. On June 30, the Senate approved S. 1234, the FY2000 foreign operations bill. It provides $780 million for the NIS account, 24% less than the request and 8% less than FYI 999.) At Congressional hearings in the first half of 1999 on the FY2000 NIS aid request, some Members appeared supportive of the Administration's plans for programs in the nonRussian NIS, including Central Asia, but less receptive to other NIS programs and requested funding levels. Conferees on H.R.2606/S.1234 may address increased funding for Expanded Threat Reduction programs in Central Asia and other NIS. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief 95077: The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance, updated regularly.)
Should the United States Play a Prominent Role in Central Asia?
The Administration and others have argued that the United States should emphasize ties with the Central Asian states. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights in these new states. They stress that the openness of the current regimes and societies to the West should be bolstered, so that the region does not move into the orbit of anti-Western or extremist powers.
Those who object to current U.S. engagement with Central Asia argue that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and that developments there remain marginal to U.S. interests.34 They advocate limited U.S. involvement undertaken along with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure general U.S. goals of preventing strife, fostering democratization and regional cooperation, and improving human rights and the quality of life. Some even accord a major role for a democratizing Russia in the region. They argue that the region's energy resources are relatively small and will not greatly influence Western energy security, that there are complex energy delivery problems, and that there is ethnic turmoil and a lack of regional integration.
What are U.S. Interests in Central Asia?
While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on the general desirability of fostering such objectives in Central Asia as democratization, the creation of free markets, trade and investment, integration with the West, and responsible security policies, others urge different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement. Many of those who endorse current policy or urge enhanced U.S. aid for Central Asia support the view that political instability in Central Asia can produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey. They also point out that, although Kazakhstan is now free of nuclear weapons, the presence of nuclear weaponsrelated materials and facilities and other elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in the region raises the danger of proliferation to radical Third World regimes or terrorist organizations. U.S. interests, they maintain, are served by assisting the Central Asian states in preventing such proliferation.
Others point to lingering civil and ethnic conflict in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region as a reason for the United States to eschew major involvement that might place U. S. personnel and citizens in danger. They also discount fears that Islamic fundamentalism, such as that fostered by Iran, will soon make headway and threaten the secular regimes or U.S. and Western interests.
Calling for greater U.S. policy attention to Central Asia and South Caucusus, Senator Sam Brownback introduced "Silk Road" legislation in the 105th, and 106th Congresses. Similar legislation was sponsored in the House by Representative Benjamin Gilman (105th) and Representative Doug Bereuter (106th). 35 The House approved a "Silk Road" bill on August 2, 1999 (H.R. 1152). On June 30, 1999, the Senate approved an amendment to Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2001 (S. 1234) incorporating the text of the Silk Road Act, as amended. In introducing the amendment, Senator Brownback pointed out that the Central Asian and South Caucasian states are "caught between world global forces that seek to have them under their control." Russia and China, he stated, seek to have prominent influence in the new states, as do Iran and Afghanistan, who also vie to install obedient Islamic fundamentalist regimes in most of the states. To counter such goals, he argued, the United States should emphasize democratization, the creation of free markets, and the development of energy and trade with the region to bolster its independence and proWestern orientations. 36 On August 4, the Senate struck all but the enacting clause of H.R.2606, Foreign Operations Appropriations, substituted the language of S. 1234, and requested a conference. 37
What Roles Should Outside Powers Play in the Region?
Although many U.S. policyrnakers argue that a democratizing Russia could play a positive role in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts to dominate the region. Some observers warn that a less democratic Russia might soon seek to reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire. Others, however, discount such plans by a Russia facing immense internal economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder, but nonetheless endorse close monitoring of Russian activities that might infringe on the independence of the NIS. Others appear to acquiesce to Russia's argument of historic rights to a "sphere of influence" in Central Asia that provides a reduced scope for U.S. involvement.
According to some critics, Administration policy should focus more clearly on reducing or refereeing Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence in the region so that the Central Asian states can develop freely. U.S. interests may correspond to China's or other outside states' interests in political and economic stability and improved transport in the region, so that the coordination of some activities in the region becomes possible. 38 U.S. interest in the Caspian region might also conflict with U.S. relations with Russia, Iran, or China, leading to tradeoffs. The U.S. interest in restricting Iran's financial ability to sponsor international terrorism, for instance, may conflict with desires by Central Asian states to build pipelines through Iran. U.S. Iranian rapprochement might contribute to a less hostile Iranian attitude toward pro-U.S. governments in Central Asia and U.S. regional investment. In the cases of Russia and China, the deterioration of their relations with the United States might contribute to a more hostile attitude toward U. S. influence and investment in Central Asia and more determined individual or joint moves to establish spheres of influence in the region. U.S. poor relations with Iran and questions about Russia's role contribute to U.S. support for the Ceyhan pipeline route.
While the Administration has supported a role for Turkey in the region, others argue that its domestic problems hinder its positive influence. Some call for the United States to recognize Iran's ties with the region, and not press the Central Asian states to limit economic and political ties. Representative Robert Ney on April 21, 1999, called for the United States to seek to improve relations with Iran, arguing that the lack of dialogue harms U.S. ties with Central Asia, "with whom Iran has had historic cultural and strategic interests.” 39
Some observers charge that the Administration views ties with Central Asia through the lenses of U.S. Russian relations. They call for the reorganization of the State Department to create a regional emphasis on Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan, rather than a focus on "former Soviet republics." They identify such "lenses" in Sestanovich's testimony in April 1998, when he stated that the United States "does not object" to the presence of Russian troops in other NIS if the states "consent freely" to their presence, and that Russia does not seek to control the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Representative Doug Bereuter countered that the United States should object to Russian troops in other NIS, and questioned Russian motives in those regions. 40 Others identify a U.S. preoccupation with ties With China. Representative Dana Rohrabacher on June 29, 1999, warned against extending most-favorednation (normal trade relations) status to China, arguing that China seeks to dominate Central Asia, including by making territorial claims and through "a massive influx of Chinese into the sparsely populated Central Asian republics." 41 House language in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (H. R. 140 1 /S. 105 9) reflects these concerns about China, calling for the establishment of a Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University, and requesting that the Center assess Chinese intentions regarding Central Asia.
How Significant Are Regional Energy Resources to U.S. Interests?
The Administration contends that the participation of U.S. firms in developing regional energy resources bolsters the U.S. economy, enhances the sovereignty of the states and their ties with the West, breaks Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, promotes Western energy security through diversified suppliers, and assists ally Turkey. A U.S. role also discourages the building of pipelines that transit "energy competitor" Iran or otherwise gives Iran undue regional influence. The Administration endorses building a transCaucasus gas pipeline to Turkey, with a transCaspian link to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as part of the "Eurasian Transport Corridor" given Administration impetus in 1997. 42
Critics of Administration policy question the economic viability of Ceyhan and transCaspian pipeline routes given uncertainties about regional stability, ownership of Caspian Sea fields, world oil and gas prices, and the size of regional reserves. They question whether the oil and other natural resources in these new states are vital to U.S. security and point out that they are, in any event, unlikely to be fully available to Western markets for many years. The GAO has said that oil from Kazakhstan will probably not be a major source for the United States, because its planned production would be only a small fraction of total U.S. consumption. 43
Some of those who oppose U.S. policy also juxtapose an emphasis on energy development in these states to what they term the neglect of broaderbased economic reforms that they argue would better serve the population of the region. Other critics argue that the Administration's policy against energy routes and projects involving Iran makes it more likely that the Central Asian states will have to rely for several more years on Russia's willingness to export their oil. They criticize what they view as conflicting Administration signals, such as Secretary Albright's July 1997 statement that the United States would not necessarily oppose foreign investment in building a pipeline through Iran to Turkey to transport Turkmen gas, "to help Turkey and Turkmenistan," as long as the pipeline was not used for shipping Iranian gas. 44 The State Department later reemphasized continued U. S. opposition to U. S. and foreign investment in developing Iranian oil and gas fields and opposition to building pipelines through Iran.
What U.S. Security Involvement is Appropriate?
Those who endorse growing U.S. security assistance to Central Asia stress that the region was host to Sovietera weapons of mass destruction and their research and development facilities, and that these technologies, materials, and personnel might fall prey to terrorist states or groups. They view military education and training programs as bolstering human rights, fostering the creation of a professional, Westernstyle military and democratic civilmilitary relations, and reducing chances of military coups. Training that these militaries receive through PFP is multinational in scope, involving cooperation among regional militaries, with the purpose of spurring these states to continue to work together. They also argue that as Iran increases its military capabilities, including missiles and possibly nuclear weapons, the Central Asian states may necessarily seek closer countervailing ties with the United States.
Critics argue that the United States should primarily seek to encourage demilitarization in the region. They oppose providing formal security guarantees to the region, and endorse making it plain that U.S. security assistance implies no defense "umbrella." 45 A few critics assert that the region is not a vital U.S. interest and that EDA and other such aid is a waste of taxpayers' money.
Should the United States Try to Foster Democratization?
While Central Asia's leaders have appeared to counterpose stability to democratization, and opted for stability, the Administration and other observers have generally viewed the two concepts as complementary, particularly in the long term. They suggest that although the Central Asian states are making scant democratization progress, over a generation or so the states may emulate the positive features of Turkish or other secular democracies. In the meantime, the United States should be watchfully engaged and encourage the states to uphold human rights, according to this view. This wide engagement policy was explained at a hearing held by the Congressional Helsinki Commission on May 6, 1999, where Representative Michael Forbes asked if the United States should link U.S. aid to Kazakhstan's democratization progress. State Department official Ross Wilson responded that the Administration has "serious reservations" about such a linkage, and stressed that other salient U. S. policy goals included halting proliferation and fostering free market reforms, energy development, U.S. business, and regional cooperation. 46 Senator Brownback on June 30, 1999 also cautioned against "ignoring" the region because of faltering democratization and human rights violations, arguing that "it is important to engage and continue to encourage a positive process."
Critics of this
policy have suggested that the Administration's stress on gradual and peaceful political change connotes U.S. support
for the stability of current leadership. They warn that U.S. support may unwittingly assist the regimes to stay
in power, and might even encourage a countervailing rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of
dissent. Still others oppose most aid for democratization programs they view as unlikely to succeed in cultures
historically attuned to authoritarianism. (For
details, see CRS Report 98642, Democratization
in the New Independent States.)
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Appendix:
Selected Outside Players
Russia. For the Central Asian states, the challenge is to maintain useful ties with Russia without allowing it undue influence. This concern is most evident in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and less so in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan, because of its shared 4,200 mile border with Russia and its relatively large ethnic Russian population, is highly vulnerable to Russian influence. In wartorn Tajikistan, President Rakhmanov has welcomed Russian influence that has helped keep him in power.
While in 1995, Yeltsin declared that Russia's policy toward the CIS was to “create an economically and politically integrated union of states," 47 in actuality there has been waning Russian influence in Central Asia, marked by declines in trade, military presence, and the numbers of ethnic Russians residing in the region. The use of the Russian language in official and informal discourse has declined with the increasing use of national languages. Some observers suggest that, compared to its interests in the South Caucasus, Russia seems to be paying less attention to Central Asia (except Kazakhstan).
Russia's behavior in Central Asia partly depends on alternative futures of Russian domestic politics, though regardless of scenario, Russia may well retain some economic and other influence in the region as a legacy of Tsarist and Soviet power. This push could intensify if antireformist hardliners gain more influence over Russia's domestic politics. These hardliners might call for the reintegration of former Soviet republics, brushing aside current concerns by many in Russia that such efforts as the RussiaBelarus union are detrimental to Russia's economy and security. The hardlinerdominated Russian Duma in early 1996 resolved that former republics should reintegrate on a "voluntary" basis. Most former Soviet republics harshly rejected the Duma call, illustrating their sensitivities about Russia's future course. 48 Uzbekistan, especially, vows to resist reintegration pressures. It is possible that, even barring major reintegration efforts, Russia can still use its military and security forces to manipulate Central Asian states which possess much weaker military and security capabilities.
Russian officials have emphasized that Russia retains major interests in Central Asia, expressed in terms of strategic security, economic interests, and concern over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Russian influence has been greatest in the security sphere (though that is waning), moderate in the economic sphere, and minimal in the political sphere, except for obtaining assurances on the treatment of ethnic Russians. Russian strategic concerns have focused on criminal activities such as drug trafficking and civil conflict in the region, and the role of the region as a buffer to Islamic fundamentalism. Russia has endeavored to meet its strategic concerns by concluding bilateral military arms and training, basing, and border security agreements, as well as multilateral accords such as the CIS Collective Security Treaty. These agreements have been fitfully implemented. Russia has military bases in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Russian border troops defend "CIS borders" in Tajikistan, but have had little success in halting drug trafficking from Afghanistan. 49 Russia has pointed to military gains in Afghanistan by the Taliban as evidence of an Islamic fundamentalist threat to Central Asia. Russian fears of such a threat may reflect their anxiety about a loss of influence in the region.
Russia's security links with the region received another blow when Uzbekistan withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty in early 1999. In an interview on April 26, 1999, Karimov stated that Russia's failure to meaningfully assist Uzbekistan during 1998, when the Taliban advance appeared most threatening, helped prompt the withdrawal. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also removed their "peacekeepers" from Tajikistan in early 1999, spurring Russia to convert its "peacekeeping" role in Tajikistan to a military basing agreement. Russian border troops were withdrawn from Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in 19981999 (100 military advisors remain in Kyrgyzstan), further reducing Russia's troop presence in the region, though Russia's air defense ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have been strengthened.
Russian economic policy in Central Asia has been contradictory, involving pressures to both cooperate with and to oppose US and Western interests. A CIS customs union (including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) has been viewed by some in Russia as a vehicle for reintegration, but it has proven ineffective. Russia has cut off economic subsidies to Central Asia and periodically demands debt repayments. Its opposition to U.S. and Western private investment in the region has led it to demand that Caspian Sea oil and gas resources be shared in common among littoral states (this position has recently changed somewhat) and to insist that oil pipeline routes transit Russian territory to Russian Black Sea ports. On the other hand, Russian energy firms are partners with U.S. and Western firms in several regional oil and gas development consortiums. Some Russians argue that enhanced cooperation with U.S. and Western private investment and business in the region would best serve Russian national interests and its oil and other companies.
The Soviet-trained leaders and elites of the states maintain some cultural orientation toward Russia. Continuing economic ties with Russia are encouraged by the existence of myriad Moscowbound transport routes, the impossibility of trade through wartorn Afghanistan, and U. S. opposition to ties with Iran. Also, there are still many interenterprise and equipment supply links between Russia and these states. While seeking ties with Russia to provide for some security and economic needs, at least in the short term, the Central Asian states have tried with varying success to resist or modify various Russian policies viewed as diluting their sovereignty, such as Russian calls for dual citizenship and closer CIS economic and security ties. Karimov and Nazarbayev have been harsh critics of what they have viewed as Russian tendencies to treat Central Asia as an "unequal partner."
The safety of ethnic Russians (or more broadly, "Russianspeakers") in the "near abroad" (a Russian term for the former Soviet republics) has been of some popular concern in Russia but has had little impact on Russian policy toward Central Asia. This issue has served to some degree as a stalking horse for those in Russia calling for greater control over former "Russian lands." Ethnic Russians constitute a rapidly declining minority in Central Asia. According to the 1989 Soviet census, nearly ten million ethnic Russians resided in Central Asia, constituting about 40% of all ethnic Russians residing outside of Russia (25.3 million). Six of the ten million reside mainly in northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan, and many Kazakhs fear potential separatism in these regions. Ethnic Russian fears are raised by employment, language, or other policies or practices they deem discriminatory, and interethnic violence that sometimes involves ethnic Russians. These factors, combined with others such as differential birthrates, have contributed to the decreasing numbers of ethnic Russians in the region. Remaining ethnic Russians tend to be elderly or lowskilled. Russian media reported in early May 1999 that the withdrawal of most of Russia's 2,000 border troops from Kyrgyzstan (leaving 100 advisors) had caused Kyrgyzstan's remaining ethnic Russian population to consider whether to leave or stay, with mainly older pensioners deciding to stay. 50
Afghanistan. Afghanistan's ongoing civil war has presented a number of concerns to its neighbors, including increased drug trafficking, refugees, and terrorism. 51 TaJikistan has been concerned about the spillover of conflict and the status of 6.2 million ethnic Tajiks residing in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, likewise, has concerns about 1.5 million ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan. Karimov has supported ethnic Uzbek paramilitary leader AbdululRashid Dostum in Afghanistan, but Dostum lost to Taliban forces in August 1998. Iran and TaJikistan have supported ethnic Tajik Ahmad Shah Masood's paramilitary forces. Taliban has been hostile to both the Rakhmanov and Karimov governments. 52 Iran's massing of troops on the Afghan border in August 1998 in response to Taliban's takeover of MazareSharif and killing of Iranian diplomats and Shiite civilians also gave support to Masood. Central Asia's concerns about the Taliban were heightened after the Taliban victory in Mazare-Sharif, the major city still controlled by Dostum's forces. Concerns have focused on the export of Islamic extremism and on drug trafficking. Central Asian leaders do not want Islamic extremists to use bases in Afghanistan, as the Tajik opposition did. They object to the refuge the Taliban provides for terrorist Usamah binLadin, who is accused of embassy bombings by U.S. authorities and who allegedly contributes financing and training for Islamic extremists throughout Central Asia who seek to overthrow governments in that region. (See also CRS Report 98106, Afghanistan.)
Turkmenistan's concerns about the status of half a million ethnic Turkmen residing in Afghanistan, and its hopes for possible energy pipelines through Afghanistan, have been determinants in Turkmenistan's pursuit of workable relations with Afghanistan. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have mediated between the Taliban and the Afghan opposition. Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov in January 1999 met in Pakistan with Taliban officials to discuss a gas pipeline and bilateral relations. This, along with Turkmenistan's 1999 endorsement of a trans-Caspian pipeline (criticized by Iran), indicates its interest in pipeline development not involving Iran, according to some observers.
A Taliban victory in Afghanistan might present the current Tajik government with regimes in both the north (Uzbekistan) and south (Afghanistan) that seek to gain undue influence. Iran and Uzbekistan have backed different sides in the Tajik civil war, but both oppose the Taliban in Afghanistan. Tajik opposition ties with Iran provide friction with Afghanistan. TaJikistan's instability and regional concerns tend to cause the Rakhmanov government to rely more on Russia and, by granting formal basing rights, antagonizing Uzbekistan and the Taliban.
China. China is becoming a major trading partner for the Central Asian states and in the future may be the dominant economic influence in the region. In comparison, Turkeys trade with the region is much less than China's. Central Asia's China trade has reached $1 billion or more annually by the late 1990s, and is growing.
Central Asia's ties with China have been bolstered by agreements on the sanctity and demilitarization of borders, major issues of concern to the new states. In April 1996, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan traveled to Shanghai to sign a treaty with Chinese President Jiang Zemin pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of borders. They signed protocols that they would not harbor or support separatists, aimed at China's efforts to quash separatism in its Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang Province, which borders Central Asia. Instability in Xinjiang includes bombings and other violence, security problems that might affect a proposed KazakChinese oil pipeline. According to the human rights group Amnesty International, China has committed largescale human rights violations against the Uighurs, an Islarnic and Turkic people. 53 In April 1997, the five presidents met again in Moscow to sign a followon treaty denuilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet border with China.
The five countries held further meetings in June and lateAugust 1999 to discuss border demarcation, drug trafficking, and other security issues, indicating ongoing tensions surrounding border security and delineation. A major topic was disputed borders between Tajikistan and China in the Pamir Mountain region, which President Rakhmanov had discussed during a trip to China in midAugust 1999.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been deft in building relations with China. They have cooperated with China in demarcating borders, building roads, and increasing trade ties. However, officials in these states have also been concerned about Chinese intentions and the spillover effects of tensions in Xinjiang. Some have raised concerns about growing numbers of Chinese "suitcase" traders and immigrants, and they worry that China seeks control over Central Asia's resources and territory. Most analysts do not anticipate Chinese territorial expansion into Central Asia, though China may seek greater economic influence. China's crackdown on dissidence in Xinjiang creates particular concern in Kazakhstan, because over one million ethnic Kazakhs reside in Xinjiang and many Uighurs reside in Kazakhstan. Some ethnic Kyrgyz also reside in Xinjiang. On the other hand, Kazakhstan fears that Uighur separatism in Xinjiang could spread among Uighurs residing in Kazakhstan, who may demand an alteration of Kazakh borders to create a unified Uighur "East Turkestan." In July 1998, Nazarbayev and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement transferring about 400 sq. miles of Kazakh territory to China. Opposition groups in Kazakhstan denounced the agreement and the Kazakh legislature delayed its ratification. Kazakh nationalists also are calling for annexing Chinese border areas where ethnic Kazakhs are the majority.
In 1993, China abandoned its policy of energy selfsufficiency, making Central Asia's energy resources attractive. In September 1997, Kazakhstan granted China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPQ production rights to develop major oil fields and China pledged to build a 1,900 mile transKazakh pipeline to Xinjiang within five years (and a shorter pipeline to the Turkmen border). However, CNPC is debtridden and appears unable to find funding for the pipelines, so Kazakhstan may consider canceling the development rights. 54
Iran. Iran has pursued limited economic interests in Central Asia and has not fomented the violent overthrow of the region's secular regimes. Iran has had good ties with Turkmenistan, having established rail and pipeline links, but Iran denounced Turkmenistan's February 1999 endorsement of a transCaspian gas pipeline to Azerbaijan. Iran's relations with other Central Asian states are more problematic. In midMay, Nazarbayev issued a decree tightening control over state secrets, following espionage on behalf of Iran by a highranking Kazakh official and the detention of three Iranian "spies." (For background, see CRS Report 9886, Iran: Relations with Key Central Asian States.)
Iran views U.S. support for the EastWest pipeline and its military assistance to Centrazbat as part of U.S. efforts to make Central Asia part of an antiIranian bloc. Iran and Russia share similar concerns to retain their influence in the Caspian region by hindering the growth of U.S. and Western influence. They have also opposed U. S. encouragement of Turkey's role in the region. They have used the issue of the status of the Caspian Sea to hinder Western oil development efforts. Although Russia and Kazakhstan moved toward partial agreement on seabed resources in 1998, the Iranian Foreign Ministry in May 1999 still called for all the littoral states to reach a delineation and use agreement before resources were claimed or developed. The Ministry demanded that Azerbaijan cease development of Caspian Sea oil fields off the coast of southern Azerbaijan until talks on Caspian Sea delineation are concluded.
Turkey.
After the Soviet collapse, Turkey initially expected to play
a major role in Central Asia among its mainly Turkic peoples. While Turkey plays a significant and U.S. supported
role in trade and cultural affairs in the region, it has been hampered by its own political struggles between secularists
and Islamic forces and has been obsessed with its own economic and ethnic problems. Russia opposes Turkey's endorsement
of building oil and gas pipelines to Ceyhan that would circumvent Russian control. Uzbekistan has raised concerns
about training that its citizens allegedly receive from Islamic fundamentalist groups in Turkey. The EU's 1997
refusal to place Turkey on a fasttrack for admission has invigorated Turkey's efforts to forge ties with other
areas of the world, including Central Asia. (See also CRS Report RS20253, Turkey.)
Faced with growing oil and natural gas demands, Turkey has given priority to enhancing its economic and security relations with both the South Caucasian and Central Asian states along the "Silk Road" to bolster its future access to regional oil and gas. The building of prospective oil and gas pipelines will bolster ties between Central Asia and Turkey, and Turkey's role as an energy conduit also would enhance its influence in Europe, according to some observers. Turkey desires the abatement of ethnic conflict in the Caspian region that threatens energy development.
The
South Caucasus. Central Asia is linked with the South Caucasus
region as an historic and reemerging transport corridor. Plans for major pipeline and transport routes from Central
Asia through the South Caucasus region to Europe makes Central Asia's economic security somewhat dependent on the
stability of the South Caucasus.
|
Central Asian State |
Kaz |
Kyr. |
Taj. |
Turk. |
Uzb. |
Total |
| Territory (000 sq. mi.) |
1,100 |
77 |
55.8 |
190 |
174.5 |
1,597.3 |
| Population Beginning 1999; Millions) |
15.6 |
4.7 |
6.2 |
4.8 |
24.5 |
55.8 |
|
Gross Domestic Product (Bill. Dollars, 1998; Purchasing Power Parity, 1995 Prices) |
40.5 |
10.4 |
4.4 |
11. 8 |
60.5 |
127.6 |
| GDP per capita (Dollars) |
2,584 |
2,236 |
725.6 |
2,495 |
2,518.3 |
2,112 (Avg.) |
|
Oil Reserves Proven & Possible (Bill. Barrels) |
88-101 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
34 |
1.0 |
123.6136.6 |
| Natural Gas Reserves Proven & Possible (Trillion Cubic Feet) |
141-171 |
0.54 |
1.0 |
257-314 |
109-123 |
508.54 |
| Size of Security Forces |
89,600 |
17,200 |
8,200- |
17,000- |
98,000- |
46,000 |
| Cumulative US Aid Obligations, FY1992 FY1998 (Mill. Dollars) |
550.13 |
380.96 |
212.23 |
157.81 |
134.93 |
1,436.06 |
| of which: Security As- sistance (Mill. Dollars) |
177.55 |
2.01 |
0.32 |
0.90 |
3.57 |
184.35 |
|
FY1999 Estimated
Obli- |
53.407 |
34.386 |
16.58 |
17.205 |
35.721 |
157.299 |
|
of
which: Security As- |
6.069 |
3.791 |
3.624 |
1.96 |
6.036 |
21.48 |
|
Administration
Request |
63.742 |
41.856 |
21.321 |
17.178 |
45.765 |
189.862 |
|
of
which. Security As- |
15.176 | 9.607 | 7.563 | 5.318 | 13.308 | 50.972 |
| Sources: Planecon Review and Outlookfor the Former,Yoviet Republics, Planccon, October 1998; Caspian Sea Region, and Country Reports, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy; The Military Balance, 19981999, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998; US Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States, 1,Y1998 Annual Report, Department of State I Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY2000, The Secretary of State. |
END