Karen Donfried
Specialist in European Affairs
Paul Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
ABSTRACT
This report reviews progress within NATO to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and the initiative within the European Union to create a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The report considers both European and U.S. perspectives on these developments. It will be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RS20356, European Security and Defense Policy: The British Dimension.
| Summary |
| For decades, there has been discussion within the European Union (EU) about the creation of a common security and
defense policy. In part, those efforts were hampered by the opposition of the United Kingdom to any European defense
identity outside of NATO. In the fall of 1998, however, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a change in
this stance, pledging support for an EU defense role. This new British engagement and the fact that NATO's air
campaign in Kosovo highlighted deficiencies in European military capabilities, have led to advances on the road
to a common European security and defense policy for the European Union, at least at the institutional level. The Clinton Administration has encouraged the development of a strengthened European pillar, known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), within NATO. Important decisions in this area were made at NATO's 1996 Berlin Ministerial. ESDI is aimed primarily at promoting greater burdensharing by the Europeans in defense matters, in particular in the area of crisis management. At NATO's Washington summit in April 1999, the Administration expressed concern that any European Union initiatives on security and defense not "decouple" European defense from NATO, "duplicate" NATO institutions such as the North Atlantic Council or the command structure at SHAPE, or "discriminate" against NATO members not in the Western European Union by excluding them from a possible role when the EU considers a military operation. In December 1999, in Helsinki, the EU underlined its "determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU?1ed military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army." The EU set the goal, by 2003, of member states' achieving the capability for the coordinated deployment of military forces numbering up to 50,000?60,000 within 60 days, and to sustain them for at least one year. These forces would be capable of carrying out the full range of crisis management tasks. The structure, leadership, and relationship to NATO of such a policy within the EU are in an early, formative stage. Increased military capability might enable EU members to share a greater part of the burden in possible future conflicts, or to act alone should the United States believe its interests insufficiently affected to warrant involvement. U. S. officials believe that a strengthened European defense pillar, either in the context of NATO or the EU, would have important implications for U.S. interests on the continent. |
Contents
Introduction
NATO and ESDI
Developments within the European Union
The EU's Cologne Summit
The EU's Helsinki Summit
Most Recent DevelopmentsEuropean Perspectives on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
U. S. Perspectives
FOOTNOTES
List of Tables
Membership in NATO, European Union, and Western European Union
European Security: The Debate in NATO
and the European Union
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have sought to redefine the alliance's mission. While the United States and the allies agree that NATO's core purpose remains collective defense in the event that one day Russia again becomes a threat, there is no clear consensus over a NATO response to lesser contingencies, such as crises on the periphery of Europe. Initial reluctance by the United States to become involved in ending the conflict in Bosnia, followed by deficient European military capabilities evident in the conflict in Kosovo, have generated greater interest among European Union (EU) members in developing a more substantial European defense pillar. The structure, leadership, and relationship to NATO of such a policy within the EU are in an early, formative stage. Increased military capability might enable EU members to share a greater part of the burden in possible future conflicts, or to act alone should the United States believe its interests insufficiently affected to warrant involvement. U.S. officials believe that a strengthened European defense pillar, either in the context of NATO or the EU, would have important implications for U.S. interests on the continent. The European pillar within NATO is known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), whereas, within the EU, member states are crafting a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
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The Clinton Administration has encouraged ESDI, primarily for the purpose of encouraging greater burdensharing by the Europeans in defense matters, particularly in crisis management. At NATO's 1996 Berlin Ministerial, the allies agreed to the general outline of a U. S. proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), to become operational in 2001 or 2002. There are two types of CJTF contemplated. One type would use a "deployable" NATO headquarters outside the member states, able to undertake missions from peace operations to combat, with a strong U.S. contingent, and led by a U. S. commander. The second type, more distantly perceived, would also have a deployable headquarters, but be composed primarily or entirely of European forces and led by the Western European Union (WEU), again with missions from peace operations to combat. To this latter type of CJTF the United States might "lend" assets such as command-and-control, intelligence, and lift, each of which the United States possesses in much greater proportion than the allies. CJTF, fully within NATO and developed and directed by commanders and units trained for NATO operations, has been considered a nascent from of ESDI. In the Administration's view, CJTF should be developed so that the Europeans might undertake missions in which insufficient U. S. interests are evident to compel strong U. S. involvement. The degree of U. S. decisionmaking and influence in each type of CJTF has not been fully agreed.
A WEU-led CJTF would use European officers trained for NATO but "doublehatted" to the WEU; forces in such an operation would be "separable but not separate" from NATO, a formulation meant to designate the arrangement as temporary. It should be noted that the WEU is not synonymous with the European Union (see membership table at the end of this report). The WEU has different membership, as well as a strong Article V "collective defense" clause which, for example, the former "neutrals" of the European Union do not wish to see adopted by the EU. CJTF remains in its early stages, with continued wrangling over how and when Europeans might use U.S. military assets in an operation that Europe might lead. Training to develop an operational CJTF remains in the earliest stages. 1
At the Washington NATO summit in April 1999, in the midst of the Kosovo conflict, the allies took a further step. They debated, and eventually agreed upon, a Strategic Concept to outline allied objectives over the foreseeable future. Discussion of ESDI was an important part of the debate. The Administration expressed concern that any European Union initiatives not take a form that would "decouple" European defense from NATO, "duplicate" NATO institutions such as the North Atlantic Council or the command structure at SHAPE, or "discriminate" against the NATO members not in the WEU2 by excluding them from a possible role when the EU considers a military operation. On the issue of "discrimination," Turkey strongly objected to being excluded by EU members in decisions to undertake a military operation, and threatened to block agreement on the Strategic Concept unless it retained a role in decisionmaking in a European-led operation. At the eleventh hour, EU members conceded the point, and the allies agreed at the summit to an ESDI "under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European allies if they were so to choose."3 ESDI as conceived in the Strategic Concept would emulate a CJTF, using NATO command structures, operating within NATO, and open to all NATO members, including the United States.
The Strategic Concept echoed the Senate's concerns expressed in the Kyl Amendment that the European allies develop more geographically mobile combat forces. 4 The Amendment passed overwhelmingly during the NATO enlargement debate and was raised again during the Kosovo conflict. The Strategic Concept captures a key element of the Amendment by emphasizing the need for the allies to develop lighter, more mobile forces that will "reflect [their] commitment to collective defense and to conduct crisis response operations...distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory."
However, a key U. S. objective of broadening NATO's mission under Article V (collective defense) was not met by the Strategic Concept. The Clinton Administration views threats to U. S. and European security as coming from terrorism or the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, as well as from instability in Europe. Clinton Administration officials initially sought to raise such threats to Article V status, which would have placed greater pressure on the allies to consider a military response to terrorism and proliferation, and to threats to disruption of the supply of petroleum. The Europeans saw the principal threats coming from closer to home. In the end, the Strategic Concept contained a general statement for responding to VVTSM, terrorism, and threats to the flow of natural resources, a formulation that Europeans interpret as expressing their preference for countering such threats through political efforts and diplomacy rather than the use of force.5 The Europeans' position has implications for their force structure, in that it may imply a decision not to develop mobile forces able to address these issues.
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Developments within the European Union
For decades, there has been discussion within the European Union about the creation of a common security and defense policy. In part, those efforts were hampered by the opposition of the United Kingdom to any European defense identity outside of NATO. In the fall of 1998, however, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a change in this stance, pledging support for an EU defense role. 6 This new British engagement and the fact that NATO's air campaign in Kosovo highlighted deficiencies in European military capabilities, have led to advances on the road to a common European security and defense policy for the European Union, at least at the institutional level.
The EU's Cologne Summit
At its Cologne summit in June 1999, EU leaders resolved to give the EU "the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense....To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." EU leaders emphasized that the intent was to complement, not replace, NATO. By the end of this year, the EU plans to incorporate the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) of the WEU.7 The EU will not assume the WEU's Article V "collective defense" commitment. European NATO countries not members of the EU -- Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic -- are associate members of the WEU and have viewed the WEU as the only mechanism that provides them with a concrete possibility of participating in formulating a European security policy. Thus, these six countries have expressed concern about being excluded from the emerging EU construction. The EU also appointed then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana as its new High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; he assumed that position on October 18, 1999.
The EU's Helsinki Summit
In December 1999, at the Helsinki summit, the EU underlined its "determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."8 The EU set the goal, by 2003, of member states achieving the capability to deploy military forces numbering up to 50,00060,000 capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks within 60 days, and to sustain them for at least one year. 9 New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council of Ministers, including a standing Political and Security Committee (composed of senior national representatives); the Military Committee (composed of the Chiefs of Defense, represented by their military delegates); and the Military Staff to provide military expertise and support. 10
Most Recent Developments
The interim Political and Security Committee held its first meeting on March 3, 2000. The interim Military Body followed suit on March 7; except for France and Belgium, most EU states named their representatives to the NATO Military Committee as their appointees to the interim military body.11 A small group of military experts from the member states has been assigned to the EU Council to form the core of the future EU military staff. In Lisbon, on March 23-24, the EU confirmed its intention to convene a Capability Pledging Conference by the end of the year. At the EU's summit on June 19-20, 2000, its Presidency, currently held by Portugal, is expected to issue a report on relations between the EU and NATO. 12
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European Perspectives
on European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP)
Britain and France, in pressing the defense initiative, share a mix of motives, but Britain arguably is driven more by the view that Europe needs to share the military burden more equitably with Washington, while France is motivated more by a lack of faith in Washington's commitment to Europe and disquiet with a NATO dominated by the United States. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine describes the United States as a "hyperpower" and argues Europe should "constitute a factor of equilibrium" in the world. 13
Germany, given its size and wealth, is key to the success of any EU defense initiative. The Schr6der government has pledged support, but the government's austerity package, despite the protests of Defense Minister Scharping, includes a significant cut in the defense budget. Thus, observers have commented on the discrepancy between Germany's rhetoric and its actions. Declining defense budgets are a reality in most EU member states.
The Italians and the smaller EU members appear wary of backing an EU defense initiative which they fear would be a mechanism for their larger neighbors to gain a monopoly over EU policymaking in that area. They seem to prefer the arrangement within NATO, which is dominated by a relatively distant superpower. When former Italian Prime Minister D'Alema met with Tony Blair in July 1999, the focus was squarely on improving defense capabilities, rather than on creating new institutions. Italy, and some other allies, also remain concerned about the possibility of a revived, hostile Russia, and continue to value U. S. commitments through the collective defense provision in the NATO treaty.
When speaking privately, European officials tend to make several points in response to the skeptical reaction they feel the EU's defense initiative has received in Washington. First, they argue that U.S. officials ought to stop being ambivalent, paying supportive lip service to Europe in the abstract, but when the Europeans propose concrete initiatives, expressing alarm that the initiative is aimed at undermining NATO. George Robertson, NATO's new secretary general, has said the United States suffers from "a sort of schizophrenia...on the one hand saying, 'You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden.' And then, when the Europeans say, 'OK, we will carry more of the burden,' they say, 'Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?"' 14
Second, European officials remark that the European Union is not a subset of NATO. They argue that Europe cannot just be the checkbook for policies made by others. The European Community, which rose out of the ashes of World War II and a deeply held conviction by its founders that European countries must never take up arms against each other again, has been developing deeper political and economic integration over four decades. The United States has consistently supported the Community and its successor the European Union as a means to enhance stability in Europe.
Finally, European representatives warn that the United States should not simply sit back and take comfort from the notion that the Europeans will not succeed in bringing about a common security and defense policy. While they admit that the process is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, they argue that if Washington does not engage positively during that process, once the reality is before the United States, it will be too late to affect the fundamental character or structure of the policy. And, given that virtually any European official expresses a preference for U. S. engagement in any foreseeable military operation, it is essential that EU structures be compatible with NATO. 15
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There are several key viewpoints evident in the Administration and Congress that shape U.S. policy towards ESDP:
- The Administration opposes an ESDP that might "decouple" Europe from the United States, "duplicate" NATO structures and capabilities, or "discriminate" against NATO members not in the European Union or WEU.
- Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has emphasized NATO's primacy as a European security institution, and said that the United States "would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates but that could eventually compete with NATO." 16
- Some U.S. policy analysts have questioned whether the prospect of EU missions without NATO participation is an indication that at least some Europeans believe the creation of ESDI within NATO has failed. How else, they argue, can one explain why NATO's EU members would support the creation of a distinct defense identity within the EU?
- The Kyl Amendment reflects a view that Europeans should support U.S.-led operations distant from Europe that combat terrorism and WMD proliferation and protect access to resources, if the United States is to continue to join crisis management operations, such as quelling ethnic conflict, in Europe. The Amendment captures a general sentiment both in the Administration and Congress that an enhanced European defense capability should lead to greater burdensharing by the European allies.
- S.Res. 208, passed on November 8, 1999, repeats language from the Kyl Amendment that the Europeans develop lighter, more mobile forces able to join U. S. forces in "high intensity conflicts" distant from NATO Europe. It emphasizes Europe's need to concentrate on the development of greater military capabilities rather than new institutions. It adds that the EU should cc undertake an autonomous mission" through ESDI "only after NATO had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action."
- The House of Representatives passed H.Res. 59 relating to NATO on November 2, 1999. The resolution states that "in order to preserve the solidarity and effectiveness that has been achieved within the Alliance over the last 50 years, it is essential that security arrangements elaborated under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy complement, rather than duplicate NATO efforts and institutions, and be linked to, rather than decoupled from NATO structures, and provide for full and active involvement of all European Allies, rather than discriminating against European Allies that are not members of the EU."
- The concerns expressed in these two resolutions were articulated on November 10, 1999, at a hearing held by the House International Relations Committee and on March 9, 2000, at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.
- At the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich in February 2000, Defense Secretary Cohen expressed concern that the EU could end up establishing a new bureaucracy without any new military capability. He argued for additional spending, particularly in the areas of logistics, intelligence, command and control systems, and mid-air refueling. If EU members of NATO continue to reduce defense spending, they will undermine the alliance rather than building a stronger European defense pillar, he said. 17