[Top] [Bottom] [Previous] [Next] [TOC]

Appendix J
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT
PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FY 2000


OVERVIEW OF THE DOD STATEGIC PLAN

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has embraced several fundamental and enduring objectives: to maintain the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

Achieving these basic objectives in an increasingly interdependent world requires fostering an international environment in which critical regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile powers; in which the global economy and free trade are growing; in which democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted; in which the spread of nuclear, biological, chemical, and other potentially destabilizing technologies is minimized; and in which the international community is willing and able to prevent and, if necessary, respond to calamitous events. The United States seeks to play an international leadership role by working closely and cooperatively with nations that share its values and goals, and by influencing those that can affect U.S. national well-being.

Key objectives that guide U.S. defense policy and planning include shaping the international environment through military engagement programs and activities, and responding to the full spectrum of crises with appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces. Of equal importance, the United States must prepare for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. superiority in key warfighting capabilities, by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs to transform U.S. forces for the future, and by fundamentally reengineering the Department of Defense (DoD) to achieve a 21st century infrastructure.

To ensure that it can most effectively achieve these objectives, the Department has developed a mission statement, vision statement, and corporate-level goals that reflect critical steps in the execution of the national security strategy. The following sections summarize the national security strategy and present DoD’s mission and vision statements. DoD’s corporate goals derive from these statements and form the basis for the performance goals set forth in this performance plan.

KEY TENENTS OF THE U.S.NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

To meet the potential security challenges and opportunities that lie ahead, the Administration has developed a national security strategy concomitant with U.S. global interests. The United States will remain engaged abroad while supporting efforts to enlarge the community of secure, free-market, and democratic nations and create new partners in peace and prosperity. While retaining the nation’s ability to act unilaterally, the security strategy emphasizes coalition operations as essential to securing basic U.S. national goals, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, and creating preferred international conditions. Indeed, the nature of the challenges the nation faces demands cooperative, multinational approaches that distribute the burden of responsibility among like-minded states. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States strive to build close, cooperative relations with the world’s most influential countries.

Maintaining a strong military and the willingness to use it in defense of national interests remains essential to a strategy of engagement as the 21st century approaches. Today, the United States has unparalleled military capabilities. As the only nation in the world capable of projecting overwhelming military power to conduct large-scale military operations far beyond its borders, the United States is in a unique position. Its ability to organize effective military responses to large-scale regional threats is the cornerstone of mutually beneficial defense alliances and security partnerships and the foundation of stability in key regions of the world. To sustain this position of leadership, the United States must maintain ready and versatile forces capable of conducting a wide range of military activities and operations—from deterring and defeating large-scale aggression, to participating in smaller-scale contingencies, to dealing with asymmetric threats like terrorism.

Nevertheless, both U.S. national interests and limited resources argue for the selective use of military force. Decisions about whether and when to employ U.S. forces should be guided, first and foremost, by the interests at stake—be they vital, important, or humanitarian in nature—and by whether the costs and risks of a particular military involvement are commensurate with those interests. When the interests are vital—that is, of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of the nation—the United States will do whatever it takes to defend them, including, when necessary, the unilateral use of military power. Vital U.S. national interests include:

· Protecting the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States.

· Deterring the emergence of hostile regional coalitions or hegemons.

· Promoting and facilitating uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.

· Deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression against U.S. allies and friends.

· Ensuring freedom of the seas, airways, and space, and the security of vital lines of communication.

In some cases, the interests at stake may be important but not vital—that is, they do not affect the nation’s survival, but they have a significant influence on the national well-being and the character of the world in which Americans live. In such cases, military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. strategic interests, if they are likely to accomplish their objectives, and if other means are inadequate to achieve U.S. goals. Such uses of force should be both selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the U.S. interests involved.

When the interests at stake are primarily humanitarian in nature, the U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a crisis. In some situations, however, use of the military’s unique capabilities may be both necessary and appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond or when the need for immediate relief is urgent and only the U.S. military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster. In such cases, if the United States decides to commit military forces to assist in the situation, the military mission should be clearly defined, the risk to American troops should be minimal, and substantial U.S. military involvement should be confined to the initial period of providing relief until broader international assistance efforts get under way.

In all cases where the commitment of U.S. forces is considered, determining whether the associated costs and risks are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake should be the central calculus of U.S. decisions. Such decisions should also depend on the United States’ ability to identify a clear mission, the desired end state of the situation, and the exit strategy for the forces committed.

DoD Mission

The mission of the Department of Defense is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States; to provide for the common defense of the United States, its citizens, and its allies; and to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world. To accomplish this mission, the Department maintains trained forces ready to respond to threats to U.S. security arising anywhere on the globe.

In peacetime, the United States works with friends and allies to promote a stable world that supports economic growth and provides opportunities for emerging democracies. The routine deployment of U.S. forces overseas, combined with the maintenance of ready forces at home, both promotes stability and deters the use of force against U.S. interests. The same military forces that help shape the environment can also respond quickly to threats to U.S. security when crises arise. The performance goals presented in the Department’s FY 2000 performance plan derive from the national security strategy. Objectives related to shaping the international environment and responding to threats are embodied in one corporate goal, while goals and objectives relating to preparing for future requirements are captured in a second goal.

DoD Vision

The Department of Defense:

· Fields the best trained, best equipped, best prepared fighting force in the world.

· Supports alliances and security relationships that protect and advance U.S. security interests.

· Advances national interests by working effectively with other federal agencies, Congress, and the private sector.

· Serves as a model of effective, efficient, innovative management and leadership.

DoD Corporate-Level Goals

DoD has established two corporate-level goals:

DoD Corporate-Level Goals

Goal 1. Shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises by providing appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces.

Goal 2. Prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key warfighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineer the Department to achieve a 21st century infrastructure.

 

The Department’s corporate goals are fully consistent with the departmental objectives articulated in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In a letter to Congress accompanying the QDR and in last year’s Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) performance plan, DoD divided the shape, respond, and prepare objectives into six corporate goals. This year, the Department has regrouped the objectives into two corporate goals: "shape and respond" and "prepare," more accurately reflecting the necessary resource trade-offs between current and future needs.

THE ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN AND THE GPRA REQUIREMENTS

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 seeks to improve government-wide program effectiveness, government accountability, and, ultimately, public confidence by focusing on results achieved for resources expended. The Department of Defense employs the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to create a budget that fully implements the national security strategy within available resources. The DoD budget has one principal output: military forces that are ready to go to war. Because these forces are intended to deter potential adversaries, the Department’s output is considerably more difficult to measure than are the bottom-line returns (net profits or losses) of most private enterprises. Nonetheless, the Department has developed a methodology that allows it to present output-oriented goals and accompanying measures within the context of GPRA.

As stated earlier, DoD’s two corporate goals guide the annual implementation of the PPBS. Thus, the two corporate goals form the basis for using GPRA as a management tool. They serve as strategic goals for the Department, and the document that introduced them, the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, is the Department’s strategic plan.

The Department’s annual performance plan plots a short-term course toward achieving its multiyear strategic plan. Annual performance goals (hereafter referred to as performance goals) establish a measurable path to incremental achievement of specific corporate goals articulated in the strategic plan. Performance goals are supported and evaluated by quantifiable output, which is assessed using performance measures or performance indicators. Normally, one performance goal encompasses several performance measures or indicators. For the portion of the performance goal they evaluate, performance measures are sufficient in themselves to judge results. Performance indicators are not sufficient to gauge the success of a program; rather, they provide meaningful insights for qualitative assessments. Performance measures and indicators quantify the output of the defense program for key measures associated with providing a ready force and preparing for the future.

This appendix presents the Department’s performance plan for FY 2000. DoD will evaluate its progress in executing this plan in the FY 2000 Annual Performance Report, to be submitted in the spring of 2001. Additionally, this appendix updates and replaces DoD’s FY 1999 performance plan, the report on which will be submitted in the spring of 2000.

CORPORATE GOAL 1 - SHAPE AND RESPOND

Corporate Goal 1. Shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises by providing appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces.

 

Annual performance goals supporting Corporate Goal 1 include:

· Supporting U.S. regional security alliances through military-to-military contacts and the routine presence of ready forces overseas, maintained at force levels determined by the QDR.

· Maintaining ready forces and ensuring they have the training necessary to provide the United States with the ability to shape the international environment and respond to the full range of crises.

· Maintaining sufficient airlift and sealift capability, with adequate prepositioning, to move military forces from the United States to any location in the world.

In addition to the performance goals cited above, several less quantifiable but equally important efforts contribute to achieving the Department’s first corporate goal. For example, the Department’s role in shaping the international environment is closely integrated with the State Department’s diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy serves as a critical force multiplier in times of crisis, when the United States seeks to establish and work with coalition partners. In addition, to defend against terrorism (including potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction), DoD provides technical support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DoD also works closely with the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to ensure the security of the increasingly interconnected and vulnerable infrastructures of the United States against physical or cyber attack. Finally, DoD provides airborne and seaborne surveillance of high-intensity drug-trafficking routes in support of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Performance Goal 1.1 – Support U.S. regional security alliances through military-to-military contacts and the routine presence of ready forces overseas, maintained at force levels determined by the QDR.

Overseas presence promotes regional security and stability, deters potential conflicts, and gives substance to U.S. security commitments. It contributes to deterrence by demonstrating the nation’s determination to defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests in critical regions, while enabling U.S. forces to respond rapidly to crises in distant locales. Further, the routine presence of U.S. forces abroad enhances coalition operations across the spectrum of conflict by promoting joint and combined training and encouraging responsibility-sharing on the part of friends and allies. In support of these principles, the QDR established force-level objectives of roughly 100,000 military personnel both in Europe and in the Asia/Pacific region. In addition, the QDR directed the continuation of rotational deployments to key regions like Southwest Asia. Maintenance of these levels of forward-deployed forces forms the basis for Performance Measures 1.1.1 through 1.1.4.

Military-to-military contacts are also a key component of these efforts. Such contacts strengthen core alliances and enhance the ability of U.S. forces to operate as part of international coalitions, when such needs arise. Military-to-military contacts result from having forces both permanently stationed abroad and on rotational or temporary deployments. These activities complement and reinforce other efforts, such as International Military Education and Training programs. In addition, the Department conducts an international exercise program that leverages the benefits of forces present in a region with overarching U.S. assets (such as space systems and global mobility) to demonstrate U.S. capabilities and resolve. Performance Indicator 1.1.5 reflects the Department’s commitment to international military exercise programs.

Performance Measure 1.1.1 – Army Overseas Presence

 

FY 1998 Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Mechanized Divisions in Pacific Region

1

1

1

Divisions with Elements in Europe

2

2

2

 

Performance Measure 1.1.2 – Naval Overseas Presence
(Percentage of time regions are covered by an aircraft carrier battle group)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Pacific

67

100

100

Europe

40

75

75

Southwest Asia

82

75

75

NOTE: See Performance Measure 1.1.4 for coverage by amphibious ready groups.

 

Performance Measure 1.1.3 – Air Force Overseas Presence (Fighter wing equivalents)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Pacific

2

2

2

Europe

2

2

2

Southwest Asia

1

1

1

 

Performance Measure 1.1.4 – Marine Corps Overseas Presence
(Percentage of time regions are covered by a Marine expeditionary unit/amphibious ready group)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Pacific

100

100

100

Europe

82

80

80

Southwest Asia

50

50

50

 

Performance Indicator 1.1.5 – Number of Overseas Exercises

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Number of Combined Exercises

165

161

146

NOTE: Combined exercises involve the participation of U.S. forces with military forces of other nations.

 

The primary purpose of joint training is to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint and multinational operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program provides critical mission-based readiness training required by unified commanders to deploy and employ combat forces worldwide. Exercises conducted under this program demonstrate U.S. resolve and the ability to project U.S. forces to distant theaters in support of national interests and commitments to allies. CJCS exercises provide joint force training that emphasizes interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment. Such training, conducted in conjunction with allies, provides opportunities to test and evaluate combined systems, lines of communication, and support agreements.

Exercises with foreign militaries must be balanced against the full list of tasks assigned to U.S. military units. The QDR directed that the number of joint exercise man-days be reduced by 15 percent from historic levels as a means of reducing excessive operational demands on troops and equipment. As a result, combatant commanders continuously reevaluate their exercise programs and have reduced the number of exercises through program consolidations.

Performance Goal 1.2 – Maintain ready forces and ensure they have the training necessary to provide the United States with the ability to shape the international environment and respond to the full range of crises.

The force structure objectives established in the QDR reflect the need for a balance between investments in existing forces and adequate preparation for the future. Today’s security environment presents the same pressing needs for military forces as existed when the QDR was conducted. The force-level objectives for FY 2000 are, therefore, largely the same as the goals set in the QDR. The intent of these goals is to provide forces that can fight and win two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. At the same time, the goals reflect the fact that the United States must remain prepared to respond to smaller-scale contingencies. Although they are much less demanding than major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies can become a very high priority, particularly when swift intervention of military forces is needed to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly.

Because crises can arise quickly, U.S. military forces must be continuously ready to respond. Readiness was a central concern in FY 1999, and both the FY 1999 and FY 2000 budgets were increased to correct deficiencies in the readiness of both combat and support forces. At the same time, the Department recognizes that tempo can have a significant impact on readiness. High tempos can impede readiness by adversely affecting the quality of life of military personnel, lowering morale as well as annual retention rates. High tempos can also result in excessive wear on military equipment and, where forces are performing tasks outside their primary mission area, can cause some perishable skills to degrade.

In recognition of the need to more closely monitor tempo across the force, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, has instituted a tempo management process. Due to variations among the four Services in equipment, internal organization, operational concepts, and methods of managing tempo, it was necessary to establish Service-specific goals. The metric, for each Service, is the number of units exceeding its tempo goal.

Performance Measure 1.2.1 – Army Force Levels

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Active Corps

4

4

4

Divisions (Active/National Guard)

10/8

10/8

10/8

Active Armored Cavalry Regiments

2

2

2

Enhanced Brigades (National Guard)

15

15

15

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.2 – Army Deployment Tempo

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Number of Units Deploying More Than 120 Days per Year

18

0

0

Number of Units Deploying More Than 179 Days per Year

6

0

0

 

Performance Measure 1.2.3 – Naval Force Levels

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve)

11/1

11/1

11/1

Air Wings (Active/Reserve)

10/1

10/1

10/1

Amphibious Ready Groups

12

12

12

Attack Submarines

73

57

56

Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve)

118/10

106/10

108/8

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.4 – Navy Personnel Tempo

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Units Not Meeting Personnel Tempo Goal

2

0

0

NOTE: The Navy uses a combination metric for personnel tempo. To meet the goal, a unit must deploy for not more than six months at a time, spend twice as much time nondeployed as deployed, and spend 50 percent of its time in home port over a five-year cycle.

 

Performance Measure 1.2.5 – Air Force Force Levels

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Fighter Wings (Active/Reserve)

13/7

13/7.2

12.6/7.6a

Air Defense Squadrons (Reserve)

10

6

4

Bombers (Active/Reserve)

175/25

158/27

163/27

a Fighter wing equivalents are preliminary and may be increased slightly on a temporary basis while F-16 units transition between roles or to newer-model aircraft.

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.6 – Air Force Tempo

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Percent of Personnel Assigned to Combat Systems Who Are Deployed Under 120 Days TDY per Yeara

77

100

100

Average Number of Days Deployed for Those Personnel Exceeding 120 Days TDY per Year

142

N/A

N/A

NOTE: TDY = temporary duty. TDY is a measure of the time that a unit is deployed away from its home station.

a Includes personnel in occupational specialties directly associated with the operation of aircraft, weaponry, or other systems required for overseas deployments.

 

Performance Measure 1.2.7 – Marine Corps Force Levels

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Marine Expeditionary Forces

3

3

3

Divisions (Active/Reserve)

3/1

3/1

3/1

Air Wings (Active/Reserve)

3/1

3/1

3/1

Force Service Support Groups (Active/Reserve)

3/1

3/1

3/1

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.8 – Marine Corps Deployment Tempo

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Units Deploying More Than 180 Days per Year Over
a 36-Month Scheduling Period

1

0

0

 

There are two sets of measures that are classified and are therefore omitted from the FY 2000 performance plan. Performance Measures 1.2.9-1.2.12 set goals for the readiness of forces from each of the Services, while Performance Indicators 1.2.13–1.2.16 define goals for the percentage of billets filled in each Service. The Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, January–March 1999 contains the performance plan for these measures. The Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, October-December 1999 will provide the FY 1999 performance report for these measures.

Trained and ready forces provide the flexibility needed to shape the global environment, deter potential foes, and, if required, rapidly respond to a broad spectrum of threats. Each Service strives to optimize its limited training resources by establishing priorities for allocating them among major units, whether it be by assigning higher priority to first-to-fight units, following a cyclical readiness pattern, or maintaining a high state of overall readiness. The Services sustain different levels of readiness based on missions, response requirements, and force characteristics. While each Service employs a different approach to ensuring force readiness, all U.S. military forces must be trained and ready to bring their unique core competencies to bear. Performance Indicators 1.2.17 through 1.2.19 illustrate the significant resources the Services devote toward ensuring that U.S. forces have the capability and flexibility needed to respond to changing requirements.

Performance Indicator 1.2.17 – Number of Flying Hours per Month

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Army (Active)

14.0

14.1

14.5

Army (Reserve Components)

8.7

8.0

9.0

Navy and Marine Corps (Active)

20.2

22.1

22.3

Navy and Marine Corps (Reserve)

11.0a

11.0a

11.0

Air Force Fighter/Attack (Active)

17.0

17.7

17.2

Air Force Fighter/Attack (AFR)

10.8

10.7

11.1

Air Force Fighter/Attack (ANG)

11.6

11.6

11.6

Air Force Bombers (Active)

19.3

17.9

15.8

Air Force Bombers (AFR)

16.5

16.0

17.2

Air Force Bombers (ANG)

19.7

19.7

19.7

NOTES: AFR = Air Force Reserve
ANG = Air National Guard
Army data reflect monthly flying hours per aircraft. Data for all other Services are expressed in monthly
flying hours per crew.

a Naval Reserve only.

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.18 – Number of Tank-Miles per Year

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Army (Active)

800

800

800

Army National Guard (Enhanced Separate Brigades)

288

288

278a

a Includes 100 miles per year for individual tank crew and squad training, 76 miles per year for platoon-level training, and 102 miles per year for transit to and from training areas.

 

Performance Indicator 1.2.19 – Number of Steaming Days per Quarter

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Navy (Active Deployed)

50.5

50.5

50.5

Navy (Reserve Deployed)

50.5

50.5

50.5

Navy (Active Nondeployed)

26.8

28.0

28.0

Navy (Reserve Nondeployed)

18.0

18.0

18.0

 

Performance Goal 1.3 – Maintain the capability to move military forces from the United States
to any location in the world in response to aggression, using a combination of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment.

Global power projection ensures that the nation has the ability to respond, with appropriate numbers and types of forces, to crises worldwide. As in its assessment of combat force levels and readiness, the QDR recognized that mobility forces must be able to respond across the spectrum of operations, from peacetime engagements to major theater wars. Further, the QDR reaffirmed the baseline requirements for an intertheater airlift capability of approximately 50 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) and a surge sealift capacity of 10 million square feet of cargo space. (Surge sealift refers to seaborne transport capacity that can be brought to bear at the outset of a crisis. It does not include ships routinely used for prepositioning purposes, discussed under Performance Measure 1.3.3.) Programmed aircraft and ship acquisitions will enable the Department to reach its goals for airlift and sealift in FY 2005 and FY 2001, respectively.

The prepositioning of military equipment and supplies near potential conflict regions reduces response time in contingencies. With materiel stored on land or afloat at overseas locations, only troops and a relatively small amount of equipment need to be airlifted to a theater in a crisis. Objectives for prepositioning are based on those forces required very early in a conflict to halt an enemy’s advance.

Performance Measure 1.3.1 – Intertheater Airlift Capacity (MTM/D)

 

FY 1996
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

FY 2005
Goal

Military Airlift Capacity

27

26

26

30

Total Airlift Capacity

47

46

46

50

 

The FY 2005 goal of 50 MTM/D represents the minimum combined civil and military airlift capability that U.S. forces would need to fight and win two major theater wars at an acceptable level of risk. This goal was established by the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU). Military airlift is required for carrying outsize loads (such as Patriot missile systems, tanks, and helicopters) and for unloading cargo rapidly, particularly at airfields lacking materiel-handling equipment.

MTM/D is an aggregate measure of airlift capacity used as a top-line comparative metric. It combines measures such as aircraft flight hours per day, speed, and payload. Typical or average values are selected for each of these measures for each aircraft type in order to compute MTM/D. Thus, changes in MTM/D values reflect changes in the number and type of airlift aircraft. There are no known verification or validation deficiencies with this metric.

Performance Measure 1.3.2 – Surge Sealift Capacity (Million Square Feet)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

FY 2001
Goal

Organic Surge Sealifta

7.3

7.7

8.7

10

a Capacity contributed by DoD-owned or -chartered vessels. Excludes additional capacity provided by commercial ships that could be requisitioned for military use in a major operation.

 

Based on lessons learned from the Gulf War and detailed mobility studies, the QDR reaffirmed the goal set by the MRS BURU of achieving 10 million square feet of surge sealift capacity by FY 2001. Square footage serves as an aggregate measure of ship capacity and is computed from ship deck plans by the Maritime Administration or the Military Sealift Command; it is tracked as a planning consideration by the United States Transportation Command. Square footage is the preferred capacity measure for roll-on/roll-off ships. For containerships and break-bulk ships, the standard measures (number of containers or volumetric capacity) are converted to square footage based on the vessels’ ability to carry equivalent military cargo.

Performance Measure 1.3.3 – Forces Supported by Land- and Sea-Based Prepositioning Programs

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Army Heavy Brigades

     

Land-based

5

5

6

Afloat

1

1

1

Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)

     

Land-based

partiala

partiala

partiala

Afloat

3

3

3

a Material is prepositioned only for the lead elements of a MEF.

 

Land-based prepositioning programs are maintained in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific region. Sea-based prepositioning provides an additional means of stockpiling military materiel abroad; it complements land-based storage programs by providing the flexibility to move stocks between theaters of operation, as needs arise. Additional prepositioning programs, not covered in Performance Measure 1.3.3, provide base, fuel, and medical support for contingency operations.

CORPORATE GOAL 2 - PREPARE

Corporate Goal 2. Prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key warfighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineer the Department to achieve a 21st century infrastructure.

 

Annual performance goals supporting Corporate Goal 2 include:

· Recruiting, retaining, and developing personnel to maintain a highly skilled and motivated force capable of meeting tomorrow’s challenges.

· Transforming U.S. forces for the future.

· Streamlining the defense infrastructure by redesigning the Department’s support structure and pursuing business practice reforms.

· Meeting combat forces’ needs smarter and faster, with products and services that work better and cost less, by improving the efficiency of DoD’s acquisition processes.

Performance Goal 2.1 – Recruit, retain, and develop personnel to maintain a highly skilled and motivated force capable of meeting tomorrow’s challenges.

No amount of technological sophistication will enable the U.S. military to respond to future challenges if it fails to maintain the quality of its personnel or to make the investments necessary to develop them to their fullest potential. The Department is committed to recruiting high-quality service members, providing robust training for them, and improving the quality of life of its military personnel and their families.

The measures for Performance Goal 2.1 address recruiting and retention. The recruiting metrics focus on enlisted personnel, where the Department’s major challenges lie. Officer recruiting is monitored annually, and recruiting goals are generally met. The primary management challenge with respect to the officer corps is maintaining the proper mix of specialties. For example, the Navy has recently had difficulty recruiting naval flight officers (non-pilot officer aircrew personnel) and nuclear propulsion officers, and in retaining aviation, surface, and nuclear specialists. Legislative initiatives to expand specialty pay have been developed to help remedy this situation. The Air Force currently is experiencing a shortfall of about 650 pilots, particularly within the fighter and theater airlift specialties. Despite actions to increase the size of pilot training classes and other management measures, the shortage is projected to grow over the next several years. The Air Force also has lengthened the time pilots are required to serve on active duty following flight training, but anticipates long-term challenges.

Performance Measure 2.1.1 – Enlisted Recruiting

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Active Force

186,200

196,400

203,900

Selected Reserve

141,100

151,100

157,200

 

In FY 1998, the baseline year, the Department reached 97 percent of its numeric goal for active-duty recruits and 96 percent of its goal for recruits in the Selected Reserve. Each of the Services reports these data monthly in a standardized format.

Performance Indicator 2.1.2 – Quality Benchmarks for Enlisted Recruits (In percents)

 

FY 1998
Baseline
(Active/Reserve)


FY 1999
Goal


FY 2000
Goal

Recruits Holding High School Diplomas

94/ 89

>90

>90

Recruits in AFQT Categories I-IIIA

68/ 64

>60

>60

Recruits in AFQT Category IV

0.9/ 2

<4

<4

NOTE: AFQT = Armed Forces Qualifying Test. The AFQT is a subset of the standard aptitude test administered to all applicants for enlistment. It measures math and verbal aptitude and has proven to correlate closely with trainability and on-the-job performance.

 

The quality benchmarks for recruiting were established in 1992, after a study conducted jointly by DoD and the National Academy of Sciences produced a model linking recruit quality and recruiting resources to the job performance of enlistees. The model illuminates the relationships among costs associated with recruiting, training, attrition, and retention. It uses as a standard the performance level demonstrated by the recruit cohort that served in the Gulf War. The Department has adopted recruiting targets derived from this model—90 percent high school diploma graduates and 60 percent top-half aptitude (AFQT categories I-IIIA)—as its minimum acceptable quality thresholds. Adhering to these benchmarks reduces personnel and training costs, while ensuring that the force meets high performance standards.

Performance Measure 2.1.3A – Active Component Enlisted Retention Rates (In percents)

 

FY 1987
Pre-Drawdown
Baseline

FY 1998
Post-Drawdown
Baseline


FY 1999
Goal


FY 2000
Goal

Army First Term

36.5

51.4

55

55

Army Second Term

70.5

74.8

75

75

Navy First Term

35.7

30.5

32

33.5

Navy Second Term

51.8

46.3

48

49.5

Air Force First Term

62

54

55

55

Air Force Second Term

76

69

75

75

Marine Corps First Term

35.4

21.6

23

23

Marine Corps Second Term

53.2

57.7

N/Aa

N/Aa

a The Marine Corps, while monitoring trends, does not set management goals for second-term retention.

 

The post-Cold War drawdown of U.S. military forces affected retention goals for nearly a decade. The Services gave some members early retirement and released others from active duty in order to achieve force reduction targets. Since retention rates are based on required manning in each pay-grade, retention goals were relaxed while the military was reducing in size.

The force drawdown is now effectively over, and personnel levels have begun to stabilize. Retention rates still reflect effects of the drawdown, however. For that reason, the table for Performance Measure 2.1.3A provides FY 1987 retention rates for purposes of comparison. The FY 1987 rates do not necessarily represent goals; rather, they serve as reference points from a period when the force was stable. The retention figures for FY 1998 serve as references against which to compare the FY 1999 and FY 2000 objectives.

Performance Measure 2.1.3B – Selected Reserve Enlisted Attrition Rates (In percents)

 

FY 1987
Pre-Drawdown
Baseline

FY 1998
Post-Drawdown
Baseline


FY 1999
Goal

Army National Guard

19.2

18.3

Establish Attrition Goals for FY 2000

Army Reserve

29.1

32.6

 

Naval Reserve

29.6

26.3

 

Marine Corps Reserve

34.7

29.6

 

Air National Guard

11.7

11.1

 

Air Force Reserve

19.6

13.6

 

 

In assessing retention trends in the reserve components, DoD employs attrition rates rather than reenlistment rates. Attrition is computed by dividing total losses for a fiscal year by the average personnel strength for that year. This metric is preferable to reenlistment rates because only a small portion of the reserve population is eligible for reenlistment during any given year. In addition to monitoring attrition, the Department has decided to create attrition goals in order to enhance reserve personnel management. A reserve component recruiting/retention task force recently developed a common reserve component attrition formula based on information from the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Reserve Component Personnel Data System. The reserve components are now defining attrition performance goals for FY 2000 and beyond.

As the Department develops these goals, it is important to recognize that attrition rates below targeted levels can present challenges, albeit not as severe as the problems created by excessively high attrition rates. For example, insufficient attrition can hamper career progression. An additional consideration in developing attrition goals is the fact that desired attrition rates vary among, and even within, individual reserve components. Accordingly, the Department’s goals will reflect the unique needs of each reserve component.

Performance Goal 2.2 – Transform U.S. military forces for the future.

In Joint Vision 2010, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997, the nation’s senior military leaders outlined the transformation needed to ensure a fully capable military force in the 21st century. Key attributes of such a force include the ability to read the battlefield and maneuver multiple elements to achieve maximum advantage, attack enemy targets with precision, protect U.S. forces and facilities, and support U.S. military operations anywhere in the world. The transformation to the Joint Vision 2010 force requires maintaining U.S. technological superiority through the fielding of state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment while continuing research into designs for subsequent generations of combat systems. Yet a purely technological solution to future military needs is insufficient; history is replete with examples of militaries that failed to understand the proper use of the technologies they had harnessed. Joint experimentation into new operational concepts must be closely coupled with, and at times precede, the development of new weapons.

Fielding modern and capable forces in the near to mid-future requires aggressive action today. Sustained, adequate spending on the modernization of U.S. forces will be essential to ensure that tomorrow’s forces continue to dominate across the spectrum of military operations. The procurement objectives established by the Department strike a balance between the need to devote continued resources to the operation and maintenance of existing forces and the need to sustain a high level of performance through the replacement of aging equipment.

Looking farther into the future, the Department sees research as critical in pursuing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA will result from the application of communication, information, and associated technologies to military operations. To maintain technological superiority and pursue the RMA, the DoD science and technology (S&T) program will continue to invent, develop, and harness technology to provide new warfighting capabilities. The RMA is discussed in Chapter 10.

To ensure U.S. military preeminence in the long term, the Department must continue to focus investments on new generations of defense technologies. The Defense Science and Technology Strategy, with its supporting Basic Research Plan, Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, and Defense Technology Area Plan, is the foundation of the science and technology program. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the military departments, and the various defense agencies collaboratively develop the S&T program.

The Department’s commitment to transforming U.S. military forces requires robust and stable funding for the science and technology program. S&T expenditures support basic research as well as focused investments guided by Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs). DTOs provide a framework for S&T efforts by identifying:

· What specific technologies will be developed and/or demonstrated.

· What specific milestones are to be reached, using what approaches.

· What quantitative metrics will indicate progress.

· Which customers will benefit.

· What specific benefits the customers will gain.

· What level of funding will be programmed and from which sources.

Joint experimentation is critical to gaining insights into new operational concepts and validating their ability to meet future battlefield requirements. The Department is committed to an aggressive program of joint experimentation that integrates Service efforts and fosters innovation and the rapid fielding of new joint concepts and capabilities. With the June 1998 designation of the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) as DoD’s executive agent for joint experimentation, the Department has taken a major step toward realizing the integrated military capabilities described in Joint Vision 2010.

The joint experimentation program will facilitate development of the new doctrines, organizations, and training and education programs needed to meet operational requirements in the 21st century. The program will test new concepts by exploiting synergies in the experimentation programs planned by the individual Services and the acquisition and information technology communities, building eventually to large-scale joint experiments.

Performance Measure 2.2.1 – Annual Procurement Spending ($ in Billions)

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Budget Request

38.9

48.7

53.0

Amount Appropriated

44.3

49.2

N/A

 

Following the end of the Cold War, the Department scaled back its weapons modernization investments, in line with the ongoing downsizing and restructuring of the U.S. military. At the same time as modernization expenditures were being cut, unanticipated contingencies and other unplanned operating expenses caused a steady migration of funds from the investment accounts to the operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts. This lower level of investment initially was appropriate, as it allowed older equipment and systems to be retired from the inventory as the force was being reduced in size. However, elements of the force structure have now aged to the point that selected weapons and items of equipment must be replaced. To achieve the appropriate balance between modernization investments and O&M expenditures, the QDR identified a goal of $60 billion in annual procurement spending, to be attained by FY 2001. The FY 2000 budget requests $53 billion for procurement. Although this figure falls slightly short of the QDR’s FY 2000 expenditure target of $54 billion, it represents a substantial increase over the $44.3 billion appropriated in FY 1997 and the $48.7 billion requested in FY 1999. The FY 2000 budget is on track to meeting the QDR goal.

The Department’s procurement spending goals are closely linked to its plan to exploit the Revolution in Business Affairs, addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Implementing the recommendations of the QDR and the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) will help reduce cost growth in the operating accounts, which causes the migration of funds from investment accounts.

Performance Indicator 2.2.2 – Status of Defense Technology Objectives as Judged by Technology Area Review Assessments

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Percent of DTOs Judged Green (on track)

70

³ 70

³ 70

Total Number of DTOs

345

N/A

N/A

 

Beginning in FY 2000, each DTO will be reviewed every two years. Half the DTOs will be evaluated one year and the other half the next year. Independent peer review panels, called Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA) teams, will conduct the reviews. Each TARA team will comprise 10 to 12 members, of whom at least two-thirds will come from outside DoD. Members will include experts in relevant fields from other U.S. government agencies, private industry, and academia. Other science and technology stakeholders (e.g., senior S&T officials, the Joint Staff, and technology customers) will be invited to attend the reviews as observers. The TARA teams will assess the DTOs in terms of three factors—budget, schedule, and technical performance—and will give the programs a Red, Yellow, or Green rating based on how well they are progressing toward their goals. The following criteria will be used in assigning the ratings:

· Green – Progressing satisfactorily toward goals.

· Yellow – Generally progressing satisfactorily, but some aspects of the program are proceeding more slowly than expected.

· Red – Doubtful that any of the goals will be attained.

The DTO ratings are semi-quantitative metrics reflecting the opinions of independent experts. This method of peer review is accepted and endorsed by the science and technology stakeholders. Adjustments will be made to program plans and budgets based on the ratings awarded.

Performance Indicator 2.2.3 – Joint Experiments

 

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Number of Joint Experiments Conducted

Establish Program

14

 

The joint experimentation program will proceed in building-block fashion from simple to more complex experiments. Initial experiments will piggyback on already-planned experiments. While the initial experiments are being conducted, new doctrine will be written and scheduled for testing in future experiments. As with all experiments, both successes and failures will occur. The results of these experiments, whether successful or not, will provide insights leading to the new capabilities envisioned in the RMA. Ultimately, stand-alone large-scale experiments are anticipated.

The task of establishing a joint experimentation office has been assigned to USACOM. The FY 1999 objective is to establish the organization and prepare a detailed experimentation plan. The FY 2000 goal shown in the table is based on preliminary plans that, with only a few exceptions, do not yet identify specific experiments to be carried out.

In reviewing the table, it should be noted that the number of experiments conducted, while useful for illustrating annual activity levels, is an incomplete indicator of the degree of commitment to, or the amount of progress achieved in, joint experimentation. More experiments are not necessarily better. Fewer, more meaningful experiments are vastly superior to larger numbers of lower-quality experiments that do not produce any lessons learned. Neither is success a valid measure of progress attained in experimentation programs, as much can be learned from failed experiments. The FY 1999 and FY 2000 performance reports will identify the number of joint experiments conducted and assess their contribution toward the long-term goal of Joint Vision 2010 implementation.

Performance Goal 2.3 – Streamline the DoD infrastructure by redesigning the Department’s support structure and pursuing business practice reforms.

U.S. military forces and operations are changing dramatically in response to the changing security environment and advances in technology. The forces contemplated by Joint Vision 2010 and the RMA will require a radically different support structure. Effecting these changes will necessitate steadily increasing investments that can best be offset by increased efficiencies in support operations. Just as combat forces will become more agile and capable, the changes in infrastructure are designed to produce an increasingly responsive support structure. Performance Indicator 2.3.1 shows the relative portion of the defense budget dedicated to support.

The 1998 DoD Logistics Strategic Plan identifies areas of opportunity for reducing the total cost of logistics—throughout the full life cycle—for supported personnel, weapons, and equipment. Goals for increased efficiency in this area are covered by measures of logistics response time and the ability to track items in the supply channel. Faster delivery and worldwide visibility of assets will allow the Department to reduce supply inventories. More detailed information on logistics metrics can be found in OSD Operation and Maintenance Overview, FY 1999 Amended Budget Estimates (February 1998).

There is an inherent expense in holding any property. Inventory must be warehoused; inventory and real estate must be protected and maintained. Inventory reduction and consolidation of unneeded real assets is a sound business practice. The performance measures for this area therefore assess progress in reducing inventories and eliminating excess real property.

Performance Indicator 2.3.1 – Percentage of the DoD Budget Spent on Infrastructure

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Projected

FY 2000
Projected

Infrastructure Spending

46

43

43

 

As the Department pursues innovations to streamline its support operations, the proportion of defense resources devoted to infrastructure is expected to decline. However, the lack of a standard definition for infrastructure makes it difficult to evaluate overall trends. To address this situation, the Department has developed a definition of infrastructure based on categories of funding in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Because FYDP data extend as far back as 1962, this metric is a useful indicator, but not a precise measure, of infrastructure trends.

Performance Indicator 2.3.1 defines infrastructure as activities that support or provide control over military forces from fixed installations. Real property maintenance, environmental compliance, test ranges, and some depot logistics support are part of the infrastructure that supports military facilities and equipment. Also included are personnel support costs, such as recruiting, pilot training, and the Defense Health Program, as well as command and control elements, such as unified commanders in chief headquarters and air traffic control systems.

Because there is no single best value for this indicator, actual and projected budget shares are presented in lieu of a goal. A downward trend in this metric would tend to indicate that the balance is shifting toward less infrastructure and more combat forces. Performance Indicator 2.3.1 is calculated by analyzing the annual budget request.

Performance Indicator 2.3.2 – Unfunded Depot Maintenance Requirements ($ in Millions)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Army

538

451

174

Navy

608

585

581

Air Force

218

46

107

 

The unfunded depot maintenance requirement is the difference, in dollars, between the Services’ estimates of the cost of depot maintenance needed to keep all equipment fully operational and the amount of maintenance actually funded in the budget. The FY 1999 and FY 2000 goals reflect the outcome of budget decisions made during the PPBS process.

The Services estimate maintenance requirements based on projected usage rates of their equipment. Service funding requests are generally lower than forecast requirements, but the unfunded portion of the requirement does not necessarily mean that maintenance will be forgone. Inspections accomplished prior to and during depot maintenance sometimes identify overhaul options that would be less costly to carry out than those reflected in the original workload projections. Moreover, unscheduled repairs often satisfy depot maintenance requirements. This metric enables the comparison of unfunded requirements over time. An upward trend indicates a higher likelihood that needed maintenance will not be accomplished. This metric is not intended to measure success of the depot maintenance program in any given year. For information on the annual financial performance of depot working capital funds, see Performance Indicator 2.3.8.

Performance Measure 2.3.3 – Public-Private Sector Competitions

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Number of Positions Subject to A-76 Competition Studies

32,600

52,000

53,400

 

The size of the defense infrastructure is directly related to how many functions the Department maintains the internal ability to perform as opposed to those it outsources.

Competition forces organizations to improve quality, reduce costs, and focus on customer needs. For functions that are not inherently governmental, the Department is relying increasingly on the competitive powers of the marketplace to generate efficiencies and savings. To ensure that competition between the public and private sectors occurs on a level playing field, DoD uses the competitive process established by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities.

Defense Reform Initiative Directive #20 instituted a review of the entire military and civilian work force to identify those functions that are commercial in nature and could be opened up to competition. The review was completed in January 1999. Based on the results, the Department will develop master plans defining the number and scope of future competitions. Because such changes will affect local communities and other constituent groups, the Department will need congressional support as it institutes these changes.

Performance Measure 2.3.3 reflects the number of A-76 competitions planned as of December 1998. It is subject to change based on the master plans developed as a result of the January 1999 review.

Performance Measure 2.3.4 – Logistics Response Time

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Logistics Response Time (Days)

35

24

18

 

Logistics response time is the elapsed time (in days) from customer requisition to receipt of material ordered from the DoD wholesale system. Reducing delivery time improves the readiness of operational units, while lowering inventories and costs. In addition to reducing order-to-receipt time, DoD is moving aggressively to reduce cycle times across all elements of the supply chain. These efforts include placing greater reliance on electronic contracting (to shorten administrative lead times) and on flexible manufacturing (to reduce production lead times).

In 1997, DoD began measuring the performance of the wholesale logistics pipeline in a uniform manner using the Logistics Metrics Analysis Reporting System. This system is the source of the data reported in Performance Measure 2.3.4. The reporting system allows the Department to identify and correct causes of delay and to build predictability, and hence customer confidence, into the wholesale delivery system. Future enhancements to logistics response time measurement include efforts to capture retail transactions, local commercial purchases, and use of government purchase cards. Alternative measures of customer service, such as on-time delivery rates, also are being explored.

Performance Indicator 2.3.5 – Visibility and Accessibility of DoD Materiel Assets (In percents)

 

FY 1996
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Materiel Asset Visibility and Accessibility

50

80

90

 

The goal of the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program is to provide DoD users with timely, accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of military assets (units, personnel, equipment, and supplies) and the capability to perform transactions using that information. The objectives for TAV capability will be achieved in large part by integrating existing and evolving business systems employed by the Services and defense agencies.

Asset visibility is defined as the percentage of DoD’s worldwide inventory that is both visible and accessible to Integrated Materiel Managers (IMMs). IMMs are the DoD organizations assigned wholesale management responsibility for given assets or classes of assets Department-wide. Currently, 94 percent of DoD’s worldwide inventory is visible to Service or defense agency tracking systems, but only 80 percent is accessible by the appropriate IMM due to data system interoperability problems.

The strategy for FY 2000 is to enhance the interface among the Services and defense agencies in order to achieve a TAV level of 90 percent. This strategy relies upon initiatives that facilitate the sharing of information among formerly stand-alone Service and defense agency data systems. A potential complication in executing the strategy is the fact that TAV initiatives must compete with Year 2000 (Y2K) requirements for scarce information technology resources. However, as described in Appendix K, sufficient management attention is being placed on the timing of these system changes to mitigate the risks of funding shortfalls.

DoD will shortly require quarterly status reports from the Services and defense agencies, which it will use in monitoring progress toward joint TAV goals. These reports will be reviewed and progress tracked through the National Partnership for the Reinvention of Government High-Impact Agency working group.

Performance Measure 2.3.6 – Disposal of Excess National Defense Stockpile (NDS) Inventory and Reduction of Supply Inventory

 


Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

NDS Inventory Disposed (FY 1996 $B)

0.6a

0.6

0.5

Supply Inventory (FY 1995 $B)

67b

59

56

a Baseline year is FY 1997.
b Baseline year is FY 1996.

 

This performance measure includes two related but distinct metrics. The first tracks reductions in the National Defense Stockpile, which is composed of general commodities and raw materials. The second measures the supply system inventory of repair parts and finished goods.

The NDS inventory contains strategic and critical materials needed to meet military, industrial, and essential civilian demands during a national emergency, when domestic and foreign supplies are likely to be insufficient. The baseline value of the stockpile was $6.1 billion in 1996. Since prices of individual commodities in the stockpile are subject to market fluctuations, the total value of the stockpile is also subject to large changes. For this reason, the value of material disposed of, rather than stocks remaining, is used as the metric. The Department’s goal is to reduce the value of the NDS inventory through the disposal of $2.2 billion (in FY 1996 dollars) worth of excess stockpile materials by FY 2000.

Excess NDS materials are disposed of through public sales using competitive contracting procedures or, where no market exists, by other disposal methods. DoD coordinates with the Department of Commerce and other interested parties through an interagency process to ensure that stockpile sales do not unduly influence prices on the world market. A portion of the revenue from NDS sales is used to fund high-priority DoD programs, including those financed through the operation and maintenance accounts. Based on recent world economic events leading to a decreased value of commodities, DoD projects a $250 million shortfall against the FY 2000 goal of $2.2 billion in disposals.

The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC) within the Defense Logistics Agency compiles data on NDS sales. There are no known deficiencies with regard to DNSC data-collection means. The DNSC is planning to downsize both storage sites and personnel as the sales program reduces the inventory of stockpiled materials. The long-term goal is to shut down DNSC operations by 2007.

The supply inventory is larger than required to support today’s smaller force structure. Since 1995, the Department has planned to reduce supply inventories. The goal is to cut holdings from an FY 1989 high of $107 billion to $56 billion by FY 2000 and $48 billion by FY 2003. The key metric associated with this goal is the value of the supply inventory, measured in constant FY 1995 dollars. Surprisingly, some logistics reforms may tend to slow the real or perceived rate of inventory reduction. For example, improvements in total asset visibility (Performance Measure 2.3.5) may cause documented inventory to increase. In addition, selective inventory increases are being made in some areas (notably aircraft parts) in response to operational requirements. A new model reflecting these factors is expected to produce revised inventory reduction goals late in FY 1999.

The Department will pursue its inventory reduction objectives through improved business practices. The Services and the Defense Logistics Agency are reducing their supply inventories by:

· Improving equipment reliability.

· Reducing logistics response times and other cycle times (see Performance Measure 2.3.4).

· Improving requirements-generation processes.

· Selectively outsourcing weapons support and other functions.

· Having vendors ship stock directly to end users.

· Promptly disposing of supply stocks when their associated weapon systems are retired from U.S. or allied inventories.

The Department will validate and verify the data generated by the components’ automated inventory data-collection processes. These processes are approved accounting sources for defense and component supply inventories. No known data or inventory system deficiencies have been identified. Valuation is also reviewed during the preparation of component and working capital fund financial statements as part of the PPBS process.

Performance Measure 2.3.7 – Disposal of Excess Real Property

 

FY 1996
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Excess Acreage

291,000

182,000

145,000

Cumulative Square Feet Disposed (Millions)

N/A

25

41

Cost per Cumulative Square Foot Disposed ($)

N/A

11

11

 

Maintaining excess property places a drain on resources that could be applied to force modernization and readiness. While the problem of excess bases has captured media and public attention through the actions of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission, there is a lesser but real problem of excess and obsolete structures on bases the Department does not desire to close.

Through BRAC, DoD has closed or will close 97 major bases, realigned 55 major bases, and taken action on 235 minor closure and realignment decisions, at a net cost savings of approximately $14.5 billion during implementation. The excess-acres metric tracks land on bases that have been authorized for closure by BRAC decisions but are still under DoD control. The excess acreage is reduced through direct transfers to other federal agencies and by deed conveyances through public benefit transfers, economic development transfers, and market sales. The Department intends to achieve a 50 percent reduction in excess acreage, relative to the FY 1996 baseline, by the end of FY 2000.

The excess-acreage metric has been modified through the removal from consideration of certain properties. Three parcels from Jefferson Proving Ground, Idaho (55,270 acres), Adak, Alaska (73,923 acres), and Sierra Army Depot, California (Honey Lake, consisting of 60,108 acres) were excluded from the metric due to their large size or technical complications associated with the presence of unexploded ordnance. Therefore, the 50 percent goal has been applied to the remaining 291,420 acres associated with the installations approved for closure under BRAC. The goal of disposing of 50 percent of the surplus property equates to a reduction of 146,000 acres. The Department has requested $0.7 billion in FY 2000 and $1.6 billion in FY 2001 to support BRAC closures.

Property disposal data are obtained from base transition coordinators and the Base Closure and Transition Office (BCTO), verified by the appropriate Service, and maintained by the BCTO. Updates to the number of acres approved for transfer are made as property transactions are completed. These properties are well defined, since they are connected to BRAC actions. The risk of data deficiencies is minimal.

On bases not slated for closure, installation commanders report that they are often forced to retain obsolete and excess facilities because they lack the funds necessary to demolish or dispose of the properties. This excess inventory wastes O&M funds that are needed elsewhere and presents serious safety concerns. To ameliorate this situation, the Department has undertaken a Defense Reform Initiative to demolish and dispose of 80 million square feet of excess space at military facilities during FY 1998–2003. This action will prepare DoD for the future by streamlining the facilities infrastructure and reducing the potential for migration of resources from investment to operating accounts. For each Service, the Department has established a separate group of program elements and provided funding sufficient to meet the year-by-year targets and the overall goal of disposal of 80 million square feet of excess property by FY 2003.

Performance Indicator 2.3.8 – Defense Working Capital Funds Net Operating Results ($ in Millions)

 

FY 1998
Goal/Actual

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Army

     

Supply Management

+9.8/-21.9

-4.9

+38.2

Depot Management

+18.3/+8.3

+9.6

0

Navy

     

Supply Management

+87.5/-26.3

+65.9

+42.7

Aviation Depot Management

-21.8/-18.3

-13.8

+1.2

Shipyard Management

+83.1/+83.4

+4.0

-2.6

Air Force

     

Supply Management

+36.6/+172.1

-216.2

0

Depot Management

+200.1/+92.9

+133.2

-45.5

United States Transportation Command

     

Transportation

+80.7/+63.8

+8.7

-155.3

 

Defense working capital funds (DWCFs) are used to finance selected DoD activities. Customers purchase products and services at prices that reflect all direct and indirect costs of a given DWCF budget activity. Customer accounts are financed through direct appropriations at a level commensurate with expected purchases from the respective fund. In addition to selling products and services to customers, DWCF budget activities may make purchases from one another using sales revenue. As the DWCFs cover widely differing areas of the Department’s business operations, they each have unique management goals, which are reflected in their budget submissions.

Net operating result (NOR) is a management measure common to all working capital funds. NOR is the difference between an individual fund’s revenue and its costs. During the PPBS process, NOR goals are created to cancel out any shortages or surpluses from previous years. An NOR that is higher than the assigned goal indicates that a fund may have exceeded expectations; conversely, one that is lower suggests a fund may have been less efficient than desired. If the NOR target for a working capital fund is not met, the unique management goals for that fund will provide insights into the underlying causes.

Performance Goal 2.4 – Meet combat forces’ needs smarter and faster, with products and services that work better and cost less, by improving the efficiency of DoD’s acquisition processes.

The QDR stressed the need to exploit the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) in order to radically reengineer defense infrastructure and defense support activities. The RBA calls for reducing overhead and streamlining infrastructure; taking maximum advantage of acquisition reform; outsourcing and privatizing a wide range of support activities; leveraging commercial and dual-use technology; reducing unneeded standards and specifications; using integrated process and product development; and increasing cooperative development programs with allied nations. Performance Goal 2.3 included aspects of the RBA that involve management of services and physical property held by DoD. Performance Goal 2.4 addresses acquisition reform and defense reform initiatives involving the acquisition of new property, systems, and services. The ultimate purpose of all business efficiency efforts in the Department is to shift resources to the operating forces.

This goal echoes the themes of modern procurement practices: minimizing product introduction times and cost growth, while simplifying the purchase process through the adoption of modern practices, such as purchase cards and electronic commerce.

Performance Measure 2.4.1 – Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Cost Growth

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

MDAP Cost Growth (Percents)

-0.3

<1.0

<1.0

 

Cost growth can arise for various reasons, including technical risk, schedule slips, and overly-optimistic cost-estimating. Acquisition reform seeks to reduce cost growth from all sources as a true output goal that the procurement manager for an individual system, or for an entire Service, must make hard choices to attain. Managerial responses are expected to include both specific cost-control initiatives and process changes. The objective is to keep the metric below a 1 percent increase annually.

Cost growth is the difference between the current year’s and the previous year’s budgets, divided by the budget for the previous year. Only programs continuing from the previous year are considered; adjustments are made to account for changes in quantities ordered and for the effects of inflation.

Within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, the Department reviews projected spending on MDAPs to detect early signs of cost growth. Further reviews, conducted prior to submission of the President’s Budget, serve to detect possible causes of MDAP growth before additional funds are requested for the programs in question.

Data on cost growth are collected from the annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for MDAPs. SAR data provide a means to verify and validate the measured values. There are no known SAR data deficiencies. It is important to emphasize that this metric is not an absolute measure of research and development and procurement cost performance. Some cost growth in MDAPs can be the unavoidable result of program changes; such increases can occur as a result of the best management practices. When the 1 percent goal is exceeded, the SAR reports provide data useful for isolating the specific causes of cost growth.

Performance Indicator 2.4.2 – MDAP Cycle Time

 

FY 1996
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Average Months from Program Start to Initial Operational Capability

132

<99

<99

 

During the 1960s, a typical acquisition took only seven years to complete. By 1996, the same acquisition required 11 years to progress from program start to initial operational capability (IOC). Recent efforts to reverse this trend include attempts to enhance program stability through secure, long-term funding; improved management oversight afforded by Integrated Product Teams; and more extensive use of commercially-derived items. Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) represent another means of rapidly introducing new technologies. ACTDs emphasize technological integration rather than technology development. The goal is to provide prototype capabilities to operational commanders and to support evaluations of those capabilities through military exercises. These initiatives are beginning to bear fruit; however, more work is needed to understand the complex web of factors that conspire to lengthen programs.

DoD has established the objective of delivering new MDAPs to the field in 25 percent less time than was the case for programs initiated prior to 1992. The key measure for this goal is the average elapsed time from program start to IOC, measured in months, for all MDAPs in development during a given calendar year. The 1996 baseline is 132 months, representing the average cycle time for 58 MDAPs begun before 1992. Programs initiated after 1992 have a current (predicted) cycle time of 100 months. Average cycle time will be computed using schedule estimates or actual data taken from the Selected Acquisition Reports or the Acquisition Program Baselines.

The Department will continue to monitor MDAPs through the PPBS process, emphasizing the need for program funding stability and identifying possible unintended effects of short-term budget decisions.

Performance Measure 2.4.3 – Successful Completion of Weapon System Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Events

 

FY 1999 Goal

FY 2000 Goal

Percentage of OT&E Events Successfully Completed

Establish Methodology

100

 

DoD testing programs aim to provide U.S. forces with defect-free, effective, and suitable weaponry and equipment. Future U.S. combat systems will be increasingly interoperable and interdependent; new systems entering service will have to function effectively not only with other systems in the U.S. inventory but also with weaponry and equipment operated by allied and coalition forces. The increasing complexity of modern warfare demands a rigorous testing effort aimed at providing superior weapons to U.S. forces in a timely manner. The OT&E program is designed to support decision makers in maintaining program schedules (Performance Measure 2.4.2) and costs (Performance Measure 2.4.1).

Operational testing and evaluation entails numerous tests of new weapon systems, simulating the needs of, and conditions expected to be faced by, combat forces. These OT&E events are designed to collect data on the systems’ effectiveness, performance, suitability, and survivability.

The Director of OT&E will track the number of events in acquisition program test and evaluation master plans that have been accomplished successfully. Success in a test event is defined as the collection of data supporting all learning objectives for a given test. Rules must be established reflecting the interplay between the system tested and the testing process. FY 1999 will be the baseline year for this new indicator. Goals for FY 1999 include establishing methodology and collecting initial data. This indicator will be limited in scope to acquisition programs under OSD oversight.

The Department’s senior leaders are emphasizing early involvement by operational testers, early operational insights from a variety of OT&E events, and early identification and correction of operational deficiencies. The Director of OT&E will track how soon in the weapons system life-cycle testing events are accomplished, with an eye toward the earliest possible feedback to decision makers.

Performance Indicator 2.4.4 – Purchase Card Micro-Purchases (In percents)

 

FY 1996
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Percentage of Purchases Made by Purchase Card

52

80

90

 

The Army Audit Agency estimates savings of $92 per transaction when supplies or services are procured using government purchase cards. In the traditional acquisition process, a requisition document is forwarded sequentially to various functional elements, such as the purchasing component’s resource management office (for commitment of funds) and supply manager (to screen for local or national inventories). If the requirement cannot be filled through the component’s supply system, a purchase request is forwarded to the local contracting activity. Use of government purchase cards for micro-purchases virtually eliminates this entire workload. Micro-purchases are supplies or services (other than construction) valued at less than $2,500. Through purchase card use, the Department has already realized sizable manpower-related savings, which it has redirected to mission elements of the force.

Since 1997, all contracting officers have been required to use purchase cards for micro-purchases except in narrowly defined circumstances. The military departments and defense agencies have likewise been directed to abolish nonessential technical screening requirements and to reduce the categories of items that require such screening controls for purchases made with government purchase cards.

Performance relative to the goal will be measured by dividing the purchase card transactions within the micro-purchase threshold by the total number of micro-purchases. These data, which are provided to the Federal Procurement Data System, will be used to verify and validate the measured values. There are no known data system deficiencies.

Performance Indicator 2.4.5A – Percentage of DoD Paperless Transactions

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Purchase Requests

71

85

90

Funding Documents

69

80

80

Solicitations

49

70

90

Awards/Modifications

21

65

90

Receipts

16

50

90

Payments/Invoices

13

50

90

 

The Department is committed to employing contemporary information technology and commercial best practices to reinvent its contracting processes. Contracting, particularly that related to high-cost weapon systems, consumes a large portion of the defense budget and employs a significant portion of the DoD work force. To inject information technology and best practices into all contracting processes, the Paperless Contracting Defense Reform Initiative is reengineering and standardizing the Department’s contracting and payment practices. Over time, paperless contracting will contribute significantly to reducing acquisition cycle time (Performance Measures 2.3.4 and 2.4.2) and streamlining the acquisition work force (Performance Measure 2.4.6). Use of government purchase cards (Performance Measure 2.4.4) will be the primary means of achieving paperless contracting for small purchases. The Services and defense agencies, under the auspices of the Defense Reform Initiative, will employ Internet technologies, workflow systems, electronic commerce/electronic data interchange transactions, and digital signature/public key encryption capabilities to accomplish this goal.

The Department will seek legislative authority to expand the use of purchase cards in lieu of contracts. Increases in the number and type of transactions made by purchase cards must be pursued judiciously, as many of the specific clauses in small purchase contracts support socioeconomic goals. The lack of widespread acceptance of digital signature and paperless/Web-based transactions, both within and outside DoD, remains the largest impediment to achieving this objective.

The Services and defense agencies compile quarterly reports on transactions in each area covered by Performance Indicator 2.4.5A, using data gathered from field operating sites. Heuristics have been developed to validate these statistics using data generated by formal DoD reporting systems. Performance Indicators 2.4.5A and 2.4.5B use the same data sources.

For more information on this and other reforms sponsored by the Defense Reform Initiative, see Chapter 13.

Performance Indicator 2.4.5B – Paperless Acquisition Transactions (In percents)

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Total Electronic Contracting and Payment Transactions

29

82

90

 

The DoD acquisition community is implementing the DRI Paperless Contracting Initiative, discussed above under Performance Indicator 2.4.5A, through a three-pronged approach. The approach is designed to achieve paperless life-cycle management through the introduction of paperless acquisition management/integrated digital environments, life-cycle support practices, and electronic contracting. Acquisition community goals for electronic contracting and payments are shown in Performance Indicator 2.4.5B. Metrics for the other two areas will be added when data-collection issues have been resolved.

Electronic contracting focuses on the elimination of paper from the acquisition process. Efforts in this area span all phases of the process, from contract requirements generation to final deliveries, including paperless payments to industry. The primary metric for this goal is the annual percentage of contracting and payment transactions that are conducted electronically.

Performance Indicator 2.4.6 – Reductions in the Acquisition Work Force (In percents)

 

FY 1998
Baseline

FY 1999
Goal

FY 2000
Goal

Reduction from FY 1997 Work Force

5.8

11.3

15

 

The Department is making an active effort to reduce and restructure its acquisition work force. The goal is to eliminate duplicative functions, consolidate organizations, simplify procedures, improve professionalism, streamline processes, and increase efficiency throughout the Department. Initiatives in this area also contribute to the reduction of defense infrastructure, discussed under Performance Goal 2.3 and Performance Indicator 2.3.1.

Reports submitted to the Defense Manpower Data Center by DoD components will serve as a basis for verifying and validating work force reductions.

Performance Measure 2.4.7 – Disposal of Unneeded Government Property Held by Contractors

 

FY 1997
Baseline

FY 1998
Goal

1999
Goala

Cumulative Value of Tooling and Equipment Disposed of ($B)

1.1

2.5

3.0

a To be achieved by December 31, 1999.

 

Between FY 1986 and FY 1997, the acquisition value of DoD property in the possession of defense contractors grew to $91 billion, despite repeated efforts to curb growth. The military buildup of the 1980s and the renewed emphasis on developing new weapon systems under cost-reimbursement contracts were factors in that growth.

In order to reverse the property growth trend and reduce the amount of government-owned tooling and equipment in contractors’ possession, the Department will either dispose of property no longer needed for contract performance or directly fund its storage separate from the acquisition contracts. The key measurement for this performance goal will be the current dollar value of special tooling, special test equipment, and other equipment and material disposed of relative to the total value of such materials in the possession of DoD contractors as of September 30, 1997. DoD contractors are required to report this information on a fiscal-year basis. Reports for the immediately-prior year are due during the first quarter of each fiscal year.

The baseline excludes military property (typically provided to contractors for repair or test and evaluation purposes) and real property. There are millions of items in the baseline, some acquired more than 25 years ago. Therefore, it is impractical to convert the acquisition cost for each item to constant dollars. Data will be based on contractor reports of excess and underutilized property. There are no known deficiencies in the data-collection process.

Performance indicator 2.4.8

Performance Indicator 2.4.8 is a qualitative assessment of reengineered defense transportation documentation and financial processes. This reengineering effort attempts to eliminate DoD-unique documentation requirements, improve data accuracy, decrease documentation process costs, reduce payment cycle times, and increase the effectiveness of transportation movement and financial processes. The goal is to increase transportation efficiency and reduce infrastructure costs for DoD and commercial partners.

Means and strategies for accomplishing this goal include:

· Using commercial rather than government-unique transportation documentation.

· Reducing data requirements.

· Using purchase cards to pay for both commercial and intragovernmental transportation services.

· Prototyping concepts in four modes of transportation—airlift, sealift, truckload/less-than-truckload, and express carrier—to validate concepts and identify and resolve issues.

VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF DATA

Procedures for verifying and validating data were discussed in previous sections of this performance plan, along with the performance measures and indicators that the data support. Many of the metrics refer back to DoD financial and accounting systems that have experienced problems in the past accurately capturing costs and tracking disbursements. To remedy these shortcomings, the Department has undertaken a number of financial management reforms designed to enhance system effectiveness while cutting costs. Many of the improvements provide for the consolidation of multiple Service- and agency-specific systems into a smaller number of standardized systems. For an expanded discussion of these and other financial management reforms, see Chapter 14.

THE PPBS PROCESS

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is the process employed by the Department of Defense to ensure that its strategic plan—the QDR—is implemented in its budget. Through the PPBS, the Department apportions resources annually in support of the corporate goals articulated in the QDR, consistent with the DoD vision statement presented earlier in this appendix.

Each year, the Department issues detailed planning guidance based upon the results of previous years’ budget execution, as well as upon changes in defense policy. The Deputy Secretary of Defense supplements this programmatic guidance by providing fiscal guidance to each of the Services and defense agencies. The Services and defense agencies then use the planning and fiscal guidance to adjust their individual programs. The product of these adjustments is a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) prepared by each of the military departments and defense agencies, outlining the programs they propose to pursue to achieve the Department’s goals. Each of the POMs addresses the multiyear period reflected in the associated Future Years Defense Program. The Department evaluates the combined Service and agency POMs to ensure they properly implement the planning and fiscal guidance. Alternative approaches for implementing the guidance are defined and resolved through a process known as the Program Review. During the Program Review, the Department selects those alternatives most consistent with its corporate goals.

With this programmatic guidance in hand, the Services and defense agencies have a clear roadmap to use in preparing their Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs). The BES funding profiles collectively reflect the financial strategy the Department will follow to achieve its corporate goals. The combined BESs are vetted through a Budget Review conducted by the staffs of the Department’s Comptroller and the Office of Management and Budget. During the Budget Review, the Department’s ability to accomplish its goals at the planned funding levels is carefully examined. Following the Budget Review, the Deputy Secretary approves either the estimates from the BES submissions or alternative estimates developed by the Comptroller. Taken together, these decisions constitute a financial blueprint for achieving the corporate goals derived from the Department’s strategic plan. With the issuance of these decisions, the process of preparing the defense portion of the President’s Budget is complete.

In sum, the PPBS process is an effective mechanism for the Department to match the national military strategy with the appropriate budgetary resources in a fiscally constrained environment. At every step of the way, senior leaders have visibility into those issues that could threaten the Department’s ability to properly match means to ends as expressed in the QDR. The end result of PPBS execution is an annual budget that fully supports the Department’s corporate goals.

CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS

There are several national security issues that the Department addresses as part of an interagency team. As noted earlier, DoD provides technical support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its efforts to combat terrorism, including potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. DoD likewise works closely with the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure the security of the increasingly interconnected and vulnerable U.S. infrastructures against physical or cyber attack. DoD also works closely with FEMA to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. Finally, DoD conducts airborne and seaborne surveillance of high-intensity drug-trafficking routes in support of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.

[Top] [Bottom] [Previous] [Next] [TOC]