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Chapter 8
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

The strategic vision for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is to provide capabilities that enable forces to generate, use, and share the information necessary to survive and succeed on every mission. Major accomplishments in all areas of C4ISR bring DoD closer to achieving this vision.

Information superiority provides the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversaryís ability to do the same. It includes comprehensive knowledge of the battlespace, including the status and intentions of both adversary and friendly forces. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified information superiority as the backbone of military innovation, and noted that the Revolution in Military Affairs centers on developing the improved information and command and control capabilities needed to significantly enhance joint operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control (C2) systems provide the means to effectively execute nuclear, conventional, and special operations. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which replaced the World Wide Military Command and Control System, provides nearly 700 locations with its secret level functionality and increased capability. GCCS provides an enhanced common operational picture, force status, intelligence support, enemy order of battle, related facility information, and air tasking orders. In 1998, GCCS Version 3.0 will provide imagery, meteorological, and oceanographic data. GCCS Top Secret (GCCS-T) provides a top secret infrastructure for C2 throughout the force deployment cycle. When completed in mid-1998, GCCS-T Version 2.2 will add nuclear Single Integrated Operational Plan capabilities and a top secret (including special intelligence) common operational picture. GCCS and GCCS-T improvements in 1999 will further add sensitive compartmented information, increase user sites, and improve performance and reliability. DoD will evolve toward more integrated and interoperable battle management systems through continued deployment of GCCS below the joint command level and into operational units.

GCCS is supported and complemented by other modernized automated information systems. For example, the Global Transportation Network (GTN) is being deployed to provide GCCS with information to support planning for common user airlift, surface lift, and terminal services for global military force deployment and sustainment. Together with other applications such as Joint Total Asset Visibility, GTN is being integrated into the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), which complements GCCS by providing warfighters with the ability to track the status and location of critical logistics, procurement, engineering, finance, personnel, and medical resources. During 1998, GCSS will enhance the common operational picture of the battlespace with asset visibility information and decision support tools to plan and execute combat service support for military operations.

DoD continues to modernize, consolidate, and optimize its portion of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System to be more effective and efficient. It relies on survivable and endurable command centers and a redundant, survivable communications network. Increased utilization of the Milstar satellites will improve the ability to initiate, execute, and terminate a nuclear response. The Space-Based Infrared System will provide improved ballistic missile launch detection.

Command and control includes the ability to safely and efficiently apply airborne resources in support of air, land, and naval military operations. With increased air traffic and growing reliance on satellite navigation, DoD must assure air safety with improved navigation. DoD is working closely with the Federal Aviation Administration and its international counterparts to establish common military and civilian standards. The Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, Air Traffic Control and Landing System and its deployable counterpart, the Global Positioning System, avionics modernization, and the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System are funded to facilitate essential international military air operations.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Defense intelligence must be able to provide timely, usable, detailed intelligence to allow U.S. military forces to out-think and out-operate enemy forces and protect American lives. Round-the-clock crisis and contingency support is provided to military commanders and deployed forces. During 1997, intelligence and counterintelligence support has provided:

ē Ground force capabilities, intentions, and force protection assessments for the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

ē Noncombatant evacuation and contingency planning support in Albania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone.

ē Targeting support and enemy capability assessments in Iraq.

ē Humanitarian and disaster relief support.

ē Support for counternarcotics, force protection, and monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.

Increasing demands for precise, finished intelligence strain the resources available to satisfy the required analytical depth and breadth of Defense intelligence. Due to the changing conflict environment, global scope, and the wide range of potential military missions, significant improvements are essential to meet current and long-term needs.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) issue Joint Intelligence Guidance to provide focused program direction and priorities for all intelligence and related activities. They co-chair the Expanded Defense Resources Board, which is the senior advisory body for reviewing all Defense intelligence and related activities, including programmatic, resource, and substantive intelligence issues. Defense intelligence is placing greater emphasis on activities that promote information availability and interoperability between Services and multinational partners. DoD is aggressively pursuing an integrated intelligence collection, production, and infrastructure strategy.

During U.S. Forces Koreaís Ulchi Focus Lens exercise in August 1997, the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture concept to improve battlespace visualization and information sharing was demonstrated. Recent implementation of revised security policy by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has expanded the availability of national imagery at the unclassified level.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is leading an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) to enhance management systems for intelligence collection across all echelons. DoD and the Central Intelligence Agency are reviewing potential evolutionary approaches to fully integrate collection management, and to improve the balance of imagery, signals, and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. The Defense HUMINT Service has restructured global assets to increase human intelligence capabilities, and new defense attache offices have expanded U.S. military diplomatic presence around the world. The DIA Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Office initiatives to improve intelligence collection from complex sensors, unattended MASINT monitoring, and chemical/biological weapon detection programs have been successful.

DoD has implemented numerous other programs to enhance intelligence capabilities. The Joint Staff has enhanced the process for identification of intelligence support requirements for new weapon systems, and for input to new intelligence systems by weapon system developers and users. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program has established electronic connectivity among 28 continental United States (CONUS) Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers and the organizations they support. DoD is developing a Defense Reserve Language Program to enhance Reserve linguistic resources. In addition to its currently accredited Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence curriculum, DIAís Joint Military Intelligence College has gained congressional approval to award the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence. NIMA has established new training standards and is conducting a pilot program to improve the integration of geospatial data into intelligence analysis for imagery analysts and cartographers.

To continue progress toward Joint Vision 2010 implementation, Defense intelligence must further expand the availability of information to participants in joint and multinational military operations. Among other initiatives, a multi-level security (MLS) strategy is required, leading to immediate MLS implementation within the Intelligence Community and the Department. Additionally, standard dissemination paths, data access procedures, and delivery formats must be established. These innovations must be tested with advanced technology and concepts to enhance information superiority within the context of military operations. This will be accomplished by fully integrating Defense intelligence into the Task Force XXI (Army), Information Technology 21 (Navy), and Hunter Warrior (Marine Corps) advanced warfighting experiments.

DoDís counterintelligence (CI) program provides protection against the intelligence activities of foreign entities and terrorist organizations. All of the Departmentís tactical CI capability and almost 70 percent of its foreign CI program directly support U.S. military operationsóprimarily force protection. The Department runs over 2,000 CI investigations annually. In addition to espionage cases, the Department conducted several high profile CI investigations into the illegal transfer of critical defense technologies, intrusions into defense automated information systems (AISs), and terrorism. A joint computer forensics laboratory and computer investigations training program are being developed to support both criminal investigations and CI.

Following the Khobar Towers bombing, the Department conducted a comprehensive, worldwide review to determine how DoD could substantially enhance intelligence and CI support to combating terrorism and force protection. Ten study recommendations approved by the Deputy Secretary in FY 1997 are currently being implemented. DoDís terrorism warning apparatus is being overhauled to ensure that threat warning is timely, widely disseminated, and as predictive as possible. Training of analysts and CI agents has been substantially improved. A single primary terrorism data base will be established and sharing of terrorism data with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is being improved. The studyís 11 remaining recommendations are being consolidated and refined for implementation in FY 1998.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

To increase interoperability, the National Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office are developing complementary space and airborne surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Joint Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Avionics Family (JSAF) sensor equipment will not only provide increased performance, interoperability, and commonality across the airborne reconnaissance fleet, but also allow interoperability with satellite systems.

Increased warfighter demands for information have highlighted the need for enhanced airborne reconnaissance coverage and increased reconnaissance operating tempo. DoD is procuring a family of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to complement current manned systems, with significant savings. Through the ACTD process, Predator UAV was quickly fielded and has flown over 3,600 hours in support of operations in Bosnia. Other UAVs are beginning flight tests and will participate in warfighter demonstrations beginning in FY 1999.

Manned airborne surveillance and reconnaissance assets are developing better situational awareness by using enhanced and modernized capabilities, such as Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and JSAF. In addition to the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), the most robust and capable example of MTI surveillance, MTI capabilities have migrated to the U-2 and the Airborne Reconnaissance Low. While U-2ís improved MTI-capable radar will begin delivery in FY 1998, both the RC-135 RIVET JOINT and EP-3 aircraft are completing other major upgrade programs and will begin transitioning to JSAF in FY 1999. JSAF equipment can be used not only in manned signals intelligence platforms, but also in UAVs, pending their adoption of the signals intelligence mission.

The airborne reconnaissance fleet is migrating toward Common Data Link (CDL) compliance. The Tactical CDL, a low-cost, lightweight communications system to facilitate this migration, will complete development in FY 1999. DoD is consolidating Common Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS) and Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture standards. Most Service imagery ground systems will meet CIGSS standards by the end of FY 1999.

DoD has expanded the flow of intelligence information from national reconnaissance systems to all users. The Common Object Framework (which achieved initial operational capability in October 1997) uses commercial off-the-shelf software to integrate national reconnaissance data directly into the Air Force Special Operations Command mission planning system. During the 1997 Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration, users received primary imagery for precision strike planning and targeting using open systems and commercial standards. And finally, in 1997, submarines in the Pacific received real-time situational awareness data from newly installed tactical receivers and exploitation equipment.

To meet long-term requirements, the National Reconnaissance Office has launched initiatives to revolutionize collection technologies used in space. NIMA acquires commercial imagery from multiple vendors for both geospatial production and peacetime and crisis applications. NIMA will also acquire unclassified imagery from new high-resolution commercial sensors with enhanced spectral capabilities. A joint government/industry team has been established to identify the best acquisition approach for the future. NIMA will migrate existing production systems to a more sustainable and flexible open architecture, and is shifting from predominantly hardcopy production, storage, and distribution to digital capability.

Numerous programs are being developed to allow users to receive data more quickly with the ability to manipulate it to meet their requirements. Presently, users have Internet-like access to information and services over existing communications channels. The Intelligence Community is developing a global geospatial data base for rapid access to dynamic, highly accurate, time-tagged views of the mission space. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System allows cartographers to gain expanded access to intelligence data bases, while providing warfighters with access to critical fused intelligence.

Information Operations

Information operations (IO) are actions taken across the entire conflict spectrum to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting oneís own information and information systems. Information warfare is conducted during crisis or conflict to achieve specific objectives over an adversary. Information assurance protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality.

In 1997, the Department identified command operational priorities for IO requirements and continued to improve processes for fielding IO capabilities. IO reviews included intelligence (from indications and warning, collection, and production); modeling and simulation; and battle management/command, control, and communications. The Intelligence Community published the first National Intelligence Estimate on IO which identified foreign interest in IO and worldwide availability of IO tools. The Department also established the IO vision, goals, and objectives; described IO strategies and timelines; and identified federal agency interfaces in an IO master plan. To examine IO issues, DoD sponsors the Highlands Forum, which brings together government, industry, and academic professionals from various fields. DoD provides two intensive IO courses to students from all federal agencies, and wargames and exercises are being extended to increase experience in applying IO to military operations.

The new Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC) acknowledges a transition in viewing IO threats and targets as technology-centered rather than geography-centered. Through a formal DoD/DCI agreement, the IOTC will enhance IO cooperation throughout the Intelligence Community. Also, the Joint Staff is evaluating potential changes to joint warfighting organizations and processes, to centralize command responsibilities for executing IO campaigns and responses to strategic IO attacks. This requirement was identified during the two primary 1997 IO exercises. Exercise Evident Surprise (March 1997) highlighted the interagency coordination process required to deconflict and execute IO, and Exercise Eligible Receiver (June 1997) highlighted Indications and Warning issues, as well as coordination of responses to IO attacks.

Security

Defense security programs prevent or deter espionage, sabotage, subversion, theft, or the unauthorized use of classified or controlled information, systems, or war materiel in DoD custody. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS), which provides security services to DoD, will become a fee-for-service organization in FY 1999. Cost visibility will motivate customers and focus DIS on more cost-efficient operations. DIS has already undertaken reengineering of the entire Personnel Security Investigative Program, from request to clearance issuance. Case completion time for initial investigations has already been reduced from 192 to 133 days (40 percent), with a target of 90 days or less by the end of FY 1999. In FY 1998, information technology modernization will reduce internal processing times and provide customers and end users with Internet and intranet access to standardized data from a corporate data base.

In 1997, DoD declassified over 68 million pages, eight times the number declassified in 1996. Additionally, multidisciplinary threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments to determine the threat against critical program information provided the basis for decisions and identification of appropriate security countermeasures.

C4ISR INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

Achieving information superiority requires improvements in C4ISR integration and interoperability. Developing an overall C4ISR architecture is the critical element to ensure consistent implementation and effective employment in all operations.

DoD conducted an extensive C4ISR Mission Assessment to examine how C4ISR should evolve to support future operations. The study forecast the impact of C4ISR performance on the battlefield, examined C4ISR interoperability and integration architecture issues, and defined a C4ISR architecture framework and an investment strategy. Assessment results will help DoD balance C4ISR investments and enhance C2 system integration.

The Joint Technical Architecture, which facilitates use and exchange of information for operational planning and combat decision making, is DoDís most important C4ISR architecture initiative. To facilitate AIS development and operation, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) common operating environment provides an architecture of standards and software.

To integrate C4ISR operational and systems architectures at the command level and below, DoD has expanded the Command Intelligence Architecture Planning Program. All Unified Commands completed their first C4ISR architectures under this program in FY 1997. The C4ISR Architecture for the Warfighter program describes current priority C4ISR operations; highlights shortfalls, deficiencies, and incompatibilities; identifies relative priorities; and enables management to initiate corrective action.

The Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center (DSC) provides analytical support to requirements and acquisition decision makers. During 1997, the DSC studied precision engagement architectures, C4ISR impacts on strike warfare, and space-based versus airborne tactical communications. FY 1998 studies include dissemination of intelligence sensor information, Moving Target Indicator radar requirements, precision force architecture analysis, and reengineering the C4ISR interoperability requirements process.

C4ISR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT

Subdivision E of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, better known as the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA), is the most far-reaching management reform legislation enacted during the past several years for DoDís C4ISR. Along with the Government Performance and Results Act, ITMRA changes the selection and management process for information technology resources and requires that information technology investments provide measurable improvements in mission performance. Information technology investments must support only those functions that are consistent with agency missions, and that cannot be performed more effectively and at less cost by the private sector or another government agency. Programs that pass these two tests must be reengineered before new investments are made. DoD has designated a Chief Information Officer (CIO), established a DoD CIO Council, published the first information technology management strategic plan and supporting component plans, and established ITMRA compliance requirements for information technology acquisitions. The annual report required by Section 5123 of this legislation is provided as Appendix K.

The Department determines the level of oversight and approval based on cost and special interest. Presently, there are 44 major AISs or special interest initiatives subject to oversight by the DoD CIO, or Major AIS Review Council, and 27 major AIS or special interest initiatives subject to component oversight. A steering committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense is overseeing correction of the Year 2000 problem throughout the Department.

DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

The Defense Information Infrastructure is the web of communications networks, computers, software, data bases, applications, weapon system interfaces, security, and other services that meet DoDís end-to-end information transport (telecommunications) and processing (computer) needs. Defense Information Infrastructure resources connect DoD mission support, C2, and intelligence systems and users through voice, data, imagery, video, and multimedia services. The Defense Information Infrastructure is part of the National Information Infrastructure. The Defense Information Infrastructure relies upon the National Information Infrastructure when cost, performance, and security considerations support that choice.

Telecommunications

The Defense Information System Network (DISN) is DoDís worldwide, common-user telecommunications network that interfaces with customer-owned equipment to deliver secure and non-secure information from desktop to foxhole. DISN, the communications infrastructure of the Defense Information Infrastructure, supports the Defense Message System (DMS) and Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI). DISN incorporates surge capacity, robustness, interoperability with the systems of allied and coalition forces, end-to-end network management, and assured service using a mix of military and commercial media. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, the secure compartmented information component of DISN, provides Defense intelligence and other secure communications capabilities.

DISN has adopted common standards and integrated disparate DoD networks and services into a common-user network and is now buying and using services based on new and emerging technologies to improve interoperability, reliability, and positive control. Five major DISN contracts were awarded in 1997ótwo for CONUS services, one for services in Hawaii, and two for global services. These contracts will provide sizable cost savings following completion of network implementation in June 1998. Acquisition of DISN services for the Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia theaters is under way. Non-CONUS initial operating capability will occur through FY 2000.

The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) is a ultra high frequency terminal that uses Link 16 (DoDís primary tactical data link) to provide secure, jam-resistant, high-capacity interoperable voice and data communications for tactical platforms and weapon systems. The terminal uses an internationally standardized NATO waveform and message format to transmit tactical information. The third generation Link 16 terminal, the Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT), is an international cooperative program with France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom that will be JTIDS-interoperable. The first MIDS-LVT terminals will be delivered in early 1998. These new terminals will be half the price and weight and one-third the size of JTIDS terminals, allowing expanded fielding opportunities at lower cost.

In September 1997, DoD initiated the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), previously called the Programmable Modular Communications System, acquisition program to develop a single family of radios to replace many incompatible Service radios. The JTRS family will have modular configurations that will satisfy all user requirements from backpacks to strike aircraft and will span multiple frequency bands and waveforms. JTRS will be scalable, extendible through technology insertion, and low cost. The initial family of JTRS products will respond to the Mission Needs Statement validated and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Value-Added Services

The Defense Message System is a secure, reliable, standards-based global message system that uses mainline commercial products. DMS-compliant messaging provides high assurance interoperability within DoD, the national intelligence community, NATO/allied partners, and some federal agencies. DMS also provides a global directory and public key infrastructure that can be used by other Defense Information Infrastructure applications. DMS completed initial operational testing in August 1997. Operational testing and rapid deployment will continue through FY 1998/1999. DMS will allow the phase-out of the 1960s technology automatic digital network message switches by FY 2000. Future DMS technology will include transmission of all messages, including those using closed national systems today.

ITMRA seeks substantial operational improvements through the use of modern information technology. Electronic Commerce (EC) has emerged as one of the dominant functional applications of information technology. EC uses technologies such as electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, imaging, facsimile transmission, electronic bulletin boards, electronic catalogs, electronic engineering drawings and data, electronic funds transfer, bar coding, webs and electronic navigators, and workflow management systems. An EC oversight office and an EC Information Services Office will provide the information services and infrastructure needed to coordinate EC initiatives, assure DoD-wide interoperability, and eliminate duplicative efforts.

Information Assurance

Information Assurance (IA) is the component of Information Operations that assures DoDís operational readiness by providing for the continuous availability and reliability of the information systems and networks that comprise the DII. IA protects the DII against exploitation, degradation, and denial of service, while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute and reestablish vital capabilities following an attack. IA is recognized as a critical component of DoDís operational readiness.

Accordingly, DoD components are actively addressing the issue by increasing operator and system manager training; installing firewalls and guards, network intrusion detection systems, and encryption hardware and software; using 24 hour-per-day computer emergency response teams; identifying critical nodes that support the Department; and conducting system and network vulnerability assessments.

Given the shared risk environment created by the Departmentís increasing reliance on global networks, DoD is restructuring its management of IA, and is creating an integrated, ITMRA compliant, Defense-wide Information Assurance Program. This program will empower DoD and component CIO oversight of the Departmentís IA operations and resources, and will synchronize Department-wide IA efforts to maximize return on investment. In doing so, DoD will build and maintain a DII capable of continuously protecting the Departmentís information and enhancing the operational effectiveness of U.S. military forces throughout the world.

Spectrum Accessibility

Assured access to the electromagnetic spectrum is essential for U.S. strategic and tactical systems to fulfill their missions. These include communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and weapons guidance. Government and private sector requirements and competition for this finite resource are increasing. DoD continues to review its spectrum requirements to assess which (if any) spectrum can be shared, and to identify ways to manage the spectrum more effectively and efficiently. As spectrum becomes an increasingly scarce resource, national level processes will need to place even more emphasis on ensuring emerging private sector and federal requirements are systematically addressed. Before additional government spectrum is reallocated, target bands should be reviewed based on priority consideration of the cost and operational impact on military operations, readiness, and national security.

Information Systems

The Defense megacenters provide computing capabilities critical to DoDís global combat support operations. The overall annual operating cost of DoD mainframe processing has been reduced from $1,062 million in 1990 to $505 million in 1996, with a 70 percent personnel reduction. The QDR approved further consolidation of the current 16 Defense megacenters into six sites. Consolidation and workload optimization will result in steady-state annual savings by FY 2003 of $203 million. Customers will receive reduced information processing rates beginning in FY 1999.

DoD continues migration to a suite of standard automated information systems for combat and combat support functions, and will eliminate 1,000 legacy systems by FY 2000. Increased compliance with the Joint Technical Architecture and other technical standards will improve compatibility, interoperability, and integration. Nonstandard data elements are also being reviewed to standardize data element identification. Over 15,000 standard data elements have been approved, resulting in a ten to one reduction in departmental data.

CONCLUSION

The QDR reaffirmed the general focus and level of resources that DoD is applying to C4ISR. Major improvements in capability have occurred during the last four years, and programs now under way will accelerate progress toward achieving information superiority. The Departmentís challenge lies in improving the balance within C4ISR programs, applying advanced technology to support modernization targets and information-enabled operational concepts for Joint Vision 2010, and using information technology to achieve DoDís revolution in business affairs.

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