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Chapter II WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

More changes have occurred m the US milhy during the last three years than m any similar period since the National Security Act of 1947. 'Ihrce key factors -- the end of the Cold War, increased budgetary constraints, and a wised Title X of the US Code which incorporates Goldwater- Nichols legislation -- have converged to provide the opportunity, necessity, and license to make changes. Lndeed, these changes have already resulted m fundamental difference in the way we're structured, the way we tmin, and the way we fight. They have embraced all Services, affected sll functional areas, and touched virtually every facet of the militaty.

This ongoing transition to a very diffcren~ post- Cold War _ was not undertaken in a random or arbitraxy fashion. Instead, we followed a ddikate approaek formulating a new National Mi. MatyStrategy for today's see@ envir~ e3tabIishing a "Base Force" structure spedfically tailored to execute that strate~, concentrating our

I attention on a wide array of measures

designed to improve capability and enhance efficiency; and finally, stepping back to specifically examine roles, missions, and fbnctions m Lightof all the other changes we had irnpkmerlted.

The Armed Forces of the United States are prepared to meet the challenges of the Nineties, not with a minimum version of the Cold War milkary, but with a new force desigxied for a new era. Lessons learned in our decisive victo~ m DESERT' STOR? d and in succedidly accomplishing a host of other milhaty operations have conrnbuted to the evolutionary process of organizing, training, and equipping our Anned Forces so they are ready to act decisively when called upon.

What follows in this chapter is a quick look at some of the major changes we have made sb the last biennial review of roles, missions, and fictions.

II- 1 70 70 Page 71 72 NAnotwL MILITARY SIRATEGY A dynamic and responsive military strategy is key to the effective employment of nditaxy forces. Our current strategy is spelled out for all the world to see in the md straw of the -, an unclassified publication released in JUIU~ 1992. This strategy takes into account the gco@ itical environment of the post- Cold War era, conuibutes to the achievement of our national objectives, and focuses on protecting our vital interests during a period of reduced defense spending,

Detening nuclear attack and containing communism - the cornerstones of our

_ s~ ategy and planning for more than 45 years -- have given way to a more

diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and designed to respond decisively to the challenges of this decade. Built upon the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Fonvard FYescnce, Crisis Rcq rose, and Reconstitution, the strategy provides the basis for all US - activity. lhe principles which underlie the National

_ S@ ategyhave been embraced by the Semites and incorporated m their respective

PaPCrSt~. tie Air Fo= Gkzlzal ~, ~ the Nav ~ Marine Corps White Paper, , . . From @

~. It is against this stimegic backdrop that the US Anneal Forces are now organized, train~ and equipped.

THE 'BASE FORCE" As the wodd situation changed, the _ Mdertook a thorough analysis of the force stmxure needed to accomplish the

new mildary strategy. Today we have a force capable of deterring aggression, providing mean. ingfid presence abroad, responding to regional crises, and, if ever necessary, reconstituting a global wm-@ hting capability. As we continue our planned drawdown and contemplate additional changes, we must ensure the US Armed Forces retain these cow capabilities.

The Base Force is a future force which anticipates continued progress and improvement in the strategic environment. It is a dynamic force which can respond to fkrther favorable change. And it is a total for~ which includes all aspects of our Active and Re- swe components.

Because it is srnalIer, the Base Force must also be more fiexible, better trained, and able to adapt to changing circumstances. 'l% enew miWuyswategy re@ res that units retain a high state of readiness+ m order to respond to the dymamic challengw of the new world order, rncluding rapid response to crises, natural disasters, and peacekeeping operations. It takes into consideration each Service's strengths and provides the greatest return horn available resources.

The end of the Cold War and development of a new _ strategy have affected more than just the size and structure

II- 2 71 71 Page 72 73 of our force. 'Ile past three years have also had a signiilcant impact on the assignment of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces and the combatant commands. Some of the significant changes we have already implemented are described below.

NUCLEAR FORCES

US Strategic Ce~ rnand (USSTRATCOM)

The end of the Cold War led the Joint Chiefi of Staff to conduct a comprehensive review of the Unified Command Pla the document Which establishes combatant commands and assigns their geographic and functional responsibilities. one key conclusion was that adjustments m command and control of the nation's strategic nuckar forces were necessary and appropriate.

As a result of this assessment USS'I'IL4TCOM W= created. the W . . . our ? _ all of Anwica's strategic nuclear weapons are consolidated under one combatant CINC. Command of ail strategic bombers, missiles, and submarines will alternate between an Air Force general and a Navy admiral - = me- hard tO _ only a few yerm ago. This consolidation of the forces that tmly do

safeguard our way of Ii& is perhaps tie most dramatic and fundamental change in the assignment of roles and missions among the Armed Semites of the United States since

they tlrst ~ere established by law in 1947. Establishment of USSTRATCOM also reduced costs, through consolidation of Airborne Command posts and the disestablishment of the Strategic Air Command as a combatant command and as a major command within the Air Force. This restructuring not only centralized command and control of US strategic nuclear forces; it also ekn. inated over 1,100 staff positions, including more than half the associated general and flag officer billets.

President's Nuclear Inifiaiives Aiier the faiki coup in Moscow m August 1991 and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, long- stalled arms control negotiations were sud& rdy invigorated, and supplemented by unilateral initiatives and rapid bilateral and multilateral agreements. As a result of nuclear initiatives developed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by President Bush and anr mnced m September 1991 and January 1992, 4 wide range of unilateral actions has had a tremendous impact on every aspect of our lan~ sea, and air nuclear forces. Nuclear roles, missions, and functions have km fundamentally changed, commands reorganized, and entire classes of systems eliminated.

Ix- 3 72 72 Page 73 74 The President's nuclear initiatives included several measures to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons. Our entire worldwide inventory of ground-Iaunched, short- range, tactical amd theater nuclear weapons, including nuclear mi. llery shells and short- range nuclear ballistic missile warheads, has been withdrawn and is being eliminated The Amy and Marine Corps -- both of which had nuclear roles since the mid- 1950s -- no longer have nuclear weapons, and instead rely on theti sister Semites for nuclear weapons support. The savings in force structure, equipmn~ materie~ and training fiorn this measure are signifkam. Also at the President's directio~ all tactical nuclear weapons were removed by Juiy 1992 from aircraft carriers, surface ships, attack submarines, and land- based naval aircraft. Most of our tactical nuclear weapons have been returned to ~tral storage locations on US territory, In addition to the obvious cost savings, this measure resulted m the "& nuclearization" of our air forces in the Pacifii.

For the tit the since the 1950s, all US strategic bombers have been taken off alert, as have 450 Minuteman II Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (KBMs).

Follow- en Agreements On June 17, 1992 Presidents Bush and Yeltsin approved the framework of a new treaty intended to reduce US and Russian strategic forces even more radically. lle

resuking trea@, START II, was signed on January 3, 1993. When ratdlecl and entered into fome, START II dl reduce stiategic weapons to fewer than 3,500 wtieads on either side, The treaty mandates that by 2003, no land- based ICBMS will have more than one warhead. The US agreed to reduce Submarine- hunched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) waheads by half. US Peacekeeper ICBMS will be eliminated and all Minuteman III missiles will become single- wadwad

These nuclear initiatives and their results illustrate clearly the dynamic nature of the Base Force. When we started developing our planned 1995 force, there were 21,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons m the US arsenal, including sea-based, airdeliverd and ground- launched systems. As our requimnents for nuclear &terrence changa the 13qwtrnent of D& me took the lead in recOmrnending corresponding reductions in nuclear forces to a total of about 5,100 weapons -- a Ievei rqmsenting onequaner of the Cold War nuclear stockpile. 'l&- se scommendations will dminate every weapc and every unit that is no longer re+ ired for the nation's security, Reductions in our nuclear forces are also reflected in restructured roles, missions, and fimctions. As already noted, the Amy and Marine Corps are without a nucleax role or fimction for the first tie m four decades. Should they ever require nuclear weapons, they will call on the Navy or Air Force. 'XIMArmed Semites of the

II- 4 73 73 Page 74 75 United States miy on one another for essentiid support: modem warfare is a team effort all the way.

CHEMICAL INITIATIVE In September 1992, at the Conference on Disannarncmt m Genev~ 39 nations machcd agreement on a total ban on lcthai chemical weapuns, and voted to forward the treaty text to the United Nations General Assembly, which approved the Chemical Weapons Convention (cWC) m November 1992. The United States signed the CWC in Paris on January 13, 1993, and in doing so renounced the use of chernkd weapons for any reason, including retaliation.

The United States will retain countermeasures for chemical and biological warfare programs and deter an enemy's use of chemical and bio~ ogical weapons by maintaining the milhary M@ 3ilities to deny an enemy a significant milhary advantage tim such USC. If US forces, facilities, or citizens, or those of our allies,- come under chemical or biological attack, the US has the capability to respond with a wide range of milhy options. Any use of chernbl or biologi@ weapons would have the most severe consequences to the user. We may respond with all appropriate means consistent with our rights and obligations un& r international Iaw.

US kcptance of the CWC results m " the eliminadon of several fictions for the SeMces. T& Air Force and Marine Corps no longer have to cert@ aircrti for delivery of ChCmicldWe~ llS, and air and ground crews no Ionger Gain for this task. Auny and Marine Corps artillery units are likewise relieved of these requirements. The Services are no longer required to maintain Personnel Reliability Progmirns or communication and security systems for control and release of chemical weapons. The Army does not have to maintain chemical stocks m a "ready- for-issue" status. This will produce monetmy savings for the Services and reduce human risk due to decreased rnairitenance and surveillance requirements. The Army will be able to destroy the chemical stodpile m the safest and most cost effective and

+tiy dfickm manner,

II- 5 74 74 Page 75 76 STRATEGIC Regional focus, flexiile and adaptive phu- dng, and signi6cantly reduced fomvard pnxence combine to increase our reliance on strategic mobility. It is essential to our new strategic focus that we lx able to move quickly, anywhere in the world, with combat forces and accompanying suppofl elements sufficient for the mission assigned. Wti these realities in mind, we have developed an integrated program to improve and modemiz. e our smtegic lift forces.

Since its establishment in October, 1987, the US Transportation Command (USTFWNSCOM) has consolidated the previously dilliud individual Setwice respmsibilities for air, lan~ and sea transport of equipment and supplies. The unparalleled success achieved m improving efficicnq and responsiveness has been clearly apparent during a host of recent relief operations. In speeding relief to the victims of Hurricanes hdl% W and hiki and Typhoon Omar, lR .NSCOM coordinated the movement of nir= ships, more than 800 aircraft, nearly 500 railcars, and almost 2,000" recks. While responding to these three natural disasters, TRANSCOM simultaneously supported operations PROVIDE REUEF in Somali% PROVIDE HOPE m the fonncr Soviet Union+ PROVIDE PROMISE m the former YugosIavi~ PROVIDE TRANSITION in Angolz and condngency operations in the

Persian Gulf' With the mission of transporting troops and equipment placed solely cm TIL4NSCOM, what remained was to match our lifl capabilitim with the National Mi. Iitary Strategy and the planned force stmcmre. The Mobilitiy Requirements Study (MM), completed m January 1992, established the fkunework for current and future lift initiatives.

The approved program includes continuation of the Air Force C- 17 program to improve airlift capacity and procurement of 64 additional ships to enhamx our sealift capability. Twenty- two of these vessels, from new US construction or conversion, will support surge requirements and prepositicming efforts. The remaining 42 vessels will be acquired from the commercial rnadcet and assigned to the Ready Reserve Force to further expand the capacity of US Sealifl resources.

In additiom the ~ identifies and provides for major improvements m selected us seaports to increase the quantity of troops and materiel that can & moved through them in one day. We also seek to enhance the Ready Reseme Force by placing more "RO/ ROs" - roll- on / roll- off cargo vessds - in an increased readiness status.

various other srrategic lift enhancements have aIso been undertaken. lle Axrny is implementing atloal preposkioning program an expanded which includes

II- 6 75 75 Page 76 77 suppiies and equipment for a heavy combat brigade. Additionally, We arc studying enhancements to en route basing and host nation support programs; examining management initiatives for all strategic lift assets, including prepositioned ships and various Army crafG and recommending construction of a containerized ammunition port on the West Coast.

Envisioned mobility improvements will enable deployment of an Army light division and a heavy brigade to any "hot spot" m approximately two weeks, and two heavy divisions in alxmt a month.

Perhaps more than in any other role, missio% or functional area, the requirements of strategic mobility illustrate the interdependence of today's A- reed Forces. The capabilities of our Total Force are indeed greater than the sum of its idvMual parts,

( *

mRwARD PRESENCE Containing communist expansionism during the Cold War required a sizable contingent of US forces to be stationed overseas -- in anticipation of a global war that might sum with little or no warning. Our new mlitary smtegy, which takes into account the dramatic changes sines 1989, reflects the end of the era when large numbers of GIs were pemnanently stationed on foreign soil. A we continue to implement and reline the strategy, we will SUbS_ y but ~~ y reduce and restructure our forces around the world.

In Europe, we are reducing as rapidly as practicable toward a planned forward presenx of one Army corps, three- plus Air Force fighter wings, and a tadored Naval expeditionary force. We are well on the way to reaching our current objective of 150,000 European- b@ WOOPSby 1995, having withdrawn appm& r@ y 114,000 soMers, sailors, airmeq and marines m just two years.

We wiil continue to honor our commitments to NATO - the most successful alliance slmcturc ever devised.

In the Pacific, our fonvard presence wiliremain prirnad yrnar'itirne, wit hhalfour projected carrier and amphibious forces oriented towards that region. % m Europe, we are reducing Army and Air Force fonvard- stationed forces, but not our commitment to the region. Already, 18,000

II- 7 76 76 Page 77 78 fonvarddcpIoycd troops have been withdrawn. Further reductions of US forces stationed in South Korea are planned, but the Secretaty of Defense suspnd d the drawdown in 1991 pending satisfactory resolution of certain concerns about North Korea. The changing s~ ategic landscape alSOwnn. itted UStO C1OSC bases and f@ tieS in the Pacific, particularly Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base m the Philippines.

The Armed Forces' continuing efforts to lower operating costs also resulted in streamlining and con. soli& ting hundreds of Semi= activities. In Southern Europe, for example, our future basing concept envisions increasing the joint use of facilities, thereby reducing unnecessary duplication of bases and support functions, The Navy and the Air Force are planning to use the Naval Air Station at Sigonell% Italy for fighters, maritime patrol aircraft, and fleet support. 'Ihe Naval Air Station at Scwda Bay, Crete will host markime patrol, fleet SU~ l?, and smeillance aircraft for the Navy and Air Force. 'I% e air base at I& 5@ Turkey will be used for rnulti- semicc contingency operations. In the Pacific, Navy and Air Force personnel m Singapore share Ieg& medic~, housing, educatiom and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation services. And some Navy elements, displaced from the Philippines are now hosted by the Air Force at Andersen Air Force Base in Gu=..

As we r+ duce the overall size of our forws and consolidate much of what remains in the United States, the potential exists for significant savings to be realized as a result of overseas base C1OSU. IW. Changes to the stmtegic landscape since the first report on roles, missions, and functions have allowed us to ident@ more than 500 fiwihties for consolidation among the Semites or outright return to host nations. As resmlcturing continues, wc will seek every opportunity to consolidate and close no- longer- needed militaty installations that suppor? ed our Coid War force stnxture.

Our plans for cutting costs while maintaining proven effectiveness include a new idea for fonwrd presence operations. The concept cqlores the deployment of joint forces, configured to complement one another and meet peacetime and contingency operational needs. For example, a carrier battle group deploying to the Mediterranean without an amphibious ready group might rdy upon the Amy airborne task force m Italy to perfo n the ground tactical role m support of :. -It operatic= Sirnilady, art arnphiiious ready group might dep~ oy separately to "the Meal," and mly on Air Force land- based air assets, rather than on carrier- based naval aviation. Future fonvard presence operations may thus consist of speciaUy tailored joint task forces that can maintain essential forward presence at less overall cost.

II- 8 77 77 Page 78 79 Bringing an all- vohmeer force home isn't easy. It requires detailed logistical planning and depends on the extraordinary efforts of our men and wornen in uniform, and their families. The troops we've brought home sines 1990 had a proportionate share of husbands and WiVcS, his, pets, ~y cars, and prized possessions. Getting them home, whether to a Stateside assignment or to an unexpxtedly early return to civilhl life, without aliendng theti husbands and wives, traumatizing their kids, losing their pets, denting their cars, or damaging their pxsonal property, is an immense task. We are bringing the troops home as fast as we can - while continuing to maintain a fmvard pmencc that protects our vital interests, enhances stability, and reassures our allies. Once ag~ we emphasize that America must maintain its commitment to these superlative soldiers, SitdOrS, airmen and

---~~ e~ ti-- b- g them home as fast as is reasonable, and no

faster.

COIMER - DRUG OPERATIONS In 1989, the Department of Defense was given the mission to provide detection and monitoring support to help halt the aerial and maritim transport of illegal drugs into our country. Consequent y, a comprehensive program has been established for attacking the flow of drugs -- at the source, m transit, and upon arrhd in North ArnC2iC~ Implementing this program requires the sustained employment of active duty and Reseme forces properly trained and equipped to perform a non- traditional role. We are developing new joint doctrine and using our pool of u@ litie3 in new ways against threats we never had to confront m the Cold War. We are more involved with interagency organizations and host- rmion police and militmy authorities in pkmning and executing the war against drugs. This Gm@ gn mquircs the involvement of several combatant commanders, who have worked closdy together and shared joint lessons leaned to improve their capability to perform this unprecedented mission.

Whh drug detection and interdiction efforts taking place m an area more than twice the size of the United States, coordination and cooperation are required among all branches of the Armed Forces and the Coast Guard. For example, special operations forces provide Active and Resme components to theater CINCS for counterdrug missions and activities. In

II- 9 78 78 Page 79 80 addition, the Coast Guard provides law enforcement detachments as specialists had US Navy ships, enforcing counter-drug operations and embargoed goods.

In Canada and Amy, Navy, and Air

UN resolutions on the United States, Force mobile radars have been integrated into the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) surveillance system to provide real- time cueing arid intercapt information.

To increase efficiency and reduce costs in the war against drugs, the Navy is equipping three ships, originally designed and built for antisubmarine wmfare, for continuous counter- drug surveiliamc. l% ese smaller ships are able to provide equivalent capabilities at one- tenth the cost of combamnts normally assigned the same mission.

lhe Navy is dso reconfiguring maritime patrol aircraft to create a rnulti-mission aircraft better able to perform counter+" ug missions than some of the shorter+. ,h. rance aircraft currently assigned the mission. And in the Pacific, reserve ships have been assigned to counter- dreg operations, king active duty ships to support battle group deployments. Working closely with law enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard and National Guard support a Ml range of monitoring, detection, and seizure operations. The National Guard also operates the National Counterdmg Institute, training Interagency memkcm of

all SeMces, ' federal, state, and local enforcement pmomel.

COMBATLOGISTICS Because our strategic focus has changed from planning for global WM to planning for regional conflicts of shoner duration and less intensity, our logistics support requirements have also changed. Previously, our goal was to have enough stocks so that each theater command could fight its part of the anticipated global conflict simultaneously and without re- supply from the Continental ?Jnited States (CONUS) for a considerable time, Whh a new strategy that envisions fighting, at most, two major regional contingencies concurrently, existing in- theater stocks are being reduced substantially. Only enough "starter" stocks are mquirwl to last until theater forces are resupplied fkom CONUS or from other propositioned "swing" stocks that can be moved quickly bm one ~gion to another, as needed. To provide such fkxibiMy, some stocks now based on land will be repositioned afloat.

In this way, inventories can be signibntly reduced while titig peacetime materiel readiness and combat sustainability. The krny has estimated that a 50% reduction m war reseme requkements is achievable through this concept. DOD has already reduced overaIl inventories from $114 billion in FY 1989 to $80 bdlien by

It- 1o 79 79 Page 80 81 FY 1992. The other goal is to provide commanders and Iogisticians with the information they need to pkm ahead and to make sound decisions on materiel positioning and movement and on reducing inventories.

Each Sewice has efforts ongoing to improve logistics management and reduce its levels of stocks worldwide, For example, the Army has embarked on a major logistics initiative to reduce and withdraw its inventoiy of materiel and equipment from Europe. After a 40- year accumulation of materiel m Europe, the task is massive -- in a recent inspection art Army team ident. iiied some 42, WM items of equipment that must be withdrawn to the United States, sold to other countries, or eliminated.

Combat support has entered a new era with a new yardstick for ddl. ning combat logistiai requirements 'The emphasis k on being able to locate stocks on a regional basis so they best support our new strategy.

COMMUNICATIONS An often- repeated, never- confirmed report horn Operation URGENT' FURY m Grenada tells how a young officer used his telephone credit card to call back to his base and asked them to relay his request for fire support to a nearby support unit. Whether true or not, the story illustrates how desperately we needed, m 1983, to improve communications among our forces. Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM showed how far we've come since Grenadai but they also demonstrated again how the coordination of multi- semi~ operations can stress the cornmand- and-control communications structure.

We have continued to draw on the lessons of DESERT ONE and URGENT FURY, and we've incorporated new lessons learned in more recent joint and combined operations. We've made great advances m

joint d- e, joint training, communications systems to improve rnteropr? mbiliry, nxponsiveness, eff~ v- ness.

and our and

A XEWconcept, called "Comrnan4 Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligent (@ I) for the Wtior," K@ fOllh

an ob~ ctive, guiding principles, and a road map for achieving global communications intero~ rability. This program is aimed at providing a responsive, diable, secure, and affordable nenvork that can provide an accurate and complete picture of the

II- n 80 80 Page 81 82 battlefield, timely and detailed mission objectives, and clear t~ get views. 'l% e program includes a "Quick Fix" phase to enable existing system to communicate with one anothe~ a "Mid- Term" phase to ensure inter- Service communications requirements are adequately evalutied during development, testing, and aapisition of new systerns; and an enduring "Objective" phase during which evolving technologies and techniques will be continuously identfied and assimilated. These program improvements add up to a giant step fomw. rd in our "communications jointness."

Today, our ability to talk artd pass data between elements of the various Services is even better than it was when we launched the overwhelmingly successful air, sea, and land carnpai~ that led tO viCtO~ in Operation DESERT STORM.

MELLIGENCE Another mi. tical area subjected to intense examination since the hst triennial review is the defense intelligence structure. The dramatic changes m the narure of threats facing the United States required and permitted the lntelligen~ Community to analyze our future intelligence collection needs. As a result of this analysis, the Intelligence Community is rnod@ ing both its focus and its structure

TWO~ OItS helped shape this Shift in organization and focus. 'l% e first, initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence @CI) at the direction of the President, was National Strategy Review- 29. T% e second was a memoran@ ~a Deft se n ?~, issud by the Secrwuy of

Defense.

N~ QrKIl Securify Review - 2S To ensure all elemcxtts of the 'melligence Community are prepared to meet 'Mchanging needs of intelligence consumers tnrough 2005, a systematic review of anticipated collection and analysis requirements was conducted in 1991. This effort, which resulted in National Security Review- 29 and the subsequent National Security Decision Dinxtive 67, established intelligence priorities for the post- Cold War world. A part of this review, DOD idetied and developed 12 specific areas of interest to serve as the focus for planning

II- 12 81 81 Page 82 83 fhlrc defense intelligence collection, atldy$ i$, and diSSetiO~

Strengthening Defense Intelligence

To capitalize on lessons learned the Gulf War and continue adapting from to a

changing world, the Secretary of Defense in the spring of 1991 de= steps to be taken to centralb management and strengthen the performance of defense intelligent functions. Among the measures the Secretary directed were consolidation of Service component indigence resources into a joint intelligence center (JIC) at each combatant comrnan~ consolidation of existing intelligence commands, agencies, and elements into a single intelligence command within each Service by Fwal Year 1995; and reduction or dhination of no-Ionger required operating locations and intelligence units hated overseas.

Some of the steps already taken to provide better intelligence for joint warfi@ ng are outlined blow. Others stilI under review are addressed in Chapter III.

Intelligence Suppoft to ' Jdnt Warflghfing

'TIIc intelligence support available to US and other Gulf coalition commanders during DESERT STORM was probably the best in milhary history. partly due to measures This success was implemented long

before I@ 's invasion of Kuwait and partly due to irmomtions made on the spot.

Despite the ovemll intelligence sucmss, some commanders at the theater and tactical level expressed frumalion after the wti over the lack of coordination and timeliness in dissemination of intelligence collected at the national level. In responding to lessons learned in the war, the Intelligence

Community's aim was to institutional and enhance what worked well, and fix what didn't. Results of this post- war effom are outlined below.

Bed. A standing board comprised of senior Defense Intelligence Agency (IXA) and Seti= intelligence officials organized the full range of intelligence suppoti for DESERT STORM. 'Thehard was such a success that its structure has bean xdned and expanded to include representatives from other DOD and Intel@ ence Community organizations. 'fhe IW. Maryblligence Board now serves as a key advisory body to the Director, DL4 in recommending programming priorities and coordinating support for military operations.

c-. Another SUC= SS story from Operation DESERT STORM was the provisional establishment by US Central Command (USCENTCOM) of a forward- based Joint Intelligence Center. The CENTCOM JIC acted as the clearinghouse for intelligent nqui. rements such as battle damage assessment, and production of unique intelligence for

II- 13 82 82 Page 83 84 CENTCOM; and served as the collection manager for theater- based indigence assets. Created on an ad hoc basis during DESERT STORM, the JIC is now king institutionalized for all combatant commands.

In the US Pacific CommanA for example, consolidation of all general intelligence production and analysis facilities in Hawaii into a single JIC resulted m a 25% manpower savings. US European Command has established a similar rn- Sexvice organization to produce intelligence support for mission planning and operations by US andmedc ommanders m peace, crisis, and war -- resuh. ing in the elimination or reduction of about half the headquarters and component- level intelligence organizations. US Space Command and US Strategic Command plan to share the large intelligence infrastructure that W= Ori@. tidyestabbhed to support the Strategic Air Command'lhis consolidation will elimhate the need for additional facilities and intelligence staff at Space Command headquarters.

A DI. A assessment of command intdligence requirements enabled the JICs to optimize intelligence capabilities ~ specifying ., production responsibilities, facilitating infosrnatiort exchange among combatant command and national intelligence centers, and allowing Semite intdligence organizations to focus on their own areas of expertise. In establishing a JIC at each combatant command we have

improved the ~ality of intelligence support to the wtighter while decreasing the resources requked to produce such support.

Jcunt . Inte! m QllK. I mC). Our difficulty at the start of the Gulf War m coordinating requests from multiple consumers to multiple producers of intelligence resulted in duplicative requirements that created costly and unnecessary confusion. To provide the needed coordination, the NMJIC was established m the Pentagon as the single fusion point for intelligence m support of DESERT STORM. The NNUIC performed so well that it is now manned by representatives of all dita. ty Services, the National Security Agency (NSA) and DIA. All Service current intd. igence resources in the Washington DC area were consolidated at the NMJIC m 1992. The NMJIC serves as the fdcal point for support to the combatant commands and to Joint Task Forces by acting as a narionaf clearing house for intelligmcc requests and by coordinating CI.& DIA, and NSA support.

se~~ . . The area of signals intelligence also is being affected by si~ cant reductions of overseas field stations and the consolidation of rernaining overseas resources into regional operating facilities. The Director of NSA is workhg closely with the DLAand Service intelligence to tailor theater signals intelligence assets into a reduced intelligence focused on the combatant structure that is command ~Cs.

II- 14 83 83 Page 84 85 At the MtiOMl kVd, NSA has expanded its presence in the NIWIC to allow for more effective management of collection operations and lxttcr support during periods of crisis. ,. . lC$ of ~ . In testimony

after the Persian GuJf War, General Schwarzkopf expressed the frustration he'd experienced in getting intelligence products he wanted fkom the national level. In response, the DCI established an Of& e of Military Affairs within the CIA. Manned by a general or flag officer with a supporting staff that incluck rndkary Offk- ers, this Office works with the CIA on a day- today basis to ensure national level intelligence capabilities arc better integrated with the activities of mildary intelligence organizations m suppon of military Operafiom.

~. Anotir DESERT STORM intelligence ShOltf~ w=

the insufficiency of imagery products for detecting and targeting enemy activities over a broad area. In May 1992, directives issued by the Secretary of De& we and the DCI established the Central Imagery _ (aO), "to ensure that United Stat= Government intelligence, mapping, geodesy, and othqr needs for imagery arc met effectively and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security..." The ~0 is a designated combat suppofi agency under the overall supemision of the Asistant Secretary of Defense for Comman~ Control, Communications and Intelligence. 'he

office inclu'de- srepresentatives horn CIA and IX& the MiMary Services$ and other agencies with intelligent responsibilities.

. Authority for tasking all DOD human intelligence

(~ hM been assigned to the DIA. This consolidation was accomplished to coordinate more effectively operations of vahab] e, l. irnited HUMINT KSOUr'= Xand optimize collection capabdiies.

II- 15 84 84 Page 85 86 ACQUISITION Despite the proven success of advanced weapons systems first used in Panama and the Persian Gulf, three factors -- a vastly different security environment, the ever- increasing cost of advanced technology, and the growing need for interopcrability to support joint and combined operations -- have led to fundamental changes in the way the Semiccs select and procure defense hardware.

Juint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

Joint application and intemperability considerations now pemade the entire acquisition process. Following the Goldwater- Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chi. man of the Joint Giefi of Staff established the JROC to examine the requirements for every major Service acquisition program. An important JROC fimction 5 to identi@ programs for direct joint participation and joint technology pin-offk which may be applicable to ~fiher service programs. To provide necessary muscle and experience, the JROC is chaired by the Vice Chirrmm of the Joint Chiefl of Staff, and its members are the Vice Chiefs of the Services.

Militay acquisition actions (including major systems, subsystems, and components) that involve formal management or fimding by more than one SeMce during any phase

of a system's IJftxycle are now designated as joint programs. This change has substantially reduced duplication of effort; increased our ability to provide the & st technology options for force planners and senior decision makers; and enhanced supportability, interoperability, and wax- fightingeffectivenms. As Admiral David Jerernk@ Vke Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated during testimony before the Senate Amed Semites Committee, this "joint Wrspective focuses on the contribution each program makes to the overall joint wa@ hting capab~ and hOW that apability conrnbutes to the execution of our National Military Strategy."

Program initiatives We've already realized immediate rewards as a result of this major change in the acquisition process. Four programs are of particular note. The Advanced Medium-Range Air- to- Air Missile (AMR4AM) inhiafive will provide the next generation, aU- weather, allavironrnen~ medium range, air- to- air missile system for the Navy, Air Force, and selected NATO allies.

Our Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program will develop a family of UAVSwith specific range and payload capabilities to accommodate a variety of needs from small unit, over- the- hill recomaissance to much deeper, over- the- horizon .sumeillance.

II- 16 85 85 Page 86 87 The Navy's Mine WarfaR Plan emphasizes research and development of systems such u the Magic Lantern mine detection systcn SQQ- 32 sonar upgrades, and a shallow water mh neutralization system to conduct efficient, effective, and s~ edy mine counter measure (MCM) operations in the very shallow water and surf zone environments m support of amphibious operations. As a result of lessons Iearncd horn Operation DESERT STORM, an MCM support ship is also being planned that will provide better command and control, logistics, and personnel S~ rt of OUrMCM ships and helicopters

Finally, the MILSTAR Satellite Communication System wilI provide a smivable, jam- resistant, worldwide sccurc communications system for command and control of US forces in fbturc conflicts.

& Cold War threats have NM many of the systems that were being developed to counter those threats no longer cany the priority they once had. As a result, we've idcntMcd several programs wkc cost, schedule, or technical chdcngel have grown to unacceptable !evck, and we've taken appropriate action to eliminate or curtail them. 'l% e following arc prominent exarnpks of how we've been billions.

Cl Because of nuclear arms programs such as the B- 2

abk to save agreements, Bomber and Tri& nt II SLBM have been reduad, and the Small ICBM, Pcacckeepcr Rail

Q 9

Gamisdn, and Shofl Range Attack Missile have been terminated

T'& diminMA threat horn potential ~y SUbfnSlinCShas resulted in the termination of two torpedo programs and an antisubmarine sweillance system, and a major reduction m procurement of the SEAWOLF attack submarine.

The Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter, the Navy's A- 12 medium attack aircraft, and the Navy's new antisubmarine patrol phme, the P- 7, have been canceled; and several air- m- air and air- to- ground missile programs have been restructured.

When we detenninc that capabilities we have now need enhancement, we carefully study the tic- offs Ixmveen new acquisition and mdfying our existing systcrns. In many instances, requirements to I@ WC &tig US wcapary m order to maintain a signifkam technological advantage arc not as urgent as they were a few years ago. As a result, we've nxluced concurrency in dcvehprnent programs and are retaining existing qgipmcnt for Iongcr periods. We increasingly incorporate technological advances through upgrades instead of through initiation of new systems. Upgrade of the Navy's F- 14As into F- 14Bs,

by incorporating ncw engim% and modest avionics changes, is one exampk of this philosophy.

II- 17 86 86 Page 87 88 We are procuring less and procuring smaner. We are elhimtm" g duplication of effort and exploiting joint application wherever possible.

DOCTRINE A joint force, synchronized and integrated into an overall campaign pl~ provides a combatant commander with a wi& range of capabilities that can pose

multiple and complex problems for any enemy. But this kind of orchestrated employment is by no means easy to accomplish. Joint doctrine is the medium that deals with the fbmhnental issue of how best to employ the nation's milhary power to achieve strategic ends. Joint doctrine and training capture our collective experience with warfare, and ensure we are ready to fight the next war - not the last one.

The Armed Forces have made great strides in the development of joint doctrine, particularly sin= our experiences in DESERT ONE and Grenada

service doctrine is now requkd to be consistent with joint doctrine. A recent series of publications more clearly articulates considerations for joint operations. The prime example is Joint Publication 1, ~ ~ed Forces. ?+ . -isTe~ _ w ", which sewes as the focal point for further doctrimd dialogue and deveIopnenc

As the biggest test of joint doctrine since the establishment of the Air Force and the formal crwdon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DESERT STORM demonstrate~ beyond doubt that our emphasis on joinmess has yielded a more effective and efficient fighting fem. Emerging doctrine and concepts were made available to General Schwarzkopf, his staff, and components throughout the planning and execution of the campaign to liberate Kuwait,

Of particular note during the war was the establishment and use of a single Joint Force Air Component Commander -- the JFACC -- to oversee and synchronize all ti component opetions under the CINC'S campaign plain The effectiveness of air operations in DESERT STORM can be directly attributed to our emphasis on joint doctrine as exemplified by the JFACC.

DESERT STORM joint sir operations also demonstrated that we have room to improve. We quickly learned that the Sefices lacked an electronic means to pas the JFACcs My Air Tasking Ordexs (ATOS) to sII the wings and squadrons executing the air portion of the campaign plan. To get the order to Naval Aviators eager to attack the targets they were assigned by the JFACC, a lengthy document had to & picked up in Riyadh evexy day and flown via navai aircraft to each of the carriers in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

II- 18 87 87 Page 88 89 We've given priority to rcct@ ing this inter- semice dissemination shortfall since the Gulf War. There are now at least nine naval vessels with an ATO data link wbw, which permits high data- rate exchang-bemveen air and naval forces. Seven mom vessels have ken modi& d so they can be similarly equipped, m an emergency, m less than one &y. 'IMs new inter- Setice command- and< ontrol communications capability will allow the Navy battle group commander at seato function as the JFACC when required. During exercise TANDEM THRUST 92, in a demonstration of the transmission of an ATO from a ground-based terminal to a terminal afloat, the daily ATO was transmitted to the naval force commander m under five minutes. Work continues to tier enhance ATO interopcrability with all* Setices.

4 TRAINING Training and education Me indispensable to the effective application of

_ power. We perform m combat with the lmowledge, skills, and attitudes we've

attained through education, training, and exercises; and the abilities of our leaders rest in large part on the quality of these tools. Significant improvements have &n made sin= 1989 m the areas of professional military educatiou training, and exercises.

Our mditary educimion system is now organized around a framework centered on the tactical, operational, and smtcgic ~evels of war. It constitutes an integated, "cradle-to- grave" approach to prepming our soldiers, SdO1'S, tim and marines for the challenges of the nineties and beyond.

To foster an enhanced joint prspctive among all the SeMces, a nvo- phase program for jornt education has been fully implermntcd by intermediate and senior level Servica colleges. As vividly demonstrated m DESERT STORM, _ leaders today face Opemtional challenges that can only be met by a deep appreciation of joinmess. Knowledge of the capabilities and Limitmions of I@ se% air, space, and special operations forces -- rnchxiing emphasis on organization, operations, planning systems, and integrated command- and- control communications and intelligence requirements - will ensure our COmmandem

have a clear advantage in responding to

H- 19 88 88 Page 89 90 contemporary and future challenges. Simply stated, wc fight as we 5*, so we must train and exercise as we intend to fight. We have demonstrated, m major joint and combined exercises, our ability to control air, ground, and naval forces from afloat or ashore through a Joint Task Force commander.

The Army and Marine Corps have developed what they call the "endless exercise." This concept is an acknowledgment that joint interaction, especially beween complementary units, should be a permanent condition and credo for action. T% e two Services have established a periodic visit program to pursue and expand upon operational issues of mutual interest. Joint exercises provide the proving ground for refhing joint wtilghting, intelligence, comman~ control, communications, and Iogistics operations among conventional forces and between conventional and special operations forces. OCEAN VENTURE ~2 and T~ EM THRUST 92-- conduc M off the Carolina coast and m ~Oti al the mid- Paciiic, respectively -- saw thousands of soldiers, sailors, airrnem and marina training together on joint war@ e tasks. 'Ihese large annual exercises (TANDEM THRUST she involved 20,000 troops) plus others like TEAM SPIRIT in KOrea and DISPLAY DETERMINATION m Europe, bring major air, nava and ground units together regularly to train jointly and to conmibute,

through lessob they learn together, to the development "and refiment of jobt doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures,

Large and expensive increasingly being replaced assisted exercises of more This use of modem modeling

exercises are by computer modest scaie. and simulation techniques enhances the training value of exercises for combatant commands and subordinate Joint Task Forw staffs while driving down costs. %naller- scale, carefhl. ly fbcused exercises are proving invaluable m training joint forces to meet combatant commanders' mission mquircments. In recognition of the importance of this concept, the Joint Doctrine Training and Simulation Center is being established to support joint exercises, s- ewe as the focal point for joint doctrine development, manage the joint Iessons Ieamed system and support joint training initiatives.

Consolidation of education and training between Senice schools also conrnbutes to joint operations, and moreover has resulted in impressive swings. More than 20,000 marines attend the schools of other Semites every year. Marine artillerymen tankers, engirwm, remanned aerial vehicle crewmen, and ditag police are trained at by schools. Every year, the Army trains more than 8,500 marines, 13,500 airmen, 12,000 sailors, and 60 Coast Guardsmen, resulting man unprecedented Commonaky of approach to basic battlefield skills and large savings.

11- 20 89 89 Page 90 91 The Army is not the only Service training people in other uniforms. Worldwide Milituy Command and Control System (TWVMCCS) operators, imagery interpreters, and rnihtary police working dog handlers are trained by the Air Force. The NavaJ Postgraduate School in Monterey, California is attended by all four Semites. 'l% e Navy also conducts cryptology tig m Pensacoi~ FIorida. The Marine Corps conducts the Scout Sniper Insmuctor Course, the Computer Science School, and the Aviation Weapons and Tactics Insm. mtor Course. The emphasis is on identifj- ing the Semite with the preponderance of requirements m a particular career field or skill area, and achieving economies of scale by having people fi- om all Services train under one se~ ice's roof. Where no one Servi= has a monopoly, training and education are consolidated under DOD. Examples rnclude the Defense Mapping School and the Defense Intelligam College. As part of the Department's continuing effort to reduce costs and increase effeaiveness, sII information !@ ahts - journalists, radio and television commentators -- will be trained, starting in 1995, at the DOD Anwrican Forces Information semi= School at For$ Mea&, Ma@ and

hWkTRUmURE REDUCTIONS Our drawdown to achieve the levels planned by 1995 requires a concurrent reduction m miitary inflastructurc m the United States. More than 170 activities have been i& nM. ed by the Services for elirninatio~ consolidation, or realignment. Congressional support for these reductions is =Sential.

The commissary functions of all services have already been combined into a single Defense Cotisary Agency. Other examples rnclu& the consolidation of aircrew simulator and training development faciiries, combination of several advanced tactical radio development progmrns, elimination of the Amy Intelligence Agency, reassignment of the Armed Forces Medical IntcUigence Center and the Missile and Spx Intelligence Center to the Defense Intelligence Agency, consolidation of 34 separate Navy laboratory activiti~ into five facilities, and consolidation of the Air Force's Systems and Logistics Commands into one Materiel Comrnand In diitiOtl, DOD is conducting a &tailed review of the roles, missions, funding, and management of the Defense Nuclear Agency to deteti if efficiawies and reductions can be made to eliminate any duplication m capabtities that may exist. This DOD review, which is m progress, is expected to be submitted to Congress in May 1993.

II- 21 90 90 Page 91 92 Another innovation to e= w unnecessary duplication is the assignment of an executive agent to oversee common functions for several Services. This concept eliminates competition in contracting for the same resources. The clean- up of former DOD- owned hazardous waste sites; operation of common user ocean termhds; and suppofi for medical materiel, military postal service, and domestic disaster relief are functions for which one or another Semi= has been designated as the executive agent.

Substantial sav@ s m personnel and other resources are also being achieved through the reduction and reorganization of Semi= staff$. me Amy is reducing headquwters functions by 23% and has elirnhated 42 general officer billets of the 63 phmned over the next several years. 'l'he Navy staff has reorganized to enhance coordination with the Joint Staff, the W& d c ornrnan& rs and the other Sendcc s-. ~ reorga. nhtion will reduce tic headquarters by 24% and the number of flag officers m the Navy by 34. A restructuring of Headquamrs Air Force wilI result in a 23% decrease, including ehination of 59 gerierai officer positions. A similar reorganizati~ effort has reduced the Matinc Corps Semite Management Headquarters by 24% and will eliminate 9 general officers.

These reorganizations reflect the reality of significant budget cuts as weIl as dramatic changes m the international strategic

landscape. l'hey are designed to attain greater levels of peacetime efficiency while maintaining and enhancing the combat effectiveness required to respond to future regional challenges.

Innovative steps are also being taken to control the spiraling costs of milkiuy and dependent medical care. ResponsibMty for the preparation and submission of a unified medical budget for all Services has been consolidated under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) in order to standardize programs and procedures and conseme resources.

In Europe, the by medical materiel center has become a tri- Service organization, providing semkes such as spectacle fabricatio~ equipment maintenance, and medical supply distribution and requisition support for all mlitary medical treatment facilities in the European Command's area of responsibility.

Similarly, the Atmy's tqional medical center at Lmdstubl, Gerrnmy -- a major milhary rrdical treatment MI. ity in Europe - will soon be jointly stalled by the Auny

and Air Force.

The Central Command has also moved significantly towards the consolidation of Semite medical functions, using a single manager for all rnedcal logistics to eliminate duplication by saemhing pltig and purchming.

II- 22 91 91 Page 92 93 CONCLUSION Changes since the 1989 review of roles, missions, and l% nctions have fundamentally altered the Armed Forces of the United States. We are well ahmg on our planned ~dUCtiOlland restructuring. M pm of the cominuous process of assessment, adjustment, and reassessment, we have eliminated considerable Chlpficatiom improved jointncss, restmctured part of the force, and developed effective plans to complete our planned reshaping by 1995.

These efforts fully unnply with the Congressional mandate to review critically our roles, missions, and functions. In so doing, they affirm the miLitary's strong commitment to change.



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