2. Battle Command Systems Operational Capability Requirements
Recent and current operations continue to reinforce the concept that future military operations will be increasingly complex and ambiguous. Our quest for decisive victory at minimum cost leads us to exploit technologies to increase lethality, survivability, and operational tempo. However, at the heart of it all remains the competent battle commander with an intuitive sense. As operations become more complicated, battle commanders must make faster, more complex decisions. To make the best decision, the commander requires clear and timely information, decision support aids, and better means of communicating intent and mission. Battle Command Battle Lab OCRs reflect the capabilities required by our future commanders to exercise battle command throughout the force projection cycle in war, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, and disaster relief missions.
BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEMS
BC01: Battlefield Information Control: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the battle command system must have the capability to collect, process, and disseminate in real- and near real-time information on the friendly and enemy situation, command directives, and other essential information.
These three aspects of information control are described individually. Collecting: To provide a meaningful virtual, continuous picture of the entire battlespace, requires timely and accurate information from all available sources throughout the depth of the commanders battle space. To provide the maximum coverage of the battlespace and inaccessible Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) and Targeted Areas of Interest (TAIs), the collection system must orchestrate multi-echelon sensor coverage from organic, non-military intelligence, joint, multinational, UAV, and ground sensors. Sensors must detect, identify, and locate active and passive targets including C2 nodes that are underground, above ground, waterborne, airborne, or in space. Sensors must also provide warnings of NBC threats, theater missile attacks, and provide near real time battle damage assessment. Sensors should have cross-cueing capability. Automatic target recognition technologies should be incorporated within sensors where possible. The most salient features of sensor images should be fused to provide the most complete picture of the battlefield. Information must be collected from sensors for all levels of operations regardless of natural or man-made environmental conditions (weather, terrain, obscurants, electronic warfare, day/night, etc.). Sensors must be invisible to detection by the enemy when collecting information. If detected, sensors must have protection from enemy fire and should contain preventive measures to protect against engagement from friendly fire. Processing: To support the commanders critical information requirements, future command and control systems must have a robust, high speed distributive processing capability in conditions where decision times are compressed and vast amounts of information must be filtered, fused, and correlated in near real time. Systems must minimize data transmission requirements and operator workloads, and maximize automated decision aids and automated target recognition, and be compatible with current and planned C4I hardware. Systems must have automated filters for controlling information flow from large databases and high capacity storage means. Distributing: In order to influence the battle at the critical time and place, information and command directives must be communicated accurately, in real- and near real-time, between commanders, staffs, and weapon platforms while in the air, on the ground, on the sea, or in space.
BC02: Battlefield Information Passage: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, a capability is needed for all commanders, their staffs, and all battlefield functional areas to seamlessly pass and share information, via integrated digital communications and computer networks, in both hierarchical networks (vertically and horizontally) and non-hierarchical networks, between battlefield functional areas and from the tactical level through the strategic.
The seamless, secure, global information architecture must support integrated combat operations with a focus on the mobile warfighting commander. The information architecture must (1) provide horizontal and vertical integration of secure and non-secure voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video information; (2) facilitate operations planning, information collection, and information dissemination; (3) enhance the commanders ability to acquire information from sensor systems, battlefield functional area systems, and from subordinate, adjacent, and higher organizations; (4) support both analog and digital capabilities; (5) integrate commercial and tactical communications networks; (6) provide a capability to transfer information within the architecture without requiring specific knowledge of the mechanism or platform characteristics that make up the communications and automation hardware; and (7) be rapidly deployable. Implied are requirements for streamlined communications procedures and for global connectivity of extended-range communications assets, as well as integrated communications between the various interagency, joint, combined, and coalition forces including national command authority, operations (command and control), intelligence, logistics, administrative functions, and the numerous potential echelons of a Force Projection Task Force. Ideally, the adaptive nature of the information architecture and full use of the electromagnetic spectrum should reduce or eliminate degradation factors caused by weather, terrain, distances, obstacles, Electromagnetic Pulse, co-site RF interference, or jamming between sender and receiver or from supporting communications nodes.
BC03: Decision and Planning Support: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, systems must have the capability of assisting the commander and battle staff in mission planning, preparation, and execution.
Decision making and operations planning requires expert systems, decision aids, and artificial intelligence capabilities to improve quality of and reduce decision making time. Aids must take advantage of information available on seamless information networks to plan and rehearse operations and conduct split-based C4I, medical, and logistics support. Embedded training and simulation tools must be incorporated into decision support software for commander/staff training, mission rehearsal, and other tasks that are critical either because of the complexity of the task or the time sensitivity of the results. Decision aids are required to facilitate in-depth analysis of information and support "wargaming" potential scenarios. An example of decision aids requirements is an automated IPB process that integrates and depicts the affects of weather and terrain on operations, allows synchronization matrices and collection plans to be quickly updated, and provides realistic, interactive wargaming.
BC04: Smart Pull / Brilliant Push: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, systems must have the capability to pull down information as it is needed and to automatically receive information that is critical to the situation.
With greater amounts of data and information available on the battlefield and increased operational tempo, commanders and staffs will have reduced times to filter through information relevant to their situation. Information relevant to all commanders and staffs should be broadcast directly to them. Through the use of automated decision aids and programmable filters, commanders and staffs will be better able to identify and articulate their critical information requirements. This, in turn, will allow for critical information to be automatically displayed as it becomes available. In other situations, the system will facilitate the commanders and staffs requests for more specific and detailed information that can be "pulled down" from any information source on the battlefield using system menus. Systems should have the capability of automatically notifying outside support organizations when a warfighter has exceeded programmed parameters (for example: consumed a significant portion of a critical commodity such as fuel or ammunition or exceeded a control measure).
BC05: Information Presentation: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to tailor information systems to the style of the user and to appropriately present information pertinent to the situation throughout the range of force projection operations.
Information should be displayed in a manner that best supports the acquisition, exchange, and use of information. Data (i.e., terrain, operational graphics, and status information) displays should support the intuitive commander and the decision making process by aggregating numerous pieces of information in standardized visual displays and locations using standardized symbology. Three-dimensional representation of information (i.e., terrain, airspace management, or weapons engagement envelopes) should be realistically portrayed. Information displays must support on-the-move operations. Decision oriented graphics symbology should be displayed clearly. Operators must have the ability to change graphics interactively. The ability for the commander to either adapt quickly to a particular layout or to modify the layout should not effect the underlying information sources. Operator training requirements must be minimized. Hardware and software for automation and communications systems must be user friendly in high stress, physical, and mental environments. The use of multiple-layer menus should be avoided. Automation tools should also minimize "man-in-the-loop" requirements and allow commanders to focus on critical war-fighting tasks. Large screen devices should be suitable for operation in static and mobile CPs and should accommodate the interaction of more than three personnel, keeping in mind the space limitations of some Cps.
BC06: Electronic Tethering: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, systems must provide the capability for the commander to remain electronically connected to his information sources while he is enroute, moving, or stationary anywhere on the battlefield.
Commanders must have the freedom to move around the battlefield to locations where they can best influence the battle at the critical time and place. While they cannot be tied physically to operations centers, they must be tethered electronically to access time sensitive operational and intelligence information to allow them to continuously plan, communicate intent, issue orders, and monitor and coordinate operations. Command and control systems must be capable of linking all battlefield elements from the individual soldier through the national command authority. Systems must support battle command functions wherever the commander is located. Systems must be small and lightweight, easily transportable, and facilitate rapid movement and emplacement. C2 platforms must be mobile and transportable yet ensure that designs and human engineering are adequate to house and support battle command personnel and systems for continuous operations. This includes, but is not limited to, adequate space, power and internal communications.
BC07: Common Picture: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, battle command systems must have the capability of providing a tailorable, scaleable, and relevant common picture.
Having a relevant common picture will enable the commander to operate within the enemys decision cycle by synchronizing forces and dictating the operational tempo. This relevant common picture must be comprised of timely, accurate, and relevant friendly and enemy situational and status information (situational awareness) laid over a common, near-real-time representation of the area of operation (including elevation and natural and man-made features). Having real-time situational awareness across the battlefield will enable the commander to intuitively picture the friendly and enemy situation and reduce battlefield uncertainty by displaying friendly and known enemy force location and status. The relevant common picture must be scaleable to appropriate levels of command, tailorable by function, and based on variable user determined parameters. Enabling technologies allow weather and terrain products and situational updates in textual and graphic formats to be integrated.
BC08: Split-Based Connectivity: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, selected elements must have the capability to connect CONUS-based command headquarters, national intelligence data bases, and other split-based type operational activities to forward deployed maneuver and support units.
Future operations may be supported by selected elements that never deploy from home station, or operate strictly out of rear, base, or sanctuary areas. Communications systems supporting split-based operations must be deployable, robust, assured, and provide a seamless state-of-the-art system of C4I across the operational continuum (including joint and combined forces) on a continuous basis.
BC09: System Interoperability: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, systems must be interoperable with other U.S. Army, sister service, government and non-government agencies, and allied systems.
Forces require total, uninterrupted, interoperable communications between government and non-government agencies, and joint and combined forces throughout the battlespace from the National Command Authority to operator level.
BC10: Target-to-Shooter Information Fusion: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to link near real time enemy information over large areas, with long range precision munitions.
The domination of extended battlespace will require agile and robust deep and simultaneous attack capabilities. Battle command systems must be able to extend the battlespace in time and space; eliminate the time required to shape the battlespace; and facilitate full dimensional attack of the enemys center of gravity. All acquisition systems will require a target to shooter fusion link in order to guide indirect fires and attack aircraft onto the target. This system must provide target acquisition and recognition/ identification, target value analysis, prioritization of targets, and deconfliction of targeting data and airspace usage. Once the target list is approved, it must be relayed to long range precision indirect and/or attack aircraft units or aircraft in flight. Systems must operate in near-real-time to facilitate rapid decision making and shooter response to acquire short exposure targets.
BC11: Hands-Free Operation: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the user must have the capability of hands free equipment operation while stationary or on-the-move.
Commanders and their staffs must have the capability to operate and control automation and communications equipment hands free when either stationary or on-the-move in a tactical environment in joint and combined operations. This capability must exist in noisy, unstable, and stressful conditions. Enabling technologies include: voice, eye, and/or touch activation, heads-up displays, voice synthesis, automatic language translation, interactive natural language voice commands, and reduction or elimination of ambient noises. These capabilities are required to facilitate operations by minimizing computer operator interface requirements such as system setup (e.g., frequency settings on a radio), initialization, data manipulation functions, and transmission of messages while on the move.
BC12: Upgrade Exploitation: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, systems must be easily upgradable to fully exploit expanding technologies.
New technologies will be developed at rates even faster than today; however, it is not economically feasible to completely replace Battle Command Support Systems at the same rate. Therefore, systems must be designed to be easily upgradable to exploit new technologies rapidly and to the fullest extent. Module replacement or additions of modules should be pre-planned and allow for horizontal integration across platforms. Software should be modular, easily tailored to accept future changes, and maximize compatibility with current and planned hardware. New technologies must not only allow for interoperability between legacy and current systems, but anticipate future system capabilities. They must be versatile, allow for rapid distribution, and be affordable so that they can be introduced throughout the Army. New technologies must require little to no user train-up. Upgrades must not distract a unit from its assigned mission and task.
BATTLE COMMAND SUPPORT TEAMS (BCST)
BC13: Commander to Battle Command Support Teams (BCST) Connectivity: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, BCSTs must have the capability to locate forward on the battlefield and remain electronically linked to the commander, regardless where he or the BCST is.
Commanders and staffs enroute to the theater or moving across fluid battlefields must be able to continuously plan, communicate intent, issue orders, and monitor and coordinate operations. An adaptive warfighter information network with flexible ranges must provide the capability to interoperate with superior, adjacent, and subordinate commanders and their battlefield operating systems. BCSTs must have the capability to operate from mobile platforms. These platforms must be adequate to house and support battle command personnel and systems for continuous operations. They must be able to maintain the pace of the operational tempo, and withstand small arms and indirect fires and NBC attack.
BC14: Staff Support: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, BCSTs must have the capability of BCST to support the commander in controlling current operations and adjusting plans for future operations.
The staff must be an extension of the commander, see things as he does, and share his responsibility for the mission so he can reach the critical decisions with the best possible information and lead from where he can best affect the action. Staffs will utilize the systems described in BC01 through BC12. Skilled staffs work within the commanders intent to direct and control units and allocate the means to support that intent. They assist the commander in anticipating the outcome of the current operation and developing the concept for the follow-on mission. They understand, and can apply, a common doctrine. The battle staff must also understand what information the commander deems important for making decisions and provide it in an accurate and timely manner. It is the product of staff work that serves the needs of the commander. Battle staffs must be organized to ensure the command process is sustained, especially when the commander must rest or in the event he becomes a battle casualty. Underlying this capability is the requirement to recruit, develop, and retain quality people. Recruiting programs must be developed and employed to determine early the capabilities and potential of commanders and staffs. Training programs must be developed and harness new technologies to improve the comprehension and retention of key leadership and staff skills.
BC15: Team Building: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to tailor BCSTs to the mission and commanders requirements.
Modular, functionally-based force designs that can better support the current force and are aligned with Force XXI development initiatives are required to support continuous operations, task organization, and incremental force deployments. Concepts must focus on development of organizations that provide for increased flexibility and mobility, while eliminating redundant "cold war" headquarters and streamline other Force XXI structures and organizations. The goal is to field an "adaptable" force with improved force tailoring, adaptive packaging, and deployability. The network systems must have the capability for smart networking and instant communications. It should grow stronger as units are added rather than weaker.
BC16: Battle Command Support Team (BCST) to CONUS Connectivity: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the BCSTs must have the capability of accessing information from CONUS-based command headquarters, national intelligence data bases, and split-based operational activities.
Force XXI Operations must have the capability to be supported by selected elements of Battle Command Support Teams that never deploy from home station, or operate strictly out of rear areas. Battle Command Systems (described in OCRs BC01 through BC12) will provide BCSTs the capability to conduct split-based operations, operate with virtual staffs, and obtain information from any location in the world quickly and seamlessly. Staffs must be trained to operate systems and understand their capabilities.
BC17: Battle Command Support Team (BCST) Footprint: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, BCSTs must be smaller, yet be able to perform necessary functions.
Smaller Battle Command Support Teams (BCSTs) are desirable to reduce strategic lift requirements, present smaller targets, enhance mobility, and reduce sustainment requirements. In order that BCSTs be reduced in size, but still perform the same functions, technologies must be applied that will reduce the workload on soldiers. Enabling technologies include decision support software and planning aids, user friendly systems that optimize work performance, systems that automate staff functions, allow workload sharing, and predict high workload periods and miniaturized hardware. Deployed BCSTs may also be made smaller through the use of virtual staffs. Using advanced command, control, and communications systems, small BCSTs could be linked to larger staffs in the rear, in a sanctuary, or even CONUS. Utilizing a shared, relevant common picture, rearward staffs could provide timely and accurate planning, operational. and administrative support to the forward located BCST. System capability requirements are described in OCRs BC01 through BC12. Other actions required to make BCSTs smaller are more efficient and effective man-machine information interface, reorganization of staff structure around information flows that reduce fragments, stovepipes, and hand-offs. Staffs should be internetted and at least partially nonhierarchal to conduct cross-BOS processes.
BC18: Digitized-Battle Command Support Teams (BCST) to Non-digital Unit Interfacing: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, liaison teams must have the capability to share information with non-digitized units.
Liaison teams in non-digitized units must have the capability to exchange sensitive and non-sensitive data with U.S. Headquarters. This data includes doctrine, organization, unit locations, amounts of equipment by type, weapon capabilities, Warning Orders, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. The system providing this capability must be lightweight, durable, and connected to the relevant common picture. It must have automatic translation, graphics, and video/audio capabilities to allow the non-digitized commander to interface with his digitized U.S. counterpart. It must be able to receive and impart data regardless of terrain, weather, and enemy jamming/intercept capabilities. This system must have an internal power source, but be able to utilize external power if available. There is also a need to have security parameters installed which prevent the unauthorized use of the system or technologies.
BC19: Information Attack: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to disrupt an adversarys ability to exercise authority and direction over his forces.
Sensors are required to detect, identify, accurately locate, and schematically map an adversarys C2 nodes in order to maximize counter C2 operations that exploit, deceive, damage, or destroy the adversarys C2 system. Such systems must be able to identify threat forces that do not exhibit traditional electromagnetic signatures. Future Counter-C2 development must consider multi-function, modular systems to defeat night vision devices and adversary optics and electro-optics; indirect fire electronic weapons to defeat deep adversary electronics; improving the survivability of jammers and increasing their frequency coverage and range; developing a military capability to attack an adversarys information systems internally (computer attacks); improving the capability to perform electronic deception; and developing smart weapons that seek out and destroy high payoff information systems that are engaged in either the collection, processing, dissemination, or display of information.
BC20: Information Protection: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, friendly command and control capabilities must be protected.
C4I systems must survive to operate under nearly all weather conditions, on dirty battlefields, and despite enemy jamming efforts. Systems should provide warning of unauthorized penetration and monitoring. Systems at all echelons must be protected against the NBC and Electronic Warfare (EW) threat. Systems should also provide redundant, automatic capability to acquire, distribute, and process information even in the event of destruction of a primary processing facility, loss of an individual system, or in the event of isolated data loss at a particular node of a C2 system. Additionally, systems should have computer virus detection, protection, and source identification. Encryption capabilities should increase denial thresholds of current systems to the potential for enemy exploitation. Capabilities should facilitate automatic operations and minimize man-in-the-loop requirements. Capabilities should be embedded, but must be seamless when accessed in joint and combined operations. The ability to process all levels of security without the necessity of operating at the highest classification level on the same system is critical for rapid and efficient processing and communication of intelligence information. Signals should be made invisible with transmission masking and the origins of friendly signal sources hidden or disguised so that actual locations are not revealed to the enemy. Automatic controls should be embedded in C4I systems in order to disguise the signature produced and make it look as if there were not a C4I system operating. The controlling effect should be flexible enough to produce varying signatures in order to avoid pattern detection. Transmission of signals must be reduced to the least amount of time possible (e.g., improved datacompression and the increased use of packet switching). Decoys should simulate the signatures (sight, sound, thermal image, and electronic, for example) of a command post realistically enough to deceive enemy sensors. Systems should have the capability to penetrate enemy C4I operations, without alerting the operators that their computer and information systems have been compromised. Once inside the enemys C4I structure, the capability must exist to present information to the enemy that deceives them about the true objectives of the operation. Given imminent capture, a fail safe means must exist to destroy sensitive information residing on C4I systems locally or at remote locations.
BC21: Information Exploitation: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to exploit an adversarys information system.
To facilitate the exploitation of an adversarys C2 system, the friendly C4I system must consist of integrated ground, airborne, and space-based multi-discipline sensor/collection systems that support situation development. Fusion of sensor data at the sensor platform will minimize communication bandwidth requirements and allow for integration of multi-spectral information. It will be necessary to collect information from an adversarys information age systems such as digital and LPI communications. The C4I system must allow for detection and location of an adversarys intelligence collection and sensor and electronic attack systems. These systems must be easily reprogrammable for countering diverse threat weapon systems. Tools need to be developed to allow for analysis of an adversarys C2 system. Distributed all source analysis and dissemination systems will be required to facilitate seamless access to intelligence information at all echelons. The ability to pull intelligence from higher echelons as desired/required as well as to disseminate tailored intelligence products both horizontally and vertically to multiple users is required.
BC22: Information Enable: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, there must be a capability to enable or facilitate friendly information exchange.
Friendly C4I systems must facilitate seamless, real time information exchange that provides warfighters with the information they require regardless of echelon, physical location, or security level. Digitization of the battlefield, which consists of processors and digital communications all using common formats, will permit a common view of the battlefield which allows for situational awareness, synchronization of battlefield activities, and command and control on the move. C4I systems must provide for information exchange at the rates required to facilitate up-to-date situational awareness at all necessary locations. Automated multilevel security processing within C4I systems must be provided. C4I architectures must allow for information exchange among a forces home station, the logistics agencies, and intelligence agencies. Deploying forces need information while enroute and in-theater. These communications must be reliable and flexible. Some types of intelligence collection will require special forms of communication to facilitate efficient and secure information exchange. Standardized graphics are required that can be shared with joint, coalition, and multi-national forces.
BC23: Commander and Battle Staff Training: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the capability must be available to train commanders and battle staffs using integrated battle command systems and live, virtual, and constructive simulations.
Training for commanders and battle staffs must integrate live, virtual, and constructive simulations across the total force. Training capabilities must be designed into all systems and these capabilities should replicate combat conditions. Training systems will be linked together seamlessly. Training should also allow for extensive Combat Support and Combat Service Support participation to include non-traditional players such as medical and JAG. Training and simulation must include all tactical communication systems. Subordinate units participating must have the capability to do so from many different and diverse locations including across the continent and globe. The training system must be weather and terrain independent and be user friendly. Such a system must allow for the capture, storage, and processing of historical data for later analysis and use in the after action review process. The training system will also provide for a video feed for an after action review between the players.
BC24: Force XXI Training: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Commander Concept, the commander and his critical staff must comprehend the organization, structure, capabilities, and limitations of Force XXI C4I architectures (organic and split-based).
There is a requirement to instruct future commanders in the organization, structure, and capabilities of the Force XXI C4I architectures. This requirement must be met before the commander arrives to take command of his unit. This training may take place through a variety of hands-on simulations and exercises that teach and test the commanders understanding of the C4I architecture. There is also a requirement for critical staff officers, such as the G-3, to have a full understanding of the C4I architecture as well.
BC25: Joint/Coalition Doctrine: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the commander must have the capability to rapidly integrate his forces into a joint/coalition force projection environment which spans the continuum of military operations.
The Force XXI commander and staff will require an extensive knowledge of joint and coalition doctrine. They must have a clear understanding of how future joint/coalition partners intend to operate in war and OOTW, and of their strengths and weaknesses. Liaison officers must understand the joint/coalition partners organization, doctrine, capabilities, equipment, civil agency procedures, intent, and in certain cases languages.
BC26: Commanding Modular Organizations: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the commander must have the capability to maximize the benefits of modularly structured organizations (tactical, operational, and strategic).
Commanders must be schooled in the task organization and employment of modular organizations. While the modular concept will actually allow a better mix and size of forces available to the commander, it will also provide him additional challenges of units that may not have trained, exercised, or been employed together previously. C4I systems must link all organizations and training in common doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Commanders must receive training/experience in the human dimensions of fighting teams organized from modular units. This will include the training and simulation systems addressed in OCR BC22.
BC27: Media Impact: To fulfill the vision articulated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, and the Battle Command Concept, the commander must have the capability to either exploit or react to the influence of the media on operations.
Commanders need to be educated on the capabilities of the media in all its forms: electronic, written, and audio. Commanders must be constantly aware of the changing Global Information Environment, its effect on the opinions, attitudes, and beliefs held by the American public, political leaders, soldiers and their families, allies, adversaries, and other important audiences, and the impact of these opinions, attitudes, and beliefs on the Army and its operations. Commercial satellite technology has the ability to provide detailed, graphic, and live coverage of and information about events from anywhere in the world to everywhere in the world. This ability will continue to influence our operations. At all levels, battle commanders must be taught how to enable, enhance, and protect the use of information in the friendly decision and execution process while influencing (degrading and controlling) an adversarys decisions and actions through the manipulation of the Global Information Environment. Battle commanders need to understand the immediacy of the impact of media coverage so they can anticipate adjustments to their plans and operations. Also their plans and operations will form world opinion and affect strategic decisions in a more profound and immediate way than in the past.