Chapter II. Science and Technology Integration With Army XXI
Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP 1997)

2. Force XXI Patterns of Operation

a. Project the Force

Force XXI will be a power projection Army. No matter where future conflicts or military operations take place a portion of the force will have to deploy to the theater. But, projecting the force is far more than deployment. Power projection begins with receipt and analysis of the mission. Force XXI's modularity enables rapid and effective tailoring of the force based on METT-T. Concurrent with building the force is mission planning and rehearsal. Automated systems and simulations provide the capability to plan, coordinate, and wargame, leading to team building and training that results in effective execution immediately upon arrival in theater. (See Figure II-17.)

Army forces will be prepared to deploy from CONUS or from a forward station not in the AOR. First come early entry forces, either with their equipment or marrying up with prepositioned stocks. The prepositioning afloat of brigade sets of equipment provides operational agility and rapid reaction in crisis situations. Forced entry forces (Airborne, airmobile, SOF) may deploy straight into combat operations leveraging simultaneous, distributed operations to dictate the tempo and manner of the fight.

Deployment of the force directly into operations is paramount. Our Army can no longer afford the deploy, stage, move to combat paradigm. Enroute battle command will enable adjustment of plans and execution of combat operations during and immediately after deployment. Streamlined logistics, characterized by Total Asset Visibility and Split-Based operations, will support early operations upon arrival in theater.

Projecting the force is absolutely a Joint, Integrated operation. Joint not only in how we deploy, but in how each service fights and supports while projecting the force. Additionally, even while projecting the force, Army elements are beginning to Gain Information Dominance, Shape the Battlespace, and even conduct Decisive Operations.

b. Protect the Force

The Force XXI approach to force protection will be a holistic one, incorporating organizational, materiel, and procedural solutions to the challenge of protecting soldiers and equipment. Protect the Force solutions have been developed through both experimentation and practical experience in contingency operations. Army digital capabilities enhance these solutions across DTLOMS.

Common situational awareness enables early and accurate IPB. That IPB optimizes employment of security forces by signaling where a threat will appear that requires active security measures. Situational awareness also facilitates greater dispersion, increasing enemy targeting difficulties. Dispersion, elasticity, simultaneity enhance deception. Deception inhibits enemy prediction of friendly actions which not only promotes decisive operations, but also protects the force. Precision emplacement of dynamic obstacles, getting the right obstacle in the right place, in time will increase Army force lethality and survivability simultaneously. (See Figure II-18.)

From experimentation a scheme of protection has emerged. This approach builds first on the stealth approach--If you can't be found you can't be hit. Traditional means such as camouflage and smoke are integrated with counter-recon efforts such as using air defense elements to defeat UAV sensor platforms. If detected, Army elements attempt to prevent acquisition--don't give the enemy the chance to target you. Agility, mobility, and operations in reduced visibility prevent acquisition. If acquired, avert a hit through techniques such as missile avoidance drills. If hit, survive the hit through means such as enhanced ballistic protection or telemedicine.

A critical means of protecting the force is pre-emptive attack. The TMD AWE has demonstrated that improved sensors, shooters, and linkages will enable defeat of enemy attacks even before they occur. That AWE also confirmed that protecting the force is a multi-dimensional, Joint endeavor, requiring cooperation and interoperability. Taken together, Protect the Force efforts ensure sufficient combat power remains available for combat and other military operations while preserving the lives of our soldiers.

c. Gain Information Dominance

A great deal of theoretical work has been done with information over the past several years. What Force XXI experimentation provides us is practical experience in conduct of Information Operations (IO). Dominating Information Operations means creating a disparity between what we know about our battlespace and operations within it and what the enemy knows. If the disparity is great enough our soldiers and leaders at each echelon are making informed decisions while the enemy is guessing based on incomplete or erroneous information. Our leaders are able to influence the battle, while enemy leadership is isolated and powerless. (See Figure II-19.)

Even before a contingency arises, strategic IO are being conducted around the globe. Once the decision is made to commit military forces, that strategic information is enhanced by theater, joint, and coalition collection efforts. Early in the projection of force, information is used to tailor the force and plan campaigns and operations. Equally early in the campaign, the give and take of information warfare commences as opponents seek, through both offensive and defensive measures, information dominance at each echelon. The combative nature of IO means that information dominance is neither assured or continuous. This means that over time U.S. Army forces may have to fight under conditions of information parity or less. Even when possessing information dominance, enemy forces may have niche capabilities that overmatch some aspects of friendly operations. But IO is not only information warfare. It includes establishing and maintaining the means of using information (communications nets, digitized networks).

Army IO are conducted within the context of Joint IO, including PSYOPS and Deception campaigns, as well as media and global information operations. Successful IO results not only in eliminating enemy information capabilities, but also provides greater clarity to battle command through improved situational awareness. Most importantly, Gaining Information Dominance is key to Shaping Battlespace for Decisive Operations.

d. Shape the Battlespace

The purpose of shaping battlespace is to set the conditions for friendly success in decisive operations. Shaping battlespace is far more than the traditional preparatory fires or deep battle. Instead, we set conditions in terms not only of what we do to the enemy, but also of how we posture the friendly force and take advantage of the operational environment (terrain, weather, and infrastructure). The overall goal is to eliminate the enemy's capability to fight in a coherent manner before committing forces to decisive operations. (See Figure II-20.)

Shaping the battlespace begins with early, continuous, precise Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). This enhances Joint as well as Army fires, even during early entry operations. IPB supports identification of the enemy main effort and key enablers. Lethal and non-lethal fires strike to eliminate enemy critical capabilities while sensors locate and track the enemy main effort. That main effort is fixed in time and space not by traditional blocking positions, but rather through counter-mobility, friendly maneuver, command and control warfare, and fires. The battlespace is further shaped by dynamic obstacles employed precisely in time and space through enhanced situational awareness. Economy of force operations, including civil and public affairs, counter-intelligence, and military police allow decisive operations to mass effects against the enemy main effort.

As with information operations, friendly forces cannot count on automatically shaping the battlespace as desired. Instead, we seek to create windows of advantage by setting conditions for decisive operations, evaluating the results, then setting conditions for another decisive action. These "windows of opportunity" must be planned, coordinated, and established in time and space for success. That success, either in offense or defense, is achieved through Decisive Operations.

e. Conduct Decisive Operations

Decisive Operations are just that--the military operations that force the enemy to decide to give in to our will. In combat operations, decisiveness is measured in terms of victory in campaigns, battles, or engagements. In other military operations, it is measured in terms of accomplishing the military objectives (free elections in Haiti or the absence of war in Bosnia are examples). Within the pattern of operations, decisive operations are the means of achieving success. (See Figure II-21.)

Decisive Operations require the precise integration and application of combat power and combat multipliers throughout the enemy formation in depth--and in all dimensions to quickly defeat him. Concurrently striking the enemy at multiple critical points in a specific sequence, appearing to the enemy as a simultaneous action, will destroy his critical forces and functions--bringing rapid defeat of his force as a whole.

Decisive operations will be more Joint in nature, as the land force commander draws from a suite of capabilities the services bring to the battle. Due to the dynamic nature of crisis situations, land-based tactical forces must anticipate, plan, and prepare for decisive operations to provide the NCA or CINC an instantaneous tactical option if required. This requires setting conditions for decisive attack even while other options are being employed. The land force commander must integrate all aspects of decisive operations, ensuring coherency of intent and synergy in execution. The end result of decisive operations is the destruction of the enemy's means and will to fight.

Land combat in the early 21st Century will not appear markedly different than today--the tanks, howitzers, helicopters, and rifles used to apply combat power will be the same or slightly improved. What will be significantly different will be how we plan, coordinate, and execute the employment of those systems. Overmatching situational awareness, a product of digitization, will yield more precise, effective, and efficient maneuver and fires; as well as precision employment of dynamic obstacles and other combat multipliers. This will enable Army elements to mass effects without the risk of massing forces. Information dominance will enhance tactical surprise, so that we fight when and where we want, on our terms. The end result of decisive operations is the destruction of the enemy's means and will to fight.

f. Sustain the Force

Sustainment remains an ongoing effort throughout the entire pattern of operations. Force XXI Operations seek not only to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, but also to maintain that tempo over time. That capability will only be realized through improved logistics. Force XXI Sustainment is a combined arms effort, using solutions across DTLOMS, not just the responsibility of the logistician. (See Figure II-22.)

Key to Sustainment is anticipatory logistics, enabled by digitization. The concept of Total Asset Visibility (TAV), developed in AWEs and refined in operations in Somalia, Macedonia and Haiti, increases the efficiency and timeliness of logistics. Common situational awareness and TAV taken together enable logisticians to make informed decisions, allowing Army elements to execute proactive vice reactive logistics.

Army power projection must be accomplished through split-based operations. Deploying only those logistical capabilities absolutely required to the theater increases the agility of the force. Integration of CSS automation systems within the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is critical to execution of split-based operations. That integration facilitates the flow of logistical requirements and synchronization of support activities, also enhancing throughput and increasing the velocity of logistics support.

Flexibility and tailorability of the force is absolutely critical in contingency operations. Modular structure of CSS elements means logistical packages can rapidly be formed based on METT-T. Modularity also allows a smooth transition between combat and other military operations, where support requirements will change substantially.

Increasing the pace of logistical operations to match that of maneuver is required if we are to dominate tempo. The addition of battlefield distribution, palletized load system, and improved cargo handling technologies will significantly alter the speed at which we execute service support. Key also will be reinforcement of the existing infrastructure within the battlespace. Integration of materiel capabilities with operational and organizational innovations into an overall Sustainment Concept will enable full execution of Force XXI Operations.