News 1998 Army Science and Technology Master Plan



C. Requirements

1. Technology Drivers (Threat Summary)

This section briefly describes the missile– and space–based threats to the United States and its allies projected for the periods 1998–03 and 2004–15. Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) are discussed first, followed by the strategic threat to the United States, cruise missiles, and, finally, space systems. Each of these sections addresses threat trends that will likely drive U.S. technology development.

a. Overview

Proliferation. There continues to be a trend away from manned weapon platforms toward unmanned weapon systems (TBMs, cruise missiles, etc.) with longer range standoff capabilities. Factors motivating this trend include economics, availability, regional power struggles, and lessons from the Gulf War. (Reference 1)

Technology Trends. As a result of the increase in "dual–use" computer, electronics, and materials technologies, we anticipate technological improvements in virtually every type of weapon system. The use of global positioning systems (GPSs) for cruise missile accuracy improvements is a good example of the employment of dual–use technology to improve an existing weapon system. (References 22, 23)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). At least 20 countries have, or may be developing, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the ballistic missile systems needed to deliver them. Ten countries are reportedly pursuing biological weapons research, and at least as many are reported to be interested in developing nuclear weapons. The incorporation of these WMD munitions on various weapon platforms presents enormous challenges to defensive weapon systems designers. (References 2–4)

b. Theater Ballistic Missile Threat Overview

TBMs include ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 5,500 kilometers (km). They are surface launched, fly a ballistic trajectory that may include aimpoint corrections, and can carry conventional or WMD warheads. TBMs are typically transported and launched from a transporter–erector launcher (TEL), which provides both mobility and concealment. The threat from TBMs is real and growing. The proliferation of ballistic missile–delivered WMD is an issue directly confronting the strategic interests of the U.S. and its traditional allies. Long–range artillery rockets are included with TBMs since their size, trajectory, warheads, and target set are similar. TBM performance trends are summarized in Figure D–1. (References 1, 6)

Figure D-1. TBM Performance Trends

c. Strategic Threat Overview

The strategic threats to the U.S. include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine–launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long–range cruise missiles armed with WMD. The only current ICBM and SLBM threats to the U.S. are Russia and China. Russia possesses over 6,500 warheads mounted on 1,300 ICBMs and SLBMs. Under the provisions of the START I treaty, they must draw down inventories to less than 4,900 warheads by the year 2002, and they appear to be on schedule. If START II is ratified by the Duma, a further reduction to 3,500 warheads should occur. While China is both improving performance and the quantity of the weapons in its strategic force, Russia is the only current strategic–range cruise missile threat. The strategic threat performance summary is shown in Figure D–2. (References 1–3, 5, 7)

Figure D-2. Strategic Threat Performance Summary

d. Cruise Missile Threat Overview

Cruise missiles are receiving increased attention as a weapon that U.S. and allied forces are likely to encounter in various situations around the world. Cruise missiles are not a new threat. They were used extensively in World War II (the German V–1), the Falklands War EXOCET, and most recently by the U.S. in the Persian Gulf War. While the majority of the current threat is designed for the antiship mission, this trend is expected to change to an emphasis on land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) in the near future. A further complication is their similarity to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are being used more and more primarily for nonlethal missions around the world. Systems that possess antiradiation homing (ARH) capabilities are a particular concern to defensive systems. LACM and UAV performance trends are shown in Figure D–3. (References 1, 4, 5, 9–16, 20)

Figure D-3. LACM and UAV Performance Trends

e. Space System Threat Overview

Virtually all countries now have some degree of access to space system resources, either by developing their own space system resources, or by purchasing, leasing, renting, or timesharing available space system assets from one of the space developer nations or consortiums. Space systems are primarily utilized for two major purposes: observation and communications, with research coming up a distant third. The two primary functions serve as major force multipliers when considered in a military perspective. The space threat to the U.S. involves any trends that increase a foreign capability to perform these functions or to impair the U.S. capability, resulting in a reduction in the degree of our information superiority. The importance of this superiority was illustrated by the fact that the denial of access to space–based information by Iraq was considered a major factor in the overall campaign success of Operation Desert Storm. Threat trends involving employment of space systems and antisatellite (ASAT) threats to U.S. space assets are summarized below in Figure D–4. (References 1, 5, 8, 17–19, 21)

Figure D-4. Space Systems Performance Trends

2. Linkage of Technology to Future Operational Capabilities

FOCs provide fundamental guidance for S&T work based on warfighting requirements. Throughout this document every opportunity will be made to link technology to the fundamental needs of the warfighter as expressed in the FOCs. It is important to understand what constitutes warfighting requirements: it is a change to any of the current DTLOMS systems needed to achieve a desired future operational capability. Consulting a number of different areas—including concept development, S&T research, warfighting experimentation, and the existence of urgent and immediate operational needs—will now derive the new requirements. The requirements are determined throughout the Army but documented and defended primarily at TRADOC schools and Battle Labs. A crosswalk of FOCs to SMDC technologies is provided in Table D–1.

Table D–1.  FOC/Technology Crosswalk

 

Technology Area

Future Operational Capabilities (May 1997)

Kinetic Energy Weapon Technology

Hit–to–Kill Miniature Interceptor

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–003 Munitions
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Exoatmospheric Interceptor Technology TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
Pilot Line Experiment Technology

AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Focal Plane Array Technology

AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA 97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Advanced Discriminating LADAR

AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Signal/Data Processor

AD97–006 Classification, Discrim, ID, & Correlation of Information
AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA 97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Algorithm Development

AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA 97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Inertial Measurement Unit

DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Control System AD97–002 Mobility
Booster Development

AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–012 Counter Aerial & Space–Based RISTA
DSA97–001 Extended Ranges of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Power Development

DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Warhead Development

AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–003 Munitions
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–001 Extended Ranges of Deep Attack Systems
DSA 97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Endoatmospheric Interceptor Technology

AD97–012 Counter Aerial & Space–Based RISTA Platforms
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Millimeter–Wave Component

AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Window Technology Development

DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Composite Airframe & Structure

AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–003 Munitions
AD97–012 Counter Aerial & Space–Based RISTA Platforms
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–001 Extended Ranges of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–019 Enhanced Mobility for TMD & Precision Strike Attack Systems
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Poly Acrylonitrile Fiber

DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

SHORAD With Optimized Radar Distribution

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–003 Munitions
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–001 Extended Ranges of Deep Attack Systems
DSA 97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–018 Rapidly Deployable Attack Systems

Sensors Technology

CO2 LADAR Development Programs

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AR97–009 Mtd Standoff Minefield
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
AV97–007 Survivability
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–024 Sensor to Shooter Linkages
EEL97–026 Space–Based Early Warning

Advanced Radar Technology Program

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
AV97–011 Aviation Battle Command
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid ID & Location of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Focal Plan Array Processing & Packaging Development

AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid ID & Location of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
EEL 97–026 Space–Based Early Warning

Multimission Sensor Suite

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
TR97–020 Information Collection, Dissemination, & Analysis
TR97–021 Real–Time Target Acquisition, ID, & Dissemination
AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
AD97–007 Sensors
AR97–006 Situational Awareness
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid ID & Location of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
EEL 97–026 Space–Based Early Warning

Phenomenology

Phenomenology Analysis & Algorithm Development Program

AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems

Phenomenology Experiments Program

AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems

BM/C4I

Integrated Operational Airspace Management System (IOAMS)

TR97–001 Command & Control
TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–005 Airspace Management
AD97–002 Mobility
AR97–007 C&C On the Move
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
BCG97–001 Battlefield Information Passage
BCL97–013 Information Protection
AV97–011 Aviation Battle Command
DSA97–017 Terrain Independent Communications & Information Distribution

Free Space Laser Communications

TR97–007 Battlefield Info Passage
SP97–001 Space Sensors Linked with Terrestrial Systems
SP97–102 Survivable Systems with Low Probability of Intercept/Detection
SP97–011 Real–Time Dissemination Systems
SP97–012 Survivable Systems with Low Probability of Intercept/Detection
AD97–004 Fused & Correlated Situational Awareness
BCG97–008 Information Protection

BM/C3I Technology

TR97–XX Command & Control (ALL)
TR97–XX Information Management (ALL)
AD97–004 Fused & Correlated Situational Awareness
AD97–005 Decision Support Software & Tactical Planning Aids
SP97–001 Space Sensors Linked with Terrestrial Systems
SP97–003 NBC Threats & TM Attack Warning
SP97–009 Real–Time Dissemination Systems
SP97–020 Missile Defense
BCG98–001 Battlefield Information Passage
BCL97–003 Decision Planning Support
AD97–005 Decision Support Software & Tactical Planning Aids
AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
AR97–007 C&C On the Move
AV97–003 Mission Planning & Rehearsal
AV97–012 Airspace Management

Survivability and Lethality

Survivability

TR97–043 Survivability—Materiel
AD97–008 Air Defense Systems Survivability
AV97–007 Survivability
DSA97–003 Theater Missile Defense
DSA97–004 Survivability Of Deep Attack Systems
SP97–020 Missile Defense

Lethality

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
BCL97–012 Information Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
SP97–020 Missile Defense

Modeling and Simulation

Modeling & Simulation

TR97–003 Mission Planning & Rehearsal
TR97–047 Leader & Commander
TR97–054 Virtual
TR97–055 Live, Virtual, & Constructive Simulation Technologies
TR97–057 Modeling & Simulation
AD97–013 Live Virtual Battlefield Description
AV97–013 Systematic Upgrade of Constructive Combat Development Models
AV97–016 Virtual Reality; Interactive Training Capabilities in Synthetic Environment Systems

Targets, Test, and Evaluation

Future Test Target Requirements

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–003 Munitions
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
SP97–020 Missile Defense

Directed–Energy Weapons Technology

Solid–State Laser Technology

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
SP97–020 Missile Defense
SP97–021 Space Control
BCL97–012 Information Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–026 Alternative Attack Systems
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Hydrogen Fluoride Overtone Technology

AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
BCL97–012 Information Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–026 Alternative Attack Systems
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
DSA97–030 Counter RISTA

Materials and Components Technology

Microelectronics/Optics Program

SP97–006 Robust Architecture to Overcome Degradation Factors
SP97–020 Missile Defense
AD97–013 Live Virtual Battlefield Description
AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Innovative Radar Components Research

TR97–002 Situation Awareness
TR97–005 Airspace Management
TR97–006 Combat ID
AD97–007 Sensors
AD97–011 Early Warning
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid ID & Location of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
DP97–002 Sensors to Detect Passive & Active Targets
SP97–020 Missile Defense

Operations Research and Systems Analysis

TEL Hunter/Killer

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–002 Mobility
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–001 Extended Ranges of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–002 Smart & Brilliant Munitions for Deep Attack
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather, All Terrain Sensors
DSA97–025 Sensor to Shooter Linkages

Advanced Technology Demonstrations

JLENS Program

TR97–002 Situation Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
TR97–020 Information Collection, Dissemination, & Analysis
TR97–021 Real–Time Target Acquisition, ID, & Dissemination
AD97–007 Sensors
AD97–011 Early Warning
AR97–006 Situation Awareness
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–011 Rapid Location & ID of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–024 Beyond the Visual Range ID
DSA97–28 Missile Defense of the U.S.

Kinetic Energy Antisatellite Program

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–008 Air Defense Systems Survivability
AD97–012 Counter Aerial & Space–Based RISTA Platforms
BCL97–012 Information Attack
DSA97–030 Counter RISTA
SP97–021 Space Control

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations

Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)

TR97–040 Firepower Lethality
AD97–002 Mobility
AD97–012 Counter Aerial & Space–Based RISTA Platforms
AR97–001 Mounted Firepower
BCL97–012 Information Attack
DSA97–018 Rapidly Deployable Attack Systems
DSA97–019 Enhanced Mobility for TMD & Precision Strike Attack Systems
DSA97–026 Alternative Attack Systems
DSA97–028 Missile Defense of the U.S.
DSA97–030 Counter RISTA
SP97–021 Space Control

Science and Technology Objectives

Laser Communications

TR97–001 Command & Control
TR97–007 Battlefield Information
AD97–007 Sensors
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
AV97–011 Aviation Battle Command
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather
SP97–001 Space Sensors Linked with Terrestrial Systems
SP97–009 Real–Time Dissemination Systems

Laser Boresight (LLYNX–EYE)

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
TR97–020 Information Collection
AD97–004 Fused & Correlated Situational Awareness
AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
AR97–004 Mounted Target Acquisition & ID
AR97–006 MF Situation Awareness
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
AV97–011 Aviation Battle Command
DSA97–008 Real–Time Seamless National Targeting Dissemination
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather, All–Terrain Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid Location & ID of Passive Targets
DSA97–014 Information Fusion Technology Supporting Precision Strikes
DSA97–025 Sensor to Shooter Linkages

Battlefield Ordnance Awareness

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
TR97–020 Information Collection
AD97–007 Sensors
AD97–011 Early Warning
AR97–009 Mtd Standoff Minefield Detection & Neutralization
AV97–006 Weapons Suite
DSA97–004 Survivability of Deep Attack Systems
DSA97–011 Rapid Location & ID of Passive Targets
DSA97–023 Low–Altitude, Low–Observable Threat
DSA97–024 Beyond the Visual Range ID
DSA97–025 Sensor to Shooter Linkages

Overhead Passive Sensor Technology for Battlefield Awareness

TR97–002 Situational Awareness
TR97–006 Combat ID
TR97–020 Information Collection, Dissemination, & Analysis
TR97–021 Real–Time Target Acquisition, ID, & Dissemination
AD97–006 Classification, Discrimination, ID, & Correlation of Information
AD97–007 Sensors
AR97–006 Situational Awareness
DSA97–003 TMD
DSA97–010 Day/Night, All–Weather Sensors
DSA97–011 Rapid ID & Location of Passive Targets
DSA97–021 Sensors
DSA97–025 Sensor to Shooter Linkages
SP97–002 Sensors to Detect Passive & Active Targets
SP97–009 Real–Time Dissemination Systems

 

3. Relationship to Joint Vision 2010

The technology under development and for future development by SMDC and MDSTC must support the Joint Vision 2010. Joint Vision 2010 applies new operational concepts as a mechanism to achieve military success across a range of operations. It recognizes that changes in how information is used and disseminated, as well as changes in technology, potential adversaries, and capabilities, will dramatically impact how well armed forces can perform their duties in 2010. This annex focuses on contributions to Joint Vision 2010 and the vision’s four key operational concepts, as described briefly below.

Dominate maneuver concerns the application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks (supporting technology efforts include battle management/command control, communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I), IOAMS, laser satellite communications, etc.).

Precision engagement concerns enhanced joint operations that ensure greater commonality between service precision engagement capabilities and provide future joint force commanders with a wide array of accurate and flexible response options. Technology programs supporting precision engagement include Advanced Radar Technology Program, multimission sensor suite (MMSS), forward acoustical sensor and digital relay (FASDR), CO2 laser detection and ranging (LADAR), LLYNX–EYE, BM/C3I, hit–to–kill (HTK) miniature interceptor, tactical high–energy laser (THEL), free electron laser (FEL), algorithm development, etc.

Full–dimensional protection concerns control of the battlespace to ensure forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement, while providing multilayered defenses (Exoatmospheric/Endoatmospheric Interceptor Technology Programs, THEL, short–range air defense (SHORAD) with optimized radar distribution (SWORD), etc.) for forces and facilities.

Focused logistics concerns the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response; track and shift assets even while en route; and deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. BM/C3I, laser satellite communications, free space laser communications (LASERCOM), etc., are technology programs and will support focused logistics.

4. Relationship to Army Vision 2010

Missile and space defense capabilities are an important part of Army Vision 2010. They enable a full spectrum of operations by contributing to force projection and force sustainment. They will also assist in providing information dominance and shaping of the battlespace through contributions of advanced technology and rapid prototyping of systems available to the soldier in near–real time such as was demonstrated during Desert Storm. Army missile and space defense contributions to Army Vision 2010 include sensor fusion, NMD, situational understanding, total asset visibility, assured space access, precision navigation, precision targeting, global missile warning, near–real–time weather, global communications, sensor–to–shooter links, and multielement joint TMD.

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