International military–industrial partnerships contribute to the warfighting capabilities of our soldiers and our allies by maintaining truly world–class technology and industrial bases built on a global–minded workforce and the best available industrial capabilities and services. As shown in Figure E–1, our International Armaments Cooperative Strategy (IACS) is a comprehensive effort to focus our diverse goals to:

Effective international cooperation demands both the development of sound long–term partnerships and the ability to respond opportunistically when the occasion arises. Annex E is designed to accomplish both these objectives. First, this annex provides insights into the broad capabilities of other countries that can be used to allocate resources to develop and cultivate cooperative programs with partners that are most likely to provide reliable long–term benefits. At the same time, identification of specific niches of excellence provides a basis for responding quickly to targets of opportunity.

As discussed in Volume I, Chapter VII, identification of an opportunity for partnering in this annex to the ASTMP establishes the existence of an acceptable technological quid pro quo. Within the guidelines of identified subtechnologies and countries, this annex provides an authoritative basis for initiation of international agreements, as shown in Figure E–2. However, the proponent organization must make the final determination that appropriate quid pro quo exists for concluding cooperative agreements. This annex offers a snapshot in time, and new and rapidly emerging development may not be reflected. As this document is publicly released, sensitive or classified information is not included. However, the annex includes global technology leveraging opportunities that are updated annually.

The Army Plan is the Army’s capstone strategy planning document. This annex plays a supporting role in several of the Army Plan’s mission areas. As a planning and reference tool, this annex provides senior Army management with a roadmap for initiating discussions with partnering countries on technology cooperation.

Understanding trends is key to an effective strategy, but technology is advancing rapidly, and some opportunities may be time sensitive. This annex contains a broad–based global technology and trends analysis by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and from within the Army’s technology base. The criteria for determining county capabilities and associated trends were as follows:

Leadership in applied technology with identified military relevance is shared among relatively few countries—the United States and its NATO allies France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.); Japan, and to a lesser extent, the former Soviet Union (FSU) states of Russia and the Ukraine. Two other countries (Israel and Canada) are identified as having significant capabilities. As noted in Volume I, Chapter VII, the trend is toward the development of more advanced capabilities in a growing number of countries.

We can obtain a rough measure of how widespread technological capability is by looking at the number of countries identified as having a significant capability in the subareas of technology and research (identified in Volume I, Chapters IV and V). As a point of reference, the technology and research areas listed in Tables E–1 and E–2 have been cross–referenced to the areas in the Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) and the Basic Research Plan (BRP), respectively.

Table E–1 provides a summary of the number of technology subareas of interest where other countries are assessed to be on a par with the U.S. or at the leading edge of technology and capable of offering technology leveraging opportunities. At least one country was found to be on a par with the U.S. in all 72 subareas of technology identified in the Chapter IV roadmaps. Of these there were 44 subareas in which other countries were working at a level that could be considered as driving the state of the art, and 18 in which such capabilities are shared by three or more countries.

Table E–2 provides a similar summary for the subareas of basic research identified in Chapter V. The capabilities in basic research are indicators of future technological capabilities, and point to areas where the Army might seek to develop long–term cooperative relationships. There was at least one country assessed to be on a par with the U.S. in all but two of the 53 basic research subareas—discrete mathematics (such as computational fluid dynamics) where the U.S. has a lead based on a combination of historical access to superior computing capabilities, and in the area of image enhancement and analysis in physics. Even in these subareas, a number of countries are identified as having niche capabilities and having the potential to drive the state of the art in the future. Of the 53 subareas, there were 42 in which at least one country was assessed to be at the state of the art, and 29 subareas where three or more share a leading role.

The number and geographic distribution of countries having significant scientific and technological capabilities is large and can be expected to increase. In the global economy, reliable sources of electronics, computers, many types of sensors, and new materials are becoming more widely available as advances spread rapidly throughout global markets. Computers and electronics are simply commodities, basic tools for studying the scientific areas that these countries have chosen—the life sciences, biology, chemistry, and behavioral and medical sciences.

Tables E–3 and E–4, provide more detailed breakouts of specific technology and basic research areas wherein other countries are identified as having particularly strong capabilities. The capabilities highlighted correlate generally to the areas where countries are shown in the individual subsection tables as having world–class capabilities, and a level of activity that is expected to enhance or at least maintain their relative position.

While scientific and technological capabilities are important determiners of future capabilities, there are global economic forces at work that will also play an important role. These forces will inevitably change the distribution of wealth, and with that shift, the future potential for technological and scientific leadership. The dominance of the United States as the largest economy and market in the world is changing. There is an evolution towards at least three major economies and markets—Europe, Asia–Pacific, and North America. Each of these will have its leaders and as each market develops, other countries will emerge with increasing economic and technological strength.

Europe is currently dominated by the Western European nations, but Eastern Europe will play an increasingly important economic role. In the Asian–Pacific arena, Japan, and to a lesser extent, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, currently hold sway, but already India and China are showing signs of great growth potential and no one doubts that they will soon be major players. In North and South America, the United States and to some extent Canada have been dominant. This situation is not likely to change soon, but eventually Mexico and Brazil will probably become more important players. These future shifts will have dramatic consequences that will help influence the future technological leadership of the world.

For the near term, the U.S. and our traditional allies will probably maintain a commanding dominance in the physical sciences and in electronics and computers (as we currently know them), and will perpetuate a worldwide abundance of devices, systems, and instruments, including sophisticated weapons. In other areas, however, an increasing number of countries will have world–class capabilities. In areas that do not require a large infrastructure investment, or a high level of education, many other countries can contribute effectively in the global market. Software, for instance, is an area in which good mathematical skills and education are the primary ingredients, especially since inexpensive, powerful computers are becoming so widely available. The life sciences, biology, chemistry, medicine, and behavioral science are other areas in which many countries have the requisite skills to compete effectively.

This document provides the necessary basis for building a strategic approach to international technological cooperation. With the growing emphasis on coalition warfare, it is important not only to leverage global technology, but to keep the channels of communication open and viable. Given the widespread and increasing opportunities for technology leveraging, coupled with the decreasing resources, it is important that the Army’s approach to cooperation be both focused and productive.

Sections B and C contain specific technology assessments based on previously mentioned criteria. The numbers in the summary charts in this sections reflect a general assessment of country capabilities and their rate of advance relative to the field at large, as follows:

To implement our international cooperative strategy effectively, we must be prepared to take advantage of existing capabilities and exchange mechanisms to access cutting–edge research and technology in other countries. At the same time, we need to improve our awareness of new opportunities and significant global technology trends. With the spread of the Internet and other modern communications links, there is unprecedented access to global data. The continuing evolution of new tools needed to collect, evaluate, and synthesize these data will continue to enhance the dynamic nature of global technology assessments.