MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
(MDMP TTPs)
Section II. COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
13-2. DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION
The CCIR are not intended to be all encompassing, but are designed to focus the command on specific information the commander needs personally to make a decision. CCIR are not limited to decisions during execution. The initial CCIR may support the commander’s concept development. They change as often as the situation and the commander’s personal need for decisionmaking information change. Some CCIR may even be "standing CCIR," such as a loss of communications with a major subordinate unit.
Much information is important. CCIR provide focus on what the commander needs. Humans can only do about three things at same time; CCIR help make the commander’s load bearable. Long lists of everything that is believed important do not equate to CCIR.
A commander should not develop CCIR that overloads him with making decisions that are a part of the plan (i.e., "on order" tasks to subunits). He must accept that the entire plan will not go as originally envisioned and focus his energy on decisions relative to changes in the situation, not on oversupervising execution that is generally going according to plan.
Because the commander commands by personally making critical decisions, CCIR must be developed personally by the commander, with the assistance of the staff. That is not the same as having the staff nominate CCIR for the commander to approve. The following is a technique to narrow the focus and increase the relevance of CCIR.
The commander develops a concept that envisions a favorable outcome to a future action. From that vision, comes information regarding friendly capabilities, enemy actions, and the terrain that helps confirm or deny the vision during execution. Information that confirms the vision becomes a part of the plan: tasks to subordinate units, intelligence collection priorities, R&S plans, radar cueing schedules, etc. Gathering, processing, analyzing, and disseminating this information is important, but since it supports the plan, decisionmaking related to that information is also a part of the plan. Decisionmaking is pushed down to the appropriate levels so subordinates can exercise initiative consistent with the commander’s intent.
The commander focuses his CCIR on visualization of those enemy, friendly, or terrain aspects of the future action that would cause the envisioned COA to become invalid. The commander, assisted by the staff, develops the potential answers to information requirements that will cause the commander to personally make decisions and issue orders that deviate from the planned COA. The decisions can be related to good things- exploit an opportunity- or bad things- respond to an unexpected enemy action. The commander answers the question "What, if I see it in a certain place at a certain time, will cause me to have to deviate from my current plan (transition to a branch, shift the main effort, commit the reserve, abort an air strike, etc)?"
CCIR wording should be in the form of answers, not questions. PIR questions, such as "When and where will the enemy commit his tank reserve?" and "When and where will the enemy use chemical weapons?" and FFIR, such as "any company that drops below 70-percent strength" are useless unless the commander has envisioned specific times, space, and capability answers that would cause him to have to act. As written above, they always require an observer to perform some level of analysis and draw concrete conclusions for something that no one can truly discern in the time required to make a meaningful decision.
Here are several good PIR:
Will the 20 MID DAG set up in the vicinity of NAI 36 by 252300 Feb? (DP 15, last time information is of value (LTIOV) 260200)
Will the 2 TD be employed along AA B or AA C? (DP 12, LTIOV 251800)
Will the 2 Army employ a forward detachment to secure bridges and crossing sites between Werseberg and Weisenfels? (DP 3, LTIOV 251200)
Envisioning and developing answers is not solely a result of the commander’s intuition, even though the commander’s experience is vital. The staff must give the commander relevant, focused, analytical conclusions so he can orient his vision of how to impose his will over a resisting human enemy.
As a way to think about CCIR, visualize the fight in terms of "if," "and," and "then" before categorizing CCIR as PIR, FFIR, and EEFI. For example, "if a certain enemy or friendly situation occurs (in some relative time and space) and I have a specific set of capabilities available or not available in time and space to deal favorably with the situation, then the commander must make a decision."
The specifics associated with the if and and answers can then be categorized as either PIR, FFIR, or EEFI as appropriate. They should be articulated using descriptive words that do not require further analysis by an observer. The then forms the basis for development of a branch or contingency plan. Once articulated and disseminated throughout the organization, CCIR allow the entire unit to recognize information that is critical to the commander. The commander’s intent for CCIR is for anyone who sees it to transmit it unfiltered to the commander. CCIR allow CPs to focus their battle-tracking priorities and anticipate requirements. They also allow subordinate commanders to decide and act in accordance with the commander’s intent if there is a loss of communication with the commander or if the situation is now different from the original plan. Most importantly, CCIR extend the commander’s personal decisionmaking scope; they allow the entire unit to enhance his efforts to stay ahead of the enemy decisionmaking cycle.