Chapter 13

MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,  AND PROCEDURES

(MDMP TTPs)

Section V. COA DEVELOPMENT WORKBOOK

13-3. MISSION ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

    Prior to COA development, the staff officer must draw certain specific conclusions from his analysis of the mission and the commander's guidance. At a minimum, he must understand the unit purpose, the unit current operation, the most likely enemy COA, the anticipated decisive point, the estimated duration of the current operation, and the critical events of the operation.

    a. Step 1: analyze relative combat power.

        (1) The staff officer makes a rough estimate of relative force ratios and compares them against historical minimum planning ratios (fig 8-3).

These numbers do not, by themselves, tell him anything about friendly or enemy force capabilities. However, planning without regard to relative combat power capabilities at specific places and times leads to flawed planning assumptions. The numbers derived in this step are tools for planning the array of forces and drawing logical conclusions about estimated combat power capabilities at the start point, decisive point, and end state throughout the COA development process.

        (2) He uses the conclusions from mission analysis and the analysis of relative combat power to answer the following questions:

            (a) Enemy forces.

                1. Define mission success and mission failure through the eyes of the enemy force commander.

            2. Define criteria that will cause the enemy force commander to change his COA or execute a contingency plan.

            3. Define the times and places where the enemy commander can decide to change his COA or execute a contingency or counterattack plan.

            4. Define the times and places where major enemy maneuver forces are decisively committed (cannot change their COA, even if the commander tries to).

            5. Define points at which the enemy commander can mass combat power faster than friendly forces can.

        (b) Friendly forces.

            1. Define the space requirements associated with critical events (the minimum space subordinate units require to occupy and the frontage, depth, and size of sectors, positions, or objectives).

            2. What is the duration of the current operation, and what are the time, location and duration of critical events?

            3. What is (are) the minimum combat power or resources required to perform critical events and accomplish task and purpose?

            4. Define the time and place of decisive commitment (the point during execution where friendly forces lose flexibility to change a COA).

            5. Where are the decision points and transition points (transition to a branch or sequel with anticipated capability required to execute)?

            6. What are the reconnaissance priorities and what is the time required for reconnaissance over the duration of the operation?

        (c) Other conclusions.

            (3) Analysis of combat power conclusions. Compare friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses using the dynamics of combat power. (See notes below.) List the conclusions regarding relative combat power strengths and weaknesses for this operation.

NOTES:
1. Maneuver: explain why each side has positional or mobility advantages or disadvantages in relation to other friendly forces, the enemy, and the terrain.
2. Firepower: explain the advantages and disadvantages associated with direct and indirect fire capabilities. Consider weapons system range capabilities, day and night TA capabilities, joint capabilities, and sustainment capabilities.
3. Protection: explain the advantages and disadvantages associated with the ability of each side to prevent the enemy from disrupting preparation and execution of the operation. Consider reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance capabilities; passive and active protective engineer, ADA, and signal capabilities; and LOC security capabilities.
4. Leadership: explain any factors that may enhance or inhibit the ability of either side to operate at its optimum (or doctrinal) level of proficiency. At the tactical level, unit leadership capabilities are more important than specific leader personalities. The practical experience gained through combat is, in the short term, offset by the higher rate of casualties suffered by unit leaders. Consider how long a force has been in combat, the effect of casualties and replacements, the effect of unit reorganization or organization changes, and communications capabilities. Are soldiers still capable, given their training, experience, and equipment, of doing what their commanders are ordering?

    b. Step 2: Generate options.

    From the conclusions drawn in Step 1, the staff can begin to develop feasible, acceptable options for exploiting enemy weakenesses and capitalizing on our strengths to achieve their purpose. They can establish a relationship between enemy forces, friendly forces, and the terrain to the friendly force decisive point. To develop a plan for friendly forces to impose their will on an enemy, they must visualize the point at which, relative to time, space, requirements, and realistic capabilities, they will start winning and the enemy will start losing.  On these two pages the staff would record essential considerations that the COA must address in order to pass a test of suitability.

Other enemy conclusions:

    c. Steps 3 through 5:

        - Array forces.
        - Develop scheme of maneuver.
        - Assign headquarters.

        (1) Process. The staff uses the attached nesting diagram and sketch to record the array of forces.

            (a) Show most likely enemy COA SITEMP at the decisive point. Portray enemy forces two levels down.

            (b) Describe the desired effects of combat power at the decisive point.

            (c) Describe purposes for the main and supporting efforts.

            (d) Describe the task that provides the estimated minimum effects needed to achieve the purpose.

            (e) Describe the type and size units capable of accomplishing the tasks and purposes.

            (f) Describe the C² HQ requirements for each unit.

            (g) Re-evaluate vertical and horizontal nesting of the tasks and purposes for the subordinate unit.

            (h) From the decisive point, develop the scheme of maneuver by working backwards to the start point and forward to the end state.

            (i) Show array of friendly combat power two levels down. (This means that at brigade level, show maneuver companies, not battalions, on this first sketch.) Array forces independent of the current task organization command and support relationships. Allocate sufficient combat power required to accomplish all critical events. Where requirements exceed available combat power, conduct risk analysis and reassess the COA for feasibility and suitability.

            (j) Establish minimum control measures required to clearly convey scheme of maneuver and responsibility for terrain.

            (k) Use stickers and pencil first. Do not commit pen to paper until you are satisfied with array of friendly forces required to accomplish mission.

            (l) Stay focused on the current operation. Beyond taking a note regarding the requirements, do not get sidetracked by branches or sequels at this point.

HINT: If the staff has determined more than one decisive point or has more than one essential task and purpose for the main and supporting effort forces, while not wrong, it means the members will probably soon realize one or more of the following problems: the COA will fail tests of feasibility or acceptability because they:

- Have incorrectly analyzed the unique contribution of their unit to higher HQ success.
- Have incorrectly analyzed time and space requirements.
- Have incorrectly analyzed subunit capabilities to meet critical requirements.
- Are addressing a branch or sequel rather than the current operation.
- Have made the COA too complicated to articulate and coordinate clearly, concisely, simply, and in a timely manner.

            (m) Risk. The staff analyzes the risks to the force and determines controls required to protect the force. The objective is to minimize the risk to keep it at an acceptable level. A staff officer develops an understanding of the risks by comparing potential enemy threats and the availability of combat power or combat multipliers to mitigate the threats and deciding whether mission success outweighs the risk. He never accepts unnecessary risk.

    During COA development, the commander and staff continue to identify METT-T hazards and begin development of controls to reduce their risk. Risk should be considered when applying the COA criteria of feasibility and acceptability. Risk to the force due to METT-T hazards must be identified and controlled. The remaining risk (residual risk) is what commanders, leaders, and soldiers must decide to accept or not accept before performing any task or mission. The decision must be based on whether or not potential benefits outweigh potential costs. The potential costs of high risk missions can be significantly reduced by effective identification and control of hazards.

        (2) Recording: The staff uses the nesting diagram below and a draft sketch to organize and record its array of forces.

            (a) Nesting diagram.

           b. Nested concepts. Nested concept (Army)- The means to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept is nested in the other. (FM 101-5-1, p 1-108) This diagram illustrates nested concepts

            d. Step 6: COA statement and sketch.

                (1) The COA statement must be clear, concise, and easy to read and understand in a single rapid reading by a subordinate. The COA contains proper English sentences and paragraphs. It does not contain bullets. The staff officer drafts, revises, and rewrites on scratch paper until he can meet the communication standard. The following outline is useful to practice communicating a COA statement in a clear, logical form. It should not exceed one page.

I. Restated mission statement.

II. Articulate the decisive point.

    A. Friendly force location and combat power.
    B. Desired effect on enemy force.
    C. Terrain and time.

III. How major subordinate maneuver units will achieve the decisive point.

    A. Form of maneuver or pattern of defense for force as a whole.
    B. Responsibility for critical doctrinal tasks associated with form of maneuver or pattern of defense.
    C. Mission essential tasks and purpose for major subordinate maneuver forces.

        1. Main effort.
        2. Supporting efforts.
        3. Deep.
        4. Reconnaissance and security.
        5. Reserve planning priorities.
        6. TCF.

IV. Acceptable risk.

    A. Define the risk.
    B. Is this risk worth your soldiers’ lives?

V. End state.

    A. Location and status of major subordinate maneuver units.
    B. Location and status of enemy forces.

        (2) Final COA sketch. Sketch must clearly convey the scheme of maneuver articulated in the statement using correct graphics (FM 101-5-1). The sketch uses decision graphics to show combat power allocated to accomplish the task and appropriate level command responsibility.  It shows units in a manner that conveys relationship to the overall form of maneuver or pattern of defense.  Dashed symbols convey the end state.   Solid and dashed boundaries convey subordinate responsibility for terrain.

    The following, as appropriate, provide a clearer picture of the scheme of maneuver and areas of responsibility:

         -Boundaries one level down.
        -Main attack in the offense.
        -Additional phase lines (PLs).
        -Axes of advance.
        -Zones and/or sectors.
        -Assembly areas.
        -Battle positions.
        -Engagement areas.
        -Objectives.
        -FEBA or LD/LC.
        -Major manmade and natural obstacles.
        -Fire support coordination measures.
        -Key terrain.
        -Identifying features (cities, rivers, highways, etc).