MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
(MDMP TTPs)
Section VI. ANALYZE THE DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER
13-4. COMBAT POWER
Combat power analysis should reflect two separate and distinct components: the measure of absolute combat power and the assessment of relative combat power potential.
Absolute combat power is assessed through the process of correlation of forces that results in absolute force ratios. The application of this method uses numerical values assigned to systems and units. It then compares all enemy systems to friendly systems to generate a numerical ratio. While this method helps determine mission requirements versus on-hand resources, it should not be the end of combat power analysis.
A unit can achieve effects beyond its absolute combat power by maximizing relative combat power potential. Through the application of strengths against weaknesses and the minimization of weaknesses against enemy strengths, the maneuver-oriented unit can attain a relative combat power advantage against a numerically superior force. Relative combat power analysis (RCPA) is a system that attempts to measure combat potential versus absolute value.
RCPA employs inductive reasoning, which causes the commander to think proactively; deductive reasoning leads to reactive thinking. The commander needs to make some assumptions in this method. He looks for times, places, and events on the battlefield where friendly and enemy forces might be able to concentrate and synchronize their forces to accomplish their purpose. These become potential decisive points, places and times where one side or the other can gain a relative combat power advantage. The commander will then focus on key and potentially decisive points where he can mass the effects of his combat power to gain a relative advantage at a given time and place.
a. Step 1 of RCPA uses the dynamics of combat power- maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership- to determine the relationship between friendly and enemy forces. The commander uses his estimate, judgment, and experience to assess his own strengths and weaknesses and the enemy strengths and weaknesses using the four dynamics of combat power.
b. Step 2 is the process of comparing strengths and weaknesses. Comparing friendly strengths and weaknesses against enemy strengths and weaknesses helps the commander determine some general factors about his mission by highlighting things he may need or want to accomplish to be successful. It also helps him identify his vulnerabilities relative to the enemy. He can then take steps to reduce those vulnerabilities.
c. The results of this comparison are recorded as deductions and become the basis for step 3 of RCPA, the formulation of potential tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that pit our strengths against enemy weaknesses and reduce our vulnerabilities. Significant factors are also identified and will be used later in COA development. Table 13-1 shows an example of a relative combat power analysis.
"Relative superiority, that is, the skillful concentration of superior strength at the decisive point, is much more frequently based on the correct appraisal of this decisive point, on suitable planning from the start; which leads to an appropriate disposition of forces..."
- Clausewitz
"To maneuver the fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of ones forces. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon the portion of the hostile line which is of the first importance to overthrow. To arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point but that they shall engage at the proper times with ample energy."
- Jomini
Table 13-1. RCPA of a Light Infantry Unit Versus a Mechanized Infantry Unit
| Combat power | Enemy forces |
US forces |
Deductions |
TTP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maneuver | + Speed
on roads. +Tactical mobility. + Can dismount. - Predominately roadbound. - Must resupply. |
+ We
can shape the battlefield. + All terrain mobility. - Cannot reposition rapidly. |
·
Force enemy to dismt to equalize the fight. · Org for two fights: veh and dismt. · Conceal pos. |
· AT
ambush. · Stop veh forward momentum. · Canalize enemy. · Separate armor from inf and inf from veh. |
| Firepower | + More
heavy wpns. + 120-mm DS morts. + BRAG in support. - 80% of major wpns on turrets. - Difficult to preplan fires. |
+
Numerous AT wpns. + Close terrain. + Can preplan arty. -No rapid fire AT. - 80% of major wpns are small arms. |
· Arty
vs veh. · Mech vs inf. · Deny enemy the combined arms fight. · Arty vs 2d Mech. |
·
Focus plt on 2 or 3 veh. · Use smoke at AT ambush site. · Target 120-mm and BRAG. · AT ambush veh w/smoke. |
| Protection | + Enemy
under armor. - Time to resupply. |
+ We
have prep time. + Build obs plan. +Prestock ammo. -Vulnerable to arty and NBC. |
· Must
survive arty prep. · Get enemy out from under armor. · Cant stay in initial pos. · Must conceal to gain surprise. |
·
Establish hides. · AT ambush from fwd pos, then fall back. · Sell recon that pos is weak. |
| Leadership | +
Simple attack drills. - Centralized C2. - Rigid at lower levels. - Less initiative. |
+ Time
to rehearse. + Decentralized C2. + Small unit initiative. - Large AO. |
·
Rehearsal to strengthen decentralized execution. · Aggressive counter recon. · OPs. |
·
Practice electronic attack. · Rehearse. · EW vs cmd nets. |
13-5. CHARACTERISTICS
a. Maneuver effect.
(1) Unit mobility:
- Physical fitness.
- Teamwork and esprit.
- Equipment capabilities.
- Equipment maintenance.
- Mobility.
- Tempo and speed.
(2) Tactical analysis:
- Intelligence and knowledge of enemy tactics.
- Understanding of terrain effects.
- Understanding of own capabilities.
(3) Management of resources:
- Utilization of equipment.
- Utilization of supplies.
- Utilization of time.
- Utilization of soldiers energy.
(4) Command, control, and communications:
- Span of control.
- SOPs and doctrine.
- Staff efficiency.
- Communications efficiency.
b. Firepower effect.
(1) Volume of fire:
- Number of delivery means.
- Supply capability.
- Rate of fire of weapon systems.
(2) Lethality of munitions:
- Design characteristics.
- Explosive energy.
- Penetration.
(3) Accuracy of fires:
- Weapon and ammo design characteristics.
- Crew proficiency.
- Terrain effects.
- Visibility.
(4) Target acquisition:
- Intelligence and analysis.
- Location and function of forward observers and observation points.
- Transmission of target data.
(5) Flexibility of employment:
- Weapons ranges.
- Mobility.
- Fire control systems.
- Tactical employment doctrine.
- Set up to fire time.
c. Protection effect.
(1) Concealment:
- Camouflage.
- Stealth.
- Equipment design.
- Enemy intelligence acquisition means.
- Our acquisition and tracking means.
(2) Exposure limitation:
- Minimize potential target size.
- Minimize potential target exposure time.
- Complicate potential target tracking.
(3) Damage limitation:
- Individual protective equipment design and use.
- Use of natural cover.
- Use of artificial cover.
- Combat vehicle design.
- Medical treatment and evacuation system.
- Equipment repair and cannibalization.
- Alternate C2 arrangements.
- Personnel replacements.
- Equipment replacements.
d. Leadership effect.
(1) Technical proficiency:
- Training.
- Experience.
(2) Understanding of unit capabilities:
- Training.
- Experience.
- Selection.
(3) Communication skills
- Selection.
- Training.
- Written, oral, and graphics.
- Subunit teamwork.
(4) Dedication, commitment, morality:
- Motivation.
- Training.
- Recent success or failure in combat.
(5) Understanding:
- Combat experience.
- Training.
- Luck.