Chapter 3

MANEUVER

Section IV. LIGHT INFANTRY OPERATIONS

3-12. DOCTRINE

    Light infantry, air assault, and airborne units each possess unique skills and operational design. These units are generally more deployable and have less firepower than mechanized infantry units, but they share the common mission to close with and destroy the enemy.  Because air assault and airborne are a means of delivery to the battlefield, airborne and air assault forces are also refered to as light forces.

    a. Operations in depth. Due to their unique organizational structure, each of these units possesses differing capabilities to conduct combat across the depth of the battlefield.

        (1) Deep. Unlike heavy divisions, these light forces do not have MLRS and/or ATACMs in their DIVARTY. However, they do possess unique capabilities to conduct deep maneuver.

            (a) Light infantry division. The light infantry division conducts deep operations using attack aviation and ground maneuver. The light infantry division is ideally suited to conduct deep maneuver by infiltration. Unless augmented by additional assault aviation units, the light infantry division cannot conduct major forcible entry operations. Due to its small size, it is more deployable than any other division.

            (b) Air assault division. The air assault division possesses both an attack aviation brigade and an assault aviation brigade. With its three attack battalions (AH-64), the air assault division can conduct significant deep operations. Using its organic assault and medium helicopter battalions, it can also transport the assault elements of an entire air assault brigade with CS and CSS in one lift. Consequently, it can conduct forcible entry operations within the range of its helicopters. However, if using sealift or airlift, the air assault division is not as strategically deployable than an airborne or light division because of the large number of organic helicopters.

            (c) Airborne division. Using airborne assault, the airborne division can conduct deep operations on any suitable drop zone (DZ). It has the unique capability to conduct forcible entry operations anywhere in the world from the continental United States (CONUS) without using an intermediate staging base (ISB). The size of the operation is limited only by the amount of airlift allocated to the mission and USAF aircraft available for fire support and CSS.

        (2) Close. Due to their limited firepower, protection, and ground tactical mobility, these three divisions are best suited for close operations in restricted terrain, limited visibility, adverse weather, and urban warfare; however, light forces can be attached to armored units to conduct specific, special operations for a short time.

        (3) Rear. These three types of light forces generally conduct rear operations in the same manner. Because of the size and logistic requirements of its large aviation brigade, terrain management and sustainment will be most demanding for the air assault division.

    b. Unique planning procedures. air assault and airborne operations are both backward planned (the ground tactical operation is planned first and all preceding phases are planned afterwards) using closely related phases. The four phases of planning airborne operations are ground tactical, landing, air movement, and marshaling. The five phases of air assault operations are ground tactical, landing, air movement, loading, and staging. Although the number and names for the phases differ when planning the two types of operations, both are similar in that the ground tactical plan dictates the preceeding phases.

3-13. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

    a. Common employment considerations. All light forces share the following common:

        (1) Capabilities.

             (a) Effectively maneuver in areas that restrict the mobility of mechanized forces.
            (b) Seize, occupy, and retain terrain.
            (c) Employ all forms of mobility, such as trucks, helicopters, aircraft, rafts, etc.
            (d) Operate under limited visibility, with or without night vision devices.
            (e) Close with and destroy the enemy.
            (f) Employ organic and supporting direct and indirect fires to defeat heavy forces.

        (2) Limitations.

             (a) When operating on foot, light forces are not as mobile as heavy forces.
            (b) Light forces are vulnerable to all types of observed fire, especially artillery and CAS.
            (c) Infantry battalions possess limited organic CS and CSS assets.
            (d) Light forces that require high-level mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) have severely degraded combat power.
            (e) Light forces have a limited antitank capability.

    b. Capabilities and limitations of a light infantry division.

        (1) Capabilities. The light infantry division can:

             (a) Attack to defeat light enemy forces or seize terrain. It can attack to defeat heavy enemy forces on close terrain if augmented.
            (b) Reinforce forward-deployed forces by fully integrating into their operating and support structure. The light infantry division is particularly useful as an economy-of-force unit on close terrain, allowing deployed heavy units freedom for decisive employment elsewhere.
            (c) Operate for 48 hours without external support.
           (d) Conduct military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).
           (e) Conduct rear operations within the limits of organic tactical mobility assets.
            (f) Integrate and command and control combat, CS, and CSS augmentation forces.
            (g) Participate in amphibious operations that are not a part of a forced entry.
            (h) Conduct air assault operations within the limits of organic aviation assets.
            (i) Reinforce or be reinforced by airborne, air assault, ranger, special, or heavy forces.

         (2) Limitations. The light infantry division:

             (a) Has limited vehicular mobility.
            (b) Has limited aircraft capability.
            (c) Has limited antiarmor capability.
            (d) Has limited protection from conventional and nuclear fires.
            (e) Has limited capability for NBC reconnaissance, deliberate smoke production, and decontamination.
            (f) Cannot conduct a forced entry operation.
            (g) Operates without redundant systems.
            (h) Requires external CSS after 48 hours.
            (i) Requires local air superiority and possibly naval support for deployment into a hostile area.

    c. Capabilities and limitations of an air assault division.

         (1) Capabilities. An air assault division can:

             (a) Attack into otherwise inaccessible areas.
            (b) Overfly barriers, bypass enemy positions, achieve surprise, and cause the enemy to react prematurely or disclose his positions to other attacking forces.
            (c) Concentrate, disperse, or redeploy rapidly to extend the division area of operations (AO), to develop enemy contact, or to decrease the division vulnerability to enemy attack.
            (d) Maintain a rapid tempo of operations by fighting simultaneously in more than one direction or in more than one AO.
            (e) Conduct operations under adverse weather conditions and during limited visibility to facilitate deception and surprise.
            (f) Rapidly move FA by air and conduct artillery raids.
            (g) Conduct airhead operations without external support for approximately 2 days.

         (2) Limitations.

             (a) Helicopters cannot fly in extremely severe weather conditions.
            (b) Secure landing zones are needed to land units in the AO prepared to employ fire and movement (tactical integrity).
            (c) The division has minimum ground transportation.

    d. Capabilities and limitations of an airborne division.

         (1) Capabilities. The airborne division can:

             (a) Conduct an airfield seizure to secure a lodgement for follow-on airland forces.
            (b) Conduct a combined arms combat parachute assault to seize and secure vital objectives behind enemy lines until linking up with other supporting forces.
            (c) Rescue US nationals besieged overseas.
            (d) Reinforce forward-deployed forces (if augmented with transportation).
            (e) Serve as a strategic or theater reserve.
            (f) Conduct large-scale tactical raids (if provided transportation for withdrawl).
            (g) Occupy areas or reinforce friendly units beyond the immediate reach of ground forces.
            (h) Capture one or more ISBs for forward operating bases for ground and air operations.

         (2) Limitations. An airborne division:

             (a) Must rely on the USAF airlift for initial entry into battle and for resupply, until linkup with ground forces.
            (b) Requires more CAS than normally provided to infantry divisions because it is organized with only light FA. The absence of medium and heavy FA limits support for maneuver battalions and reduces the ability to deliver counterfire and to suppress enemy AD.
          (c) Has limited ground and air mobility once delivered into the AO. The nine infantry battalions are footmobile. Truck transport normally moves supplies. Using these trucks for troop movement hampers the division logistic effort. The assault aviation companies of the aviation brigade can lift the assault elements of only two rifle companies at one time.
           (d) Is vulnerable to attack by enemy armor or motorized formations because of its limited antiarmor capability. Substantial numbers of TOW and Javelin missiles in the division may help but do not completely offset this limitation.
            (e) Is unsuited for operations in a nuclear, chemical, or biological environment.