Chapter 4

Intelligence provides timely, concise, accurate, relevant, and synchronized intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to tactical and operational commanders across the range of military operations. IEW operations in peace support the deterrence of war. In war and SASO, IEW operations support the winning of battles and campaigns. IEW operations reduce uncertainty and risk to US forces and permit the effective application of force.

a. Intelligence. Intelligence supports the Army as a whole through the intelligence operating system. The intelligence operating system is a flexible and tailorable architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment that responds to the intelligence needs of commanders at all echelons. It consists of intelligence collection and analysis assets at each echelon from the national level down to the maneuver battalion level.

Since no echelon has all the organic intelligence capabilities it needs to fully support the commander, IEW assets must be employed to support the needs of all echelons. This support is comprehensive and reaches across the range of military operations.

b. Commander drives intelligence. The commander drives the intelligence effort. The commander's role in IEW is central to the success or failure of IEW in operations, not just when the crisis begins, but well before and throughout the operation. The commander directs the intelligence effort by selecting and ranking intelligence requirements. He designates the CCIR, the information the commander needs to visualize the outcome of operations. The staff assists the commander in developing intelligence requirements and will generate additional ones in support of the concept of operations and targeting as needed. The commander and staff establish these requirements to fill the gaps and voids in unit common understanding of the battlefield.

a. Distinction. A distinction can be made between intelligence and information. Much information is used in the development of intelligence. If raw data can be used for fire or maneuver as received, with no interpretation or integration with other data, it is combat information. Combat information is unevaluated data gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander that, due to its highly perishable nature, cannot be processed into intelligence in time to satisfy the user's requirements. Once raw data is validated, integrated, compared, and analyzed, it becomes intelligence. In other words, the distinction between intelligence and combat information is in how the information is handled and used. If information must be processed and analyzed, it is intelligence and not combat information.

b. The intelligence cycle. Intelligence operations follow a five-step process known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is focused on the commander's mission and concept of operation. The principal of the cycle is intelligence synchronization. Each step within the cycle must be synchronized with the commander's decisionmaking and operational requirements to successfully influence the outcome of the operations.

(1) Plan and direct. Planning and directing involves task organizing MI assets; identifying personnel, logistics, and communications requirements; identifying, ranking, and validating intelligence requirements; developing a collection plan; issuing requests for information on collection and production; and monitoring the availability of collection information. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs) derive from this phase. (See para 4-3 for further PIR discussion.)

(2) Collect. Collecting includes acquiring information and providing this information to processing and production elements. (FM 34-2)

(3) Process. Processing is the conversion of collected information into a suitable form that can be readily used by intelligence personnel to produce intelligence. Processing includes data form and format conversion, photographic development, transcription and translation of foreign language material, and printing.

(4) Produce. Producing involves the integration, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of information from single or multiple sources into intelligence. The time constraints and demands of the battle for the S2's tactical units tend to make the processing and producing steps indistinguishable.

(5) Disseminate. Disseminating intelligence is the conveyance of intelligence to users in a usable form. The diversity of forms and means requires interoperability among C4I systems.

c. Intelligence disciplines and functions. In order to clearly describe MI, the intelligence areas are divided into four intelligence disciplines- human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT)- and two multidiscipline intelligence functions- counterintelligence (CI) and technical intelligence (TECHINT). To be effective and minimize threat deception, every intelligence operation must attempt to use all disciplines. The disciplines themselves must complement and cue each other for maximum effectiveness. Rarely will separate disciplines produce a comprehensive picture of the threat. Instead, each discipline will produce bits and pieces of information that analysts will synthesize to approach a total picture. (For detailed discussion see FM 34-1, chap 2.)

d. Primary intelligence tasks. MI accomplishes its mission through six primary tasks that generate intelligence synchronized to support the commander's mission and intelligence requirements. The six tasks can be thought of as the mission-essential task list (METL) for intelligence. The six intelligence tasks are:

(1) Indications and warning. The commander uses I&W for early warning to prevent surprise through anticipation and to reduce risk from enemy actions that are counter to planning assumptions. This enables him to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies or to shape the battlefield by manipulating enemy activities. I&W helps a commander decide whether to maintain or increase unit readiness levels if hostilities are likely. In force projection operations, I&W provides the commander time to plan and surge the intelligence effort for the impending operation. Detection of developments that may initiate force projection operations requires intelligence readiness be developed and maintained through pre-crisis intelligence operations.

(2) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The commander uses IPB to understand the battlefield and enemy. This enables him to use weather, terrain, and enemy methods of operation to synchronize battlefield operating systems (BOSs) for maximum effect. It also helps him understand the limits of the operation. The G2/S2 orchestrates the staff effort in performing IPB. IPB integrates the effects of the operational environment, weather, and terrain with the doctrine and anticipated intentions of potential opponents and reveals enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities to help determine the enemy course of action (COA). IPB enables the commander to plan the operation and time its execution to achieve desired effects or to structure conditions for future operations. The process consists of four steps:

Template	Description	Purpose
Doctrinal	Depicts enemy doctrinal deployment for various types of operations without constraints imposed by weather and terrain. Compositions, formations, frontages, depths, equipment numbers and ratios, and high value targets (HVTs) are types of information displayed.	Illustrates the disposition and activity of threat forces and assets (HVTs) conducting a particular operation unconstrained by the effects of terrain and weather.
Situation	Depicts how the enemy might deploy and operate within the restraints imposed by the weather, terrain, and current strength.	Identifies critical enemy activities and locations. Provides a basis for situation and target development and HVT analysis.
Event	Depicts locations where critical events and activities are expected to occur, or lack of activity, and where HVTs will appear. (Provides a basis for collection operations and for locating and tracking HVTs.)	Analyzes time-related events within critical areas. Depicts where activity (or it's lack) will inticate which COA the threat has adopted.

(3) Situation development. The commander uses situation development to help understand the battlefield, thereby reducing risk and uncertainty while executing his plan. Situation development provides an estimate of enemy combat effectiveness. Based on the results of continuous IPB, it confirms or denies enemy COAs and explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the friendly force commander's intent. Situation development helps the commander in his decisions to execute branches and sequels as the operation develops. Situation development is especially demanding for MI units. As an asset manager, the MI commander must anticipate and war game the collection positions for each of his IEW systems throughout the operation. Based on the results of this war gaming, the MI unit commander may prompt the staff of the supported unit to reconsider select elements of its plan.

(4) Target development and support to targeting. The commander uses intelligence in target development to effectively employ the fire support operating system for nonlethal EA and lethal fires. Target development provides targets and targeting for attack by fire, maneuver, and electromagnetic means.

Given a selected COA and the input generated by the IPB process, target priorities can be developed. The target value analysis (TVA) process identifies potential critical enemy functions that could interfere with the friendly COA or are essential to the successful completion of the enemy’s mission. These critical enemy functions are called high-value targets (HVTs). Both the fire support and the intelligence systems further develop HVT priorities in their target attack and collection plans.

See FM 6-20-10 and FM 34-130 for further discussion on intelligence support to targeting.

(5) Force protection. Force protection analysis gives the friendly commander a good estimate of what the enemy commander will see and not see of our operation and allows the commander to plan for operations security (OPSEC). Force protection analysis allows the friendly commander to:

For further discussion on intelligence support to force protection see FM 34-60.

(6) Battle damage assessment. The commander uses BDA to determine if his operational and targeting actions have met his conditions for initiating subsequent COAs. If the desired operational conditions have not been met, BDA gives the commander the information necessary to decide if, when, and how the targets should be reengaged.

BDA provides a timely and accurate analysis in terms of damage and impact on enemy combat effectiveness. BDA includes physical and functional damage assessments as well as target system assessment. The most accurate BDA is derived from multiple sources and the results of all-source analysis. The commander maximizes his limited intelligence assets when developing BDA and targeting requirements at the same time as his other intelligence requirements.

The commander determines BDA-related PIR and ranks them against his other PIR during the "decide" phase of the targeting process. The G2/S2 integrates the commander's BDA-related PIR into the intelligence collection plan and synchronizes the PIR collection with the target engagement windows. Since allocating collection resources for BDA could divert IEW assets from other missions, BDA-related PIR should only address the commander's most critical requirements. The G2/S2 ensures intelligence collected on BDA-related PIR is integrated into the targeting process, specifically the G3/S3 combat assessment (CA).

Success in the BDA process is achieved when the commander has the necessary information to quickly decide when to-

During analysis and comparison of friendly COAs (staff war gaming), the staff identifies a set of intelligence requirements for each potential friendly COA. Each requirement supports a friendly decision expected to occur during execution of a COA. This is the basis of the command list of intelligence requirements.

To this list are added those requests received from higher units, in the form of intelligence acquisition tasks, and lower units, in the form of requests for intelligence. After arranging the list of requirements in priority order, the collection manager recommends the most important to the commander. The commander approves the ranked-in-priority list of intelligence requirements and designates those tied directly to his decision points (DPs) as PIR. A unique PIR list should be developed for each friendly COA.

IR are those items of information regarding the enemy and the environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the PIR of the commander. Once determined, PIR and IR focus the entire planning and supervising effort for the intelligence operating system.

Successful intelligence synchronization provides critical intelligence on time and on target. Synchronization begins with the decisionmaking and targeting processes. Taken together, these processes identify the decisions that must be made during the execution of a COA. These decisions drive the intelligence requirements of the command. Every identified decision should be supported by an intelligence requirement.

Intelligence synchronization is the process that ensures the intelligence system provides answers to IRs in time to influence the decision they support. The S2 develops specific orders or requests (SORs) that synchronize the activities of the intelligence collectors with the specific information requirements. The S2/collection manager ensures that-

The S2/collection manager is the key to intelligence synchronization. He checks to ensure that all decisions identified during COA development are supported by intelligence requirements. He then manages the collection process to ensure that:

a. Mission analysis. Prior to staff mission analysis, the G2/S2 should attempt to provide as many of the following products as possible. At the conclusion of mission analysis, the G2/S2 will complete the following products:

b. COA development. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities that the environment and the enemy situation offer and ensures that each COA is realistic. During COA development, the G2/S2:

e. Execution. As the battle progresses, the staff uses IPB to continuously evaluate the situation facing the commander. Therefore, it is critical that the G2/S2 update the IPB products as the situation dictates, to include the:

Further discussion on intelligence support to the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) is found in FM 101-5 and FM 34-130.

Electronic warfare (EW) is an essential component of command and control warfare (C2W). Effective use of EW as a decisive element of combat power requires coordination and integration of EW operations with the commander's scheme of maneuver and FS plan. The integrated use of EW throughout the battlefield supports the synergy needed to locate, identify, damage, and destroy enemy forces and enemy C2 structure. EW can provide the commanders with substantial capabilities to electronically influence and control the battlefield.

a. Army EW operations are developed and integrated as part of the commander's overall concept of operation. Within the staff:

(2) Electronic attack (EA) uses lethal and nonlethal electromagnetic energy to damage, destroy, and kill enemy forces. Nonlethal EA (jamming) degrades or denys the enemy effective use of his C2 structure and information systems. Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpret what is received by his electronic systems.

(3) Electronic protection (EP) protects personnel, facilities, or equipment from the effects of friendly EW or enemy EW that degrades or destroys friendly communications and noncommunications capabilities.

a. IEW supports commanders. Commanders use IEW support to anticipate the battle, understand the battlefield, and influence the outcome of operations. IEW enables commanders to focus, leverage, and protect their combat power and resources. All commanders use IEW to support force protection, and, while IEW support is required for every situation, each application will be tailored to the commanders' requirements at each echelon and for each operation.

b. Commander's intelligence team. The G2/S2 and the MI commander are a team whose mission is to provide IEW support to the commander. As a team, they are responsible to the commander for planning and directing the intelligence activities of the command. Together, they develop standards for intelligence training and operations.

(1) G2/S2. The G2/S2 is the commander's senior intelligence officer and primary staff officer for intelligence at Army service component through battalion. The G2/S2:

(2) MI commander. The MI commander executes IEW operations using his organic and attached assets. He is the primary executor of G2 intelligence tasking and G3 EW tasking. The MI commander:

(1) Concept of employment. US forces must be prepared to face forces of varying degrees of sophistication anywhere in the world. These critical tasks lead to the success of any operation:

(2) Analysis and control element. The mission of the ACE is to produce and disseminate intelligence and to focus collection resources so that it can provide the information the commander needs to make decisions. The ACE provides centralized collection management and analysis for multiple assets covering all intelligence disciplines. These assets can include national, theater, and tactical intelligence. The ASAS is the primary intelligence processing system supporting the ACE in both divisions and corps.

The ACE integrates the functions of collection management, dissemination, targeting, analysis, all-source production, and technical control into a single intelligence staff element. The ACE is a flexible, dynamic organization designed to support the new environment of force projection operations.

(3) ACE interface with the commander's intelligence team. Under the direction of the G2, the ACE employs the ASAS to direct, process, produce, and disseminate intelligence to support decisionmaking and targeting. The MI commander works closely with the ACE and provides collection and nonlethal targeting from MI assets.

At the brigade level, the S2 and supporting DS MI commander form the intelligence team. ASAS workstations from the S2 section and the MI company form an ACT. The ASAS workstation in the DS company may operate as either a collateral workstation or a sensitive compartmented information (SCI) work station, depending on mission requirements.

The division ACE and MI battalion work together to accomplish collection management in support of the division. This requires close coordination between the ACE and the MI battalion, whether through physical colocation or electronic connection. The MI battalion tactical operations center (TOC) should colocate with the division main CP whenever the tactical situation permits. When not colocated, or when operating in split-based operations, the MI battalion TOC should provide a liaison to the ACE.

At both corps and division levels, the ACE, in coordination with G2 plans and operations, performs requirements management. The ACE also provides mission management and specific operational and technical tasking of assets, while the MI battalion maneuvers assets, coordinates with maneuver forces, and performs asset management.

(4) ASAS at corps and division. The requirement for the ASAS is based on the need for automated support to assist in the timely receipt, processing, analysis, and reporting of large volumes of intelligence data. This volume of information is generated when the vast capabilities of national, joint, and army intelligence collectors are focused on the needs of tactical commanders. At both the corps and division-level ACEs, the ASAS provides the G2 with:

At corps, the ASAS is organic to the operations battalion of the corps MI brigade. The corps ACE and the MI brigade work together to accomplish collection management in support of the corps.

At division, the ASAS in the ACE is organic to the HHOC of the division MI battalion. Collateral work stations are organic to the division and brigade HHCs.

(5) Deployable intelligence support element. The DISE is a small, tactically tailored, forward-deployed intelligence support team designed to support initial entry forces in force projection operations. Army organizations from corps through brigade can form a DISE from assets in their organic and DS MI organizations. The mission of the DISE is to provide the commander accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence received from the intelligence support base (corps, theater, and national intelligence assets and agencies). The DISE brings together communications, automated intelligence fusion, and broadcast downlinks in a small but powerful package.

The DISE generally consists of one to three HMMWVs with communications shelters, intelligence processors, and analysts. It is normally equipped with:

Military intelligence units are organic and assigned from separate brigade or regiment to corps level. The MI unit organization charts and their associated systems are listed in Chapter 2.

a. Military intelligence brigade (corps). The corps MI brigade (para 2-51) is structured to provide reinforcing support to divisions, separate brigades, and cavalry regiments and general support to the corps.

(a) The headquarters and operations battalion provides the G2 the ACE, intelligence special purpose communications, single-source processors, GSMs, and the ASAS.

(b) The tactical exploitation (TE) battalion provides long-range surveillance, enemy prisoner of war interrogation, document exploitation, and counterintelligence.

(c) The aerial exploitation (AE) battalion operates and maintains special electronic mission aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in general support of corps operations.

(a) The HQ and operations battalion, the AE battalion, and the TE battalion are in general support of the corps.

(b) Elements of the AE battalion and the TE battalion may be detached to reinforce subordinate corps units. This reinforcement will usually be for interrogators, CI agents, and UAV control. When reinforcing, these units will respond to tasking from the reinforced HQ in priority over corps tasks.

(c) Elements of the AE and TE battalions are assigned a general support reinforcing (GSR) role when additional flexibility is needed to meet a rapidly changing tactical situation.

b. Military intelligence battalion (division). The MI battalion in both the heavy and light divisions (paras 2-52 and 2-54) are structured to provide one DS company to each of the three ground maneuver brigades. A GS company remains at division level to support the division commander's intelligence needs.

(1) The DS companies provide organic enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interrogation, CI, UAV control, automated intelligence and combat information processing, analysis, display and dissemination (CGS), ground-based SIGINT and EW, and IEW-specific maintenance. The company supports the brigade in a doctrinal DS mission. The company responds to tasking, in priority, from the brigade and then the parent MI battalion. The brigade S2 supervises the collection, analysis, and dissemination of combat information and intelligence. The company commander positions assets to accomplish the mission tasking from the brigade by controlling technical operations and is the mission and asset manager.

(2) The GS company provides general IEW support to the division. It provides tactical SIGINT and EW (GBCS) and UAV launch, recovery, maintenance, and control. It can also weight the DS companies as the situation requires.

(3) The HHOC provides the integrated collection management, technical control, and all-source analysis element to the G2 and automated intelligence processing, display, and dissemination (CGS, ASAS, and intelligence special-purpose communications).

(4) The QUICKFIX platoon, organic to the aviation brigade, is habitually OPCON to the MI battalion. It operates in GS to the division to allow for greater collection range and depth.

(5) Long-range surveillance units (LRSUs) (light divisions only) operate in GS to the division and are deployed 15 to 80 kilometers forward of the division FLOT to observe selected named areas of interest (NAIs).

c. Military intelligence company (separate brigade or ACR) (para 2-57). Organic to a cavalry regiment or separate brigade, this company will be a conduit for combat intelligence flowing to the S2 and from the S2 to corps or division.

(1) This company will bring the maneuver unit direct access to corps and division intelligence and indirect access to theater- or component-level intelligence. It provides an automated intelligence processing, display, and dissemination capability (CGS), and, depending on individual force design, CI and interrogation, ground-based SIGINT/EW, analysis, intelligence special purpose communications, UAV control capability, and IEW-specific maintenance.

(2) The primary mission of this MI unit is to develop, assess, and disseminate combat information and intelligence required by the cavalry or separate brigade commander for maneuver, reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, security operations, and economy of force operations, and to target critical enemy nodes directly.