Chapter 8

BATTLEFIELD CALCULATIONS

Section III. RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

8-6. ANALYZING RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

    Combat power is the effect created by combining maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership, the dynamics of combat power, in combat against the enemy. By integrating and applying the effects of these elements with any other potential combat multipliers (CS and CSS arms as well as other service assets available) against the enemy, the commander can generate overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost. This task is difficult, at best. It requires an assessment of both tangible and intangible factors as well as consideration of an inordinate number of those factors either directly or indirectly affecting the potential outcome of the battle.

    However, by analyzing relative-force ratios and determining and comparing each force’s most significant strengths and weaknesses as a function of combat power, planners can gain some insight into:

        - Friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation.
        - What type operations may be possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives.
        - How and where the enemy may be vulnerable.

    Although some numeric relationships are used in this process, it is not like the former-Soviet mathematically substantiated computation for the correlation of forces. Rather, it is only a largely subjective estimate. The COAs must not be based strictly on mathematical analyses. Pure, logical approaches are often predictable, sacrificing the surprise that bold, audacious action can achieve.

    Planners can initially make a rough estimate relative-force ratios. Figure 8-2 shows a corps-level analysis in which planners are counting maneuver and field artillery brigades as roughly equal to enemy equivalents.

Ratio  =   9 : 10   or   1.0 : 1.1

Ratio  =  21 :  26  or  1.0 : 1.2

Figure 8-2. Samples of relative force ratios.

    When the staff finishes its computations, it draws conclusions about friendly and enemy relative capabilities and limitations as they pertain to the tactical situation. These computations give the staff a feel for relative strengths and weaknesses, but not absolute mathematical answers as to what friendly or enemy forces will do. Numerical relative-force ratios do not include the human factors of warfare. Many times human factors may be more important than the number of tanks or tubes of artillery. Therefore, the staff must carefully consider and integrate them into their comparisons. By using historical minimum-planning ratios for various combat missions and carefully considering terrain and enemy templating assumptions, planners can generally conclude what type of operations they can conduct (fig 8-3).

    Relative strengths and weaknesses can be further refined by attempting to derive the single greatest strength and weakness of each force, at a minimum, in each of the four dynamics of combat power. By comparing friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, planners may be able to deduce particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploitable or may need to be protected. These deductions may further lead planners to gain insights on potential decision points. They can then determine the ratio of friendly units required. (The ratios are for developing COAs only and not for actual combat.) Historical experience shows that a defender has about a 50-50 probability of successfully defeating an attacking force approximately three times his equivalent strength. The defender has many advantages: full use of cover and concealment, selection of the ground on which to fight, weapons sighted for maximum effectiveness, choice of firing first, and use of obstacle value of the terrain. Therefore, as a starting point, the commander might attempt to defend on each avenue of approach (AA) with, roughly, a 1:3 force ratio expressed as a friendly unit arrayed against the next-higher-level enemy unit. (For example, a friendly battalion would defend against an enemy regiment.)

    A planner first compares the relative force ratios with the ratios in column 2 of figure 8-3. He can then determine if his unit has the odds that would give him the flexibility to conduct any type of operations he desires. The G2/S2 will also know if the enemy has that capability. In a defensive situation, the planner would know the enemy must conduct a penetration. In an offensive situation, he would know he cannot conduct offensive operations without massing his forces and accepting risk in some area. He would be able to use this information when he begins developing a scheme of maneuver. If he identifies a ratio closer to one of the other planning ratios, he could draw other conclusions indicating another type of possible operation. This step provides the planner with a notion of "what to"; not "how to." There is no direct relationship between force ratios and attrition or advance rates. Relative-force ratios do not necessarily indicate the chance for success.

Figure 8-3. Historical minimum planning ratios.