CHAPTER 1: OPFOR Structure and Task Organization Principles

INTRODUCTION

    This chapter presents the organizational structures of the opposing forces (OPFOR) used in CGSC. Chapter one provides the CGSC student with the general guidelines and principles the OPFOR employs when selecting and organizing its forces. The organizations and guidelines detailed in this chapter enable the OPFOR to develop the mix of forces required to meet their missions and objectives.

• Uses maneuver to defeat the BLUFOR.

• Disrupts the BLUFOR’s cohesion on a large scale.

• Deprives the BLUFOR of the ability to react effectively to changes in the situation.

• Breaks up the BLUFOR’s organization and control of large formations (corps and above).

1-2 OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES.

    The goal of operational art is the physical destruction of the BLUFOR. Several principles of operational art have been developed by the OPFOR to aid in the achievement of this goal:

• Mobility

• Speed

• Initiative

• Flexibility

• Concentration of the Main Effort

• Surprise

• Information Warfare

• Preservation of Combat Effectiveness

• Effective Coordination

1-3 TACTICAL Principles.

In OPFOR doctrine, tactics are subordinate to operational art. Success at the operational level is considered the key to victory. OPFOR principles of operational art and tactics are similar. OPFOR tactical principles include:

a. Combat Readiness.

• The capability to enter battle and successfully perform assigned missions at any time, in an organized manner, within prescribed time periods.

• Highly intense, quality training under combat-like conditions is critical to OPFOR combat success.

b. Aggressiveness.

• At the tactical level, this principle determines the OPFOR preference for the offense.

c. Decisiveness.

• Determining the methods, operations, and missions that permit maximum results in the shortest time, with the least losses ensures decisiveness.

• Requires initiative and aggressive determined actions by commanders with bold use of unexpected tactics.

d. Coordinated Efforts.

• Commanders combine unit strengths, ensuring efforts are directed to the same objectives and coordinate their missions, axes, deployment lines and timings.

e. Surprise.

• A surprise attack can allow success without an overwhelming superiority of forces.

f. CCD.

• Includes camouflage, concealment, and general deception techniques.

g. Concentration of Main Effort.

• Concentration is not just physically massing troops on the main axis.

• The goal is to concentrate at the decisive point for the shortest possible time.

h. Maneuver.

• Envelopment is the most preferred form of maneuver.

• Maneuver is the swift, organized displacement of troops to important axes and sectors to create a more favorable ratio of forces.

• Maneuver permits seizing and holding the initiative, disrupting the BLUFOR concept, and successfully conducting battle in the changed situation.

• Maneuver by fire is even faster than maneuver by forces. The range and effectiveness of modern weapons make this increasingly more important.

I. Comprehensive Support.

• Combat support includes reconnaissance, defense against weapons of mass destruction and high-precision weapons, camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD), engineer support, chemical support and security.

• Combat service support includes the supply and maintenance of all types of combat systems, equipment, and ammunition

j. Maintaining Combat Capability.

• The ability to maintain combat capability and to restore it quickly, when required, can mean the difference between success and failure.

k. Command and Control.

• Command and Control must be firm and continuous.

• Effective command and control defines the goal of battle and establishes and maintains effective communications.

1-4 TYPES OF COMBAT.

    The OPFOR recognizes two types of combat: offensive and defensive. Traditionally, offensive combat is the only type that can ultimately bring victory. It is, therefore, the most decisive type of combat.

     a. Offense. The goal of offense is the BLUFOR's total defeat and the capture of important objectives. This goal is achieved by destroying BLUFOR NBC and precision strike systems (including support elements), chemical attack weapons, artillery, and maneuver formations by the use of long-range missiles, aircraft, and artillery fire. This enables the swift advance of tank and mechanized infantry (or infantry) units and formations in coordination with aviation and airborne assault forces. These formations defeat the BLUFOR by assaulting his flank and rear, by encirclement, and by splitting his forces and defeating them in detail. See Chapter 5 for detailed information on the offense.

     b. Defense. The defense is a battle with the objective of repelling an attack by BLUFOR, inflicting considerable losses, and holding important terrain, allowing the buildup of forces in other sectors and creating favorable conditions for launching an attack. This objective is achieved by the fire of all available weapon systems; by a wide maneuver of fire; forces, and assets; and by stubborn holding of occupied positions, lines, and objectives in combination with conduct of counterattacks. See Chapter 6 for detailed information on the defense.

1-5 COMBINED ARMS BATTLE.

    The OPFOR defines a battle as "an organized armed struggle among units of various sizes and formations of different branches and services of the armed forces". A battle can occur on the ground, in the air, or on the sea. Ground battle goals are the destruction of BLUFOR tactical formations and the capture, or retention, of important terrain. The essence of the tactical ground battle is combined arms combat. In combined arms battles, OPFOR commanders coordinate the actions of tactical units of every branch of the armed forces in terms of mission, place, and time, to achieve the rapid destruction of the BLUFOR. The characteristics of modern OPFOR combined arms combat include:

• High maneuverability.

• Decisiveness.

• Nonlinearity.

• Potential use of weapons of mass destruction and high-precision weapons.

• Swift and radical changes in the combat situation.

    This means that units of different combat arms and special troops, as well as of aviation, conduct combined arms combat by joint efforts. Different combat forces and assets aligned in combat formations take part in it, including mechanized infantry (or infantry), tank, artillery, air defense, engineer, and chemical protection units. Close, continuous coordination of mixed forces and assets in a single combat formation permits the OPFOR to perform combat missions successfully. Its combat attributes and capabilities are mutually supporting, ensuring the most effective combination of strikes, fires and maneuver.

     a. Strike. The OPFOR strike is a component part of battle. It consists of a simultaneous engagement of BLUFOR groupings and targets by all available assets and forces. There can be NBC, fire, troop, missile, artillery or air strikes.

An OPFOR troop strike is a combination of fire and movement by tank and mechanized infantry (or infantry) units, or by airborne assault forces, to complete the BLUFOR's defeat and take a designated objective. The strike is most typical of the offense. In the defense, it is usually used in a counterattack.

The force of a strike by units is determined above all by their firepower, rate of movement, and surprise in delivering it. Tank and mechanized infantry (or infantry) units with effective artillery and air support and reliable cover by air defense weapons have the greatest force for a strike.

     b. Fire. The OPFOR concept of fire is the engagement of the BLUFOR by fire using all available weapons. Fire differs in terms of intensity, direction, methods, and types. Fire is the chief factor in achieving success in battle, inflicting damage, which deprives the BLUFOR of combat effectiveness. Fire prepares and accompanies a troop strike, supports its development, and creates necessary conditions for executing a maneuver. In the defense, fire in combination with obstacles determines the possibility of repelling a BLUFOR attack.

The effectiveness of OPFOR weapons, especially with the appearance of high-precision weapons, has led to a significant increase in depth and accuracy of fire delivery, to damage of targets in the shortest time periods, and to an increase in the level of losses. Use of high-precision weapons has significantly increased effectiveness of OPFOR antitank fire.

     c. Maneuver. Maneuver is the third component of modern battle. It consists of the organized, concealed, rapid displacement of troops in the course of combat. It allows occupation of a favorable position with respect to the BLUFOR and creates favorable groupings of forces and assets. It also allows the transfer or re-targeting of strikes and fires for maximum effectiveness.

    In the defense, the OPFOR maneuvers units to change a position for a more favorable one, cover a threatened axis more reliably, or to reinforce or replace units. Maneuver can also allow the OPFOR to counter a BLUFOR strike, occupy a line of firing positions, or move to a counterattack position. The maneuver of forces, assets, and fire is a constant element of tactics employed in both defense and offense, in all stages of battle.

1-6 COMBAT FORMATION.

    Mission requirements and the commander’s concept determine the tactical alignment of forces at division and below. The OPFOR term for this is combat formation. Combat formation describes how any tactical-level combat element organizes and deploys its forces for combat. Thus, it is the tactical-level equivalent of the operational term operational formation.

    The combat formation of a division, brigade, or battalion is the grouping created for the conduct of a particular battle. It normally includes a first echelon, a second echelon, a combined arms reserve, and other reserves. For a division or brigade, it would also include an artillery group and perhaps a forward detachment.

    When preparing for combat, the OPFOR will have a set amount and mix of military forces from which it will select the appropriate force to accomplish a given mission. These forces are organized according to a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) which provide the basic building blocks within a force structure. They typically include maneuver forces, combat support elements such as artillery, antitank, and combat engineer units, and combat service support elements such as maintenance, transportation, and medical units. These TO&E structures provide the optimal organization for maintaining and managing the equipment and personnel within these units. TO&E organizations are found at the army group level down to the maneuver platoon. The largest TO&E unit is the maneuver division.

    However, the OPFOR seldom, if ever, employs its military force as structured in the TO&Es. Instead, the TO&E organizations go through a process, commonly referred to as task organizing, that transform the organizations into combat formations. Created to perform a specific task, the OPFOR will reorganize these combat formations at any time, either upon completion of the initial task or receipt of a new mission.

    The OPFOR determines specific combat formations, with particular attention given to the factors of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and weather, and the Time (METT-T) available. The combat formation of a division, brigade, or battalion is the grouping created for the conduct of a particular battle.

1-7 OPFOR TO&E STRUCTURES.

    This section briefly describes the TO&E structures for the OPFOR maneuver divisions and their subordinate brigades and battalions. These units will serve as the basis for combat formation formed by the OPFOR. More detailed organizational charts for these structures are found in Chapter 2.

     a. Division. Divisions are the basic building blocks of operational commanders. A division's organic assets are sufficient for it to attack or defend on a secondary sector. A typical division consists of four maneuver brigades, its organic combat and service support units. When fighting on the main effort, a division requires additional combat and service support assets. Army commanders may reinforce some divisions at the expense of others. For example, second echelon divisions may detach elements to reinforce a first echelon formation.

          (1) Mechanized Infantry Division (MID). A mechanized infantry division typically consists of three mechanized infantry brigades and a tank brigade, with its combat and service support. The mechanized infantry division contains either two IFV-equipped brigades (with a BMP variant) and one BTR-equipped brigade, or vice versa.

          (2) Tank Division (TD). A tank division typically consists of three tank brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade. Suited for an exploitation role in the offensive, in the defense the tank division deploys in the second echelon of the army or army corps to provide a counterattack force. If a tank division has to attack prepared defenses the BMP brigade would probably be in the first echelon. The OPFOR often uses BMP-equipped brigades and battalions for security and forward detachment missions.

     b. Brigade. The brigade is the basic tactical and administrative unit in the OPFOR army. The OPFOR does not expect brigades to operate independently of their parent unit without reinforcement, and then only for a limited time.

    The deployment of brigades is determined by the echelon structure of the division, usually in either one or two echelons. Two-echelon structures are appropriate when attacking or defending in the main sector of effort, against a BLUFOR deployed in depth. Grouping three brigades in the first echelon and one in the second is the most commonly adopted variant. A "two up and two back" deployment is sometimes found in the defense, on an army's or army corps' most threatened sector.

          (1) Mechanized Infantry Brigade (MIBR). A mechanized infantry brigade in a mechanized infantry division consists of three mechanized infantry battalions and one tank battalion. In a tank division, the brigade has only two mechanized infantry battalions and a tank battalion.

    Because of its firepower and mobility, mechanized infantry brigades are often found on the division's main axis in the attack or its most threatened sector in the defense. They are usually in the first echelon, although in the attack a BMP-equipped brigade may be considered for an exploitation role in the second echelon.

The division often selects battalions of a BMP-equipped brigade for special missions, such as forward or raiding detachments. BTR-equipped brigades are more suited to secondary sectors or those that favor wheeled vehicles. Heliborne operations often employ infantry from BTR units because of their man-portable antitank weapons. The mechanized infantry brigade (APC) may have a battalion of 122-mm towed howitzers (D-30), instead of this SP howitzer battalion.

          (2) Tank Brigade (TBR). A tank brigade in a mechanized infantry division has three tank battalions as its only maneuver elements. In a tank division, each tank brigade has three tank battalions and a BMP-equipped mechanized infantry battalion.

    Due to its lack of infantry, the tank brigade is not suitable for use in the first echelon of mechanized infantry divisions when attacking strong defenses. It is better suited in the second echelon, where it can rapidly exploit success. A tank brigade might be in the first echelon against a weak defense, where its goal would be to penetrate the defensive line and strike as deeply as possible before the BLUFOR strengthens his position.

    In defense, the tank brigade is likely to be in the second echelon because its equipment and organization are better for a counterattack or counter-penetration role, rather than for holding ground. In any of these roles, the tank brigade would normally be reinforced with mechanized infantry forces.

     c. Separate Infantry Brigade. The OPFOR also has separate mechanized infantry and tank brigades that are not subordinate to divisions. Compared to a MIBR, the separate brigade has more maneuver battalions plus expanded combat support and combat service support assets. This structure makes them well suited for independent action, for example, army/army corps-lead as a combined arms reserve or forward detachment.

    In situations where the OPFOR has not had time to mobilize and deploy a division from its strategic reserve, a separate brigade might have to perform missions normally performed by a division. The combat formation would most likely use two echelons. It would have three to four MIBNs, each reinforced with a tank company, in the first echelon and a TBN or TBN (-) in the second echelon, along with any remaining MIBN(s).

     d. Battalion. Tactical grouping of OPFOR battalions never involves the exchange of units (cross attachment) with other battalions, e.g., a mechanized infantry battalion (MIBN) would not exchange a mechanized infantry company for a tank company with a tank battalion (TBN). Battalions are either reinforced with brigade assets or are themselves used as reinforcements. Within the battalion, the commander organizes his force in one or two echelons. He may use his own combat support assets, and any he receives from higher level, to reinforce subordinate companies (especially on his main axis), or he may retain these assets under his own control.

1-8 MANEUVER TASK ORGANIZATION.

    This section covers the guiding OPFOR principles for task organizing combat formations. While the emphasis will be at the division and below, it is important to consider the impact of army group and army-level assets on the tactical fight. Detailed discussion on OPFOR offense is found in Chapter 5, and OPFOR defense in Chapter 6.

    If, during the course of the battle, the force on the main effort is not achieving the expected result, OPFOR commanders would strip assets away to support a secondary effort that appears to be achieving a greater success.

     a. ECHELONMENT.

          (1) Offense. The development of OPFOR tactical combat formations and echelonment in the offense is greatly influenced by the depth and the level of preparation of BLUFOR defenses, and is intended to build combat power continuously on the line of contact. OPFOR commanders at division, brigade, and battalion levels organize their forces either in two echelons or in one echelon with a small combined arms reserve. Within the division, the pattern of echelonment can vary at different levels of command. For example, a division may deploy its brigades in two echelons, while some of the brigades deploy their battalions in one echelon.

    Single-Echelon Formation. When attacking unprepared or partially prepared BLUFOR defenses, the OPFOR should organize into a single echelon with a reserve. If the BLUFOR has hurriedly assumed shallow defenses under these conditions, a single echelon may be sufficient to defeat it. The OPFOR will also use a single-echelon formation when attacking on a secondary axis. When using a single echelon, the OPFOR generally designates a combined arms reserve, thereby retaining the ability to influence the battle. After committing the reserve, the OPFOR creates another immediately.

    Two-Echelon Formation. A two-echelon formation is employed when attacking a prepared defense, or at least partially prepared in depth and on the higher commander’s main axis. The first echelon normally contains the majority (2/3) of the combat power. In addition to second echelon, he forms a small combined arms reserve consisting of approximately one ninth (1/9) of the combat power.

          (2) Defense. As in the offense, the OPFOR can deploy in one or two echelons. Also, within a formation different levels of command may use different echelonment schemes. The formation used will also depend greatly on the nature of the terrain. European-type terrain lends itself to the use of multiple echelons, while more open terrain such as in the desert would see more mobile defense.

    Single-Echelon Formation. As with the offense, a single-echelon formation is most common on secondary axes. A secondary axis, considered by the OPFOR as less threatened, will typically be given a wider frontage to defend. The combined arms reserve is considered to be sufficient for depth in this case.      Single-echelon formations are also adopted when the defender has suffered heavy casualties.

    Two-Echelon Formation. A two-echelon formation is employed on the most threatened axis. A narrower frontage (compared to the supporting effort) allows fewer units to defend in the first echelon, with significant forces remaining in depth.

    Special Conditions. Two-echelon formations are most common when defending in cities, and may even include a reserve. In the mountains, defense is organized normally when located on plateaus and wide valleys. In restricted terrain, the emphasis is not on echelonment, but on creating and holding strongpoints. The strongpoints, created where possible to be mutually supporting, are integrated with key terrain features and chokepoints such as passes, road junctions, and river crossings.

1-9 FIRE SUPPORT TASK ORGANIZATION.

     a. Decisiveness of Fire Support. Integrated fire support is a decisive element on the modern battlefield. In the offense, it is the principal means of achieving an advantageous force ratio over the BLUFOR. It can blast gaps in defenses; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy BLUFOR groupings in the tactical depth; and repel counterattacks. Fire superiority is a precondition for the success of any attack. The attacker must be able to execute his fire missions while suppressing counterbattery fire. In defense, it disrupts BLUFOR preparations for the attack, causes attrition as he approaches the forward edge and repels forces that reach or penetrate the forward edge. Fire superiority is also the cornerstone of any defense, although often achieved only for a limited time, at the crucial point in the battle.

     b. Organization for Combat. The OPFOR concentrates fires on critical points in the offense or disperses them throughout the sector in the defense. This requires artillery that is capable of rapid fire, long range, and mobility. Numerous longer-range tube artillery and MRL battalions from army group, army, corps, and division provide reinforcing fires when required. The OPFOR seeks to achieve the densities of fire necessary without sacrificing the mobility artillery units need to survive.

     c. Key Points Concerning Artillery Organization for Combat.

• Temporary groupings.

• Thoroughly integrated fire and maneuver plans.

• Allocation based on missions of subordinate maneuver elements.

• Artillery requirements of main effort forces attacking will be satisfied before any other force is allocated artillery support.

• Not all maneuver units will receive additional artillery.

• Second echelon units are not provided additional artillery until they are committed.

• Offense: intense artillery preparations of short duration.

• Defense: prolonged, high volume artillery fire in depth to break up the BLUFOR's attack.

     d. Allocation Procedures. The OPFOR carefully calculates artillery requirements in terms of weapons and rounds needed to produce a required effect on BLUFOR targets. If insufficient artillery or ammunition is available to achieve the necessary result, the OPFOR does not fire less and hope for the best. Rather, if necessary, it engages fewer targets, adjusting the tactical, or even operational, plan. Alternatively, it may prolong preparatory fire to take in more targets.

    Combined arms theory calls for artillery support to brigade- and division-size battles that exceed the capabilities of organic artillery resources. To do this, the OPFOR uses organic and allocated artillery to form artillery groups. A higher headquarters allocates artillery to a maneuver force to execute a given operation, for example:

• Army group, army, and corps normally allocate artillery battalions according to the importance of the army, corps, and division missions.

• A division might allocate some of its organic and allocated artillery to leading brigades.

• The army might temporarily allocate second-echelon divisional artillery to first-echelon divisions.

     e. Artillery Deployment.

Figure 1-1. Tactical Deployment Guidelines

      f. Artillery Groups.

• Temporary, mission-oriented groups are a command and organizational structure that ensure flexibility in concentrating artillery fire. The commander and staff of the artillery brigade or battalion usually form the core of the group.

• The goal of forming artillery groups is to provide ample fire support to the maneuver commander to conduct an operation. Army, corps, division, and brigade artillery groups provide continuous artillery support to maneuver commanders with the required degree of centralized control.

• Artillery groups usually consist of at least two battalions of field guns, howitzers, gun-howitzers, and/or MRLs.

• Artillery groups will disperse as much as possible to avoid becoming a target for BLUFOR precision weapons, air attack, and counterfire.

(1) Army Artillery Group (AAG).

• Army group artillery assets distributed to committed armies in proportion to the importance of the assigned task.

• Formed from army and/or army group artillery battalions remaining after the army has allocated artillery to its first echelon divisions.

• Tasks are counterfire and the deep target engagement (precision weapons, headquarters, air defenses, and reserve).

• An army may form more than one AAG.

• Composed of at least two battalions.

• Normally composed of gun and/or rocket launcher battalions.

(2) Army Rocket Artillery Group (ARAG).

• Formed from army and/or army group MRL brigades.

• Composed of three to seven MRL brigades.

• Normally fires under centralized control in support of the army’s main attack axis.

(3) Division Artillery Group (DAG).

• Formed from division artillery regiment and any allocated army/front artillery battalions after the division has allocated artillery to its first echelon brigades.

• More than one DAG may be formed per division.

• Normally has counterbattery mission.

• Composed of two to six battalions.

• May have gun, gun-howitzer, howitzer, and rocket launcher battalion.

• Divisional rocket launcher battalion is normally assigned to a DAG.

(4) Brigade Artillery Group (BRAG).

• Formed from the brigade artillery battalion plus at least one other battalion allocated to the regiment from division.

• Only one BRAG per brigade.

• Normally provides fires in support of maneuver elements.

• Composed of howitzer or gun-howitzer battalions.

• Has from two to four battalions.

(5) Artillery Support to Maneuver Battalion.

• An artillery battalion or battery may be directly attached to a maneuver battalion. These artillery units will not be part of any artillery group.

f. Artillery Command Relationships.

Attached - The maneuver commander has total control of the unit.

Supporting - The parent artillery organization retains control, but delegates fires to a unit.

g. Target Damage Criteria.

(1) Annihilation.

• Renders unobserved targets combat-ineffective.

• Against a point target, sufficient rounds will be expended to assure a 70 to 90% probability of a kill.

• Against an area target, sufficient rounds will be expended to destroy 50 to 60% of the targets within the group.

(2) Destruction.

• A subset of annihilation.

• Refers to engineer works such as fortifications and bridges.

• Renders targets unfit for further use.

(3) Neutralization.

• Inflicts enough losses on a target to cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, restrict or prohibit its maneuver or disrupt its C2.

• Sufficient rounds must be expended to destroy 30% of unobserved targets.

(4) Harassment.

• Limited fires designed to apply psychological pressure on the BLUFOR and hinder movement.

• Inhibits maneuver

• Weakens blue combat readiness and lowers morale

Figure 1-2. Formation of Artillery Groups (Example)

NOTES:

1. The distribution of artillery battalions shown above is only an example. Actual allocation patterns depend on the situation and the mission of the receiving organization.

2. Higher command may allocate an army group one or more artillery divisions with 20 battalions of field guns, gun-howitzers, howitzers, and rocket launchers. It may also allocate a high-powered artillery brigade (not shown here).

3. The army in this example is in the army group’s main attack, and the mechanized infantry division is in the army’s main attack.

4. It is not necessary that all 2d-echelon divisions give up artillery assets to reinforce 1st-echelon divisions. This is only an option the army/ corps commander could use.

5. The brigade artillery is part of the BRAG. An artillery battalion or battery in BRAG may also be temporarily subordinated to maneuver battalions for specific missions.

1-10 ANTITANK RESERVES TASK ORGANIZATION.

    Antitank reserves comprise units of AT artillery, often reinforced by other means, such as engineers, tank and/or mechanized infantry troops. They are directly subordinate to the combined arms commander, who uses them to reinforce AT defenses on important axes. They are a standard part of both operational and tactical formations down to brigade level. Almost invariably, these reserves work with engineer mobile obstacle detachments that create AT obstacles.

    In an army group, there may be one or more AT reserves based on an AT regiment or one or more brigades. The army forms its AT reserve from the AT regiment. At divisional level, the AT battalion fills this role. The addition of other elements depends on the mission and the assessment of the threat.

     a. Assets. OPFOR planners believe that AT fire plays a decisive role in repelling BLUFOR armor attacks. The OPFOR divides AT weapons into two categories: general and special.

         (1) General Weapons. General AT weapons systems include missiles, aircraft, tanks, and artillery. The purpose of these systems is to destroy a variety of battlefield targets. However, they may also deploy to fire against tanks and other armored vehicles. According to the OPFOR, any artillery-type weapon (over 20-millimeter) should have an AT capability. All conventional artillery up to 152-millimeter has good direct-fire AT capability and carries some armor-defeating ammunition. The 122-millimeter towed and SP howitzers and the 152-millimeter SP howitzer, which have a 360-degree traverse, are particularly effective in this role. Antitank forces often include direct-fire field artillery. Antiaircraft guns can also fire against ground targets.

    Guns and howitzers have the sights necessary for direct-fire engagements. Some weapons may reinforce the AT firepower of mechanized infantry strongpoints. However, should BLUFOR armor penetrate, the OPFOR may use artillery units. They can delay and disrupt the attackers and, thus, create favorable conditions for a counterattack and/or counterstrike into the BLUFOR's flank.

          (2) Special Weapons. Special AT weapons systems consist of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), AT guns grenade launchers, and recoilless guns. The OPFOR designs these weapons to destroy tanks and their crews by direct fire. OPFOR antitank forces therefore have a mix of ATGMs and direct-fire weapons (guns and grenade launchers) which serve to compliment each system type’s capabilities.

     b. Organization. Because neither army group, army, nor corps has a fixed organizational structure, the AT units at these levels also vary. An army or corps might have an AT regiment. While mechanized infantry divisions an organic AT battalion there are no AT guns in tank brigades or at tank division level.

     c. Missions. The importance of the AT reserve continues to grow, partly because many armies today are almost totally mechanized; therefore, defense must first and foremost be antitank in nature. It is also partly a function of the growing trend for the defense to occupy broader frontages in order to achieve protection against NBC attack through dispersal. Gaps now routinely exist in the deployment of defending units and formations. These trends have increased the importance of the AT reserve in ensuring stability in defense and in maintaining the momentum of an offensive in the face of counterattack.

      d. Deployment. For planning purposes, AT units can be assigned the following sector widths:

• A division AT battalion, from 3.5 to 5 kilometers.

• An army AT regiment, from 8 to 10 kilometers.

• An army group AT regiment, from 20 to 25 kilometers.

    Where the commander holds a reserve, and how far from the line of contact (or head of tactical march column), depends on the operational or tactical situation. As a generalization the AT reserve deploys between the first and second echelon. Both in the offense and defense it is usual to designate two, three, or even more alternate lines of commitment on each axis depending on the assessment of likely BLUFOR actions. In the defense, the OPFOR places great stress on the surprise use of AT reserves.

1-11 RECONNAISSANCE TASK ORGANIZATION.

    The OPFOR considers reconnaissance the most important element of combat support. All commanders and staffs organize reconnaissance to acquire information about the BLUFOR's weapons; force disposition and intentions; and terrain and weather in the area of impending combat. This information is crucial to the planning process for command and control systems.

     a. Principles. The OPFOR uses the following principles to guide its reconnaissance activities: focus, continuity; aggressiveness; timeliness; camouflage, concealment, and deception; accuracy; and reliability. These overlapping concepts require reconnaissance units to integrate all these principles.

b. Characteristics.

• Flexibility. The OPFOR must be able to switch priorities from one target to another without degrading the overall mission.

• Sustainability. It must be able to sustain itself wherever it is operating, without relying on others for transport, subsistence, and so on.

• Security. A reconnaissance asset should be as secure as possible during operations. This means operating in a manner that conceals activities and areas of interest at all times. Reconnaissance activity should not reveal the parent unit's plan of action. The OPFOR does not expect to conceal its reconnaissance activities entirely, but will attempt to mask the scale, specific objectives, and area of concentration of main reconnaissance efforts.

• Communications. Reconnaissance elements must have reliable communications. An intelligence organization may successfully gather all necessary information but if it cannot transmit this information to the user (such as the commander or an artillery unit), the entire effort is useless.

• Reserves. All levels should maintain a reconnaissance reserve to take on unforeseen tasks or redeem failure on key missions.

     c. Priorities. Reconnaissance activities must support the information requirements of the commander. Therefore, priorities vary at different levels of command:

          (1) Army Group. The army group conducts reconnaissance to locate the most critical BLUFOR targets including the following:

• Precision weapons.

• NBC systems.

• Air defenses.

• Intelligence-gathering assets.

• Higher headquarters and communications centers.

• General support artillery groups.

• Operational-strategic groupings and their movements.

(2) Army or Corps. The army or corps repeats these priorities and also seeks the following:

• Contents of airfields and army aviation forward operating bases.

• Precision weapons and NBC systems.

• Major concentration areas of reserves.

• Unit boundaries.

• Location and extent of defended areas.

• The BLUFOR's combat capabilities and intentions.

(3) Division. Divisions repeat army priorities and add local threats including the following:

• Location of direct support artillery and mortars and attack helicopters.

• Disposition of tanks and medium- and long-range antitank systems.

• Deployment of air defense weapons.

• Location of brigade and battalion command posts.

• Nature and extent of natural and manmade obstacles.

• Locations of field defenses.

     d. Operational Assets. Operational reconnaissance units support army-group, army, and corps commanders. Operational reconnaissance elements usually collect information throughout the entire depth of the BLUFOR's corps area. See Figure 1-3 for a graphic depiction of the effective ranges of various reconnaissance measures available to an army group. Armies and corps conduct operational reconnaissance using their own resources, plus those of their subordinate divisions and brigades.

           (1) Army or Corps. At the mechanized- or tank- army or corps level, the Chief of Reconnaissance (COR) heads the reconnaissance department (intelligence staff). This department coordinates operational reconnaissance in the same manner as the army group's reconnaissance directorate described above.

          (2) Forward Detachments. Armies, division, and even brigades employ forward detachments as the situation dictates. Maneuver forces configured as forward detachments have reconnaissance as one of their missions. These detachments transmit information on the size, type, and disposition of BLUFOR forces, BLUFOR obstacles, route conditions, and river crossing sites.

          (3) Special-Purpose Forces. An army may have a SPF battalion; it can deploy from 10 to 15 teams.

          (4) UAVs. At army level, drones and RPVs also serve as aerial reconnaissance assets. An army may have a drone squadron. Drones normally fly at low altitude and subsonic speeds. RPVs and drones fly a set course.

          (5) Electronic Assets. An army normally has a signals reconnaissance battalion. Also known as a radio and radar intercept and DF battalion. Some armies have a full signals reconnaissance brigade.

          (6) Artillery Assets. An army-level artillery brigade has an organic artillery reconnaissance battalion or battery. An army's rocket launcher brigade also has an artillery reconnaissance battery. Surface-to-surface missile units do not have reconnaissance assets, but rely on external intelligence support.

Figure 1-3. Effective ranges of reconnaissance means.

     e. Ground Forces Tactical Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a combined arms responsibility. Thus, ordinary mechanized infantry and tank units perform two functions; they perform their own close reconnaissance tasks with organic resources, and they provide reconnaissance detachments of up to reinforced battalion strength. Leading units may also conduct reconnaissance by combat, attacking the BLUFOR to determine his strength and disposition.

          (1) Disposition. Special brigade reconnaissance troops carry out reconnaissance, operating from up to 25 to 30 kilometers forward of the OPFOR line of contact (or even more in faster-developing NBC operations). They might operate out to a maximum distance of 50 kilometers. Division-level reconnaissance troops also operate out to approximately 50 kilometers. The commander might insert the airborne qualified long-range reconnaissance company up to 100 kilometers deep without its vehicles. Task-oriented reconnaissance groups, reinforced by engineer and NBC reconnaissance and, often, by mechanized infantry and tank elements, also move forward. Generally, these groups endeavor to avoid combat in fulfilling their tasks, although they may direct artillery fire or air strikes.

          (2) Missions:

• Locating, identifying, and reporting BLUFOR NBC delivery means, headquarters, communications centers, troop concentrations, and movements of BLUFOR units.

• Determining the strength and dispositions of the BLUFOR's defenses and locating his boundaries.

• Providing topographical information concerning routes to, or bypasses around, BLUFOR positions as well as concerning lateral routes.

• Identifying the extent and depth of minefields and the types of mine employed (assessing obstacles and possible crossing points).

• Establishing the extent of zones of contamination.

• Identifying potential communications facilities and other sites for use by their own forces.

1-12 ENGINEER TASK ORGANIZATION.

    As with artillery, OPFOR engineer units normally do not deploy as they are structured by TO&E. Instead, engineers assets are grouped together to perform specific missions and functions, and are dissolved when no longer required. In this way route-clearing assets perform one function, while others perform demolition, minelaying, or obstacle construction, prepare defensive fighting positions, or set up water purification sites. Additional non-engineer assets, such as chemical, tank or mechanized infantry troops, may be attached to these groupings whenever the OPFOR decides the situation warrants their inclusion.

a. Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol.

• Specialized engineer reconnaissance formation.

• Normally squad to platoon size.

• Equipment depends upon mission.

• Missions include collecting information on roads, obstacles, water obstacles and water supplies.

b. Movement Support Detachment (MSD).

• Ad hoc grouping formed from division and brigade engineer units.

• Missions include:

• Route reconnaissance

• Mineclearing

• Repair/reinforcement of bridges

• Creation of tracked vehicle routes

• Construction of bypasses

• Route marking

• Division can form up to three MSDs.

• Brigade can form one MSD normally composed of an engineer platoon, one or two dozers and up to three tanks with blades or plows.

• MSD is normally organized in three elements:

• Reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing group

• One or two road/bridge construction and repair groups

• Route marking group

• Divisional MSDs operate on main routes while brigade MSDs operate on secondary routes.

• In the march, MSDs normally move behind the combat reconnaissance patrols (CRPs).

• In the defense, MSDs are used to maintain LOCs.

     c. Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD).

• Ad hoc grouping formed from division and brigade engineer units.

• Mission: Deny key terrain to the BLUFOR, particularly those avenues of approach that are most suited for tanks.

• Composition:

• A divisional MOD normally consists of mechanical minelaying elements equipped with GMZs.

• A brigade MOD normally consists of one minelaying platoon of three PRP-3. It is sometimes reinforced with a mechanized infantry platoon.

• Normally operate with antitank reserves to provide flank protection and to repel counterattacks.

• In the march, it normally travels between the advance guard and the main body.

• In the defense, it is positioned to block any penetrations that might occur.

1-13 AIR DEFENSE TASK ORGANIZATION.

    The OPFOR unit’s mission and location determines the amount of air defense coverage, regardless of what has been actually attached to that unit. As with artillery and antitank assets, the OPFOR allocates the majority of air defense units to support maneuver units conducting the main effort. For example, in general order of priority, the division air defense regiment provides air defense coverage to the division command post, main axis maneuver units, division artillery group, second echelon and minor axis units, and the logistics tail. Therefore, the first echelon of the main effort or a battalion operating as an FSE or advance guard’s coverage will be substantially different from a second echelon force. For example, the vast majority of brigade air defense assets are allocated to the first echelon, leaving the second echelon dependent upon protection provided by the division SAM regiment.

    a. Deployment of Systems.

        (1) SA-7/14/16/18.

• A squad (one vehicle with three launcher teams) from the MIBN AD platoon is normally assigned to each MIC. It is usually deployed within 20-30 m of the company commander.

• Brigade and divisional HQS have dedicated SA-7/14/16/18 squads for self-protection as do SA-6/8/15 batteries.

• The OPFOR may use these systems to establish air defense ambushes or as roving units to cover gaps or less likely air avenues.

        (2) 2S6/ZSU-23-4.

• Normally employed in pairs with systems located within several hundred meters of each other.

• If two pairs are employed together they are separated by 1000 to 2000 m.

• A section or platoon normally supports advance guards and forward detachments.

• In the assault, sections normally support first echelon battalions, moving directly behind the first echelon companies.

• In the defense, sections again are used to support first echelon battalions. They are normally located within a battalion's defensive area.

• These systems may also be used to establish air defense ambushes or as roving units to cover gaps or less likely air avenues.

        (3) SA-9/13.

• Provide area coverage to the brigade.

• Normally operate as a platoon (four systems).

• On the march, the platoon moves with the brigade main body.

• Probable missions in the offense include protection of the brigade main CP and supporting artillery.

• In the defense, the platoon locates in the brigade defensive area positioned where it can provide coverage of the brigade CP and artillery battalion/BRAG.

        (4) SA-6/8/15.

• Typical employment is to have one battery support each first echelon brigade with the remaining batteries providing area protection to the rest of the division.