CHAPTER 1: OPFOR Structure and Task Organization Principles

1-9 FIRE SUPPORT TASK ORGANIZATION.

     a. Decisiveness of Fire Support. Integrated fire support is a decisive element on the modern battlefield. In the offense, it is the principal means of achieving an advantageous force ratio over the BLUFOR. It can blast gaps in defenses; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy BLUFOR groupings in the tactical depth; and repel counterattacks. Fire superiority is a precondition for the success of any attack. The attacker must be able to execute his fire missions while suppressing counterbattery fire. In defense, it disrupts BLUFOR preparations for the attack, causes attrition as he approaches the forward edge and repels forces that reach or penetrate the forward edge. Fire superiority is also the cornerstone of any defense, although often achieved only for a limited time, at the crucial point in the battle.

     b. Organization for Combat. The OPFOR concentrates fires on critical points in the offense or disperses them throughout the sector in the defense. This requires artillery that is capable of rapid fire, long range, and mobility. Numerous longer-range tube artillery and MRL battalions from army group, army, corps, and division provide reinforcing fires when required. The OPFOR seeks to achieve the densities of fire necessary without sacrificing the mobility artillery units need to survive.

     c. Key Points Concerning Artillery Organization for Combat.

• Temporary groupings.

• Thoroughly integrated fire and maneuver plans.

• Allocation based on missions of subordinate maneuver elements.

• Artillery requirements of main effort forces attacking will be satisfied before any other force is allocated artillery support.

• Not all maneuver units will receive additional artillery.

• Second echelon units are not provided additional artillery until they are committed.

• Offense: intense artillery preparations of short duration.

• Defense: prolonged, high volume artillery fire in depth to break up the BLUFOR's attack.

     d. Allocation Procedures. The OPFOR carefully calculates artillery requirements in terms of weapons and rounds needed to produce a required effect on BLUFOR targets. If insufficient artillery or ammunition is available to achieve the necessary result, the OPFOR does not fire less and hope for the best. Rather, if necessary, it engages fewer targets, adjusting the tactical, or even operational, plan. Alternatively, it may prolong preparatory fire to take in more targets.

    Combined arms theory calls for artillery support to brigade- and division-size battles that exceed the capabilities of organic artillery resources. To do this, the OPFOR uses organic and allocated artillery to form artillery groups. A higher headquarters allocates artillery to a maneuver force to execute a given operation, for example:

• Army group, army, and corps normally allocate artillery battalions according to the importance of the army, corps, and division missions.

• A division might allocate some of its organic and allocated artillery to leading brigades.

• The army might temporarily allocate second-echelon divisional artillery to first-echelon divisions.

     e. Artillery Deployment.

Figure 1-1. Tactical Deployment Guidelines

      f. Artillery Groups.

• Temporary, mission-oriented groups are a command and organizational structure that ensure flexibility in concentrating artillery fire. The commander and staff of the artillery brigade or battalion usually form the core of the group.

• The goal of forming artillery groups is to provide ample fire support to the maneuver commander to conduct an operation. Army, corps, division, and brigade artillery groups provide continuous artillery support to maneuver commanders with the required degree of centralized control.

• Artillery groups usually consist of at least two battalions of field guns, howitzers, gun-howitzers, and/or MRLs.

• Artillery groups will disperse as much as possible to avoid becoming a target for BLUFOR precision weapons, air attack, and counterfire.

(1) Army Artillery Group (AAG).

• Army group artillery assets distributed to committed armies in proportion to the importance of the assigned task.

• Formed from army and/or army group artillery battalions remaining after the army has allocated artillery to its first echelon divisions.

• Tasks are counterfire and the deep target engagement (precision weapons, headquarters, air defenses, and reserve).

• An army may form more than one AAG.

• Composed of at least two battalions.

• Normally composed of gun and/or rocket launcher battalions.

(2) Army Rocket Artillery Group (ARAG).

• Formed from army and/or army group MRL brigades.

• Composed of three to seven MRL brigades.

• Normally fires under centralized control in support of the army’s main attack axis.

(3) Division Artillery Group (DAG).

• Formed from division artillery regiment and any allocated army/front artillery battalions after the division has allocated artillery to its first echelon brigades.

• More than one DAG may be formed per division.

• Normally has counterbattery mission.

• Composed of two to six battalions.

• May have gun, gun-howitzer, howitzer, and rocket launcher battalion.

• Divisional rocket launcher battalion is normally assigned to a DAG.

(4) Brigade Artillery Group (BRAG).

• Formed from the brigade artillery battalion plus at least one other battalion allocated to the regiment from division.

• Only one BRAG per brigade.

• Normally provides fires in support of maneuver elements.

• Composed of howitzer or gun-howitzer battalions.

• Has from two to four battalions.

(5) Artillery Support to Maneuver Battalion.

• An artillery battalion or battery may be directly attached to a maneuver battalion. These artillery units will not be part of any artillery group.

f. Artillery Command Relationships.

Attached - The maneuver commander has total control of the unit.

Supporting - The parent artillery organization retains control, but delegates fires to a unit.

g. Target Damage Criteria.

(1) Annihilation.

• Renders unobserved targets combat-ineffective.

• Against a point target, sufficient rounds will be expended to assure a 70 to 90% probability of a kill.

• Against an area target, sufficient rounds will be expended to destroy 50 to 60% of the targets within the group.

(2) Destruction.

• A subset of annihilation.

• Refers to engineer works such as fortifications and bridges.

• Renders targets unfit for further use.

(3) Neutralization.

• Inflicts enough losses on a target to cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, restrict or prohibit its maneuver or disrupt its C2.

• Sufficient rounds must be expended to destroy 30% of unobserved targets.

(4) Harassment.

• Limited fires designed to apply psychological pressure on the BLUFOR and hinder movement.

• Inhibits maneuver

• Weakens blue combat readiness and lowers morale

Figure 1-2. Formation of Artillery Groups (Example)

NOTES:

1. The distribution of artillery battalions shown above is only an example. Actual allocation patterns depend on the situation and the mission of the receiving organization.

2. Higher command may allocate an army group one or more artillery divisions with 20 battalions of field guns, gun-howitzers, howitzers, and rocket launchers. It may also allocate a high-powered artillery brigade (not shown here).

3. The army in this example is in the army group’s main attack, and the mechanized infantry division is in the army’s main attack.

4. It is not necessary that all 2d-echelon divisions give up artillery assets to reinforce 1st-echelon divisions. This is only an option the army/ corps commander could use.

5. The brigade artillery is part of the BRAG. An artillery battalion or battery in BRAG may also be temporarily subordinated to maneuver battalions for specific missions.