CHAPTER 5: The OPFOR in the Offense

INTRODUCTION.

    This chapter provides you the necessary tactics for the OPFOR to successfully conduct an offense. It does not cover all aspects of the OPFOR’s offensive principles, planning and execution. However, it does provide the critical concepts the OPFOR follows when planning such operations.

5-1 Forms of Tactical Maneuver.

    Maneuver is a basic component of combat. It is an organized movement during combat that puts the OPFOR in a more advantageous position than the BLUFOR. The OPFOR uses maneuver to seize and hold the initiative and defeat the BLUFOR. The most common forms of OPFOR maneuver are frontal, close, deep, and double envelopment.

    a. Frontal Attack. The frontal attack is directed against the BLUFOR’s frontline forces. Its goal is to penetrate BLUFOR defenses along single or multiple axes. Its success depends on superiority of forces and firepower. An OPFOR unit conducting a frontal attack attempts to create openings for subsequent exploitation. The frontal attack, by itself, is the least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used in combination with a close or deep envelopment. A frontal attack may be appropriate when the OPFOR has the element of surprise, and may be used to fix BLUFOR defenses while other OPFOR units maneuver to attack from the flank.

    b. Close Envelopment. A close envelopment is a flanking maneuver that strikes BLUFOR units in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. The goal of the close envelopment is to attack the BLUFOR from the flank, avoiding a frontal attack. Forces conducting the close envelopment and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack need to coordinate fire support. (See Figure 5-1.)

Figure 5-1. Close envelopment combined with frontal attack.

Figure 5-2. Deep envelopment combined with frontal attack.

    c. Deep Envelopment. A deep envelopment is a flanking maneuver executed at a greater depth. The goal of deep envelopment is either to attack the BLUFOR from the rear or to seize key-blocking positions thereby preventing the BLUFOR's withdrawal and ensuring its destruction. The deep envelopment is conducted in tactical coordination with the forces advancing from the front. (See Figure 5-2.) Forces assigned to conduct a deep envelopment receive additional fire support.

    In an attack against a defending BLUFOR, a battalion or brigade-sized forward detachment could conduct a deep envelopment for a brigade or division; the forward detachment would be inserted through a gap in forward BLUFOR defenses after first-echelon forces in the main attack achieve a penetration. The depth of a deep envelopment for a mechanized infantry or tank battalion can be more than 15 km. A brigade may conduct a deep envelopment to a depth of up to 50 km. That depth can be significantly greater in a meeting battle or in a pursuit of the BLUFOR. The OPFOR may also employ heliborne forces for the deep envelopment.

    d. Double Envelopment. The OPFOR prefers a double envelopment, which can be a combination of two deep envelopments, two close envelopments, or a deep and a close envelopment. It expects to achieve the most success with a deep envelopment of both flanks, encircling the BLUFOR rear. Combining envelopments creates favorable conditions for attacking the BLUFOR's flanks and rear. The OPFOR's goal is to encircle BLUFOR groupings, split them, and then destroy them. Heliborne assault troops can also land simultaneously in the BLUFOR rear, assisting in the accomplishment of a double envelopment. Forces carrying out close, deep, or double envelopments ordinarily maneuver in a march or prebattle formation when BLUFOR resistance is light enough not to require the use of battle formation. The enveloping force can transition from march to prebattle to battle formation as the situation dictates.

5-2 Organizing for combat.

    The OPFOR organizes for combat by assigning units to function as elements of combat formations. The combat formation corresponds to the situation and facilitates mission accomplishment. It should ensure--

• Successful destruction of the BLUFOR.

• Achievement of the assigned mission.

• A combination of fire, movement, and maneuver in the course of the attack.

• Continuous command and control.

    The following paragraphs list several of the key variables involved in OPFOR organization for combat. There is overlap with other chapters, but this information is included to provide better understanding of organizing for combat.

    a. Reconnaissance. Maneuver divisions have an organic reconnaissance and electronic warfare battalion, while each maneuver brigade has an organic reconnaissance company. Mechanized infantry battalions (MIBN) have an organic reconnaissance platoon. The location of the reconnaissance objectives and the BLUFOR disposition determine how far in front of their parent organization these OPFOR reconnaissance assets move. In an attack against a defending BLUFOR, they would typically reconnoiter the BLUFOR whose destruction is the parent organization’s immediate mission; then they would move on toward the depth of the subsequent mission. In the march, their purpose is to provide the maximum warning of the BLUFOR, in terms of time and distance and to establish the strength and disposition. They also identify terrain features that could slow the OPFOR rate of advance or hinder the accomplishment of the parent organization's mission.

    b. Forward Detachment. A forward detachment is a combined arms force based on a reinforced maneuver brigade or battalion. Forward detachments ensure the unhindered advance of the division or brigade. Divisions commonly establish a brigade-sized forward detachment, or more than one battalion-sized forward detachment, to maneuver ahead of the lead brigades of an advancing division. Although any maneuver brigade can be assigned as a forward detachment, the OPFOR prefers to use BTR-equipped units as forward detachments (and advance guards), thus keeping the higher combat power of BMP and tank brigades for the main force. If the situation requires, a battalion or brigade from another unit/formation (e.g., from a second-echelon brigade/division or an adjacent division) may be temporarily attached as a forward detachment.

    In the march, the forward detachment normally moves ahead of or parallel to the march security elements (advanced guard) of the lead brigades but behind the division’s reconnaissance patrols. However, it could also move parallel to the advance guard.

    There is no set distance between the forward detachment and the main body. A brigade-based division forward detachment moves 2 to 4 hours ahead of the parent division’s main body; in European terrain conditions, this may translate to a distance of up to 80 km. A battalion-based division or brigade forward detachment moves 1 to 2 hours ahead of the parent organization’s main body; this translates to 20 to 40 km.

    c. Echelons. The echelonment of combat formations in the offense is based upon the depth and preparedness of BLUFOR defenses, and is intended to build combat power continuously on the line of contact. The OPFOR typically organize forces either in two echelons or in one echelon with a combined arms reserve. In normal terrain, companies and platoons always attack in a single echelon, without a reserve.

    When attacking unprepared or partially prepared BLUFOR defenses, the OPFOR typically attacks in a single echelon with a reserve. Against more fully prepared defenses, the OPFOR is likely to use a two-echelon formation and a small reserve. Within the division, the pattern of echelonment can vary at each level of command. A division might deploy its brigades in two echelons, while some of the brigades might deploy their battalions in one echelon. The OPFOR does not consider a three-echelon combat formation to be normal, but sometimes use it when advancing in the mountains, when maneuver is restricted in an advance along a narrow valley.

    When attacking defenses that are weak, lacking in depth, or not well prepared, divisions, brigades, and battalions normally deploy in a single echelon with a small combined arms reserve. They would also use a single-echelon formation when attacking on a secondary axis. When using a single-echelon formation, the commander must keep a combined arms reserve; thus, he retains the ability to influence the battle. If he commits his reserve, he must create another one immediately. If the BLUFOR has hurriedly assumed shallow defenses, he will not have a well-prepared defense in depth or strong reserves; and under these conditions, a single echelon may be sufficient to defeat him.

    A two-echelon combat formation is typically employed when attacking a defense prepared or at least partially prepared in depth and on the higher commander's main axis. The first echelon normally contains the majority of the combat power. Its mission is to destroy the BLUFOR's forward defenses and achieve the immediate mission of the formation/unit/subunit.

    At the same time, the OPFOR issue missions to first-echelon forces, he assigns the second-echelon force a mission, a route of advance, and a likely line and time for its commitment. During commitment, the second echelon normally passes through gaps or at flanks to avoid passage of lines and intermingling of forces. Specific second-echelon missions can include:

• Conducting a pursuit.

• Destroying bypassed BLUFOR elements.

• Defeating a counterattack.

• Achieving the subsequent mission.

• Completing the missions of successful first-echelon forces that have been rendered combat-ineffective.

    Once the second echelon is committed, a combined arms reserve from elements of the first echelon is formed if one had not designated previously. The remainder of the first echelon continues its attack to the degree that it is still able.

Figure 5-3. Commitment of second-echelon forces.

    Although the OPFOR pre-plans deployment lines and time for committing the second echelon, he retains flexibility in implementing them, depending on the progress of the battle. It is important to remember that a second echelon is an application of additional force, not reinforcement of the first echelon. However, the second echelon could be a replacement for a first-echelon force that has been successful, but at the cost of its own combat effectiveness. The second echelon's attack may be on an axis different from the one originally planned. (Figure 5-3 illustrates one example of the commitment of second-echelon forces.)

    d. Combined Arms Reserve. Divisions, brigades, and battalions can form a combined arms reserve (usually two levels smaller in size, e.g., battalion has a platoon reserve), but only if attacking in a single echelon. The combined arms reserve is small. It is a contingency force used to meet unanticipated events and to deal with tasks such as exploiting unexpected success, repelling counterattacks, and covering the flanks of the parent organization.

    e. Raiding Detachment. At the tactical level, a raiding detachment is a highly mobile combined-arms unit, usually a reinforced battalion. Reinforced companies and platoons can also conduct raids. The primary mission of a raiding detachment is to destroy or capture important military targets. Such objectives can include an artillery battalion, tactical missile batteries, elements of a reconnaissance-strike complex, a fire support helicopter forward base, a supply base/depot, or a river-crossing site. Its secondary missions can include seizing important terrain and blocking BLUFOR reserves.

    f. Enveloping Detachment. Within maneuver battalions and companies, the OPFOR may use an armored group as a smaller-scale enveloping group. The armored group is a temporary grouping of 4 to 5 tanks, BMPs, BTRs, or any combination of such vehicles. In this role, BMPs or BTRs would deploy without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The armored group can thus act on an independent axis to attack the BLUFOR flank or establish a blocking force to his rear. It has significant direct-fire capability and serves as a mobile reserve attack force for the battalion or company commander.

5-3 Types of Offensive Action.

    The OPFOR will employ three basic types of tactical offensive actions: attack against a defending enemy, meeting battle, and pursuit.

    a. Attack Against a Defending Enemy. The basic form of offensive combat and the preferred OPFOR method of attacking a defending BLUFOR:

• Occurs when the BLUFOR is occupying known defensive positions.

• Can occur in a variety of situations: envelopments, supporting attacks, penetrations of the BLUFOR defense, and exploitation.

• An attack from a position in direct contact is most often used when transitioning over to the offense from the defense.

• Figure 5-4 illustrates the difference between the two methods.

        (1) Assembly Areas.

• When attacking from the march, a division would normally occupy an assembly area of between 300 to 600 sq. km located 60 to 75 km from the BLUFOR’'s forward positions.

• Brigades could occupy assembly areas as close as 20 to 30 km.

• Forces depart assembly areas in march formation and deploy into prebattle and, if necessary, battle formation at designated lines.

        (2) Operations Against an BLUFOR Covering Force Area.

• Goal: to prevent having the main body deploy from march formation prior to reaching the designated deployment lines.

Against a weak covering force:

• Forward detachments of 1st echelon divisions, with strong artillery and air support, responsible for destroying BLUFOR covering force.

• Main bodies of divisions follow in tactical march column, ready to exploit the forward detachment success.

• Deployment of lead divisions depends on degree of BLUFOR resistance.

Against a strong covering force:

• OPFOR would deploy main bodies of 1st echelon divisions from the outset.

• Use forward detachments and air landings to cut off BLUFOR withdrawals and seize entries into the tactical zone.

• Divisions may send forward detachments to seize key terrain in the covering force area.

Figure 5-4. Attack against a defending BLUFOR.

        (3) Attack zones and strike sectors. Figure 5-5 lists average widths of attack zones (frontages) and strike sectors (penetration sectors/sectors of main effort) at the tactical level. The OPFOR's goal is to achieve overwhelming superiority in the strike sector. A minimum of 5:1 is desired but more is better.

Figure 5-5. Typical Attack Zones and Strike Sector Widths.

NOTE: These distances are doctrinal and may vary significantly depending upon the situation.

        (4) Force Disposition.

            (a) MID and TD.

• In attacking a well-prepared defense, a division will normally attack on a narrower frontage (as narrow as 10 km) with a stronger second echelon (two brigades rather than one).

• A division attacking on an army's supporting axis will normally have a wider frontage than one attacking on the main attack axis.

• Division elements will normally deploy as listed in Figure 5-6.

Figure 5-6.Deployment Depths.

Figure 5-7. MID Attack Against a Partially Prepared Defense (Variant).

Figure 5-8. MID Attack Against a Partially Prepared Defense (Variant).

Figure 5-9. MIBR Attack Against a Partially Prepared Defense (Variant)

MIBN and TBN

• Battalion may attack using either one or two echelons.
• When attacking in one echelon, it will normally have a small combined arms reserve (platoon sized).
• A tank company attached to a MIBN normally operates intact.

• Does not have the organic combat support or combat service support required for independent action, except when deployed as a security or enveloping detachment, an advance guard, a raiding detachment, a forward detachment , or a heliborne or amphibious landing force.

Figure 5-10. MIBN Attack Against a Partially Prepared Defense (Variant)

    b. Meeting Battle.

• The basic form of offense used to meet and destroy BLUFOR tactical reserves.

• Goals: to destroy the BLUFOR and to continue developing the offensive.

• The side that seizes the initiative first through rapid deployment into battle or prebattle formations and through delivery of indirect and direct fires is most likely to win, even in the face of a superior BLUFOR.

• Figure 5-11 illustrates the circumstances under which a meeting battle may occur.

• Figure 5-12 describes Phases of a Meeting Battle.

• Figure 5-13 illustrates possible outcomes of advance guard action in meeting battle.

Figure 5-11. Circumstances under which a meeting battle may occur.

        (1) OPFOR battalion in the meeting battle. A mechanized infantry or tank battalion is most likely to become involved in a meeting battle when acting as the advance guard of a brigade. This is also true of a battalion acting independently as a forward detachment of a division or brigade. When performing such a role, a mechanized infantry battalion is normally reinforced with tank, artillery, and engineer troops and possibly with antitank, air defense, or chemical protection elements. A tank battalion would be similarly reinforced, but with mechanized infantry rather than tank or antitank elements. Figure 5-14, illustrates advance guard actions.

        (2) OPFOR company in the meeting battle. OPFOR maneuver companies fight meeting battles and defending enemies in the same manner. A mechanized infantry or tank company normally fights as part of a battalion. However, it can also act independently as a forward security element of an advance guard or a forward detachment. A company in such a role can receive reinforcements from NBC reconnaissance, artillery, and a unit of the other maneuver arm (tank or mechanized infantry).

Figure 5-12. Phases of meeting battle.

Figure 5-13. Possible outcomes of advance guard action in meeting battle.

Figure 5-14. Advance Guard Actions

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (CRP) / FORWARD PATROL

Upon contact, actions of the CRP/Forward patrol are:

• Report contact to the advanced guard commander.
• Attempt to penetrate to the BLUFOR main force, bypassing his advance elements.
• Perform chemical and engineer reconnaissance.
• Collect all information on the BLUFOR that will expedite the commander’s decision.

Build-up of Firepower (CRP/Forward Patrol)

• Time: 0 minutes
• Forces Committed: 3 BTRs

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FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT (FSE)

Actions of the FSE, moving in column behind the CRP(s) by up to 10 kilometers, are:

• Advance at maximum speed.
• Engage the BLUFOR with all weapons.
• Develop the fight.
• Seize and hold a position until arrival of the advanced guard main body.

Build-up of Firepower (FSE)

Time: +20 minutes

Forces now committed:

• 11 BTRs
• 3 Tanks
• 6 Mortars
• 6 Howitzers, 122mm

  ---

ADVANCE GUARD MAIN BODY (AGMB)

At the time of initial contact, the advance guard main body is moving in march column 5 to 10 kilometers behind the FSE. The commander:

• Defines the plan for the engagement.
• Issues orders to the commanders of the CRP and FSE.
• Moves forward, with the artillery commander, at maximum speed to an observation point.
• Issues orders for the deployment of the advance guard main body.
• Launches the attack

Build-up of Firepower (Advance Guard)

Time: +60 minutes

Forces now committed:

• 50 BTRs                         2 Antiaircraft Guns
• 10 Tanks                        6 AT-4s and 9 AT-7s
• 6 Mortars                      3 recoilless guns, 73mm
• 18 Howitzers, 122mm     6 Automatic Grenade Launchers

    c. Pursuit. The OPFOR defines pursuit as a type of offensive conducted against a withdrawing BLUFOR. The goal of a pursuit is to complete the destruction of, or capture the BLUFOR.

(1) The three forms of pursuit are shown in Figure 5-15.

(2)  Characteristics of the Pursuit:

• Centralized planning.
• Decentralized execution.
• Artillery allocated to maneuver battalions.
• Extensive use of forward detachments (both heliborne and ground) to seize key terrain to block the BLUFOR's withdrawal routes.
• Heavy emphasis on reconnaissance.

Figure 5-15. Forms of Pursuit.

Figure 5-16. Example of a Pursuit.

Note: The OPFOR are represented by the shaded arrows.

5-4 MISSIONS.

During an attack against a defending enemy, units will be assigned a mission (objective).

    a. Missions contain two elements:

• The destruction of the BLUFOR with a zone.
• The seizure of an assigned line.

    b. Two Types of Missions:

• Immediate: Usually involves the destruction of the BLUFOR's main force and the seizure of a line from which to begin exploitation.
• Subsequent: Results in the complete destruction of the BLUFOR and the seizure of a line deep in the BLUFOR's rear.
• Each unit's subsequent mission corresponds to its next higher headquarters' immediate mission.

    c. Mission Depth. (See Figure 5-17) Depends on:

• The relative strength of friendly and BLUFOR forces.
• The operational functions of the friendly and BLUFOR (e.g. conducting a supporting attack as opposed to conducting the main attack or having a mission to screen rather than to defend).
• The terrain.
• Most importantly, the level of preparation of the BLUFOR's defense. The more prepared the BLUFOR's defense, the shallower the depth of the mission. The less prepared, the deeper the mission.

    d. Mission factors.

• Forward detachments may receive terrain-oriented missions, such as river crossing sites or mountain passes.
• The line of a unit's immediate mission is normally the planned employment line for the second echelon.
• After the commitment of the second echelon, both the first and second echelons continue to advance to the subsequent mission.
• Brigades and battalions may be given a direction of advance to follow after accomplishing their subsequent missions.
• Units do not normally stop to consolidate after accomplishing their missions. The advance is to continue without interruption.

• OPFOR units normally do not stop on objectives or mission lines and consolidate; they continue the attack deeper into the BLUFOR rear.

Figure 5-17. Mission Depths Against a Partially Prepared Defense.

Figure 5-18. Missions Against a Partially Prepared Defense.

5-5 RECONNAISSANCE IN THE OFFENSE.

    The OPFOR considers reconnaissance the most important element of combat support. All commanders and staffs organize reconnaissance to acquire information about the BLUFOR's weapons of mass destruction; force disposition and intentions; and terrain and weather in the area of impending combat. This information is crucial to the planning process for command and control systems. Reconnaissance can decisively influence the outcome of a battle, operation, or campaign. See Section 1-11 for Reconnaissance Task organization.

    a. Army Group reconnaissance:

• Locate the most critical targets, to include:

• NBC and high-precision weapons.

• Intelligence gathering assets

• Higher headquarters and communications centers.

• General support artillery groups.

• Operational-strategic groupings and their movements.

    b. Army reconnaissance:

            Missions:

• Contents of airfields and army aviation forward operating bases.

• Major concentrations of reserves.

• Unit boundaries.

• Location and extent of defended areas.

• The BLUFOR’s combat capabilities and intentions.

    c. Division reconnaissance:

• Operate out to approximately 50 kilometers.

• Airborne qualified long-range reconnaissance company up to 100 kilometers deep without vehicles.

            Missions:

• Locating, identifying, and reporting BLUFOR NBC and high precision weapon delivery means, headquarters, communications centers, troop concentrations, and movements of BLUFOR units.

• Determining the strength and dispositions of the BLUFOR's defenses and locating his boundaries.

• Providing topographical information concerning routes to, or bypasses around, BLUFOR positions as well as concerning lateral routes.

• Identifying the extent and depth of minefields and the types of mine employed (assessing obstacles and possible crossing points).

• Establishing the extent of zones of contamination.

• Identifying potential communications facilities and other sites for use by their own forces.

    d. Special brigade reconnaissance troops carry out reconnaissance, operating from up to 25 to 30 kilometers forward of the OPFOR line of contact. They might operate out to a maximum distance of 50 kilometers.

5-6 FIRE SUPPORT.

    In highly mobile, fluid battles, a significant proportion of the available artillery may be decentralized to lower commanders. With organic artillery and additional assets allocated from higher levels, commanders form army artillery groups (AAGs), army rocket artillery group (ARAG), division artillery groups (DAGs) and brigade artillery groups (BRAGs). Individual maneuver battalions can also receive up to a battalion of artillery in an attached or supporting role.

    a. Phases of Offensive Fire Support.

        (1) Phase I - Fire Support of a Force's Movement Forward.

• Long-range fires to protect a force moving from its assembly area to its line of deployment into prebattle formation.

• Targeted against most dangerous BLUFOR long-range weapons capable of striking the unit.

• Could begin more than an hour before the support force reaches the forward edge of the BLUFOR's defense.

        (2) Phase II - Fire Preparation.

• Seeks to annihilate or neutralize BLUFOR weapons systems, C2, and troop formations.

• Immediately precedes the attack.

• Nature of the BLUFOR defense and the quantity and type of fire support available determine the length and organization of the preparation. May last 50 minutes or more. Could be much shorter if the BLUFOR is weak and/or is occupying unprepared positions.

• Initiation of phase linked to the supported maneuver formation deploying to prebattle formation.

        (3) Phase III - Fire Support of the Attack.

• Starts immediately after the end of the preparation (no more than 2-4 min) and continues until the BLUFOR's first tactical echelon has been over run.

• Seeks to annihilate or neutralize BLUFOR troops and weapon systems directly in front of the attacking forces.

        (4) Phase IV - Fire Accompaniment.

• Supports advance of attacking forces into the depth of the BLUFOR defense.

• Supports commitment of second-echelon forces.

• BLUFOR reserves are a priority target.

Figure 5-19. Offensive Phases of Fire Support.

    b. Artillery Norms.

        (1) Density Norms. These figures represent fires massed and not to the positioning of artillery units.

• Attack of a well-prepared defense on the main axis: 60 to 120 tubes of artillery per km of frontage in the main axis.
• Attack of an unprepared defense on the main axis: 60-80 tubes per km.
• Attack of a supporting axis: 40 tubes per km.

        (2) Ammunition Expenditure Norms.

• Figure 5-20 is a sample of the ammunition expenditures required to produce a desired effect on a particular target using standard HE rounds.
• Similar tables exist for a wide variety of situations and targets. They are used for fire support planning.

Figure 5-20. Sample Ammunition Expenditure Norms.

Notes:

1. Reduce expenditure by 25% when engaging with observed fire or adjusting from a known point.

2. Increase expenditure by 10% when range to target is greater than 10 km.

3. To achieve expenditure norms for annihilation multiply rounds required for suppression by three.

    c. Types of Offensive Fire.

        (1) Fire Assault

• Characterized by surprise and a high density of fires.
• Seeks to annihilate the targets.
• Normally the predominate form used during the preparation phase.
• Usually do not exceed 15-20 minutes.
• More than one fire assault may be conducted during the preparation phase.
• Conducted against both point and area targets.
• Normally involves all or most of the artillery allocated to a division or army.

        (2) Controlling Fires.

• Conducted against a target during the interval between fire assaults.
• Denies the BLUFOR the freedom to conduct combat activity or to escape before next fire assault.
• Normally conducted by a single battery.

        (3) Fire Concentration.

• Conducted against BLUFOR troop concentrations, strongpoints, artillery batteries, C2 facilities and other such targets.
• May be conducted by several batteries or battalions.
• All weapons fire at once on the center of the target area.

        (4) Massed Fires.

• Conducted by all or most of a unit's artillery with the goal of destroying a target in the shortest possible time.
• May take the form of one large fire concentration or several concentrations fired simultaneously.

        (5) Successive Fire Concentrations.

• Conducted when the supported maneuver unit has begun its final assault.
• Provides for the successive neutralization or annihilation of specific targets or target groupings.
• May be done in the defense to support counterattacks.
• First line of concentration in on the BLUFOR's forward positions. Subsequent lines are 300 to 1000 m apart through the depth of the BLUFOR's position.
• Fires are shifted on the order of the maneuver commander.

        (6) Rolling Barrage.

• Similar to successive fire concentration in its conduct but evenly distributes fires across the width of the attack axis than concentrating them on selected targets.
• Phase lines are 400 to 800 m apart. Intermediate lines are 100 to 200 m apart. Fire duration on phase lines is at least 5 minutes. On intermediate lines, duration is 1 or 2 minutes.
• Normally, a rolling barrage is conducted through the depth of the BLUFOR's first echelon battalion.
• Because of the high ammunition expenditure required, the rolling barrage is not commonly used. May be used to support the penetration of a well-prepared defense or the crossing of a water obstacle.

5-7 ANTITANK.

    The OPFOR can employ the antitank (AT) reserve as a blocking force against a BLUFOR counterattack during the offense, and it also can cover threatened areas and open flanks. It can be reinforced with engineer assets, usually in the form of a mobile obstacle detachment (MOD).

    Missions that commanders may assign to an AT reserve include, in the offensive (or meeting engagement)¾

• Repelling counterattacks.
• Protecting the flanks of a unit or a gap in deployment.
• Covering the commitment of a second echelon.
• Consolidating on captured lines.
• Gaining time for the mounting of a counteroffensive.
• Sealing off encircled forces.

5-8 ENGINEER.

    a. Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol (ERP)

• Typical missions include collecting information on roads, obstacles, water obstacles and water supplies.

    b. Movement Support Detachment (MSD)

• Ad hoc grouping formed from division and brigade engineer units.
• Missions include:

• Route reconnaissance
• Mineclearing
• Repair/reinforcement of bridges
• Creation of tracked vehicle routes
• Construction of bypasses
• Route marking

• Division:

• Can form up to three MSDs.
• Each may have one or two of the following types of equipment: DIM, BAT, IMR, Tanks with KMT-4/6 or 5M, Tanks with BTU, MTU-20/MT-55, TMM, or Truck mounted crane.
• Operates on main routes.

• Brigade:

• Can form one MSD normally composed of an engineer platoon, one or two dozers and up to three tanks with blades or plows.
• Operates on secondary routes.

• MSD is normally organized in three elements:

• Reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing group
• One or two road/bridge construction and repair groups
• Route marking group

• In the march, MSDs normally move behind the CRPs.

    c. Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD)

• Ad hoc grouping formed from division and brigade engineer units.
• Mission: Deny key terrain to the BLUFOR, particularly those avenues of approach that are most suited for tanks. (Figure 5-21)
• Composition:

• A divisional MOD normally consists of mechanical minelaying elements equipped with GMZs.
• A brigade MOD normally consists of one minelaying platoon of three PRP-3. It is sometimes reinforced with a motorized rifle platoon.

• MODs normally operate with antitank reserves to provide flank protection and to repel counterattacks.
• In the march, it normally travels between the advance guard and the main body.

Figure 5-21. MOD in a Meeting Battle.

    d. Mineclearing

• During marches, the MSD is responsible for mine clearing on the routes.
• During assaults, the maneuver unit is responsible.
• - Normal breaching method is to use mine plows/rollers.
• - Plow/roller tanks may tow a line charge behind them to detonate once they are through the minefield in order to clear the full width of the lane.
• Normally there is one plow tank per tank platoon and one roller-plow tank per company. Figure 5-22 illustrates a tank battalion attacking through a minefield.
• Number of lanes cleared is dependent on terrain and mission:

• Battalion on main attack axis: 6-8 lanes.
• Battalion on supporting axis: As few as 2.

Figure 5-22. Tank Battalion Attacks through a Minefield.

5-9 COMMAND AND CONTROL.

    a. Maneuver Command and Control Posts.

        (1) Division.

• Forward Command Post

• Normal location of the division commander.
• Commander is usually accompanied by the operations officer and the chief of missile troops and artillery
• Is normally located 2 to 5 km behind the FLOT in the attack.
• 100% mobile.

• Main Command Post

• Under the control of the chief of staff.
• Located 10 to 15 km behind the FLOT.
• 100% mobile.

• Rear Command Post

• Headed by the deputy commander for the rear.
• Located 25-35 km behind the FLOT.

• Alternate Command Posts

• Established as required.

        (2) Brigade.

• Main Command Post.

• Normal location of brigade commander.
• Also location of chief of staff, plus the commanders of the brigade's engineer and chemical protection units.
• Supporting artillery commanders normally co-locate with this CP.
• Consists of several armored vehicles.
• Relocates 4 to 6 times each day.
• Located up to 5 km behind the FLOT.

• Rear Control Post.

• Headed by the deputy commander for rear services.
• Consists of 1 or 2 vehicles.
• Located up to 10 km behind the FLOT.

        (3) Battalion.

• Command Observation Post
• Only CP at battalion level.
• Consists of 3 or 4 vehicles.
• Located within 2 to 3 km of FLOT.

    b. Tactical Communications.

        (1) Division.

• HF and VHF radio (Primary communication means)
• VHF and UHF multichannel radio relay
• SHF troposcatter systems
• Wire
• Messenger
• Visual and Audio

        (2) Brigade and Below.

• HF and VHF radio (Primary communication means)
• Wire
• Messenger
• Visual and Audio

    c. Procedures.

        (1) Radio silence is normally observed when defending and when in or departing assembly areas.

        (2) In an attack against a defending enemy, radio silence is lifted when the artillery preparation begins.

        (3) In a meeting battle, radio silence if lifted upon contact with the BLUFOR.

        (4) Few secure nets exist below brigade level.

5-10 NBC.

    a. Chemical.

        (1) Available Agents.

• Nerve - GB, GD and V
• Blood - AC
• Blister - HO, HN, L, HL and CX
• Incapacitant
• Irritant - DA, DM, CM, CS and PS.

        (2) Delivery Means.

• All tube artillery systems 122mm and larger
• Most mortars
• All MRL systems
• FROG, SCUD and SS-21 SSM
• Antipersonnel landmines
• Aircraft (bombs and spray)

        (3) Employment.

• Offense Likely targets:

• Troops in defensive positions astride attack axes
• NBC delivery systems
• Troop concentrations
• CPs
• Bypassed pockets of resistance

• Non-persistent agents would be used on planned attack axes.
• Persistent agents would be used deep and on the flanks.

    b. Nuclear

        (1) Delivery means.

• All tube artillery systems 152mm and larger.
• 240mm mortar.
• FROG, SCUD and SS-21.
• Various aircraft.

        (2) Likely targets:

• NBC delivery means.
• CPs of divisions and higher formations.
• Prepared defensive positions.
• Reserve and troop concentrations.
• Supply installations.
• Communication centers.
• Key air defense sites.

    c. Flame.

        (1) A flamethrower battalion is normally assigned to each army. Little is known about its internal structure or how much equipment it has.

        (2) Equipment Capabilities.

• LPO-50: Light infantry flamethrower.

• Man-portable.
• Range: 50-70 m.

• TPO-50M: Heavy infantry flamethrower.

• Mounted on two-wheel cart.
• Range: 180 m.

• RPO: Shoulder fired flamethrower.

• Fires rocket propelled round containing 4 liters of napalm.
• Range: 180-200 m.

• RPO-A: Shoulder fired flamethrower.

• Fires a 2 liter round out to 400 m.

• TO-55: Flamethrower tank.

• Variant of T-55.
• Flamethrower nozzle is mounted beside the main gun and does not interfere with its use.
• Fuel Capacity: 460 liters.
• Range: 200 m.

    d. Smoke.

        (1) Equipment Capabilities.

• TDA-M: Smoke Generator.
• GAZ-66 truck variant.

• Contains sufficient fog oil for four hours of continuous operations.
• Under favorable conditions, one vehicle can create a smoke screen 800-1000 m long and 100 m wide.

• VEESS - Vehicle Engine Exhaust Smoke System
• Various smoke pots, drums, barrels and grenades.
• Artillery smoke rounds

• Fired by D-30, 2S1, M-46, 2S3, D-20 and all but the 160mm and 240mm mortars.

    e. Types of smoke screens.

        (1) Blinding.

• Positioned on BLUFOR weapon systems and observers.
• Delivered by artillery and mortars.

        (2) Camouflage.

• Positioned on or directly in front of friendly troops.
• Delivered by smoke generating vehicle, VEESS, smoke pot, grenade, drum and barrel.

        (3) Protective.

• Intended to protect electro-optical devices from the effects of laser radiation or to shield personnel and equipment from the effects of the flash and thermal radiation of a nuclear detonation.
• Positioned in front of, around or above friendly forces.

        (4) Decoy.

• Intended to deceive the BLUFOR as to the actual location and activity of friendly forces.
• Positioning depends on the situation.

        (5) Signaling.

• Used to mark BLUFOR positions or, occasionally, friendly avenues of approach.

5-11 Air Defense Deployment.

    Priorities in deploying air defense assets are usually to protect command posts, then artillery groupings and first-echelon forces.

Figure 5-23. Air Defense Support for an MIBN Assault.

5-12 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

    a. Air Support Missions.

• On Call: Preplanned target but executed on order of the supported commander.
• Pre-Planned: Executed according to detailed plan.
• Immediate: Unplanned missions flown in response to request of ground commander.

    b. Phases of Air Support.

• I - Support for movement forward
• II - Air Preparation
• III - Air Support
• IV - Air Accompaniment

    c. Key Points.

• Attack helicopters will provide most of the close air support.
• Air support plan will be fully coordinated with the fire support plan.
• Forward air controllers are normally found at brigade level and only in those brigades scheduled to receive air support.
• Battalions will have FACs only if the battalion has a particularly important or difficult mission such as acting as a forward detachment.
• In the offense, air support will normally be massed on the main axis.
• An operational commander normally withholds part of his assets in order to be able to respond to immediate missions that may arise during the course of an operation.

5-13 RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS.

    a. Methods.

        (1) Crossing a River: Contact is not expected and an administrative crossing is possible.

        (2) Forcing a River (Assault crossing): Contact with the BLUFOR is expected and an assault crossing will be necessary.

• Assault crossings may be done in one of two ways:

• From the march (preferred method)
• From positions in direct contact

• Assault crossing is done by unit using organic assets.

• Crossing is preceded by reconnaissance.
• BTRs/BMPs lead assault covered by artillery, smoke and direct fire.
• Heliborne forces may be used to seize a bridgehead.

• After mechanized infantry or heliborne troop establishes bridgehead, tanks cross the obstacle via ferry, fording or snorkeling.
• Ferry sites and bridges are established for use by non-amphibious vehicles and follow-on elements.

    b. Brigade.

• Typical brigade crossing sector: 10 km wide.
• A MIBR is expected to be able to cross its combat elements over a 200-m wide river (2 m/sec current) in 2 to 3 hours.

    c. Division:

• Typical divisional crossing sector: 20 to 30 km wide.
• A MID is expected to be able to cross its combat elements over a 200 m wide river (2 m/sec current) in 5 to 6 hours.

5-14 AIRBORNE OPERATIONS.

    a. Key Concepts.

• Rapid deployment over great distances.
• Virtually all-weather employment.
• Self-sufficient and air-droppable.
• Trained to fight across the range of military operations.
• Battalion-sized operations most common.
• Land in unopposed areas, then move to objective, defend until linkup occurs.
• Usually employed by the army commander.

    b. Support to the Offense.

• Seize vital ground, bridgeheads, defiles.
• Destroy higher level C2, political as well as military.
• Block routes used by reserves or withdrawing forces.
• Destruction of logistics installations, especially fuel and ammunition.
• Disrupt transportation infrastructure.

    c. Conduct of Airborne Operations.

• Requires air superiority, even if achieved only temporarily locally.
• Favorable combat ratios in the landing zones and objective area are essential.
• A battalion can be lifted in a single lift.
• If an entire brigade is needed, airborne elements would have to be shuttled:

• first battalion seizes the airfield.
• follow-on forces would then be air-landed.

• Speed and Surprise are critical.
• Supported by air and missile strikes, and artillery.

    d. Once on the ground:

• Consolidate and conduct reconnaissance.
• Move to objective in pre-battle formation.
• Position air defense, artillery, and engineers to support the attack on the final objective.
• Assume battle formation within 1000-200 meters of the objective.
• Attack in one echelon against a weak BLUFOR, two echelons against a strong BLUFOR.
• Once the objective is secure, establish 360-degree defense using unit strongpoints.
• Either await linkup or fight back to friendly lines.

    e. Drop Zone Selection.

• Typical battalion DZ is 3 km by 4 km.
• Typical company DZ is 1 km by 1 to 1.5 km.
• As close to final objective as possible, but no more than 20 km.