CHAPTER 5: The OPFOR in the Offense

5-2 Organizing for combat.

    The OPFOR organizes for combat by assigning units to function as elements of combat formations. The combat formation corresponds to the situation and facilitates mission accomplishment. It should ensure--

• Successful destruction of the BLUFOR.

• Achievement of the assigned mission.

• A combination of fire, movement, and maneuver in the course of the attack.

• Continuous command and control.

    The following paragraphs list several of the key variables involved in OPFOR organization for combat. There is overlap with other chapters, but this information is included to provide better understanding of organizing for combat.

    a. Reconnaissance. Maneuver divisions have an organic reconnaissance and electronic warfare battalion, while each maneuver brigade has an organic reconnaissance company. Mechanized infantry battalions (MIBN) have an organic reconnaissance platoon. The location of the reconnaissance objectives and the BLUFOR disposition determine how far in front of their parent organization these OPFOR reconnaissance assets move. In an attack against a defending BLUFOR, they would typically reconnoiter the BLUFOR whose destruction is the parent organization’s immediate mission; then they would move on toward the depth of the subsequent mission. In the march, their purpose is to provide the maximum warning of the BLUFOR, in terms of time and distance and to establish the strength and disposition. They also identify terrain features that could slow the OPFOR rate of advance or hinder the accomplishment of the parent organization's mission.

    b. Forward Detachment. A forward detachment is a combined arms force based on a reinforced maneuver brigade or battalion. Forward detachments ensure the unhindered advance of the division or brigade. Divisions commonly establish a brigade-sized forward detachment, or more than one battalion-sized forward detachment, to maneuver ahead of the lead brigades of an advancing division. Although any maneuver brigade can be assigned as a forward detachment, the OPFOR prefers to use BTR-equipped units as forward detachments (and advance guards), thus keeping the higher combat power of BMP and tank brigades for the main force. If the situation requires, a battalion or brigade from another unit/formation (e.g., from a second-echelon brigade/division or an adjacent division) may be temporarily attached as a forward detachment.

    In the march, the forward detachment normally moves ahead of or parallel to the march security elements (advanced guard) of the lead brigades but behind the division’s reconnaissance patrols. However, it could also move parallel to the advance guard.

    There is no set distance between the forward detachment and the main body. A brigade-based division forward detachment moves 2 to 4 hours ahead of the parent division’s main body; in European terrain conditions, this may translate to a distance of up to 80 km. A battalion-based division or brigade forward detachment moves 1 to 2 hours ahead of the parent organization’s main body; this translates to 20 to 40 km.

    c. Echelons. The echelonment of combat formations in the offense is based upon the depth and preparedness of BLUFOR defenses, and is intended to build combat power continuously on the line of contact. The OPFOR typically organize forces either in two echelons or in one echelon with a combined arms reserve. In normal terrain, companies and platoons always attack in a single echelon, without a reserve.

    When attacking unprepared or partially prepared BLUFOR defenses, the OPFOR typically attacks in a single echelon with a reserve. Against more fully prepared defenses, the OPFOR is likely to use a two-echelon formation and a small reserve. Within the division, the pattern of echelonment can vary at each level of command. A division might deploy its brigades in two echelons, while some of the brigades might deploy their battalions in one echelon. The OPFOR does not consider a three-echelon combat formation to be normal, but sometimes use it when advancing in the mountains, when maneuver is restricted in an advance along a narrow valley.

    When attacking defenses that are weak, lacking in depth, or not well prepared, divisions, brigades, and battalions normally deploy in a single echelon with a small combined arms reserve. They would also use a single-echelon formation when attacking on a secondary axis. When using a single-echelon formation, the commander must keep a combined arms reserve; thus, he retains the ability to influence the battle. If he commits his reserve, he must create another one immediately. If the BLUFOR has hurriedly assumed shallow defenses, he will not have a well-prepared defense in depth or strong reserves; and under these conditions, a single echelon may be sufficient to defeat him.

    A two-echelon combat formation is typically employed when attacking a defense prepared or at least partially prepared in depth and on the higher commander's main axis. The first echelon normally contains the majority of the combat power. Its mission is to destroy the BLUFOR's forward defenses and achieve the immediate mission of the formation/unit/subunit.

    At the same time, the OPFOR issue missions to first-echelon forces, he assigns the second-echelon force a mission, a route of advance, and a likely line and time for its commitment. During commitment, the second echelon normally passes through gaps or at flanks to avoid passage of lines and intermingling of forces. Specific second-echelon missions can include:

• Conducting a pursuit.

• Destroying bypassed BLUFOR elements.

• Defeating a counterattack.

• Achieving the subsequent mission.

• Completing the missions of successful first-echelon forces that have been rendered combat-ineffective.

    Once the second echelon is committed, a combined arms reserve from elements of the first echelon is formed if one had not designated previously. The remainder of the first echelon continues its attack to the degree that it is still able.

Figure 5-3. Commitment of second-echelon forces.

    Although the OPFOR pre-plans deployment lines and time for committing the second echelon, he retains flexibility in implementing them, depending on the progress of the battle. It is important to remember that a second echelon is an application of additional force, not reinforcement of the first echelon. However, the second echelon could be a replacement for a first-echelon force that has been successful, but at the cost of its own combat effectiveness. The second echelon's attack may be on an axis different from the one originally planned. (Figure 5-3 illustrates one example of the commitment of second-echelon forces.)

    d. Combined Arms Reserve. Divisions, brigades, and battalions can form a combined arms reserve (usually two levels smaller in size, e.g., battalion has a platoon reserve), but only if attacking in a single echelon. The combined arms reserve is small. It is a contingency force used to meet unanticipated events and to deal with tasks such as exploiting unexpected success, repelling counterattacks, and covering the flanks of the parent organization.

    e. Raiding Detachment. At the tactical level, a raiding detachment is a highly mobile combined-arms unit, usually a reinforced battalion. Reinforced companies and platoons can also conduct raids. The primary mission of a raiding detachment is to destroy or capture important military targets. Such objectives can include an artillery battalion, tactical missile batteries, elements of a reconnaissance-strike complex, a fire support helicopter forward base, a supply base/depot, or a river-crossing site. Its secondary missions can include seizing important terrain and blocking BLUFOR reserves.

    f. Enveloping Detachment. Within maneuver battalions and companies, the OPFOR may use an armored group as a smaller-scale enveloping group. The armored group is a temporary grouping of 4 to 5 tanks, BMPs, BTRs, or any combination of such vehicles. In this role, BMPs or BTRs would deploy without their normally assigned infantry squad on board and fight away from their dismounted troops. The armored group can thus act on an independent axis to attack the BLUFOR flank or establish a blocking force to his rear. It has significant direct-fire capability and serves as a mobile reserve attack force for the battalion or company commander.