CHAPTER 6: OPFOR Defensive Operations

INTRODUCTION.

    This chapter provides you with the tactics necessary for the OPFOR to successfully conduct a defense. This chapter does not cover all aspects of the OPFOR’s defensive principles, planning and execution. However, it does provide the critical concepts the OPFOR follows when planning such operations.

6-1 DEFENSIVE PRINCIPLES.

    OPFOR defensive goals include repelling attacks by the BLUFOR, inflicting maximum losses, holding important terrain and objectives and creating the necessary conditions to transition to the offense. The OPFOR employs the following principles when conducting a defense.

• Proper use of terrain

• All around protection

• Mutually supporting fires

• Proper use of reserves

• Camouflage and concealment

    The time to conduct a defensive action and the type of defense the OPFOR executes is dependent upon the primary mission of the OPFOR unit, the unit(s) on the battlefield and its current location in relation to the BLUFOR. Typically, the OPFOR will assume the defense to:

• Consolidate tactical gains

• Await additional resources

• Protect a flank

• Stop a BLUFOR counterattack

• Regroup

• Free up resources for other operations

• Hold key terrain

• Await logistical support

    The OPFOR may, at anytime, conduct a defensive operation. However, the actions of the BLUFOR dictate a shift to the defense. Depending on the proximity of the BLUFOR and the nature of the battle, an OPFOR unit can shift to a defense before battle occurs or during battle, under conditions of direct contact or without contact.

6-2 TYPES OF DEFENSE.

    a. Defense in Direct Contact. The OPFOR transition to the defense in direct contact occurs most often during an attack. It can also occur when the OPFOR is repelling counterattacks, consolidating captured lines and securing flanks of attacking troops, or with an unsuccessful outcome of a meeting battle. The OPFOR’s main defensive area will be in direct range of the BLUFOR.

    b. Defense Out of Direct Contact. The OPFOR can assume a defense before the battle begins, while out of direct contact with the BLUFOR. The main difference between defense in contact and defense out of contact is the absence of a security zone in the former. Under the latter condition, the transition to a defense is made to cover areas of possible contact, to repel a possible BLUFOR attack or support the deployment of additional forces.

    In a defense out of contact it is important to carefully evaluate the terrain, both in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the depth of the defense. Terrain should be selected to provide the most advantageous position for strongpoints, organizing a system of fire and good cover and concealment.

6-3 TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE.

    METT-T considerations are critical to the success of any OPFOR defense. The OPFOR must examine the BLUFOR situation, since the BLUFOR and his weapons systems influence the mix of weapons the OPFOR must use and the preparation needed. Whenever possible, OPFOR units select positions to take advantage of the terrain's protective features. The OPFOR selects defensive positions behind natural obstacles (mountains, trees, and thick vegetation) or in man-made terrain features that provide cover and concealment and a good field of view of the approaching opponent.

    Establishing the defense when in contact with the BLUFOR limits the OPFOR's ability to prepare a good fighting position and provide cover and concealment from BLUFOR fire and observation. If the terrain permits, the OPFOR should use a reverse slope defense. Part of the force remains in contact with the BLUFOR on the forward slope, while the remainder of the force prepares the position on the reverse slope.

    The advantages of a reverse slope defense include:

• Limiting or preventing BLUFOR's observation of the defensive position.

• Attacking forces are not able to receive direct fire support from following forces.

• BLUFOR's long-range antitank (AT) fires are not effective.

• Attacking force silhouettes itself crossing the crest of the hill.

• Engineers can conduct their work out of direct fire and observation from the BLUFOR.

    The disadvantage of a reverse slope defense is that weapon systems cannot exploit their maximum range. When possible, the OPFOR would use both a forward and a reverse slope defense to take maximum advantage of the terrain.

6-4 ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE.

    a. Reconnaissance. Divisional, brigade, and battalion reconnaissance elements will be located in and forward of the security zone (if established) or forward of the main defensive area.

    b. Combat Security Outposts. First-echelon brigades on main avenues often form combat security outposts, and each forward battalion can establish such an outpost. A combat security outpost for a battalion is normally a reinforced platoon. This platoon occupies a position 2 to 3 km forward of the main defenses. Figure 6-1 lists the conditions under which different types of security forces deploy.

        (1) Missions.

• to delay, inflict losses on, and to deceive the BLUFOR about the true location of the main defenses.

• Form strongpoints forward of the main defenses. They take over the mission to delay the BLUFOR's main effort when the divisional forward detachment shifts to a secondary axis.

• Forces the BLUFOR to deploy in a position short of the main defensive belt, believing it actually is the main defensive belt.

    Artillery units firing in support of the combat security outpost may have to occupy temporary firing positions farther forward than normal, even in front of the forward edge. The combat security outposts described above should not be confused with company or battalion-sized elements placed into forward positions by second-echelon brigades and/or divisions when required by the situation. These forces, too, have a mission similar to that of the forward detachments in the security zone.

Figure 6-1. Types of combat security forces.

        (2)  If the BLUFOR threatens to bypass or overrun the combat security outpost, the brigade commander may order it to withdraw to its position in the main defensive belt. Cover for its withdrawal can include planned fire from brigade assets, fire from the outpost's platoon and fire from tanks in ambush. The withdrawal plan provides the combat security outposts passages through the main defensive belt's obstacle system.

    c. Security Zone.

• Found only in the defense out of direct contact.
• Established by order of the operational (army/army group) commander.
• Is up to 50 km deep (Army) or 15 km (Division).
• Forces in the security zone will attempt to:

• Delay the attacking force.
• Deceive the BLUFOR as to the location of the main defensive area.
• Force the BLUFOR to deploy in attack formation early.
• Inflict maximum damage on the BLUFOR.
• Is occupied primarily by forward detachments. Artillery and AT elements may also be located in the security zone.

    d. Main Defensive Area.

• Mission is to prevent BLUFOR penetrations.
• Is based on defense in depth.
• Its basic element is the battalion defensive area, composed of company strongpoints.
• All weapon systems and vehicles are dug in as time permits.
• Fire sacks are used to destroy BLUFOR forces either immediately forward of or within the main defensive area.
• Counterattacks are planned for at battalion and above.
• Disposition of forces within the main defensive area is situation dependent. Forces may be repositioned during defensive operations to meet the BLUFOR’s main effort and disrupt his concept of battle.
• No major differences between the main defensive area of a defense in direct contact and one out of direct contact.

    An army of from two to four divisions will defend a sector from 100 to 150 kilometers wide and 100 to 150 kilometers or more deep on an important axis. Much depends on the relative strengths of the sides and on the terrain in the sector. An example is that in mountainous, desert, or arctic regions an army might hold a wider sector. While the army is on a greatly threatened key axis in normal terrain, it might defend a narrower sector. (See figures 6-2 for "rules of thumb" on unit frontages, 6-3 for an example of MID defense, 6-4 & 6-5 for MIBR in defense, 6-6 for MIB in defense and 6-7 for MIC in defense.)

Figure 6-2. OPFOR unit frontages.

Figure 6-3 MID in the Defense (Variant)

1. The division main defensive belt is organized into two echelons. The first-echelon brigades form along a defensive line and comprise the main defensive belt (A). Their mission is to stop the BLUFOR in front of their forward edge. The division allocates 1/2 to 3/4 of its combat power to its first echelon. The division's second echelon (B), 1/4 to 1/2 of available strength has the mission to destroy or repel any penetration of the main belt.

2. The defense in both echelons is built upon company-sized strongpoints (C) unified into battalion defensive areas. Strongpoints are planned for all-around defense and sited so deliberate, pre-registered gaps (D) exist between them.

3. Divisions form a security zone (E) in front of their main defensive belt when assuming the defense out of direct contact. Reinforced battalions taken from second-echelon brigades are designated as forward detachments; these establish a series of reinforced company-sized strongpoints sited on BLUFOR main avenues of approach. These security zone strongpoints are to delay, disrupt, and destroy advancing BLUFOR units. First-echelon brigades may establish a forward position (F) 4-6 km from the main defensive belt. This company-sized position imitates the main defense, causes the BLUFOR to conduct premature artillery preparations, and aids the disengagement of the forward detachment. Brigades and battalions deploy combat security outposts (platoon strength) (G) in the security zone forward of their sectors.

4. The division can form a combined arms reserve (H), not more than 1/9 of its total combat power, as the commander’s contingency forces. An MID holds its AT battalion, combined with an engineer mobile obstacle detachment as an AT reserve (J) to block penetrations of the first echelon and support the counterattack with fire.

5. The fire plan is based on antitank fires and integrates ATGM, AT gun, tank, BMP, attack helicopter, and indirect and direct artillery fires on accessible terrain in front of and between first-echelon strongpoints and into fire sacks (K) throughout the defensive sector.

Figure 6-4. MIBR in the Defense (Variant)

Figure 6-5. MIBR in the Defense (Variant)

Figure 6-6 Mechanized Infantry Battalion in the Defense (variant)

Figure 6-7. Mechanized Infantry Company (MIC) in the Defense

6-5 FORWARD DETACHMENTS.

    When assuming the defense out of contact with the BLUFOR, an OPFOR division fights its assigned portion of the security zone. This zone may extend 15 to 50 km forward of the main defensive belt. Forward detachments can be employed in the security zone, along with reconnaissance patrols from the divisional reconnaissance and EC battalion. In the defense, the forward detachment has the mission of delaying, disrupting, or destroying the advancing BLUFOR. A division may employ one or two forward detachments, up to reinforced battalions in size. Forces for the forward detachment come from the division's second echelon.

    A forward detachment in the division's portion of the security zone establishes a series of defensive positions sited on BLUFOR main avenues of approach. If the terrain permits, the forward detachment commander positions his companies on a major avenue to provide mutual support. Because they must cover a broad frontage, he usually deploys the battalion in a single echelon with a strong combined arms reserve of up to a company. If there are multiple avenues of approach, he may have to divide the forward detachment to cover them with individual reinforced company positions. He covers gaps or intervening terrain between the company positions with obstacles, reconnaissance patrols, and fires.

    The forward detachment prepares several successive positions, as the terrain and space allow. These positions and the avenues they control receive extensive engineer preparation, including emplacement of obstacles and minefields. Of course, the division commander has to consider the tradeoff in allocating engineer effort. If he allocates more resources to the security zone, then he delays the BLUFOR longer, and gets more time to prepare the main defensive belt. On the other hand, if the commander limits the engineer effort in the security zone, he frees assets to prepare the main defensive belt more quickly or extensively.

    A forward detachment's initial position is the one at the far edge of the security zone. If possible, it is on a favorable natural line; that is, a natural obstacle or defensible terrain. Subsequent positions to the rear are far enough apart to preclude the BLUFOR from engaging one and then another without displacing his indirect fire weapons. They are close enough to allow the forward detachment to maintain coordinated, continuous fires on the BLUFOR while moving from one to another.

    The final position the forward detachment may occupy in the security zone is the forward position, about 4 to 6-km forward of the main defensive belt. Depending on the pressure the forward detachment is receiving from the attacking BLUFOR, it may occupy a prepared forward position, or it may pass through the forward position. In the latter case, companies from first-echelon brigades occupying the forward positions may cover its disengagement and rearward passage of lines. The forward position deceives the BLUFOR about the location of the forward edge of the main defensive area. It receives extensive engineer preparation to assist in this deception.

    The separation of the forward detachment's positions from the division's main defensive belt requires the division commander to place artillery and air defense units in the security zone to support the forward detachment's mission. These forces also occupy prepared and camouflaged positions.

    The forward detachment engages the advancing BLUFOR at long range, initially with the supporting indirect fire assets. It then engages him with direct fire systems as he closes. It may launch local counterattacks if the situation dictates. The object is to strip away the BLUFOR's reconnaissance and force him to deploy to attack the position and to expend indirect fires; this can slow and disorganize his advance. Normally, the forward detachment relocates to a subsequent position rather than become decisively engaged or bypassed. By repeating these actions, the detachment may be able to exhaust and disorganize the BLUFOR before he reaches the main defensive belt. This keeps the BLUFOR from penetrating the defense and makes him vulnerable to counterattacks.

    The division commander expects the forward detachment to defend aggressively. He retains control over its successive redeployment. Without his specific permission, this forward detachment cannot relocate. The commander may need to gain time to permit the establishment of the main defensive belt. If needed, he can require the forward detachment to continue defending its position, even if this means it becomes decisively engaged or encircled.

    If the battle in the security zone is not successful in destroying or halting the attacking BLUFOR, the forward detachment occupies a forward position as a last measure before returning to its parent second-echelon brigade. The OPFOR expects that, even if all goes well, the forward detachment would take losses and would not be at full capability. The forward detachment moves off the BLUFOR main avenue of approach and occupies a forward position in a less-threatened, secondary sector. The BLUFOR, advancing along his main avenue, can still encounter forward positions. These positions are occupied by companies or battalions from the second-echelon brigades and/or combat security outposts of the first-echelon brigades instead of the forward detachment.

6-6 FIRE SUPPORT.

    Fire support covers all combat support provided to ground forces by missiles, artillery and aviation. The term "artillery" includes SSMs, MRLs, Guns/Howitzers and mortars 120-mm and larger antitank artillery.

    a. Types of Fire. The OPFOR plans artillery defensive fires – primarily barrier fires -- to disrupt the BLUFOR attack.

        (1) Barrier Fire. Barrier fire is a continuous curtain of defensive fire across the approach of the attacking BLUFOR. Although normally used in the defense, it also has applications in offensive operations against BLUFOR counterattacks. Barrier fire is useful with fire concentrations, massed fires, and directly aimed fire from tanks and guns. The types of barrier fire are:

• Standing Barrier Fire.

• Uses a single line of concentration to disrupt a BLUFOR attack. The OPFOR plans standing barrier fires well in advance.

• Projects artillery fires from likely avenues of tank approach. A ground observation point observes these fires planned in front of, and to the flanks of, the defensive positions.

• All the artillery in a formation, except rocket artillery, fires the standing barrier fire.

• Begins when BLUFOR tanks and infantry approach the planned line of fire concentration. The fires continue at rapid fire until they cut off BLUFOR infantry from their tanks and halt their attack.

• If the BLUFOR maneuvers around the fire concentration line, the fires shift to the rolling barrier fire approach.

• Rolling Barrier Fire.

• Lands on several lines of concentration. Each line lies successively closer to OPFOR defending troops.

• Lines of concentration for the rolling barrier fire should impact on terrain that a ground observation point can see. Distances between lines of fire concentration will be 400 to 600 meters or more.

• The final line of concentration closest to friendly troops will be 700 to 1000 meters from forward defensive positions.

    b. Phases of Fire Support. The OPFOR constructs a system of fire bringing all available fires on the BLUFOR as it approaches. The system provides continuous fire at the forward edge, and the flanks, and within the defensive position. In addition, it should allow rapid concentration of fire against the most threatened axis. The goal is to engage the attacking BLUFOR with an overwhelming intensity of fire as it approaches the forward edge of the defense. An effective system of fire begins with artillery concentrations and barrages on likely axes, choke points and deployment lines. There are four phases of OPFOR fire support in the defense.

        (1) Fire Interdiction of advancing BLUFOR. Typically begins when the BLUFOR moves into battalion columns. Fire interdiction of advancing BLUFOR troops occurs when the BLUFOR deploys into battalion columns. It continues until the BLUFOR reach their line of departure. Attached or supporting artillery units can occupy temporary fire positions beyond the forward edge of defense. Fixed-wing aviation and long-range artillery carry out fire on distant approaches. Where possible, BLUFOR units are destroyed as they move up, but if target intelligence is inadequate, disruption and delay is inflicted by all available assets.

    If the defense is adopted while in contact with the BLUFOR, this phase concentrates on the BLUFOR's second echelon. Throughout the period before the BLUFOR's attack, attention is paid to denying the BLUFOR good target intelligence for his preparation. As much artillery as possible remains silent until needed to repel a major attack. Batteries used before the main BLUFOR attack will fire from temporary fire positions or be used as roving batteries to confuse BLUFOR intelligence.

        (2) Fire to repel the BLUFOR attack. The most important phase in the defense consists of short, intense bursts of fire. This is the most important phase of defensive artillery fire. The phase begins when the BLUFOR crosses the line of departure and ends when he enters the first defensive positions. Fires create a zone of continuous fire in front of the defense. Fire to stop the BLUFOR attack coordinates artillery fire with antitank weapons and all weapons of the maneuver units.

    OPFOR artillery tries to break up attacks and split armor from the infantry with planned linear and box concentrations in front of the forward edge positions, and minefields in gaps between strongpoints, and eventually in depth. Guns and multiple rocket launchers start to engage the BLUFOR 15 to 25 km from the line of contact and howitzers will fire when the BLUFOR is within 10 to 15 km. Short but intense fire strikes, no more than fifteen to twenty minutes in duration are fired, followed by displacement to alternate fire positions to avoid counter-battery fire.

    Fire support to defending troops. Fire support of defending troops occurs when artillery units attack BLUFOR that have penetrated the defensive positions of first-echelon maneuver battalions. Its goal is to create fire pockets that destroy the BLUFOR, preventing him from developing the attack. Some batteries may enter preselected direct fire positions. The defender fires against individual targets.

    The artillery supports defensive positions in depth, tries to separate BLUFOR infantry from armor and fighting troops from their logistic support. If necessary, artillery may even be used in the direct fire role against armored breakthroughs. The artillery plays a key role in creating suitable conditions for the launching of a counterattack

        (4) Fire destruction of the BLUFOR during counterattack. Its goals are to recover lost positions, to destroy the penetrating BLUFOR, and to capture a line to launch offensive operations. This phase has three subphases for artillery support:

• Support for the forward movement of troops.

• Preparation of the counterattack.

• Support of the counterattack.

    A successful counterattack requires a stabilized line of contact. This line allows enough time for the second-echelon forces to advance and deploy for the counterattack.

6-7 ANTITANK FIRE IN THE DEFENSE (see also Chapter 1 page 1-8 Antitank Reserves).

    In the defense, AT units have these missions:

• Destroy BLUFOR tanks and APCs forward of the first echelon.

• Destroy tanks and APCs that have penetrated the first defensive echelon.

• Cover gaps in the defense, support the counterattack.

    The OPFOR views antitank fires as a critical component to success of a defense. Attack helicopters mounting rockets and ATGMs provide additional AT capabilities and can be used as a quick reaction reserve AT force. ATGM positions are at least 100 meters apart. The normal frontage for the ATGM unit is up to 500 meters for a platoon and 1500 meters for a battery. One or two alternate firing positions are also designated for each ATGM team to allow for maneuver during the conduct of the defense. The normal distance between tanks and antitank weapons in defensive positions is about 100 to 150 meters. On open terrain, 200 to 250 meters may separate tanks in defensive positions.

    In the defense, ATGMs have an engagement zone that extends out to 3 km or more from the forward edge. Tanks firing from defilade positions first engage attacking tanks 2 to 3 km in front of the defensive positions. The engagement zone for AT guns extends out to about 1,500 meters. Mounted AT grenade launcher or hand-held grenade launcher weapons can engage BLUFOR armor at ranges less than 1,000 meters.

    Fixed-wing aviation, helicopters, and massed artillery may fire against detected armor concentrations in assembly areas. Aircraft, especially ATGM-equipped attack helicopters, are the most effective weapons to engage moving armor forces at greater ranges. Mine laying helicopters may lay hasty AT minefields. The long-range rocket launcher can fire rockets with scatterable-mine warheads deep into the BLUFOR's forward defensive positions and along his axes of advance.

    Given the range of artillery, the goal is to concentrate fires on key sectors to break up the advancing BLUFOR attack. For example, the OPFOR should plan artillery fire to separate attacking BLUFOR infantry from their tanks approximately 700 to 1,000 meters from the forward edge. Protective fires are targeted within 300 to 400 meters of the forward edge, with concentrations to halt the advance of BLUFOR that have penetrated the defenses. Priority targets for the OPFOR units include tanks and other armored vehicles. Antitank weapons engage BLUFOR tanks at an effective range up to 5 km in front of the forward defenses.

    a. principles of antitank defense. The OPFOR can use AT fires to help channel BLUFOR armor into an open area with limited cover and concealment. Minefields are used in conjunction with AT assets to channel BLUFOR tank movements.

    The OPFOR will establish zones of antitank fire. These zones will typically be in front of the forward defensive positions, on the flanks, and between platoon strong points where antitank fires are concentrated during a BLUFOR attack. The most distant boundary of the zone of antitank fire depends on the terrain and the maximum effective range of the weapons systems being employed. The following table provides an example of ATGM ranges. More detail is found in the Equipment Chapter page 3-21.

Figure 6-8. ATGM ranges.

    b. Kill Zones (fire sacks). The OPFOR will establish one or more kill zones or fire sacks to support strongpoints. A fire sack is an area either forward of the front line of the strongpoint or in the depth of the defense, where a high density of preplanned flanking and frontal fires are placed on the BLUFOR by all available fire means. These fires are designed to produce high casualties among the attacking BLUFOR in a short period of time.

    Fire sacks are built to lead the BLUFOR into the area, through the use of natural terrain obstacles as well as minefields, man-made obstacles, and terrain changes. Once in the sack, the BLUFOR is cut off and surrounded by OPFOR units. The obstacles on the edges of the fire sack will serve to contain the BLUFOR, preventing escape. The defenses in the fire sack are well camouflaged and include the use of dummy weapons and positions.

    A typical OPFOR fire sack can be up to 1,000 meters in depth, with a frontage of 900 to 1,000 meters when created ahead of the forward edge or 500 to 800 meters when created within the strongpoint. Fire sacks may be created by a maneuver of fire, weapons, and units during a defensive battle. They may be either within the main defenses or forward of them in a security zone, but are always contained physically within the defensive positions.

6-8 ENGINEER.

    a. Engineer support in the defense involves:

• Supporting the battle and transition to the offense

• Providing reconnaissance of the BLUFOR and terrain

• Repelling BLUFOR attacks in front of forward edge

• Repelling counterattacks or penetrations into defensive sector

• Supporting second-echelon counterattack

• Reinforcing lines taken in counterattack

    b. Engineer preparation. The OPFOR divides preparation of the defense into three stages. Obstacles, both natural and manmade, play an important role in the defense.

        (1) First Stage. Barbed wire and other obstacles are emplaced in front of the position and fields of view and fire are cleared. Pits or trenches are prepared at the primary position of each fighting vehicle, crew-served weapon, and individual infantryman. Command observation posts and medical posts are dug in. The OPFOR normally allows 5 to 6 hours for this work.

        (2) Second Stage. During the second stage of preparation of the position, fighting vehicles and weapons systems are provided with alternate fire positions. Trenches are linked until they run continuously across the battalion frontage. Communication trenches are prepared. The OPFOR allows an additional 5 to 6 hours for this phase.

        (3) Further Preparation. Further preparation of the position includes improvement of existing trenches and positions, laying further obstacles and preparation of firing lines and routes for antitank reserves and second echelons. Communication trenches may be improved for use as fighting trenches. Dummy positions are prepared in intervals between strongpoints.

    c. Minefields and obstacles. Defensive positions are supplemented with minefields and non-explosive obstacles such as antitank ditches and wire. Minefields are placed to channel BLUFOR armor into the kill zones, which can contain more mines, tank traps, and trenches. Obstacles are also placed to hold the BLUFOR in the fire sack. Ideally, these obstacles are placed at about 2/3 of the effective range of the systems that will be covering them. Minefield dimensions are typically configured 300 x 60 meters. Mine outlay can reach 1000 antitank or more per kilometer of frontage on major avenues of approach.

    Natural or manmade obstacles will be used to slow, canalize or disrupt the advancement of the BLUFOR. Excellent natural obstacles include lakes, rivers, marshes, ravines, densely forested areas and escarpments. The OPFOR may create additional manmade obstacles such as minefields, antitank ditches, wire entanglements and abatis to further hinder the attacking BLUFOR.

    The OPFOR will also use mines and obstacles to protect the flanks of its position. Typically, minefields and obstacles are covered with direct and indirect fires. The level of sophistication of the engineer preparation will depend on the time available and on the engineer resources of each OPFOR unit. Some examples of obstacle emplacement times are shown in Figure 6-9.

Figure 6-9. OPFOR Obstacle emplacement times.

    b. Engineer Reconnaissance. Engineer troops assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and aiding in selection of positions for command posts and strongpoints. Engineers determine road and bridge conditions in the defensive area, availability of local materials for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply. Engineer elements observe BLUFOR preparations for the attack and determine the character and extent of BLUFOR engineer activity. Emphasis is on observing BLUFOR engineer reconnaissance activity and obstacle-clearing elements, BLUFOR route preparation through or around obstacles, and the composition and character of BLUFOR engineer and maneuver elements in the forward areas.

    During actual defensive combat, engineer observation posts monitor BLUFOR engineer activity, evaluate zones of destruction, and report areas where the BLUFOR is breaching defensive obstacles. At least one of the posts provides detailed photography of the area of interest. The posts forward all information to the combined arms commander and the chief of engineer service. When the OPFOR forces are on the defensive, engineer reconnaissance elements continue to reconnoiter terrain and the BLUFOR situation to determine routes best suited for a return to offensive action.

    The reconnaissance patrol will not normally be given a mission to conduct defensive operations. On rare occasions where the reconnaissance patrol is involved in contact with a superior BLUFOR and cannot extract itself, it may have to take up a defensive position until assistance arrives or it can disengage itself. The reconnaissance patrol will move its vehicles into the best covered and concealed positions available, dismount the scouts, and defend itself against actual or possible BLUFOR, usually in a 360-degree defense.

6-9 AIR SUPPORT.

    a. Helicopters. Rotary-wing assets will typically be used by a defending OPFOR to stop an advancing BLUFOR. Attack helicopters will serve in this role. They are entered into the defense at the point where the attacking BLUFOR is deploying into platoon columns (2 to 3 km). If the BLUFOR gains territory in the OPFOR defensive area, the attack helicopters are used as an antitank reserve. They may also be used to strike any assault landing forces that enter into the rear of the OPFOR defense.

    Helicopters are located in a deployment location where they can be brought into action quickly, but out of range of the BLUFOR (25km+). Once the BLUFOR attacks, the helicopter flight is called to action and lifts from its deployment location. Helicopters will advance at the lowest possible altitude (20-30 m) using terrain masking to hide movement.

    Once they reach the front line, the helicopters will raise up to a search altitude 35-70 m over level terrain and 100-245 m over rolling terrain. The search will be conducted from behind some natural concealment such as woods or hills. The OPFOR prefers to keep attack helicopters within the safety net of friendly air defense systems. Typically, two attack helicopters will be used per flight. Flight speeds can reach 200 kph. OPFOR attack helicopter missile systems have ranges from 5 to 10 km that allow for maximum standoff distances.

    In the defense, targets for attack helicopters include:

• Tanks and IFVs in attack formations.

• Artillery in firing positions.

• Helicopters at forward jumping-off locations.

• First-echelon command posts.

• Brigade reserves.

    When the BLUFOR target is located, the helicopter will fire (if within range) or maneuver to a position closer to where the target can be reached. When firing the helicopters must aim and fire and withdraw with the following restrictions:

• MI-24 with the AT-6 must be guided to the target.

• MI-24 the gunner must keep his sight on the target until the missile strikes (approx. 11 seconds at max. range of 5,000 m).

• KA-50 has a fire and forget missile.

    If the attacking BLUFOR gains a foothold in the OPFOR’s defensive position, helicopters will be used as AT reserves and will be brought forward in flights of 2 to 4 to fire on the BLUFOR.

    b. Fixed-wing Aircraft. In the defense, OPFOR ground attack aircraft are deployed deep with ATGMs after the BLUFOR had deploys into platoon columns. The ground attack aircraft will also target the BLUFOR brigade follow on forces. The ground attack fixed-wing aircraft used in the support of an OPFOR defense will be used to interdict advancing BLUFOR (initially done to a depth of 12-15 km forward of the front lines).

    Targets for the fixed-wing aircraft include:

• Tank and mechanized infantry lines of deployment.

• Artillery firing positions.

• First-echelon battalion and brigade command posts.

• Brigade reserves.

    Other targets are left for the attack helicopters. The attack aircraft will initially attack the battalion and company deployment lines (12-15 km and 5-6 km deep). Ground attack aircraft are organized in flights of 2, 4, or 8 aircraft.

6-10 Counterattack.

    A successful counterattack requires the same force ratios as an ordinary attack. The OPFOR constantly emphasizes that the defense is a temporary form of combat, making the transition to the offense easier. The OPFOR may opt to 1) execute a counterattack when the BLUFOR’s attack stalls or, 2) restore the defense should the BLUFOR succeed in breaching defensive positions. The OPFOR will develop a counterattack with the second-echelon or reserve forces. Tanks normally spearhead the counterattacks, following an intense air and artillery preparation, and with the support of fires of adjacent units.

    a. Features. The main features of OPFOR counterattacks are as follows:

• The BLUFOR’s attack must have been halted or, at the very least, the momentum of the attack must have been slowed. Antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments can be used to achieve this.

• The BLUFOR must be unable to commit a reserve into the penetration, either because it has already been committed, or because it has been neutralized by long range artillery fire.

    b. Ambushes. Ambushes are a feature of any OPFOR defense. In size, they vary from individual weapon systems to a platoon and are generally formed from second-echelon units. Tanks, BMPs, antitank weapons, and helicopters are all used for ambushes. They are sited on likely axes of approach, on flanks and in gaps and between first- and second-echelon positions. The goal of the ambush is to reduce the BLUFOR’s strength before he reaches the main position and to slow his advance.

6-11 WITHDRAWAL or disengagement actions.

    A withdrawal or disengagement by the OPFOR takes place due to unfavorable conditions following an offensive, while in a defense, or during a meeting engagement when it is determined that the BLUFOR has gained the tactical advantage.

    a. Features of a Withdrawal.

• OPFOR mechanized and armor companies will most often execute a withdrawal as a part of a battalion. The company may be the battalion rear guard or part of main body, but it can also act independently.

• The OPFOR will execute a withdrawal based on the losses sustained by the OPFOR. For example, a company will need to sustain a minimum of 20% in losses in the defense or 30% in the offense.

• Typically the withdrawal will take place at night or under obscure weather conditions to provide cover for the moving force. However, BLUFOR pressure is the critical trigger to execute a withdrawal.

    b. Types of Withdrawal.

        (1) Forced. The forced withdrawal is done under overwhelming BLUFOR pressure, or when the holding of a defensive position is no longer possible.

        (2) Deliberate. The deliberate withdrawal is conducted when the commander realizes that his forces are in an unfavorable situation. Before the BLUFOR is able to take advantage of this, he will move to a more favorable position. This type of withdrawal can also be done with the idea of reinforcing a sector that has been weakened, or to lead the BLUFOR into a fire sack.

    c. Engineer Support in the Withdrawal. Prior to a deliberate withdrawal, engineers will establish minefields in front of the new defensive positions. Engineers will mark corridors through which the withdrawing troops may move. If the OPFOR expects BLUFOR contact, the engineers may place minefields after the withdrawal is completed.

    d. Covering Force in a Withdrawal. The OPFOR will designate covering force, withdraw routes, collection points, final assembly area and time of the withdrawal. The covering force has the mission to deceive the BLUFOR and to cover the initial withdrawal of the main body. A covering force is composed of units deployed along the forward edge of the defensive area, typically reinforced platoons from each of the forward-deployed companies.

        (1) If the company is designated to be the rear security for the battalion or brigade: The company will have been a second-echelon company of the battalion or a company in the second-echelon battalion of the brigade, therefore, it will not be in direct contact with the BLUFOR at the time the withdrawal begins. Its mission is to prevent the breakthrough of the BLUFOR during the withdrawal of the main body of the battalion or brigade. The OPFOR should reinforce the company with a mechanized infantry platoon, an engineer platoon, and an artillery battery.

        (2) If the company is attacked by the BLUFOR during the execution of the withdrawal and the covering force or rear security company cannot contain them, the OPFOR will go into a temporary defensive position and begin to execute a defense. The company must be prepared to respond to BLUFOR fire.

        (3) If the company is going to withdraw as a part of the battalion the company commander designates a covering force. This force is made up of one platoon from the first echelon of the defense and one squad of mechanized infantry (if available).

    The OPFOR will designate all withdrawal routes for the remaining elements from their current positions to the platoon collection point. The platoon collection point is located to the rear of the second echelon platoon and it is an area where the company commander can place all of his subordinate elements, minus the covering force, into a company formation and move as a company to the new line of deployment or assembly area.

    If the BLUFOR succeeds in penetrating the defense, the OPFOR expects strongpoints to continue their resistance on the flanks, even if totally encircled. Counterattacks are attempted, even with small forces, using prepared routes and attacking from higher ground whenever possible. The OPFOR considers that mountain areas favor attempts by the defender to strike into the BLUFOR's depth. Special-purpose forces, raiding and other detachments are infiltrated into BLUFOR-held areas by ground or helicopter.

    d. Northern Regions. As is often the case in defense in special conditions, a sector in a northern area can be held with weaker forces than on normal terrain. Wider frontages are achieved by accepting larger intervals between platoon and company strongpoints. Strongpoints are positioned to cover roads, dominant high ground, defiles, and river crossings. Obstacles, patrols, and ambushes cover gaps. Strongpoints are made as logistically self-sufficient as possible, so they can continue to operate, even if cut-off by the BLUFOR or the climate. Fortifications may have to be built above ground level, but where snow cover is deep enough, trench systems are dug.