CHAPTER 7: OPFOR Operations on Special Terrain

7-2 Combat in Mountains.

    The OPFOR regards mountains as obstacles to be breached with attacks. As in other environments, the OPFOR defends to gain time. This allows it to concentrate forces for the offense or economize forces allowing it to mount an offense elsewhere. The principles of offense and defense, with some modifications, are applicable to this environment. Although the OPFOR believes that mechanized infantry units must be capable of fighting in mountainous terrain, it intends to use infantry-heavy forces most often.

  a. March. Vehicles maintain a 100- to 150- meter interval while conducting a march. The limited routes and likelihood of ambushes make reconnaissance critical for combat success. During the march in mountainous terrain, the mission of combat reconnaissance patrols and the advance guard become paramount. Low mountains and hills may cut the rate of march in half, even without the additionally slowing effect of BLUFOR action, poor weather, or natural obstacles. Steep slopes reduce movement rates approximately 50 percent. For example, the dismounted rate of march decreases from the normal 4 to 5 kilometers per hour down to 2 to 3 kilometers. The carrying capacity of transport vehicles reduces by an average of 20 to 25 percent. Fuel consumption increases by as much as 75 percent on snow-covered mountain roads. The increased altitude reduces engine power.

  b. Offense. The goals of mountain offensive actions are to control passes, road junctions, built-up areas, and adjacent high ground. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of combined arms forces, including tanks and artillery, in the mountains. The terrain isolates forces from each other and narrows the zone of advance. This dictates that units at battalion level and below conduct the majority of combat. The OPFOR attempts to get tanks into the least accessible areas because of their utility in the fire support role. It also uses artillery in the direct fire role. Mortars provide extra high-angle artillery support and are ideal for mountain operations. Because of the difficulty in passing one echelon through another and in shifting axes in constricted terrain, units from division down often advance in one echelon. However, in an advance along a narrow valley, the OPFOR may sometimes even use a three-echelon formation. The OPFOR maintains strong reserves in this environment.

    Zones of advance tend to be much wider in mountains, though actual attack frontages and strike sectors within them are much the same as on flat terrain. Attack frontages depend on the terrain. Because there are rarely sufficient routes and space for deployment, attacks from the march are uncommon. Most attacks are from positions in direct contact, despite the loss of surprise and momentum. Dismounted mechanized or motorized infantry troops lead the attack, not tanks. The OPFOR uses a sizable proportion of the assigned artillery in the direct fire role. Infantry battalions often attack independently, in separate zones, because of the limited number of routes in mountainous terrain. Battalion commanders receive missions lasting longer than usual and can receive attachment of artillery, mortars, tanks, and engineer units. The amount and type of attachments vary depending on the infantry battalion's mission.

    The OPFOR emphasizes infiltration into the BLUFOR rear during mountainous combat. Infiltration is valuable during the offense and defense. The OPFOR employs it in support of deception, and intelligence collection, or to posture a unit for an attack, as an example, an infantry battalion will infiltrate the night before an attack. Infiltration moves forces through an BLUFOR-held area to a position of advantage in the BLUFOR's rear. From there, the force uses other forms of maneuver to attack its assigned objective. Infiltration differs from a penetration. In the penetration, the OPFOR exerts maximum combat power to pass through a BLUFOR defense. In an infiltration, infiltrating units seek to avoid BLUFOR defenses and pass through gaps in the defense. Units then form for the attack.

  c. Defense. The OPFOR defense stresses thorough reconnaissance, well-organized outposts, continuous flank security, and swift counterattacks by the second echelon. Constant observation and patrolling detect and prevent envelopments. A two-echelon defense is standard in mountain areas. In sectors unsuitable for movement, the defense organizes in one echelon, with a reserve, and for only receives limited resources. The defense organizes to cover all possible areas of attack. Mutually supporting platoon and company strongpoints are essential with gaps covered by patrols. Strongpoints use forward- and reverse-slope positions and locate for 360-degree defense. The strongpoints hold even if surrounded. The OPFOR considers mountain passes as the tactical key to an entire mountain range. Therefore, it assigns the largest part of the force to defend them. In defending a pass, the OPFOR occupy the heights that dominate the pass as well as key spurs on the approaches to it.

    In mountainous terrain, battalions establish their defenses on broader frontages than on regular terrain, intersecting the most easily accessible axes of BLUFOR advance. The OPFOR defends plateaus and wide valleys the same way it defends under normal conditions. Tank avenues of approach receive emphasis. Tanks, antitank guns, and ATGMs locate in company strongpoints that are defending road junctions, exits from valleys, defiles, edges of forests, and mountain river crossings. Their firing positions enable them to hit the BLUFOR at maximum range.

  d. Armor. In the mountains, the OPFOR uses tanks as mobile armored artillery or in the double envelopment role. The tank holds the defending force while the infantry troops envelop on both sides. The OPFOR uses tanks extensively in groups of two or three to reinforce an enveloping detachment consisting of an infantry platoon, a squad of engineers, and an antitank platoon. In support of night attacks, tanks approach the objective under the cover of darkness and deliver fire during the assault. The OPFOR may allocate elements of a tank battalion to mechanized and motorized infantry battalions. OPFOR commanders attempt to get their tanks into areas where the BLUFOR would not expect them. In the defense the OPFOR may employ tanks forward in infantry strongpoints. Tanks may precede infantry but more often support ground attacks by fire. The commander may attach tanks down to what would normally be very low levels, with one tank per infantry platoon if possible.

  e. Artillery. The OPFOR frequently decentralizes fire support to support maneuver forces on independent axes. It fires its artillery by batteries or even platoons. Artillery and mortars locate forward, with the flat-trajectory weapons on the flanks. This positioning supports extended and uneven frontages and covers gaps and dead space. Artillery uses direct fire at maximum range as often as possible. The OPFOR may employ 160-mm mortars instead of the 122-mm howitzer, because of the mortar's higher angle of fire and greater mobility due to decreased weight. The 76-mm mountain gun is an outstanding mountain artillery piece.

  f. Engineer Support. Engineer support in the mountains requires a greater than normal range of assets and is more extensive and difficult to perform than over more normal terrain. The OPFOR reinforces engineer units involved in mountainous combat more heavily than comparable engineer elements in normal combat conditions. They can therefore accomplish a larger volume of work. Objectives may not be as deep for units at battalion level and below as they would be under normal conditions. In mountainous areas, the OPFOR expects to achieve only one-third the normal rate of advance. However, depending on the circumstances, the rate of advance may be higher than the expected one-third rate.