CHAPTER 7: OPFOR Operations on Special Terrain

7-3 Combat in Forests.

    The term forest includes all densely forested areas, for example, forests, grasslands, jungles, and swamps. The forest, especially in mountainous terrain, has a leveling effect on the relative capabilities of opponents, since it sharply limits the employment of armor, heavy artillery, and vehicles and also restricts aerial observation. Under such conditions, the OPFOR makes extensive use of:

• Natural cover.

• Infiltration.

• Ambushes.

• Raids.

• Deception.

• Speed of movement.

• Continuous reconnaissance.

• Well-coordinated planning.

    Forest conditions make it difficult to use large units and also complicate commanders' control over their own and subordinate units. Forests cover thirty percent of the world's landmass. There are two basic types of forests: tropical rain forests, and deciduous.

    a. Characteristics. The OPFOR characterizes fighting in forested or swampy terrain by the following factors:

• Difficulties in observation, orientation and the adjustment of artillery fire.

• The complexity of command and control (C²).

• Difficulty in using antitank wire-guided missiles (ATGMs).

• Abundance of natural obstacles easily and quickly improved.

• The possibility of forest fires.

    b. Principles. When fighting in forests commanders apply the following principles:

• Maintain the offensive; defend only to gain time. The OPFOR defense is a temporary measure, adopted only when necessary. This does not imply, however, that the OPFOR defense consists of half measures or that it is unskilled in defense techniques. It carefully and cleverly prepares it defenses.

• Embrace the BLUFOR; stay close to reduce the effects of BLUFOR firepower.

• Infiltrate at every opportunity.

• Fighting during periods of limited visibility.

• Use surprise tactics: raids, ambushes, and patrols.

• Use of camouflage, obstacles, mines, boobytraps, and survival measures (bunkers and tunnels) extensively.

• Remove intelligence indicators from the battlefield. The OPFOR goes to great lengths to leave little or no information relating to its intentions, order of battle, strength, or unit dispositions.

    c. March. The organization of the march column is important in thick woods, because it is usually very difficult to implement changes during the course of combat. Movement is generally on poor roads with limited opportunity for detours. There is great likelihood of blockage, due either to BLUFOR action or to vehicle breakdown. Flank security, assisted by mobile obstacle detachments, attempts to block BLUFOR counterattacks from the flanks.

    Platoons and companies use available roads and trails. The roads and trails may have considerable distance between them. The units advance on narrow frontages to fix the defense, while the main body attempts to envelop the position.

    The march in the forests differs from normal combat in that:

• It enhances the role of reconnaissance and flank protection. The OPFOR reinforces its reconnaissance troops with mechanized or motorized infantry troops. Each battalion is responsible for its own protection against ambushes or surprise. Flank security elements move closer than normal to the column. They travel on a route parallel to the main body.

• Forward detachments assume a greater importance, both to forestall the creation of a defensive line and to cover the deployment of the main body. The concealment offered by the forest facilitates their use.

• Movement support detachments have to be stronger than in open warfare.

• Commanders move well forward so that they can make rapid decisions on the basis of personal observation of the ground and BLUFOR.

• Route marking and traffic control assume increased importance.

    The OPFOR prefers to use mechanized and motorized infantry when fighting in the forest. Whenever possible, it reinforces units with combat engineers and artillery. It prefers direct-fire artillery in the woods, since that is usually more appropriate than indirect fire. Often, as in combat in urban areas, the OPFOR forms assault battalions and groups (companies). It reinforces each with tanks, artillery, and mortars for direct and indirect fires, air defense, and combat engineers.

    d. Offense. Forests may sit astride important axes of advance. As potential redoubts, the BLUFOR may fortify and defend them. As is the case in build-up areas, the OPFOR prefers to bypass such an area and isolate the defenders. If, however, an axis through a forest is likely to surprise the BLUFOR and catch him off balance, the OPFOR may select it as the best means of overcoming a strong defense. When obliged to attack under these conditions, the OPFOR plans the attack thoroughly, using time to conduct a thorough reconnaissance. The OPFOR tries to exploit the fragmented front in forested areas by using a combination of penetrations and envelopments. Offensive actions in forests combine tactics to fix the defender with enveloping movements executed to either bypass the BLUFOR or attack him from the rear.

    Even if entire units do not advance through large wooded areas, the OPFOR frequently uses the forests to conceal the infiltration of reinforced battalion- or larger-sized units. It also uses large wooded areas to hide airborne or air assault troops that it inserted into the BLUFOR rear to serve as raiding units. The OPFOR is a master at infiltrating units up to brigade level. However, the normal size for an infiltration force is a company or below.

    The OPFOR executes attacks in forests with battalion- or company-sized forces. It uses the normal crisscross pattern of trails and natural breaks found in forests. It organizes its advance on a wider frontage than normal, and on multiple axes using as many routes as possible to overextend and confuse the defense and conceal the main axis. Battalion and companies attack on each axis. Strike sectors are quite narrow (50 meters for a platoon), but distances between available approaches may widen the overall attack zone of the company. Platoons are normally 150 to 200 meters apart, but may separate by as much as 500 meters.

  e. Defense. The forest is a significant obstacle to an advancing BLUFOR and may not be passable even for state-of-the-art combat equipment. There are not enough roads, which forces the BLUFOR to advance along accessible axes. On the other hand, the forest facilitates prepared defenses and camouflage, concealment, and deception.

    The OPFOR does not hold the edge of the forest in strength because it is vulnerable to BLUFOR artillery and air attack. Depending on the nature of the forest, it places its forward edge ahead of the treeline or 50 to 100 meters or more it into the depth of the forest. Soldiers clear terrain to improve fields of observation and fire. The OPFOR organizes its defense in depth and bases it on a series of company strongpoints, employing all-round defense, and on key obstacles.

    Engineers and soldiers fortify company-and platoon-level strongpoints and camouflage them very well. The OPFOR patrols gaps between the strongpoints and possible bypasses denied by obstacles and ambushes. Engineers prepare the emplacements, shelters, trenches, and communication trenches for strongpoints on terrain with a low groundwater level. In sectors where there is no need to dig communication trenches, signs or marks on trees denote movement routes to the rear. As a result of limited visibility, it is common to fight close-range battles. The OPFOR uses small unit ambushes and surprise

    The OPFOR stresses active defense. It does not passively wait for attacks to develop. Continuous reconnaissance reveals the BLUFOR's intentions. This enables OPFOR artillery and air attacks to disrupt and delay BLUFOR preparations. The defenders thoroughly reconnoiter concealed routes for counterattacks. If necessary, the engineers improve them. Battalions and higher maintain reserves for counterattacks. The OPFOR avoids large reserves in favor of numerous small reserves positioned near the forward edge. These reserves remain available at short notice.

    In the counterattack, speed and the ability to react are more important than size. The defending force immediately counterattacks, even in small groups, when the attacker penetrates a position. Patrols infiltrate into the BLUFOR rear to ambush and attack BLUFOR C².

    Should the BLUFOR achieve a penetration, the OPFOR commander is unlikely to withdraw his forces completely from the area. Instead, he reorganizes battalions and companies and establishes new strongpoints or concealed areas to launch raids. Remnants of OPFOR units will continue to harass and disrupt BLUFOR rear communications until they destroy them

7-4 Night Combat.

    In the OPFOR view, night cannot be a reason for decreasing activity. On the contrary, they use the dark of night to achieve surprise, to increase the rate of advance, and to win time. The OPFOR considers darkness to be more of an advantage and an opportunity than a reason for interruption of combat.

    Combat at night is normally an extension of combat actions during the day. The battle may be carried on into the night to retain the initiative with a high offensive tempo.

    a. Characteristics. The OPFOR characterizes fighting at night by the following factors:

• Darkness favors the performance of marches and maneuvers

• Easier to concentrate men and material

• Hampers enemy use of most weapons, airborne troops, and aviation

• Provides favorable conditions for achieving surprise

• Can fulfill their mission with smaller losses in personnel and equipment

• More difficult to orient

• Effectiveness of aimed fire is reduced

• Reconnaissance and target selection is more difficult

    March. Regardless of their difficulty, night marches are a necessary. Their preparation, organization, security, and execution require a great deal of attention. The successful execution of a night march depends to a large degree on the general maintenance, organization, concealment, and rapid movement of all units.

• Greater emphasis on planning and security than day marches.

• Intervals between vehicles are shorter.

• Security elements are closer to the main body.

• Reconnaissance is conducted before and during the night march.

• No long halts

• Darkness must be used to the maximum extent of movement.

• Strict light and noise discipline are maintained.

    c. Offense. A night attack may be the continuation of daytime combat, or it may be the start of a new attack. A continuation of a daytime attack must be carried through without a break so that the enemy will not have time to bring up his reserve or to regroup.

• Night attacks are often launched 2-3 hours before dawn to permit daylight exploitation of success.

• To achieve surprise, a night attack may be launched without artillery fires.

• A night counterattack is usually conducted in one echelon to simplify control.

• In an attack from positions in direct contact, illuminated markers designate lanes through mine fields and obstacles.

• In an attack from the march, units attack on an azimuth. Lines of deployment from the march to prebattle formations and to attack formations may be designated by ground markers, signal lights or flares.

• Complicated maneuvers are avoided. The most common attack formation is the line formation.

• Mechanized Infantry units normally attack dismounted.

• Intervals between units and vehicles may be reduced.

• Each artillery battalion normally designates one platoon for illumination missions.

• Artillery illumination may be either continuous or periodic. In continuous illumination, a round is fired every 20 to 30 seconds to turn "night into day."

    Defense. Night creates many difficulties for the attacking forces but offers considerable advantages to the defender. Darkness reduces the effectiveness of an attacker’s reconnaissance, observation, and aimed fires. Darkness also provides the defender with better concealment than the attacker.

• Requires a comprehensive defense operation order.

• Additional observation posted are established if required.

• Illumination plays a critical part of the defense at night.

• An illumination plan will include:

- Illuminating the area forward of the main defensive area.

- Blinding the enemy.

- Support to counterattacks.

• Illumination may be provided by artillery, mortars and flares.
• Defense plan may include establishing ambushes and using patrols to cover gaps between strongpoints.