APPENDIX A

 

JOINT LOGISTICS

 

Note: The information in this appendix is a compilation of material on joint logistics. Most of the information came from Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, January 1995.

 

Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance.

The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks

all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management"

 

¾ LtCol George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics (1917)

 

A-1. General

 

a. Logistics. Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nationís economy to a nationís warfighting forces. Logistics is the process of plan-ning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in executing a military strategy and operation. The areas of logistic responsibilities are shown in figure A-1.

 

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies to support the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nationís capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Commanders may have more combat forces than available logistic resources to move and sustain desired operations. A nationís capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a major limiting factor in military operations. This may be especially true in future joint operations when demands for military resources become highly competitive.

 

 

Figure A-1.

b. Levels of logistic support. Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war¾ strategic, oper-ational, and tactical. They apply in war and in MOOTW. Logistic support within these levels is demonstrated in the way the Joint Staff, Services, and warfighting commanders handle logistics. The Joint Staff and services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The supported and supporting commandersí logistic staffs manage both the strategic and operational logistic issues affecting missions assigned to the combatant commanders (CINCs) in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and other such areas as the combatant commander directs. The services and the subordinate commanders down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with the necessary materiel to do their jobs.

 

All levels are interrelated with constraints at any level limiting decisionmakersí options. Within their areas of responsibility, geographic combatant commanders may establish a theater of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operation (see Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations). The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the CONUS base to the CZ. Figure A-2 shows a broad framework for this organization and the scope of logistic support needed to support a theater. All levels of logistics involve CSS and affect the sustainability of forces in the CZ.

 

c. Logistic functions. Logistic support requirements involve six broad functional areas: supply sys-tems, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services, (see figure A-3).

 

 

 

Figure A-2.

 

 

 

Figure A-3.

 

(1) Supply systems acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel operating forces require to equip and sustain the force from deployment through combat operations and their redeployment.

 

(2) Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel serviceable, return it to service, or update and upgrade its capability.

 

(3) Transportation is moving units, personnel, equipment, and supplies from the point of origin to the final destination. Additional guidance is in the Joint Pub 4-01 series of publications.

 

(4) General engineering provides the construction, damage repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or logistic enhancements the combatant commander requires to provide shelter, warehousing, hospitals, water and sewage treatment, and water and fuel storage distribution to provide sustainment and services. Additional guidance is found in Joint Pub 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

 

(5) Health services include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory serv-ices, blood management, vector control, preventive medicine services, veterinary services, dental services, and the required C2 and communications. Additional guidance is found in the Joint Publication 4-02 series of publications.

 

(6) Other services are associated with nonmateriel support activities and consist of various func-tions and tasks the service troops and logistic community provide that are essential to the technical man-agement and support forces (i.e., aerial delivery, laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and mortuary affairs). Additional guidance is found in Joint Pub 4-06, Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

 

d. Joint support responsibilities and requirements. To avoid shortfalls or increased risk in OPLANs, logistics must be balanced between the combatant commanderís needs and logistic resource availability. Logistics is also a function of command. To control the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, one must also control logistics. For a given area and mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM over assigned forces. COCOM includes directive authority for logistics, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift

logistic resources within the theater. COCOM cannot be delegated. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders.

 

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), fully explains COCOM and the other command relationships of OPCON, tactical control, and support. (Note: A CINCís authority is generally confined to the theater, while logistic support beyond the theater is usually a serviceís responsibility. This authority underscores the need for accurate, well-coordinated prior logistic planning among CINCs, services, supporting agencies, and allies.) Support, which often involves logistics, is a forceís action that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force and may involve providing services, resources, and combat power but does not involve transferring forces or units. Support is characterized as mutual support, GS, DS, and close support. Joint Pub 0-2 also provides descriptions of the concepts of coordinating authority, administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

 

One way the combatant commander applies directive authority is in determining the type of servicing to employ within a combatant command. Types of servicing are single-servicing, in which each military department supports itself; cross- or common servicing, in which one department supports itself and another; and joint servicing, in which a jointly staffed and funded activity supports two or more military services. The using service reimburses the issuing service for cross-servicing. At the COCOM level, directive authority may encompass all of these servicing modes.

 

· Single-servicing¾ each service supports itself.

· Cross-servicing¾ one service supports another (reimbursed).

· Common servicing¾ one service supports another (not reimbursed).

· Joint servicing¾ two or more services jointly staffed and funded.

 

e. Multinational logistic support responsibilities and requirements. For coalition and combined commands, formal arrangements for C2 may not be feasible, but joint command relationships and proce-dures give US combatant commanders an entry position on which to base multinational relationships. Combatant commanders cannot enter into multinational relationships that are contrary to US policy without NCA direction. Allied and coalition nations design their logistic systems to facilitate self-sufficiency within their fiscal capabilities. Although sustaining its forces is each nationís own responsibility, varying degrees of mutual logistic support among nations can be expected. Exchanging logistic support among members of alliances or coalitions can result in significant economies of effort.

 

However, in the absence of appropriate international agreements, there is no authority for the geo-graphic combatant commanders to provide for or accept logistic support from allies or coalition partners. Under these circumstances, multinational commanders should attain as much control of logistics as possible through tact, diplomacy, knowledge of allied forcesí doctrine, and generally good personal relations with allied and coalition subordinate commanders and political leaders. Commanders of the appropriate service component commands should screen requirements for multinational forces supported by or under the control of a geographic combatant commander and report separately to the geographic combatant commanderís J4. The combatant commander establishes the necessary reports and forwards the requirements to the Chairman, JCS, to obtain NCA approval to provide support to multinational forces. The geographic combatant commander will ensure he renders assistance to multinational forces IAW assigned responsibilities and as the NCA directs.

 

f. Elements of the logistic process. For each of the functional areas listed in paragraph A-1c, the geographic combatant commander should consider the four elements of the logistic process: acquisition,

distribution, sustainment, and disposition. At the theater strategic level, specific considerations include logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations, the procurement process needed to ensure logistic resources are available in a timely manner, the process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands, and the distribution system necessary to achieve maximum combat effectiveness. Theater strategic considerations are shown in figure A-4. At the operational level, specific considerations include identifying operational requirements and establishing priorities for employing the resources provided.

 

Geographic combatant commanders should understand that these functions will vary in definition and application, and plan accordingly. Efforts should be made to standardize these functions without inhibiting operations. Logistic functions should use existing service component policies and procedures whenever possible. If it is not possible to use these existing policies and procedures, the geographic combatant commanders must identify and resolve differences with service commanders early in the planning process to ascertain the degree of uninterrupted logistic support in the theater. These procedures apply across the range of military operations. Ideally, units will conduct prior deliberate planning and testing of modifications in joint exercises to ensure adequate logistic support for the expected joint operations.

 

 

Figure A-4.

 

I donít know what the hell this logistics is that Marshall is

always talking about, but I want some of it.

 

¾ Fleet Admiral E. J. King to a staff officer (1942)

 

A-2. Responsibilities

 

a. Authority and control. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). A combatant commander exercises directive authority for logistics by issuing subordinate commanders directives, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following:

 

· Effectively executing approved OPLANs.

· Effectiveness and economy of operations.

· Preventing or eliminating unnecessary facility duplication and overlapping functions among the service component commands.

 

This authorization of directive authority is not intended to discontinue service responsibility for logistic support; discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or disrupt effective procedures, efficient facility use, or organization. Unless the Secretary of Defense otherwise directs, the military departments and services will continue to logistically and administratively support service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:

 

· Under peacetime conditions, a COCOM commanderís logistic and administrative responsibilities will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed¾ legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions the Secretary of Defense or Chairman, JCS, prescribe. Where these factors preclude commanders executing a combatant com-manderís directive, the combatant commanderís comments and recommendations, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate military department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved quickly with the appropriate military department, the combatant commander will refer it through the Chairman, JCS, to the Secretary of Defense.

· Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make it necessary to divert the normal logistic process, combatant commanderís logistic and administrative authority enable them to use all forcesí facilities and supplies assigned to their commands as necessary to accomplish their missions.

 

A combatant commander will approve service logistic programs (base adjustments, force bed-downs, and other aspects as appropriate) within the commandís area of responsibility that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. When the combatant commander does not concur in a proposed service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the service chief fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman, JCS, to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

 

b. Implementation and execution. Implementing and executing logistic functions remains the respon-sibility of the services, US Special Operations Command, and the service component commanders.

 

c. Single-service logistic support. Each service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces except when agreements with national agencies or allies, or assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing otherwise provide logistics support. The combatant commanders may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated area. If so, the combatant commander may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all service com-ponents in the theater or designated area to the service component that is the dominant user.

 

d. Reviewing requirements. The combatant commander will review requirements of the service com-ponent commands and establish priorities through the deliberate planning process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. He will provide balanced and uniform plans in furthering the commandís mission.

 

e Transferring functions and facilities among services. The CINCs should give appropriate guid-ance to their components for transferring forces and rendering support. Under wartime or crisis conditions, a CINC may direct function transfers as necessary. This authorization of directive authority is not intended to abrogate service responsibility for logistic support. Every effort will be made to obtain the serviceís concurrence through coordination with service component commands or directly to the appropriate serviceís headquarters. Under all conditions, implementing such a directed transfer,

including administrative and procedural aspects, is the responsibility of the service component com-manders involved. The combatant commander still oversees and resolves issues.

 

f. Forces subordinate to combatant commands. Logistic responsibilities for forces subordinate to the combatant command will follow single-service command channels except when specifically directed otherwise either by the authority assigning those subordinate forces to the combatant command or by the Secretary of Defense, or when common, joint, or cross-servicing agreements and procedures provide other responsibilities. The geographic combatant commander may delegate to the commander of a subordinate joint force directive authority for a common support capability within that subordinate commanderís joint operations area.

 

A-3. Supply

 

a. Geographic combatant commander. A geographic combatant commanderís responsibilities for supply are listed in figure A-5. Geographic combatant commanders effectively coordinate supply support between the service components, establish supply buildup rates, and state theater stockage levels. When practical to improve economy of effort, common-item support may be assigned to a service component command, normally the dominant user. Geographic combatant commanders also allocate critical logistic resources within their theaters. They must ensure that statements of assigned forcesí requirements (including mutual support arrangements and associated ISSAs) are prepared and submitted IAW existing directives of the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and service chiefs.

 

b. Service component commands. Subject to the combatant commandersí responsibility and author-ity as outlined, commanders of the service component commands must logistically support their forces and directly communicate with appropriate HQ on all supply matters and related requirements such as deploying supplies, materiel, and equipment into the area of responsibility. Component command commanders will keep the geographic combatant commander informed of the status of supply matters affecting their forcesí readiness.

 

c. Subordinate commands. Subordinate command commanders could be required to provide supply support to elements or individuals of other services within the theater or designated area.

 

 

Figure A-5.

d Supplies for civilians. The geographic combatant commander provides supplies to civilians in occupied areas IAW current directives, obligations, and treaties the United States recognizes.

 

e. Phased buildup and cutback priorities. The geographic combatant commander recommends the priority of the phased buildup and cutback of supplies, installations, and organizations essential to the mission to the Chairman, JCS.

 

A-4. Distribution

 

Distribution is a function of visibility, management, and transportation. The geographic combatant commander maintains an effective theater distribution network that is consistent with the servicesí intertheater policy and procedures and for prescribing unique policies and procedures relating to the theaterís distribution network. In general, service component command commanders will operate their distribution networks IAW established service procedures using established distribution channels whenever possible.

 

A-5. Maintenance and Salvage

 

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for maintenance and salvage coordination within the theater. Where practical, establish maintenance facilities for joint- or cross-service use, and emphasize interservice use of salvage assets. However, service component commanders will remain responsible for service-peculiar item maintenance support. Maintenance priorities should emphasize mission-essential weapon systems that can be rapidly returned to combat readiness. An effective maintenance program (including preventive maintenance) can minimize retrograde and supply needs for major end items and enhance battle damage repair efforts.

 

A-6. Facilities Engineering and Base Development

 

a. Base establishment. Geographic combatant commanders establish bases necessary to accomplish the mission.

 

b. Real estate requirements. Geographic combatant commanders coordinate real estate requirements within the theater. Interservice use of real estate should be maximally encouraged. Geographic combat-ant commanders will resolve conflicting requirements for additional real estate and incompatible use of existing real estate.

 

c. Facilities construction. Combatant commanders prioritize, plan, and coordinate the road, bridge, and facility construction necessary to support their mission. Overseas contingency construction project requests require geographic combatant commander validation. Additionally, the CINC will determine priorities for programming facilities necessary to support the mission.

 

d. Facility assignment. The services are normally responsible for facility acquisition funding and support. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure that the minimum-essential engineering and facilities required to support the theater operational and tactical requirements are assigned to the service components. Based on mission requirements, the combatant commander may direct temporary transfers between service components. Local facility use should be maximized, especially in occupied areas.

 

A-7. Transportation

 

The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) provides strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives across the range of military operations. Combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCTRANS who, with the transportation component commands, provides a complete movement system from origin to initial theater destination. This system includes effectively using military and commercial assets. Finally, USCINCTRANS procures commer-cial transportation services through component commands (within legal constants) and activates, with Secretary of Defense approval, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and Sealift Readiness Program.

 

a. Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and MTMC transportation facilities and supplies. Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and MTMC transportation facilities and supplies not assigned to the geographic combatant commander are normally exempted from his logistic authority. Combatant commanders should communicate their requirements and priorities for modifying existing facilities and establishing new transportation facilities to service component commanders and USCINCTRANS.

 

b. Air and water ports. Host nations operate and control most airports and seaports located OCONUS, but US forces may augment them. During wartime, each service is primarily responsible for loading and unloading its military units. The responsibilities of the Army Materiel Command and its controlled aircraft are contained in multiservice publications.

 

A-8. Procurement

 

Logistics procurement is generally a national and service responsibility. Currently, the CINCs have only indirect influence on service procurement. The CINCs use a series of reports and messages to the services; Chairman, JCS; or Defense Programming Resources Board such as integrated priority lists, critical item lists, and defense budget issues to influence the budget system. The CINCsí role in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is changing, and this relationship will be put forth in future DOD directives and joint publications.

 

A-9. Health Services

 

Geographic combatant commanders coordinate and integrate CHS within their theaters. Where practical, jointly use available medical assets to support the warfighting strategy and concept of operations. Combatant commanders should ensure that the CHS system accomplishes its goals of returning ill and injured combatants to duty as far forward as possible and stabilizing and rapidly evacuating those patients who cannot RTD within the established theater evacuation policy.

 

A-10. Field Services

 

Combatant commanders are responsible for searching, recovering, identifying, caring for, evacuat-ing, or disposing of deceased personnel within their theaters. The responsibility extends not only to deceased US personnel but also to allied, third country, and enemy dead. For humanitarian, health, and morale reasons, this responsibility may extend to the local populace. Combatant commanders will control and coordinate mortuary affairs operations within their theaters. This responsibility also pertains to peacetime mass fatality incidents.

A-11. Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems, and Intel-ligence Support

 

Effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) are vital to plan-ning, initiating, conducting, sustaining, and protecting a successful joint operation. Logistic operations and intelligence functions depend on responsive C4I, the central system tying together all aspects of joint operations and allowing commanders and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, question, and react. Integrating logistic and operational command, control, communications, and computers is essential.

 

A-12. Security Assistance

 

Combat commanders will identify materiel requirements for regional minimum-essential security assistance and consolidate and prioritize wartime requirements within their theaters.

 

A-13. Wartime Host Nation Support

 

a. Negotiation authority. Geographic combatant commanders will obtain authority for negotiations with HNS through Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State channels. HNS assistance can include, but is not limited to, POL; transportation; telecommunications; civilian labor; rear area protection; facilities; contracting; equipment acquisition; supplies; services; and CHS. Areas of potential HNS are shown in figure A-6.

 

b. Facilities and real estate. Geographic combatant commanders must coordinate with the host nation to acquire and use facilities and real estate.

 

c. Acquisition cross-service agreements (ACSAs). Geographic combatant commanders and compo-nent commanders will ensure use of existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplicating HN effort. Com-ponent commanders will inform the combatant commander if an HN ACSA exists. If one does not exist, the CINC or subordinate commander can initiate an ACSA with the host nation when having one would be advantageous.

 

 

 

Figure A-6.

 

d. Language support. Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders should make every effort to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs.

 

A-14. Counterintelligence Support

 

Critical to logistic operations is an accurate picture of the threat through which the theater logistic forces must travel. Hostile activities can impede forward movement, destroy logistic stockpiles, close airports and seaports, and destroy critical logistic elementsí prime movers. Hostile actions can render invalid logistic support assumptions made during deliberate planning. Knowing the potential threat (including terrorism, hostile special operations forces, refugees, and other aspects as appropriate) is critical to the logistic effort. Counterintelligence support provides threat assessments, affects liaison with HN security and intelligence services, and conducts operations and investigations to identify and/or neutralize the threat. Combatant commanders should be aware of counterintelligence support capabili-ties and can obtain assistance through the CINCís counterintelligence security officer.

 

A-15. JOINT LOGISTICS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

 

The CINC is responsible for joint operational logistics. He applies logistic resources to generate, produce, and support theater combat power. Furthermore, the CINC must ensure that his campaign plan integrates operations and logistics plans. In his overall concept, the CINC establishes an interrelationship between operations and logistics. He does this by insisting on close cooperation and information exchange between operations and logistic planners. The CINC's influence is essential in bridging the operations-logistics gap.

 

Operational logistics planning should be carried out concurrently with strategic planning and before tactical planning. It must be done in conjunction with, and in support of, operation planning to identify and resolve support problems before the plan is implemented. This is one of JOPESí major objectives. Next, the entire spectrum of planning should consider logistic support requirements and capabilities. Simply stated, planners focus on the objective and plan backward from that point to determine how to achieve that objective. Resources are limited. In planning, questions must be answered to determine whether adequate resources are available for operations. If not, logistics will limit OPLANs. Once the operation concept is developed, the logistic concept is defined in enough detail to allow service planners to begin detailed logistic support planning for their forces. Logistic planning must¾

 

· Be concurrent and integrated with operational planning.

· Support operational planning.

· Define logistic concept sufficiently to allow detailed support planning.

 

Although the service component commanders furnish the logistic resources, the CINC develops the plan to use these resources to support the theater concept of operations. The logistic plan must cover all levels of war. In addition, the CINC should coordinate the logistic part of his plan with the international and national organizations, service components, and other commands supporting his operation.

 

CINCs or subordinate joint force commanders may establish joint logistic centers, offices, and boards to coordinate the logistic effort. The following are examples of joint logistics centers, offices, and boards:

a. Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB will establish priorities and allocate common-user transportation resources within the theater. It will process all requests for reapportioning or adjusting established allocations from the component commanders.

 

b. Joint movement center (JMC). The JMC is established under the supervision of the joint force commanderís J4 to implement the tasking and priorities the joint force commander provides. It coordinates all means of transportation employment (including what allies or host nations provide) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishing strategic or theater transportation policies within the assigned theater (consistent with relative urgency of need), port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities the CINCs set. Joint Pub 4-01 provides joint transportation procedures for using common-user lift assets and, when available, should be consulted by the logistics planner. Although the JMC functions and responsibilities may differ, depending on circumstances, the JMC will normally¾

 

· Interface with JOPES to monitor and effect changes to force and supply deployment.

· Analyze user capabilities to ship, receive, handle cargo, and recommend solutions to shortfalls.

· Advise the J4 on transportation matters that would adversely affect combat contingency opera-tions.

· Serve as the liaison with the host nation for transportation issues.

· Disseminate information concerning HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and per-sonnel.

 

c. Petroleum and Subarea Petroleum Office. Normally, the unified command Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) provides wholesale bulk petroleum management support. The primary duties of the logistic staff officer for petroleum are as follows (see Joint Pub 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine, for additional guidance):

 

· Coordinate POL planning and mission execution matters.

· Coordinate common bulk petroleum products supply to the joint force components.

· Using DOD Manual 4140.25-M, Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Storage, and Dis-tribution Facilities, coordinate with service components to determine requirements for bulk petroleum and ensure stockage through Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) sources.

· Recommend necessary petroleum product and facility reallocation and apportionment to CINCs.

 

d. Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB). The JCMEB establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the theater. It is a temporary board the geographic combatant commander activates and personnel from the components and agencies or activities that support the geographic combatant commander staff. The JCMEB arbitrates all issues the Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) refers to it and, if appropriate, prepares the civil engineering support plan.

 

e. JFUB. The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, interservice support, and construction to ensure compliance with JCMEB priorities. JFUB actions are IAW the provisions of Joint Pub 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

f. CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB). Geographic combatant commanders coor-dinate contracting operations within their commands. This requirement may be met through the CLPSB, which is a temporary board designed to achieve a properly coordinated acquisition program. A J4 representative chairs the CLPSB, and it includes representatives from each of the component commands. CLPSB functions include¾

 

· Coordinating with US embassies and host countries to acquire supplies and services, and for operations by contractors performing under US contracts.

· Eliminating duplication by arranging for single-service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services when appropriate.

· Providing an information exchange among contracting activities covering such matters as supply sources, prices, and contractor performance.

· Promulgating, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for third-country nationals and indigenous employees, in coordina-tion with appropriate agencies.

 

g. Theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC). The joint force surgeon controls the TPMRC. The center coordinates and controls, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, moving patients within and out of the assigned area of responsibility. TPMRCs generate theater plans and schedules and then modify (as needed) and execute global patient movements requirements center delivery schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the MTF. The TPMRC should be task organized to maintain flexibility in responding to the tactical situation and the CINCís mission.

 

h. Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). The JBPO, within the office of the joint force surgeon, is task organized to meet operational requirements, and service representatives who know blood bank techniques staff it. The JBPO plans, coordinates, and directs blood and blood component handling, storage, and distribution within the assigned area of responsibility. It consolidates and forwards requirements for resupply to the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO).

 

i. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO). The Army component commander is routinely designated executive agent for the theater mortuary affairs program. This includes establishing and operating the JMAO under a joint force commander J4ís staff supervision. The JMAO plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs. It will provide guidance to facilitate the conduct of all mortuary programs and to maintain data (as required) pertaining to recovering, identifying, and disposing of all US dead and missing in the assigned theater. The JMAO will serve as the central clearing point for all mortuary affairs and casualty information, and will monitor the deceased and missing personal effects program.

 

j. Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). The JMPAB modifies and recommends priorities for allocating materiel assets for fulfilling theater logistic requirements (both US and allied forces). It reviews, acts on, or forwards requests for modifications in force and activity designators to the Joint Staff. The JMPAB also recommends, to the Joint Staff, modifications to resource priorities and allocations assigned to other combatant commanders.

 

The logistic part of a plan must support the CINC's concept of the operation. It should also provide changes to the concept of operations. If the logistic part is written to anticipate change, emergency measures and improvisations can be avoided. Emergency measures and improvisations are always costly and adversely affect subordinate and adjacent commands.

Logistics planners should not focus on a campaignís deployment phase at the expense of later campaign phases. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally as important as deployment. Employment planning should neither be neglected nor delayed until deployment plans are complete. Adequate logistic plans are produced by thoroughly and concurrently considering a campaignís deployment and employment.

 

As the CINC develops and coordinates the concept of logistic support, his staff and the supporting commandís staff consider the many things that affect the conduct of operations. At the theater level, logistic support can be a dominant factor in determining the operationsí nature and tempo. Sound logistic planning and analysis allow for rapid change to OPLANs. High consumption of military materiel, great diversity of equipment types, the operations areaís large size, extended LOCs, and constrained resources characterize the operational environment.

 

The CINC must determine the proper balance between logistic functions and responsibilitiesí centralization and decentralization in developing the concept of logistic support. Too much centralization can result in sluggish or rigid response. Too little can result in waste and inefficient use of critical resources. The CINC is concerned not only with the current operationís logistic support but also with future operations. He needs a clear and comprehensive assessment of logistic support to design or modify his concept of operations. His staff must assess how logistic support issues will affect operation sequencing. They must also recommend options to compensate for logistic shortfalls.

 

The CINCs designate LOCs. They may be interior or exterior LOCs, but CINCs never rely on a single LOC. It may be necessary to conduct a major operation to secure an LOC to support a campaignís subsequent phases. The CINC and subordinate commanders need to synchronize each of the various logistic support functions and elements.

 

The CINC's concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic support of one or more courses of action. The CINC's directorate for logistics prepares this estimate, comparing each course of action the operation or planning directorate has proposed. This estimate of logistic support may be refined into the logistic estimate. But the concept of logistic support is not simply gathering information. Rather, it is organizing capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept. The concept of logistic support should specify how the operation will be supported. It should give special attention to the major LOCs and the general echelonment of support across the LOC. Also address allied HNS and any topics the CINC believes are necessary to convey key elements of the concept of logistic support.

 

A COMMZ is required for land operations. The organization and the functions of these should be laid out. The size of the COMMZ for a theater varies based on a number of factors, including the size of the theater of operations, available combat and logistic forces, need for depth, proposed sustainment base locations, number and direction of the lines of support, the enemy's capability to interdict and disrupt logistic operations, geography, and political boundaries. A diversified group of organizations perform a multitude of functions in the COMMZ. The COMMZ is always joint and may be a combined command. The TA commander who is responsible for US Army forcesí logistic support in a theater of war is often designated the joint COMMZ commander.

 

The theater concept of logistic support should extend the CINCís operational reach. Operational reach is the range at which the CINC can mass the employed forces decisively. It goes beyond merely conducting reconnaissance or strike operations at a distance. The LOCís length, efficiency, and security influence operational reach. It depends on its ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include its combat forcesí operating ranges and endurance. Establishing advance bases or depots and improving the LOCís security and efficiency may improve operational reach.

 

Operational reach is a relative value. Accordingly, improving it may deny one or several components of the enemy's operational reach. The essence of a campaign plan is extending the CINC's operational reach while denying operational reach to the enemy. As a CINC moves forces forward, they must control the command, control, and communications systems centers; transportation nodes; and prospective base areas. These centers and areas become physical objectives for combat forces to seize, control, and pass over to the logistic systems as they move forward to exploit new gains. The resulting logistic systemís forward momentum results in extending the combat forcesí operational reach and endurance.

 

A-16. SERVICE LOGISTIC SYSTEMS

 

a. Army. The Army logistic system is based on a requirement to support a large, expandable force capable of rapid deployment and flexible operations in all forms of conflict anywhere in the world. AMC, through seven commodity commands and numerous depots, operates the wholesale part of the supply support wholesale-retail system. In CONUS, supplies flow to posts, camps, and stations that issue retail supplies directly to the user. Overseas logistic commands, through their component depots, distribute supplies through DS and GS units to the user.

 

b. Navy logistics. The Navy logistic system is based on the requirement that the fleet be ready, mobile, and enduring. In general, forces based in CONUS receive support from continental sources, whereas the combat logistic forces that accompany the fleets primarily support those deployed overseas augmented by overseas base support as necessary. During overseas contingency operations, a Naval Logistic Supply Force may be created to coordinate this support, as in the Persian Gulf war.

 

(1) Organization and responsibilities. The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for the total Navy supply structureís policies, control, guidance, and development. He prescribes the degree of emphasis to place on both the acquisition process and the logistic support process. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant for logistics. He supervises all matters related to materiel production, procurement, supply, distribution, and management. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is the Secretary's principal military adviser for logistics. He sets the broad levels of attainment, determines the degree of responsiveness of supply support required, and prescribes the general doctrine and positioning of materiel for supply support operations. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N4) is the principal adviser to the CNO on conducting logistics affairs. He plans and provides the operating forces' logistic support needs.

 

(2) Control of naval materiel requirements. Navy inventory managers obtain the required mate-riel within the Navyís budget. It should be noted that, while these weapon systems and inventory managers are responsible for having the materiel available to the operating forces, DLA, GSA, and other military services centrally procure and manage certain categories of materiel. Activities outside of the Navy manage more than 75 percent of the items the Navy operating forces require. DOD integrated materiel management policies and procedures assign and manage these items. DLA and GSA are referred to as commodity-integrated materiel managers (CIMMs). Other military services managing Navy interest items are referred to as weapons-integrated materiel managers (WIMMs). The total Navy organization for supply is as shown in figure A-8.

 

 

Figure A-7. Navy logistics.

 

 

 

 

Figure A-8. Naval supply system.

(3) Organization for supply. Within the naval systems commands there are two distinct groups of Navy inventory managers. These are the naval systems commands and the Navy inventory control points (ICPs) subordinate to the Naval Supply Systems Command. It is Navy policy that only one inventory manager will manage an item of supply, equipment, or materiel. Stock coordination is the administrative process by which materiel item, group, or category is identified and assigned to one Navy inventory manager.

 

The broadening Navy materiel complex is increasingly using identical and similar items of equip-ment and repair parts in multiple Navy and other service programs. Inventory management of items peculiar to this equipment is assigned to Naval Supply Systems Command ICPs IAW their materiel mission through the stock coordination process. The concepts of program support and supply support provide the basis for a common understanding of delineating responsibilities among the naval systems commands and the Navy ICPs when the repair parts to support assigned equipment are under more than one inventory manager's materiel management.

 

Program and technical data are exchanged between the naval systems commands and the Naval Sup-ply Systems Command ICPs to support assigned weapon systems or equipment. Under this procedure, a naval systems command looks to a single Naval Supply Systems Command ICP for equipment or weapon system program support or ancillary repair parts supply support, or both. The Naval Supply Systems Command ICP accepting program support responsibilities and acting as agent for the naval systems command ensures that the appropriate inventory manager manages each repair part required to support equipment or a weapon system. The supply support inventory manager will stock the items in the distribution system or ensure the item is available from commercial sources.

 

The Naval Supply Systems Command ICPs serve as the nerve centers of the Navy supply system. The ICP determines what Navy stocks to buy, how much to buy, and what distribution to make to ensure the stock is most accessible to anticipated sources of demand. This function could not be executed without knowing the location, depth, and use of the bulk and materiel scattered throughout the supply system. Therefore, activities stocking significant quantities of materiel make either daily reports of transactions affecting stock balances or quarterly reports of stock on hand to the appropriate ICP. Using this information, information on new equipment that must be supported in the future, and weighing fund availability, the ICP will make decisions regarding procuring, redistributing, and disposing of excesses as necessary.

 

Navy fleet support is based on three echelons of supply: an organic level of supply and two echelons of resupply.

 

(a) The organic level provides the materiel specified in a ship's allowance list and carried onboard the ship itself. The allowance list is tailored to the individual ship based on the ship's equipment configuration and crew composition and size. Maintaining the allowance list will maximize endurance and provide balanced support for a specified period.

(b) The combat logistics force (CLF) is the first echelon of resupply. It includes tenders, repair ships, and fleet issue ships. This echelon of fleet support backs up the allowance list materiel the combat ships carry. Logistics ships play a special role. They carry cargoes of frequently requested repair parts tailored to the combat forces they support. They also rendezvous with task forces in the forward area and, by ship-to-ship or helicopter transfer, keep the fleet at sea and on station for extended periods of time. The materiel carried in the CLF is prescribed IAW load lists that reflect support missions and the types of ships supported. This combination of supply levels satisfies the CNO's policy that the deployed fleet will be self-sufficient during wartime operations for specified periods without resupply from CONUS.

(c) Materiel located at CONUS stock points is the second echelon of resupply. These supply activities serve as the materiel reservoir and act as a pipeline between industry and other supply systems and the fleet. Fleet Industrial Support Centers stock materiel the Navy manages as well as DOD inventory-managed consumable supplies. This materiel is issued to the CLF and directly to the operating forces. In addition to fleet support, these centers provide support to shore establishment activities: air stations, ordnance stations, shipyards, training stations, and smaller shore activities. The scope of the supply department at shore activities varies, depending on the activity size and mission. It can range from a small supply support detachment to a large supply department at a shipyard, naval station, or air station.

 

c. Marine Corps. The Marine Corps concept of logistic support was developed specifically for con-ducting amphibious operations under limited and general war conditions. Logistic support organizations and employment techniques are designed to permit task-organized logistic support units to conform to the existing circumstances of tactical landing forcesí size and makeup. The Marine Corps logistic systemís materiel support basically consists of two segments: the distribution of stores segment and the organic or user segment. The distribution segment consists of HQ, Marine Corps; one ICP; and eight remote storage activities. The organic or user segment consists of organic accounts, service units or elements, bases, camps, and installations. Within the distribution system, materiel is purchased from various sources and positioned within the eight remote storage activities. The organic or user segment purchases materiel from the distribution segment. In essence, the distribution segment can be a wholesale operation, whereas the organic or user segment may be equated to a retail operation.

 

A Marine Air-Ground Task Forceís (MAGTFís) fundamental characteristic is its ability to operate for extended periods as an expeditionary force, relying on its own resources for sustainability. All MAGTFs have enough inherent sustainability to be basically self-sufficient for preplanned periods. Larger MAGTFs have a deeper, broader, and more capable organic support capability. MAGTFs can augment their organic sustainability by using external support from Navy organizations, wartime HNS agreements, ISSAs, and in-theater cross-service support.

 

MAGTF sustainment deploys as a mix of accompanying supplies and resupply. The Marine Corps uses a planning baseline for accompanying supplies of 60 days of (ground) supply (DOS)/days of ammunition (DOA) for pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS), 90 DOS for aviation-peculiar supplies, and 60 aviation DOA. Its supply system is designed to support MAGTF operations for 60 days from onhand assets. Resupply is planned for as required. MAGTF commanders plan for resupply support beyond the baseline sustainment requirements (and/or the level of accompanying supplies) to the end of the planning period the supported CINC has established. MAGTFs deploy with a portion of their accompanying supplies sufficient for a specific period of time:

 

· Marine expeditionary force (MEF), 60 days.

· Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), 30 days.

· Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), 15 days.

· Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, as the situation requires.

 

The Marine Corps supply system (Marine Corps "green dollar"-funded) and Navy supply system (Navy "blue dollar"-funded) support a MAGTF's ground and aviation supply requirements, respectively.

The Navy supply system provides blue-dollar aviation support assets to the Air Combat Element (ACE) through the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) organic to the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). A fly-in support package accompanies deploying Marine Corps aircraft and is configured to support a specified number of single type/model/series aircraft for 10 to 15 days of combat flying. A longer-term commitment requires an additional follow-on contingency support package and/or an aviation logistics ship. Aviation units forward deployed aboard naval shipping as part of an amphibious MAGTF have 90 DOS of aviation repair parts on board.

 

MAGTFs are task organized for the mission assigned them, and within the MAGTF CSS, organiza-tions are task organized to support the MAGTF mission and concept of operations. The MAGTF has extensive inherent capability, and if necessary, the MAGTF commander can use all of the MAGTF combat service support element (CSSE), MALS, and Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) assets to provide organic MAGTF ground and aviation logistics and CSS capabilities.

 

· Ground. CSSEs are task organized to support MAGTF mission requirements from the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) and, as appropriate, from the MAW and Marine Division resources.

 

MEF MEB MEU

FSSG BSSG SSG

 

HQ & Service Bn HQ Co HQ Plt

Motor Transport Bn Motor Transport Co Motor Transport Plt

Landing Spt Bn Landing Spt Co Landing Spt Plt

Supply Bn Supply Co Supply Plt

Maintenance Bn Maintenance Co Maintenance Plt

Engineer Spt Bn Engineer Spt Co Engineer Spt Plt

Medical Bn Bulk Fuel Co Combat Health Spt Unit

Dental Bn Collecting & Clearing Co

Surgical Spt Co

Dental Detachment

 

Note: BSSGs and MEU SSGs are task organized from the permanent organizations of the FSSG.

 

· Aviation. MALS provide the ACE with aviation logistics (intermediate aircraft maintenance and supply) support. They are organic to the MAW and are task organized for the aircraft mix they support. MWSSs are also organic to the MAW and provide elements of the ACE with required ground CSS.

 

d. Air Force. The Air Force logistic system enables the Air Force to deploy to any part of the world on short notice and sustain operations for an indefinite time. This system is designed to operate under the same policies and procedures in peacetime and in war. As a result, there were no major changes during the Vietnam era. The concept for supply is to channel the requisition for materiel directly between the user (base) and the responsible supply source for needed items. There is no intermediate supply depot or HQ through which requisitions must be channeled. There are five depots, or Air Logistics Centers, all located in CONUS, that rapidly and effectively service the bases. The standard Air Force supply concept organizes all base supplies using standard computers with centrally controlled programs. Equipment maintenance is organized so that the maximum amount of maintenance is done at the lowest level for which there are skills, equipment, and facilities. Maintenance, technical guidance, and depot mainte-nance support are directly linked between the base and the applicable Air Logistics Center. A standard organization performs base maintenance functions at all bases and operates using the centralized mainte-nance concept.

 

Sustainment planning for an Air Force wing begins long before the order to deploy is received. In most cases, each wing is aware in peacetime of potential locations to which it may deploy. As a result, site survey teams travel to these locations to ascertain what support types and levels will be available and to establish contracting POCs. Wing personnel then use this information to conduct detailed sustainment planning, focusing on which organic assets must deploy versus what level of sustainment the host nation can provide. For those situations that may require the wing to deploy to an unknown location, planning will focus on using organic assets only and the extent to which they must be used to sustain the wing for various lengths of time. Shortfalls are then identified to higher HQ to allow planning for whatever augmentation forces may be necessary.

 

Although there are some variations, each Air Force wing is generally composed of four major subordinate groups: the operations group, the logistics group, the medical group, and the support group. Each group will impact on sustainment. The operations group is composed of flying squadrons (operations and maintenance) and an operational support squadron that includes operations planning, scheduling, mobility, weather, and intelligence personnel. The logistics group is comprised of squadrons responsible for logistics support and planning, maintenance, contracting, supply, and transportation. The medical group meets deployed personnelís medical needs and provides hospital, aerospace medicine, and veterinary services as required. The support group is the catch-all organization within the wing tasked with personnel, education, records, information management, reprographics, family support, resource management, mortuary affairs, food services, linen exchange, and recreation functions. In addition, a security police unit will provide security for the wing. Its size and place within the wing organization will vary depending on the situation at the deployed location.

 

All or portions of these units will comprise the total wing deployment package, as the planning described previously determines. Deployment order and timing will be determined in the normal manner through the JOPES process and be reflected on the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) supporting the OPLAN in question. Because many portions of the wing's overall sustainment structure will take time to move in theater and put in place, each flying squadron will deploy with its own small sustainment package. This package includes the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct combat operations, typically, for 30 days. For this reason, dedicated airlift will be provided for these flying squadrons and will either accompany the deploying unit (e.g., tankers dragging deploying fighters also carry maintainers, spare parts, and other equipment) or will slightly precede the arriving aircraft at the deployed location (e.g., C-141s carrying maintainers, parts, and equipment land, off-load, and receive arriving aircraft). Thereafter, the sustainment structure at each deployed location will build as additional units arrive in theater.

 

When shortfalls are identified that the wing itself cannot fill, this information is passed to the wing's designated force provider, generally the wing's parent major command [ e.g., the Air Combat Command (ACC) for CONUS-based units] . The force provider will then task other subordinate units to supply personnel and/or equipment to the wing that requires the additional support.

 

Outside of the wing structure itself and for those instances in which units must operate from austere locations, specialized Air Force engineer and services squadrons provide infrastructure development and sustainment. Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operations Repair Squadron¾ Engineer (RED HORSE)

units provide both heavy and light engineering forces for runway construction and repair, force bed-down, crash rescue, and fire suppression. Base Emergency Engineering Force (Prime BEEF) units provide light engineering forces for runway repair and miscellaneous construction. Readiness in Base Services (Prime RIBS) units provide food service, billeting, laundry, bath, and mortuary services as needed. These units use two types of prepackaged bare-base systems¾ Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon. The Harvest Eagle package contains tents, mobile kitchens, sleeping quarters, and other units that can be set up and made functional quickly. Harvest Falcon components, which fill the same function as Harvest Eagle, are semipermanent structures with hard floors but are seldom deployed due to the extensive lift required to move these heavy and bulky modules.