Transcript of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Press Briefing

Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort Lewis and the Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox

Briefing Date and Location: 16 Dec 99, The Pentagon, Washington D.C.


COL Joseph Rodriguez, Director for the Transformation Axis,TRADOC
COL Michael Mahaffey, Director of Battle Lab Integration, Technology and Concepts, TRADOC

(Start Transcription)

RODRIGUEZ: I'm COL Joe Rodriguez. I'm the director of Transformation at HQ, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. I've been doing the job for a few months now and I just wanted to give you a short update.

I'm going to talk to you about the Platform Performance Demonstration going on at Fort Knox, but I want to set the context so you understand how that fits into the overall scheme of things.

I think most of you are familiar with GEN Shinseki's vision, the intent statement, which this kind of summarizes where the Chief wants to go. Make the heavy force lighter. Make the light force more mobile, more lethal and more survivable. And the objective; he wants to erase the distinctions that exist today between heavy and light.

We don't want to talk about forces in terms of heavy, medium and light. So I won't talk about this new force as a medium brigade. I'll talk about it in the latest name for it, which is the Brigade Combat Team, BCT. First two of those that will stand up, we're calling the initial BCTs out at Fort Lewis. And they will be followed by a number of interim brigades.

This is the requirement. Be more strategically responsive to meeting the CINCs' requirements. Do not compromise our major theater of warfight capability. There's still need for this heavy, decisive force for that heavy punch, to fight a big war, but the CINCs' need a strategically responsive force that can get into the AOR quickly and contain or deter or solve the crisis. Mainly at the small scale contingency level of operations.

Today we have a great force that does this well, MTW fight, and we can't ignore that requirement. It's still out there, but we've seen more of these since the end of the Cold War. More of this, small scale contingencies, and more of this, stability and support operations.

So in the near term, this force we're creating is optimized to do this. Today, when we have to do one of these today, we have to go through a process where we alert the force, then we train them up and then we deploy them. It takes too long. So, hey, nobody does it better than the U.S. Army. There's no other army in the world that does it better than we do.

We fight the MTW -- this is what our doctrine calls for -- train, alert, deploy, and get there quickly with overmatch. But when you slide down the scale, up here you're usually fighting for clear, vital interests. As you slide down the scale, to small scale contingencies and stability and support operations, vital interests may not be involved. They may be U.S. interests, but not necessarily vital ones. And when there are not vital interests involved, force protection becomes much more important. The American people are much less willing to shed blood of America's, of their sons and daughters with these types of operations. Force protection, then, becomes more important. It takes longer to train and get those forces ready to deploy.

We've done a lot of analysis over the last 60-90 days. We've done sensing, a lot of simulation work, and the results of that analysis has produced an organizational and operational concept. We call it the O&O. And these are the key characteristics of this interim Brigade Combat Team that we're building.

We want it to be full-spectrum capable, so it'll be optimized for small scale contingencies but it will also be able to do stability and support operations, and it'll also contribute to the MTW fight.

Rapidly deployable. I think most of you know that the Chief's goal is 96 hours from wheels-up of the first plane. So when the brigade gets the order, the first aircraft is wheels-up. The Chief wants this brigade to close the line in 96 hours.

Combat capable on arrival. That's a little bit different from the way we deploy today. Oftentimes we deploy administratively today, where we don't load our military hardware and troops in a configuration that makes them operational on arrival. Therefore, when we get to the other end, it takes some time to do what we call RSIO, reception, staging, integration and onward movement. We want this brigade to be combat capable on arrival. They're not going to spend a lot of time on the other end getting ready to fight.

They maintain their freedom of maneuver by their high tactical mobility and their situational understanding. And they get great, superb situational understanding from the RSTA squadron -- reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition squadron -- and the assets that are assigned organic to the brigade. They don't have to go outside the brigade to gain situational understanding.

They can achieve decisive action by deliberate dismounted infantry assault, and the core qualities, the centerpiece of this brigade, is the infantry. Three infantry battalions are in this brigade. These infantry battalions do not fight mounted. In our current heavy force, we often fight mounted. We fought Desert Storm pretty much mounted. We very seldom dismounted in Desert Storm. This unit, the O&O does not call for them to fight mounted. They fight deliberate dismounted operations with a lot of weapons systems in support.

Key quality: everything in this brigade has to fit in a C-130 aircraft. If it doesn't fit in a C-130, it doesn't go into the brigade. That's a key parameter.

There are platform limitations. We're equipping this brigade with what we call COTS and GOTS -- commercial off-the-shelf equipment and government off-the-shelf equipment. In other words, it's equipment that exists today. We're not going in and developing a lot of new hardware. We're going to go find the platforms that best meet the O&O for this brigade, and we're going to buy that stuff off the shelf. Consequently, there are some platform limitations. In today's heavy force, we enjoy tremendous overmatch. With the M1 and Bradley and the other systems in the inventory today, we've got great overmatch. That allows us to make a mistake, and that mistake, we can recover from a mistake in our heavy force today. But this force cannot recover from a mistake. It may not recover from a mistake. OK? So they can't blunder into the enemy, they can't bounce into the enemy unawares because they don't have that platform overmatch. They make up for it with the close fight using internetted combined arms.

They're best used in complex and urban terrain. We found that since the end of Desert Storm potential adversaries will probably be reluctant to engage us in the open and rolling terrain that we've built the current force for. That's where all our technology comes into play, in open and rolling terrain. And they're probably not going to seek to engage us out in the open as Saddam Hussein did. They're probably going to use tactics like Milosevic used, like Mohammed Farad Adid used and others. And they're going to engage us in complex and urban terrain where their forces are protected and where we've got to go in and get them out without causing unnecessary collateral damage.

OK, we're going to rely heavily on reach back. That's not just reach back for logistics. It's reach back for intelligence, for information and for all those quantities that we need. The intent with this brigade is to minimize the footprint forward. That's how you get it there in 96 hours. You minimize that big logistical and that support structure that normally goes with the unit when you deploy today. You make up for that by having reach back capabilities so when you need something you reach back for it.

And it (the brigade) operates under a division, corps headquarters or the ARFOR.

Q: Could you give us a couple of examples of equipment now that wouldn't be used in the new brigade?

RODRIGUEZ: There's nothing we've put in this brigade today.

Q: I mean in general so we can get clear on how this is different.

RODRIGUEZ: M1 tank, most of our bridging capabilities today.

MAHAFFEY: Equivalent equipment that's in this brigade, right now, for instance, the combat platforms that Joe just talked about. Tanks, Bradleys, you know, they won't get in a C-130. Engineer support equipment won't get in a C-130. The self-propelled artillery pieces that we have won't get in a C-130. Self-propelled, track-based multiple launched rocket systems won't get in a C-130. Whether it's a function of cube and weight.

RODRIGUEZ: This is the organization of the Brigade Combat Team as it exists today. We think this is pretty close to being final. It's still draft, but we think it'll go to the Chief either tomorrow or early next week. This is the way the brigade looks today. Symbol for this brigade. This little thing here. Everybody asks me what this little thing means (a straight line near the left side of the brigade rectangle symbol). That means it has its own organic gun system on primary weapons platforms. Has a brigade and … headquarters company, MI company, signal company organic to the brigade.

Three infantry battalions, about 780 soldiers apiece. We're still working the exact numbers of those battalions. Each battalion has three rifle companies and each rifle company has three rifle platoons, three … rifle platoons with a multiple-gun systems platoon, as in assault guns to support the infantry.

An anti-tank company. We see that initially being equipped with the TOWII Bravo and possibly migrating to the LOSAT, line of sight anti-tank weapon system.

A reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition squadron. It has three reconnaissance troops and one surveillance troop. The surveillance troop has UAVs and ground sensors in it. So this brigade commander has his own organic UAVs, and they operate out of this unit.

An engineer company, whose focus is on mobility, keep this brigade moving so they don't get stuck. If this brigade gets stopped or forced into a static situation, very vulnerable to artillery since they're medium armored vehicles.

The artillery will initially be a HIMARS battery with the objective goal of migrating to the 155 self-propelled battalion. HIMARS is the wheeled version of the multiple launched rocket system.

MEHAFFEY: High mobility rocket system.

RODRIGUEZ: It's the wheeled version of what most of us know as the MLRS that outfit the heavy force.

And then a very austere support battalion. Everything you see over here in the shaded area possible enablers or augmentation that could be provided to this brigade based on the mission and the situation.

The two core qualities of the brigade, high mobility, and that's at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical. We see the C-17 and the C-5 as the primary means for deploying this strategically.

Now, let me give you an example of strategic mobility, just an anecdote. Today when we deploy the heavy force, we can get one M1 tank in the C-17. That's all it'll carry, one M1 tank. We think we can put four to six of these medium armored vehicles in one C-17, depending on which armored vehicle the Army ultimately selects and decides to buy.

Operational mobility. That's where the C-130 comes in. Once this brigade gets into theater, the CINC can move them around the theater, varying area of operation by C-130. Can't do that today with the mechanized force. They also have great operational capability on the ground. Put them on the road where they can move quickly across the theater. This is great tactical mobility.

The second core quality is achieving decisive combat action through deliberate dismounted infantry assault. There are a lot of weapons systems in support of that infantry when they assault. The brigade, because they have great situational awareness, they can find the place where they want to fight, and then the infantry dismount and they conduct a dismounted assault of the objective, whatever that objective might be. And all these weapons systems in the brigade support that infantryman when he dismounts.

Q: What's the advantage to that? I mean dismounted …

RODRIGUEZ: The advantage of infantry assault is, number one, this brigade is optimized for urban and complex terrain, where they engage in close ranges. Secondly, probably overriding, the key reason why they dismount, they don't have platform overmatch and survivability. Back to the point I made earlier. We're buying off-the-shelf equipment for these initial and interim brigades. When we get to the objective force, out in the future, when we get to the objective force we will have great overmatch and survivability.

Please hold your questions. Let me finish the next couple of charts and then we'll open it up for questions.

Q: One thing. You used the term complex terrain a couple of times. Would you please explain that?

RODRIGUEZ: OK. Urban and complex terrain is the military term for fighting in the cities, for built-up areas, which is urban terrain, and complex terrain consists of all that other terrain other than open and rolling, such as mountains, jungles, very wooded areas.

MEHAFFEY: Bosnia is an example of complex terrain.


We've got a couple more charts and then we'll talk the platform performance demo. I know you have some questions.

First step in the transformation process; this is a multistep process. The Chief's intent is to transform the Army. We're starting with an initial force, and that initial force will be optimized to fill this requirement -- small scale contingencies. It will also have the capability to go down the scale to stability and support operations, and, with augmentation it can conduct and fight in a major theater of war.

That's the initial force. Two brigades to Fort Lewis. Those two brigades will be followed by a number of other brigades. We think three more at this point, for a total of five, which will be interim solution. Those brigades will be equipped with the medium armored vehicle with the technology insertions that the Army desires to put in there.

And then the long-term solution, based on science and technology breakthroughs, will be to field an objective force. We think that objective force will be centered around the future combat system and, possibly, the joint tactical rotorcraft, the JTR. That's a force that's out there around the year 2012, plus or minus.

Our mission analysis for this Brigade Combat Team: does well in small scale contingencies, deploys rapidly, offers deterrence, contains the situation or shapes the situation and resolve that problem of force. In stability and support operations, a guarantor of the peace and protects the peacekeeping forces. In a major theater of war it can do several things. It can conduct a mission supporting attack or it can participate in the division's main attack with some augmentation. We believe that we have to augment for them to make an attack. It can also conduct economy of force operation such as reconnaissance, screen and rear area operations.

This is the model that we really haven't used previously when we talked about force effectiveness. In the past when we built a force, we primarily looked at this side of the chart. We built a force for lethality, survivability and battlefield mobility, battle space dominance. That's what our current heavy force is built to today. It was built to fight in Europe against the Warsaw Pact, and it has all these qualities. But it doesn't have the qualities that allow you to get it there quickly, allow you to get a brigade there in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, five divisions in 30 days, which is the Chief of Staff's goal.

So we think we need to balance that, and when we talk about force effectiveness, we're balancing these qualities with these qualities. Deployability, it's got to be sustainable without a large logistical footprint. We can't have these iron mountains that consume so much time and energy. I was telling Sean the other day that the heaviest part of an armored division is not the tanks and the Bradleys. The heaviest part of an armored is fuel. The second heaviest part of an armored division is the ammunition. The third heaviest part of an armored division are all the track vehicles. So if you can solve the fuel and ammo, if you can get the fuel and ammo rates down, then you can begin to achieve some of this.

These are some of the qualities we think come out of the O&O. I think I've talked about a lot of these. This is what we're looking for, commonality in platform. If you achieve commonality in platform. In other words, if you can build a brigade that doesn't have 20 or 30 different types of platforms, you greatly reduce your logistical requirements and your sustainment requirements. You don't have to have 20 or 30 sets of PLL, of parts. You don't have to train 20 or 30 different mechanics to work on all these different vehicles. You don't have to train 20 to 30 different drivers to keep the drivers trained.

If you have a common platform in the brigade, it greatly reduces the sustainment and logistical footprint burden in the brigade. We want high reliability in these vehicles.

That's desired. We're not sure that'll be an absolute requirement, to be swim-capable, but we're looking at that, and they'll be testing some of these vehicles at Fort Knox next month on the swim capabilities. We also want them to be able to operate at night, own the night. Just like we do today with the heavy force.

Let me talk to you just briefly about the platform performance demonstration, and then we'll open it up to questions and answers, and COL Mehaffey will assist me … on the Q&A part.

The platform performance demonstration at Fort Knox began last week. Actually, they've been preparing for it for about the past month. The purpose of it is to educate the Army on the current state of the art of medium armored vehicles. There have been great technology advances in wheeled vehicles and medium armored vehicles, both tracked and wheeled over the past 10 years.

So we want first off, we want to educate ourselves on what's out there. Secondly, we want to communicate the Army's requirements to industry. We want to share what I just shared with you, in a little more detail with industry. We want to talk to them about our O&O, how this brigade plans to fight. Some of the key characteristics in quality can come out of this, so industry then can begin working towards meeting our requirements.

We will allow the Army to refine our requirements before we produce an operational requirements document. And our expectations is at the end of the platform performance demonstration at Fort Knox that we have a refined operational requirements document -- we call it the ORD -- that we can then submit, which will go through the JROC process and lead to an RFP, request for a proposal to industry.

And, lastly, we want to explore current vehicles for adaptability for the platform requirements we've got n this brigade. We want to look at the potential for technology insertion in those vehicles. Some vehicles may be more adaptable for technology insertion than others. We've got a list of technology insertions that we think (that can be) incorporate in some of the platforms.

Now, let me tell you the big picture at Fort Knox and then we'll go into some timelines. I think you have the timeline chart.

We have 35 candidate platforms at Fort Knox, different variants. Twenty-five of those will live fire. Eleven contractors represented, six foreign countries. The foreign countries are France, Turkey, Canada, Germany, Singapore, Switzerland. And then there are a variety of platforms from U.S. companies.

These platforms, the ones that will go through live fire, the driving test, the swim test, they will be crewed by U.S. Army crews that have been trained by industry. Those crews come out of Fort Lewis, Wash., and Fort Knox, and they've been trained by industry.

While we're going through this process, as I said earlier, we'll keep conducting an analysis of vehicles for possible technology insertions. Let me give you a few examples. We think we want an improved night vision system on these vehicles. Some of them may not have advanced night vision systems, but we want to examine them for the possibility or the potential of doing modifications to put those systems in. Sensor packages. Diagnostic packages. I talked about high reliability. So those are some examples of tech insertions. The digitization … the Army Battle Command System, ABCS.

OK. Getting to the timeline. If you look at the timeline, your first sheet, I'll just talk you quickly through the timeline. If you're interested in going down to Knox and visit this platform performance demonstration, there's a name and phone number of the Fort Knox public affairs officer. You can contact him and he can help you schedule your visit.

As we go through the chart, we've already accomplished up to this point, Phase I and II, which is the planning phase, the safety and risk assessment, things the Army needs to do before we put U.S. crews on equipment that is not previously been certified. Phase III is the deployability phase. And the deployability phase will look at the capabilities to load and unload this stuff on C-130 aircraft, what has to be done to the equipment to get it onto C-130s or off. Our objective is that we would like to have to do no modifications. We don't want to have to break a vehicle down only to have to reassemble it on the other end. Remember, go back to the O&O. We want this unit to be operational on arrival.

They'll load them on heavy equipment transports. Those are trucks. They'll also do railroad tests and they'll do an airdrop evaluation. They will not airdrop any of this equipment. They will work with the contractors and the vendors to determine what their capabilities are for airdrop. There will be no actual airdrop of this equipment because the United States government doesn't own any of it at this point.

Next we go to Phase IV Alpha, which is the mobility testing. Extensive long-distance road marching, determine the reliability rates, both on and off road. They'll run through a number of driver's courses and expect to put a significant amount of mileage on these platforms.

Phase IV Bravo is the direct rapid-fire gun. That's the live fire testing. That's 11-14 Jan. Twenty-five of 35 candidates will participate in that phase of the test.

Q: The other 10 have no guns?

RODRIGUEZ: Either have no guns or the contractor is not willing to let them participate at this point. A combination of both.

Out of the 35 of those, nine of those, the contractor has only allowed them to be placed in our static display for us to look at.

Q: (Not understood. Appeared to be only for clarification. COL Rodriguez' reply was Right.)

RODRIGUEZ: OK, we go into Phase IV Charlie, to join in complex and urban terrain. We'll take them through some situational training exercises, which are military operations in urban terrain. That's MOUT and that'll be done at the M-U-C-T site, mounted urban combat training site at Fort Knox. We'll get to see how these vehicles perform in close combat in an urban environment.

The next phase is the logistical piece where we look for recovery, maintenance, towing and a range of fuel consumption. We want to see what the fuel consumption is on all these platforms, because it gets back to that balance chart I showed you about deployability and sustainability.

And then the last phase for the actual vehicles is the swim phase. Only six of the vehicles will participate in the swim phase, 18-19 Jan.

Q: What does that look like, the swim phase? What are they doing?

RODRIGUEZ: They'll swim the vehicles through a water, through water.

Q: How deep?

RODRIGUEZ: Just generally, 10 …

MEHAFFEY: I'm not sure, but it's a combination of getting to the water, swimming and getting out of the water. I mean, the agility of getting down the banks and up the banks.

Q: Do they swim? I'm, you know, I'm thinking swim. Can you describe what -- I mean are they driving across the bottom of the river or …?

MEHAFFEY: No, they are actually floating and pulling themselves through water.

RODRIGUEZ: They float and … self-propelled through the water.

OK. Different types of systems we'll have at Knox. I'm going to go through this very quickly. This will change a little bit as we go. There are still some last minute … to get into this demonstration.

Q: Do we have this list that you're going to give?

RODRIGUEZ: No, but I'll give you some examples. Let me qualify, or let me just make something clear. This platform performance demonstration is not a competition. It is not a test. It's designed to inform the Army on what's out there, what's available. And it is designed to inform industry of what the Army's requirements are, so that industry can then come back five to six months later and do a competitive source selection event, which we think will be probably in May. The date is still being negotiated. We think we'll bring the vendors back in May to a competitive source selection. We call it a 'drive-off, shoot-off.' That's the nickname.

OK. Participating vendors. General Dynamics Land Systems. They'll have a number of different variants. We think about three different variants of the Dragoon and four different variants of the Pandur. Those range from infantry fighting vehicles, command and control, ambulance, armored gun systems and armored personnel carriers.

General Motors Defense of Canada will have six different variants of the LAVIII. They'll have the infantry fighting vehicle. They'll have the infantry fighting vehicle with TOW. They'll have the turreted mortar, a 120mm mortar mounted in the turret. They'll have the reconnaissance system. They'll have the LAVIII 105 assault gun and they'll have the LAVIII Piranha, which is the Swiss variant they market to the Swiss.

Germany will submit the Fox armored personnel carrier variant.

Singapore Technologies will have the Bionix 25mm infantry fighting vehicle and another variant of the Bionics infantry fighting vehicle. There are two variants of that.

Giat Industries of France will have their wheeled armored personnel carrier called the BAD.

AM General of the United States will have the Cobra reconnaissance vehicle. It's a wheeled vehicle.

I might mention the Bionix is a tracked vehicle, Singapore Bionix is a tracked vehicle.

Cadillac Gage Textron of the U.S. will have the XM117 reconnaissance vehicle, four-wheeled medium armored vehicle. They'll also have a LAV 300 Mark II infantry fighting vehicle, and they'll have the LAV 600 with an armored gun system on it.

Turkey. The company is FNSS, so I'm not sure what that stands for. FNSS from Turkey will have three variants of their tracked vehicle. One is an armored infantry fighting vehicle. One is an armored engineer squad vehicle and one is an armored combat vehicle new generation.

And lastly, United Defense of the U.S. will have their armored gun system, the AGS, both Level I and Level II. They'll have the medium tactical vehicle light, MTVL, in a couple of configurations. They'll have an infantry fighting vehicle, an IFB with a one-man turret. They'll have an IFB with a two-man turret. And then they'll have an MTVL variant, which is just an armored personnel carrier without a turret. They'll also have a couple different, they'll have a mortar carrier tracked, a command and control vehicle tracked and then an M113A3 armored personnel carrier family of vehicles.

Q: Have to have wheels and tracks …?

RODRIGUEZ: There's a split. Yeah, there's a split. All the United Defense vehicles are tracked. The Singapore vehicles are tracked and the vehicles Turkey is sending are tracked. The remainder wheeled, so we're looking at a mix of wheels and tracks.

Q: Do we……are we currently buying from any of these countries?

RODRIGUEZ: It is a possibility and we currently have small amounts of equipment from these vendors. The Special Ops Command down at Fort Bragg just recently purchased a number of Pandurs: I think it's five or six that's going on the Pandurs. (Garbled) We have a Fox NBC vehicle in some of our units.

OK. COL Mehaffey and I will now be glad to take your questions.

Q: NAYLOR: I'm intrigued about the terminology changes. You mentioned earlier that you don't like talking about medium, light and heavy. You got something here that's going to cost the taxpayers a lot of money once you've set it up. And yet the name chosen isn't really a new name at all, as far as the brigade combat team which is the generic name for any task force at the brigade level that would apply anywhere. Couldn't you have come up with a new name for this, at least to avoid confusion? I mean if you said in two years if something blows up in Southwest Asia and you call us up and say 'We're deploying two brigade combat teams to Southwest Asia,' that information wouldn't tell us whether they're they brigade from that team …

Q: Aren't there already brigade combat teams?

MEHAFFEY: Yeah, we got light brigade combat teams …

Q: NAYLOR: Why didn't you come up with a new name for this?

RODRIGUEZ: You want to try that?

MEHAFFEY: Yeah, I'll try it. We could sit up here and name but we want the soldiers that are going to build this thing and feel out and figure out what it does and name it. Call it the Tiger Brigade or the whatever brigade. We want them to name it. The sergeants will tell us what this thing can do, and the sergeants will figure out with their soldiers and their young junior officers what the best name for this capability is. And we'll embrace it. There was a move to think about naming it here and we said, 'Wait a minute. Let the troops. Let the folks that have already -- by the way, that organization that you just saw there was created because of the professional application of tactics, techniques and procedures from generals down to sergeants in the analysis. So the captains and the sergeants and lieutenant colonels have already fought this thing over and over and over again to get to this configuration, and will fight it again before we go final. So they'll give us the name.

RODRIGUEZ: For now, for the near term, the reason we've gone to the Brigade Combat Team is the brigade is organized as a brigade combat team. The normal brigade in the U.S. Army today is not organized as a brigade combat team. They get mission-tailored and task organized when they go to combat, or when they go to train. But when they're in garrison, they're in garrison as a pure brigade. This brigade lives, eats, sleeps as a Brigade Combat Team. All the different combat arms, combat support, combat service support in the brigade, all these people rated by the colonel commanding the brigade.

MEHAFFEY: The other reason … As we watched the reaction to some of this we began to pick up the sense that this thing was niche force that goes in on a fairly benign environment. You know, it does some influence kind of things and enforcement kind of things. This thing was designed for fighting qualities from the ground up. I mean, this was designed to fight. And so what we wanted to send a signal with, like all the other brigades in our Army that are designed to fight, though these brigade combat teams, just as Sean talked about, we build them out of our lighter divisions or our mechanized divisions, this is an instant fighting force.

Q: A lot of questions. First of all it looks like you're sizing this brigade to be, maybe, 3,500 people. Is that right?

MEHAFFEY: Right now, it's around that. It's around 3,500.

Q: Looks like, well, hard to tell how many vehicles of whatever kind you're really going to put in each battalion. Do you have any idea? Lot of Hummers?

MEHAFFEY: Yeah, roughly, once you get to the interim force and if you achieve all the variants you're looking for in the medium armored vehicle, there's about 400 or so, give or take a few. I mean we're, we'll finish this organizational and operational design within the next month and go final on the total number … And then for the trucks. We also went for commonality in the support vehicles, so you're only going to see the Humvee class, the heavy truck class, what we call our HEMETs and then our light medium, or our medium tactical vehicle class. Three classes of support vehicles.

Q: So 400 combat vehicles you're talking about?

MEHAFFEY: Four hundred MAV, medium armored vehicle variants. Some of them are for command and control functions.

RODRIGUEZ: Let me give you an example. Our goal is to seek a common platform. I talked that. That common platform isn't just the infantry carrier within the infantry battalion. That common platform, ideally, could also be your mortar carrier, your command and control vehicle. That common platform is your anti-tank, the platform for your anti-tank system. It's the same platform that reconnaissance uses in this squadron. The same platform that the engineers use. Same platform that the artillery will use.

Q: You talk about how you're going to get this fire support. Where does that come from? MLRS? I don't understand where your kick comes from.

MEHAFFEY: A tremendous amount of fire support in the formations themselves. These companies that Joe talked about are all combined arms companies. You've got mortars at company level. You've got mortars at battalion level. You got mortars inside the reconnaissance element here. And remember, the key thing about this formation is we didn't go all over the map with its mission set. We said about 'what is the tactical problem the tactical environment …'

Q: Is this mortar that you're …?

MEHAFFEY: No, no, no, that's not it, John. Inside the formation -- you asked about fires across the board inside the formation. In the environment we looked at, the complex and urban terrain, you know, minimum engagement is sometimes as important as maximum engagement, high angle fire. So internally your organization has that capability.

The HIMARS are in there for a particular problem that in the analysis we could not overcome, and that was the vulnerability of this force, should you receive artillery fires, and so we had to build a quality organic to the force that can be proactive in taking out potential artillery attacks on the force. For the rest of the heavy firepower in this environment, we will go outside the force into the joint force …

Q: It's not organic?

MEHAFFEY: Oh, no. This is designed to work for a division or a corps as an Army force element, ARFOR we call it, in a changing of environment so the full capability of the joint force is in the operational environment.

Q: But isn't such a rapidly deployable force, shouldn't you get there before your artillery gets there to back you up?

RODRIGUEZ: We've got Air Force air and naval …

MEHAFFEY: Naval air and you might have coalition elements partnering with you. And, and, remember what Joe said, if the analysis of the mission said there's that much risk on that front end, we will go augment and then we may back off the deployment time. You lose your 96-hour goal then, but we're not going to send this force in without sufficient capability. All right.

RODRIGUEZ: The mortars are pretty -- COL Mehaffey mentioned mortars. There are a lot of 120mm mortars, which is a much more powerful mortar than (in) our typical infantry units today. We've also got, in addition to the 120mm mortar, 81- and 60mm mortars there in the companies. You've got the mortars here. You've got the anti-tank systems here.

But getting back to the firepower solution. When that infantry dismounts, he has an assault gun supporting, a major caliber assault gun supporting. He's got 120mm mortars supporting him, 81- and 60mm mortars supporting him. HIMARS, if necessary. Anti-tank gun systems from the brigade.

MEHAFFEY: Anti-tank gun systems inside their … vehicle, non-dedicated.

Q: How heavy will the assault gun be?

RODRIGUEZ: We're not sure.

MEHAFFEY: 105, 90 or mostly …

Q: Think they can bring a 105 or 90 and get a medium armored vehicle. That's about the caliber technology will give you right now?

RODRIGUEZ: One other point on artillery. What we're showing you now is the initial formation. The O&O calls for self-propelled 155-capability inside the formation. Right now, we haven't seen the solution to that gun. Yeah, 155 on a wheel. There are some around the world, but some of the variants we've looked at, if you looked at the brochure they maybe get on a C-130. So in the O&O right now as it stands, by the time we get to the interim brigades, we're looking for additional artillery in the formation, you know, on a common platform.

Q: How much of the Army, in 15 years, is going to look like the prototype that you're playing with here? How much are you going to convert?

RODROGUEZ: What we know right now today is probably mixed. (Rest garbled)

Q: What kind of … will be in there?

RODRIGUEZ: The goal is to convert five brigades on GEN Shinseki's watch, during his four years as chief of staff. May take a little longer to do that based on production rates. Once we decide what we're going to go with. I think we'll make that decision next summer. Around June or July we'll know what the production rates will be and how fast we can turn each of these brigades.

Let's go to this gentleman here.

Q: Five brigades will constitute the interim force right?

RODRIGUEZ: Pending the technology … completion. The interim force is the total Army force. This is just a piece of the interim force. There are other decisions, there's other pieces that are being worked as to how these brigades operate within current Army divisions. We're doing some analysis to look at the possibility of putting three of these brigades into an interim, what we would call an interim division. We're doing the analysis on that at this point. No decision has been made.

Q: Can you describe the level of threats that this brigade combat team is capable of going up against? For example, I mean, is it capable of going up against, say, for example, the Serbian army when it had it's full armor deployed in Kosovo?

MEHAFFEY: We designed this thing to handle that kind of threat. In fact, our core scenario was the Serbian kind of scenario. Now, what it won't do in that scenario is be successful in a frontal attack against prepared defensive positions with armor, you know, in numbers that are significant beyond its capability. That's not what it's designed for. But when you understand the organic situational understanding that comes to this formation with this RSTA, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, for it to be surprised by any kind of significant formation like that in that kind of environment, it's just not very likely. Now, if we were in that environment and found a sudden increase in armor and we're deadset we're going to face an armor formation, then you make a decision that even though it's an SSC, this thing may need some beefing up. If the first thing off the plane it's going to face a major armor attack, and we have the capability to do that, but that that's not what the environment has in it.

So, the acceptance of risk for that environment in the formation, but it's not … The analysis, reams and reams and reams of models and simulations and analysis tells us we can handle that force with this formation.

Q: Clarify that it's offensive or defensive?

MEHAFFEY: This is an offensive set. It's offensive action up and down the scale.

Q: What kind of budget have you been promised?

MEHAFFEY: I haven't been promised anything, never in my life.

Q: How much (garbled)?

RODRIGUEZ: We're not prepared to answer those questions at this point. Let me tell you what the timeline is. The timeline is that at the end of the platform performance demonstration we will finalize our operational requirements document, go through the JROC process. We will then, probably, we would as early February release the RFP, release for proposal, to industry. Bring all the vendors together in May for a drive-off, shoot-off source selection test, if you will, and then make the decision in June or July. The Army staff, now, is looking at ways to fund this, and the Chief is working with OSD to determine funding. Some of that funding will come from within the Army. The Chief would like to get additional funds to help fund it, but most of the funding will come internal to the Army through savings in reducing or extending other programs. We don't know the cost of this yet. I can't give you a cost or a price tag because we don't know what platform we're going to go with, and there's been a significant differences in the costs of all those vehicles that I just named off to you.

Q: How many vehicles do you think you will be buying to outfit five brigades? Are we talking 5,000 vehicles, a thousand vehicles?

MEHAFFEY: If this organizational and operational design holds, about 500 of these MAVs times five -- about 400. I'm sorry, about 400 of these times five. Total numbers of variants. What I would anticipate is, you know, we will refine this design but, as I say, as it sits here right now in front of you, it's about 400 medium armored vehicles performing several functions in the brigade.




Q: (Paraphrased) Will new MOSs have to be created for the brigade?

RODRIGUEZ: Yes, we will have new MOSs. … the table of organization and equipment. We'll have that final by the end of January. It will produce the new MOSs, probably some changes in career field progressions, changes in the way we train and develop leaders.

This is not just new equipment. This is changing the way the Army does it, the Army institutions work, the way we produce leaders, the way we train soldiers, the way we develop them. More than just hardware.

MEHAFFEY: Even the way you distribute tasks in the formation. I mean, everything's on the table so you may find that, yes, there are some additional skills we want to train soldiers that heretofore hadn't, were discreetly trained for one job or another. As an example, you find in here, in the forward observer artillery team, we told the artillery-trained guy you're going to operate your own radio as opposed to carrying along a radioman. So, if that holds, and we decide that's a final decision, we'll have to figure out how to train that guy.

The environment here is one that is pretty risky. So we're going to look to increase perhaps the degree of combat lifesaver training, general first-aid kind of training that our soldiers have. So when they look, the training there has to go up because it's to get to forces in this kind of terrain and get folks out as easily as you can in our traditional open and rolling kind of terrain. So there's all those kinds of multifunctional, multiskilled applications we'll look at, for not just the soldiers, but the teams and organizations of soldiers inside of those.

Rodriguez: We'll take this gentleman up front.

Q: Thank you. Two question. First one is fire support. Is it because of reliance on joint fire support, nonorganic, why you're going to have a battery rather than say the normal battalion that would support a brigade?

Mehaffey: Because of this. If you just look at the traditional platform focus that the Army has been in and, frankly, most of us are in, OK, you would have thrown all that stuff in here. But the mission set said, the National Command Authority needs this capability early, something that's respected and feared and can go through your door and bother you.

So you had to balance and trade off the organizational effectiveness of this organization with how dominant it is in the battle space with the requirement to get it there quickly, not create a huge burden on the joint force commander in the theater support system, and the trainability of the force. So when you do that, you begin to decide and, through analysis; this is not just a bunch of colonels sitting around a table and the generals just throwing the ideas out and stamping it -- through exhaustive analysis, you decide where you might take risks.

And what we said was, because generally we can rely on, for most conditions, the joint force, the JTF commander to provide us a lot of firepower to help us mitigate this problem, there are periods when weather, terrain, whatever may preclude that support from coming there. So we have to provide some level of indirect fire to suppress the artillery. So those are the tradeoffs you make.

The analysis might have said give me two battalions of artillery and maybe one less infantry. But, no.

RODRIGUEZ: And these are your risk mitigators over here.

MEHAFFEY: Yeah. Again, if the core organization and the mission set is different, you can bring elements in and maybe not take some of the core elements on the front load.

PERRITT: We've only got time for two more questions. Okay?

Q: Why did you exclude helicopters?

RODRIGUEZ: We excluded helicopters -- we've got them accounted for in the augmentation package. When you add helicopters to the organic units, and this is a brigade, a brigade combat team, put helicopters in there and you completely blow this model to pieces.

VIEGA: I would also point out that helicopters aren't organic to …

MEHAFFEY: Right. They're not organic to most brigades, and they're in division sets. This thing will be commanded by a division. If you've got to bring these, they'll come in. But organically, once you put the helicopters in there, it's not so much that you can't deploy the helicopters, but you start thinking about the tonnage of fuel.

I heard an estimate one time, 40 tons of fuel for a ton of ammunition for fixed wing support. I don't know if that's right. But to be able to refuel all of these, you begin to get into this problem. So it was a tradeoff we made, in terms of organic helicopters.

RODRIGUEZ: Initially, what you see here in white, this is the force that we're designing to get there in 96 hours. OK? It'll go into a permissive, semipermissive environment in 96 hours pretty much with what you see in white.

But if it's going into a non-permissive environment, it's going into the warfight, the CINC will look at what augmentation is needed. And there will be some sacrifice being made on the timeline, on the deployability timeline.

MEHAFFEY: Or, you might still meet the requirements, as we talked about earlier, and you decide to flow some of the organic forces later if you decided you needed helicopters right away. Flow them in and then bring the organic stuff behind.

The point is, when it gets there, it's already effective. It can start work as soon as it arrives. And then on day five, you begin to flow more and more capability in.

Q: How long do you usually take to start work?

MEHAFFEY: For our forced entry forces, the 82nd Airborne, as soon as they hit the ground and pop the chutes. For other forces, once you get off your lift platforms, there is usually, as Joe talked about, an RSIO requirement, through a tactical assembly area, to load up the ammo, get your formations set before you move out. So it takes a little bit of extra time.

Q: Days, weeks?

MEHAFFEY: I don't know. If they've got intrinsic action. If you've got prepo, it goes quicker, prepositioned stocks, you fly the troops in, they get in, get on equipment, and move them out. So it ranges …

Q: Do they take day or two or weeks?

Q: How useful would this force be in a situation like … or Korea?

RODRIGUEZ: You want to take that, Mike?

PERRITT: One last question.

MEHAFFEY: We fought this thing, and we found out it was very useful and very effective. You had to assign it, just like you would any force, you had to assign it a mission appropriate to the force. But we found out that in the MTW environment in the Saudi Peninsula, fighting under either a light division or under a mechanized division, it was an effective member of the team.

Now, what we haven't finished the analysis on is what are the tactics, techniques and procedures that might be different for a mechanized force for this formation. As an example, when you put this medium formation in a heavy division, with the support it required because of its vulnerabilities that the armored forces don't have, it was different. So the missions you assigned it might vary a little bit. But they were effective.

RODRIGUEZ: Okay, thank you very much.

(End of press conference.)


MEHAFFEY: Because that's not it's mission. What's a cavalry regiment's mission?

NAYLOR: Covering force, screening force for a corps.

MEHAFFEY: (Garbled) This thing here, that's not what it's for. It's to seize and hold ground.

Q: (Garbled)

MEHAFFEY: You know, this is just my opinion, but the Serbian operation, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti, Panama, you know … Here's the issue. You take the Bosnia. I'm no historian or anything like that, but we had a national, as I recall it, a national objective to stop ethnic cleansing. The opponent tends to pay attention. When I take Pvt. Naylor here, put him across your boundary river and say, 'We're now coming and we're going to take you down.' We all of a sudden start walking away from the problem here, and things go down and then you occupy and things are there. So how much more quickly the National Command Authority can exercise this military option, OK, is I think a benefit.

NAYLOR: Why not make it a corps asset? Why, if you've got it as a division asset, does that assume … You know, we've seen recently what a lot of people consider to be fairly top-heavy deployments in terms of leadership. I mean, put 5,000 people on the ground in Albania, run by a corps headquarters basically. If you decide that you (garbled) corps and you've designed it to be an 0-6 brigade-level mission, but it comes under a division, there's a lot of division commanders are going to say, 'Well, those are my guys going in,' and they're going to go in with their division headquarters over top of that. How do you avoid that?

MEHAFFEY: Well, one of the reasons we do that with the divisions now is because the way they're designed, that's the only choice we have. So part of this effort is a redesign of division/corps headquarters. As you heard the Army leadership say, that's part of its vision. We're going to make the corps capable to be ARFORS, Joint Force Land Component commanders, JTFs. We're going to make the divisions, any division, capable to command across the spectrum. So any division can take this thing and command it, but what you don't want to do is -- that gives you the 10 active component division option. You've got reserve component, as well -- but to put it under a corps, any time you have this condition, what are you doing to that corps what are you doing to that corps that has major theater war readiness requirements?

Now, that entire corps is distracted for this effort. It's the decapitation issue you've heard us talk about before. So instead of that, let's take the division, the echelon that has the competence right now to tactically employ forces and the competence to tactically sustain forces and create a capability for it to command and control the force tactically, and at the same time, unburden that force with duties that could best be handled by an Army force commander.

Q: You're streamlining?

MEHAFFEY: Well, interagency interaction, going to joint military commissions, coordinating for joint fires, you know, bringing joint logistics on, maybe work on a ship-objective maneuver, coordination with Marines from another direction, those kinds of things.

Q: When are the first two units going to be ready at Fort Lewis, what's the date they'll be in operation?

MEHAFFEY: We're shooting for -- what is it? March now, Joe?

RODRIGUEZ: We don't know. We think we'll begin reorganizing the first brigade this spring. The reason we don't know is we don't know what the production schedule will be. Till we let the contract this summer and determine the production schedule, we can't tell you when that will be.

VEIGA: Go back and look at what the Chief said at AUSA. I think he said that he had a goal that within about a year after equipping …

RODRIGUEZ: Let me make a comment, Marsha, on one of your questions. This brigade gives the CINC some additional options. Today the problem we have, if we have to do forced entry in a nonpermissive environment, our options are XVIII Airborne Corps and the Marines. And they will still do the forced entry piece, but the dilemma we've got today is we can get the 82nd in quick, we can get the Marine Corps in quick, but then there's a gap. We call it the deployment gap, because you get these light forces in very quick and then it takes you a while to close the heavy force in. So there's an element of risk there in that gap. We saw it in Desert Storm. The 82nd deployed very quickly, dug in their foxholes and then they waited and they waited and they waited for the heavy force to arrive. What this interim force gives you, it gives you that capability to put a significant combat force, that's lethal, mobile and survivable in right behind the forced entry force, without having that gap and that risk.

Q: The lease of the, or the borrow or whatever it is, of the Canadian LAVs, nothing official has come out except for a press conference at Fort Lewis. (Garbled) the financial details?

RODRIGUEZ: We're going to borrow the Canadian. The Canadians are going to loan, they're going to loan us a total of 32 LAVIIIs. We're going to get eight in early March, eight more in early April and 16 more in August.

Q: No exchange of money at all?

RODRIGUEZ: We will pay for maintenance and we will pay for transportation and we will pay for refurbishment when they're turning back into the Canadians. But there's no leasing, OK? We're also pursuing deals with other countries. The United Kingdom, Germany and France have expressed an interest in providing vehicles under the same type conditions. So we're not limited to Canadian Laves. We're looking at opportunities with other countries.

Q: Would this be in terms of using foreign vehicles, the most expensive use?

MEHAFFEY: In my memory, and it's only 30 years now, a lot of time in the force development business, I don't have a precedence for this. I mean, this idea of international countries coming to loan us their gear so that we can learn about the qualities of this force before we go into actual competition for the force development aspects of this …

Q: So that you say lending their gear in terms of what's going at Fort Knox …?

MEHAFFEY: No, no, this is different. He was talking about the loaners. We're going to have some vehicles loaned to us …

RODRIGUEZ: Up to two years.

MEHAFFEY: Yeah, which is so the troops at Fort Lewis can begin to understand the impacts of these operational and organizational qualities, like commonality, like high speed mobility.

Q: Because there's no equivalence?

MEHAFFEY: There's no equivalence in the U.S. Army or that mean the qualities of fitting on C-130s, you know, on and on and on.

Q: Because contractors don't make this stuff?

RODRIGUEZ: And you may ask why wheeled vehicles and not tracked. We know, we know. Our Army has had experience with tracked vehicles. We've, most of us at our level, we've commanded tracked units. We know what tracked vehicles can do. We don't know what wheeled vehicles can do in this kind of O&O. So there's a lot to be learned.

Q: From a layman's point of view, what are the difference between tracked and wheeled in terms of why you're looking at wheeled?

MEHAFFEY: OK. The general analysis shows that when you add up all of the qualities of the two vehicles, track has an advantage, traditional advantage for mobility over unimproved terrain. Fields, you know. Like the farm fields in Germany and that kind of stuff. Wheels, on the other hand, generally have an improved mobility potential on roads. OK? And this used to be a real distinction between the two, but in the last, what? Five, six, 10 years or so …

RODRIGUEZ: About the last 10 years.

MEHAFFEY: The advance in wheel technology …

RODRIGUEZ: Driven by the RV industry.

MEHAFFEY: Not because we went after it, but because you're trying to take an RV on a camping trip and ride smoothly and not have your teeth come out of your head when you hit a log. The technology for wheels to overcome the difference between its cross-country mobility and the track cross-country mobility is compelling.

So if we can have the high speed mobility of wheels for operational level moves -- by that I mean long distance moves from position to position -- where with tracks, in order to do that, you generally have to load them on transport vehicles.

Q: Tracks are slow?

MEHAFFEY: The reason is you don't want to run them on tracks on the road all time, and just about when you're ready to fight, you've got to replace all the track shoes because you've run them down. And then the tonnage of fuel. Generally the wheels will consume significant less tonnage in fuel than a track vehicle. Parts weigh less.

Remember the environment. It's urban and complex terrain. You know, our experience in Germany in war and, frankly, with some of advanced systems, even in training exercises, you would find what we call a mobility kill of a tracked vehicle as it went through a town, went up on a curb and threw the track because it went through the equivalent of rubble, let's say. And so a wheel would not have that problem.

On the other hand, as I say, a wheel has some gap-crossing restrictions that a tank can generally overcome.

So the issue is not that we decided wheels versus track. The issue is all the information now says you should take a look at wheels, given this organizational effectiveness approach for some part of your formation.

This interim Army -- a point was made that can't be lost. This interim Army continues to include the forced entry airborne and the Sunday punch armor forces. These are the forces when President Naylor or Andrea says, 'I'm tired of you. It's over,' that person, six months, three months, four months, he knows he's going down. It's over with.

We're coming though your barriers. We're coming through your forces and we're taking you out.

As I say, this is kind of the notion that, you know, when you put tanks down, they don't ever move anybody, but get a phone call on the other side of the fence, says 'Yo, they just showed up and the tanks are here.' The deterrence value. And a great compelling value even in those conditions where they don't fight. So we have employed armor, even in small scale contingencies, to great effect in terms of the national objectives. Bosnia is a perfect objective.

NAYLOR: The three follow-on brigades? Where are they going to be.

MEHAFFEY: The decision to be made yet.

NAYLOR: What are the options? Do you know where they are.

MEHAFFEY: The options are setting up here in the building.

NAYLOR: You talked about the possibility of being analyzed, of an interim division being formed out of three of the brigades. Would those be brigades three, four and five if that happened?

MEHAFFEY: You know, I just don't know yet. In other words, there are a lot of institutional implications that you've got to take a look at. You can say form the three brigades and have their battle drill be 'deploy under a division task force of three brigades.' Or you could deploy the next three brigades and make a decision that you're going to create a division. It just hasn't been decided.

NAYLOR: Explain to me the difference between initial and interim here, because they seem to be …

MEHAFFEY: The difference is the timelines we've assessed in terms of production of MAV variants in numbers we need will not permit the creation of a completely common formation of all MAV vehicles in the timelines we need. Timelines driven by the today-requirement that … warfighting CINCs need this capability.

So that the decision is because the requirement is today and now, we will create these two initial brigades with less than full commonality across the force. Still with commonality as a driver, but you may decide, for instance, that you can't achieve one of your variants, so we'll put a Humvee in as, say, a recce vehicle as opposed to the MAV recce vehicle or something like that. So that's what it is, and that force, though, is not going to be a tinkering force. That's an operational capability, deployable operation capability. And that's what the difference between initial and interim is.

NAYLOR: Now once you've got the opportunity to field across …

MEHAFFEY: And the ORD that you'll see written, the ORD talks to the interim capability, the objective that we're looking for for these MAV variants. So, for

instance, in the ORD you will see a requirement for a 155 or a 105 -- we'll figure that out -- but a direct-support artillery variant. Even though it doesn't show up in this initial formation.

NAYLOR: Are you going to keep the HIMARS once you bring in the 155s or the

105s? I mean the HIMARS will still be …

MEHAFFEY: Probably not. I mean -- Well, look. What you may end up with is a

mix. You may decide you want some tube in HIMARS. But remember, we've got a 96-hour requirement here. So if we keep all of that, what other capability do we give up?

NAYLOR: But the HIMARS has a much greater counterbattery capability than your tube artillery don't they?

MEHAFFEY: Arguably. Some would argue the difference. I mean, the analysis shows that you can get counterbattery out of both, but again we have this requirement to get there quickly. We're not going to come off of that, because when you do you start jerking these massive formations that begin to build tactics and can't operate without each element. So if we decide we want all tube gear that have habitual relationships, we know right where to go and, generally -- Remember this brigade is going to be employed by a division, an ARFOR, and every division has access to multiple launch rocket systems. Not necessarily the HIMARS version, but have access to them. And so if we go all tube, it's just a matter of saying we want this now and we may say to ourselves bring those in the force flow before you bring something else. And you can still meet the deployment requirement.

Q: Will it be the goal for an entire capability for an air droppable vehicle? Does that mean your goal is to have the words airborne just tagged onto the end of this name?

MEHAFFEY: Absolutely not. This thing will have nowhere in any of the lexicon the condition set that we built this requiring an airborne capability in order to get into its fight. You're familiar with the tactics? This thing, in tactical terms for the APOD, the aerial port of debarkation, equals the TAA. So you've got to have a place and somebody's got to allow you a secure landing field. So this is built with the notion that you have either a semipermissive environment or you can work your way in. You have permissive where you can land or if you have to take a tactical assembly area, an airfield or an air capability, then you would have to put forced entry capability in ahead of this battalion or whatever it takes. Rangers, 82nd …

And in that condition then, the 96 hours is gone because you've got to seize the airfield and this will float in later.

But when you look at our history now, for the last 10 years, generally we've been semipermissive at worst, for the small scale contingency environments. A couple of differences, like Grenada and, you know, we could have had a problem in Haiti, but generally we've had a contiguous capability to mash into the theater, like we did over the Sava River.

Q: For that anti-tank role that you guys are looking at, are there going to be cannon or could it be some kind of extended form of Javelin or LOSAT or some kind of rocket?

MEHAFFEY: We're going to start, probably -- we have to figure that out. This performance demo will help inform that. We think we will probably start out with TOWIIB. It could be extended range Javelin. But remember, we're not into big-deal developments here. Tech insertions, yes, but not start-up development. So we've got to go with the best capability off the shelves.

Right now, TOWIIB, extended-range Javelin appear to be the options of choice in this anti-tank formation. Don't forget, you've got Javelin, not dedicated Javelin, in every infantry teams.

OK, thanks guys. It's good to see you again.