Theater Missile Defense Staff

DRAFT 30 June, 1999

Go back to: Corps as a Warfighting Headquarters

Associated sections: [ Communications Control Center ] [ Commandant ] [ Corps Commander and Cmd Staff ] [ Intelligence Staff ] [ Sustainment and CSS Staff ] [ Personnel and Manpower Staff ] [ Operations Staff ] [ Personal Staff ] [ Planning Staff ] [ Theater Missile Defense Staff ]

Contents

Active Defense
Attack/Counterforce Operations
Command and Control
General
Manning
Operational Tasks
Organization
Passive Defense
References
Reporting
Responsibilities, EAC
Responsibilities, Theater
Standard Operating Procedures
Tactical Tasks

General

The purpose of this chapter is to detail the purpose, responsibilities, organization, procedures, and essential references as they relate to the theater TMD Cell. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plays a key role in minimizing two critical dangers to U.S. security -- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional threats to U.S. interests.  In theater, we face a challenging theater missile threat, particularly in the southern region. Theater missiles present a problem from their destructive potential not only from a military aspect but also from a political aspect due to their potential as a terror weapon to threaten population centers. The lack of an effective theater missile defense is a potential war stopper for this theater; this threat puts our theater and our allies' forces at risk. Warfighting is a joint endeavor and TMD is no different. TMD operations can be categorized under the traditional model of the phases of war (preparation for war, transition to war/conflict, conduct of war/conflict-defense, conduct of war/conflict-offense, and war/conflict termination).  The range of TMD operations will vary in size and scope, depending on the contingency. It is unlikely that any two contingencies will go exactly alike, or that any single operation will be exactly as planned. For this reason, the TMD Cell will tailor specific systems, ADP software, communications and data links, and manning to the specific conflict environment. The TMD Cell has exercised as a member of the C/J Staff, as well as each of the Component operations Cells (i.e. JFACC, Combat Ops; MCC; LCC, Deep Ops; and Combined Force Air Defense).

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Responsibilities

HQ theater establishes theater guidance and objectives for TMD and assigns and/or apportions forces and resources. CINC uses staff elements and component commanders and their staffs to plan, monitor, advise, coordinate, and execute overall operations, including TMD. HQ theater is responsible for ensuring that TMD plans and operations of subordinate forces are integrated at theater level and documented in the appropriate operations plans and annexes. Theater Missile Defense seeks to counter the missile threat posed by theater missiles. Emphasis is placed on the growing missile threat in the theater area of operation and the command's ability to protect itself against these threats. HQ theater has developed a centralized operations and intelligence fusion cell to coordinate and execute TMD. The TMD Cell is equipped and basic cadre provided by the theater Operations Directorate, Command and Control Division (J36). This cadre is responsible to "train-up" the required additional Component personnel contributions on equipment function and internal cell procedures. This cell facilitates the activities of Passive Defense, Active Defense, and Attack Operations. Passive Defense applies to measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and minimize the effects of damage caused by a TM attack. Passive Defense includes TM early warning and NBC protection, camouflage and concealment, electronic warfare (EW), and recovery/reconstitution measures.Active Defense applies to operations initiated to defend against a TM attack by destroying the missiles in flight and/or airborne launch platforms. Active Defense includes multi-tier defense in depth via available air, land, sea, space, and special operations assets. Attack Operations are initiated to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize TM launch platforms, their C2, and their RSTA and logistics support infrastructure. The theater TMD Cell known as "TMD Coordination Cell" was developed to be rapidly deployable and to provide a portion of the initial entry capability to meet current requirements for interactive/interoperable communications and automation to perform the operations/intelligence fusion functions for the EAC. This includes the capability to access National, Theater and Tactical intelligence information as well as current land, sea and air operations status. HQ theater requirements are to be operational on the 25th hour from the time it is required and that the system be 1 C-130 sortie transportable. This allows its integrated systems to be one of the first elements on the ground to support EAC operational requirements where a theater missile threat exists or its capabilities are required to support other operations.

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EAC Responsibilities

Potential adversaries possessing theater missiles pose a threat to United States security interests, forward deployed forces, and deploying forces. The precise time, location, and nature that Theater Missiles will be employed is uncertain, thus complicating the determination of force composition and method of power projection to overcome specific threats. The nature and extent of U.S. global interests require that TMD assets supporting theater operations be rapidly deployable. This suite of systems includes connectivity to component intelligence and operations systems as well as an austere capability to perform C2 for the EAC. The Cell's mission is to deploy and augment the C/J with the capability to facilitate defense of critical assets from theater missile threats and attack to neutralize weapon systems and support infrastructure. The EAC (ICW the JFC, CINC) establishes guidance and objectives for TMD. This guidance should be reflected in appropriate operations plans and their annexes. The EAC must define and implement a methodology for Joint TMD activities. EAC-level guidance must include (but not limited to): 

• A methodology for joint planning of JTMD.
• Priority of the JTMD effort, for example, what types of targets are most important for attack operations (Attack Guidance) and what friendly assets must be protected by active defense systems.
• Definition of the areas of operations (AOs) of components.
• Apportionment.
• The capabilities/forces made available to the functional components.
• Guidance on component-to-component coordination to facilitate deconfliction and timely TMD operations.
• Establishment and continuous review of Commander's attack guidance as relates to TMD targets.
• The role of the EAC's staff in coordinating JTMD activities.
• Prioritization of TMD target detection assets, sensors, and essential collection requirements.
• Degree of Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), if established, involvement in JTMD.
• The EAC's concept of operations specifies the objectives to be met and provides guidance for the employment of passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and C2 measures. The component commanders jointly conduct operations under the guidance and in support of the objectives of the EAC.

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Organization

The TMD cell is positioned as a primary staff section reporting directly to the EAC commander.  The TMD staff is not to be habitually associated with any particular component.  It is positioned to ensure communication linkages to the component, key facility, etc the TMD METT-TC is protecting.  The TMD protection may be to a force, facility, geographic area (geographic area does not necessarily mean land are and includes air and sea.) or any other threat target and because of this its staff cell position may be reassigned to a command post, component subordinate assigned unit or geographic area.

Put here the pictorials series from ED 55-11 TMD organization.

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Reporting Procedures

Theater Missile Defense is a Joint endeavor. It must be integrated into existing systems for Air Defense, C2, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Fire Support, and Air/Ground Interdiction, or deep attack. Service component capabilities and systems must be synchronized to maximize the effective use of limited resources. Whether defending land, air, or maritime forces from missile attack, TMD should be accomplished jointly. The EAC Commander's authority for TMD is necessary to ensure that all appropriate communications, intelligence, defense and attack measures are coordinated and integrated into a coherent strategy.  The TMD Cell's procedures are designed to protect friendly forces and assets, allowing freedom of action to perform assigned missions and tasks. TMD capabilities add uncertainty to the enemy commander's plans and calculations and are an integral part of our joint or combined commander's campaign plan. Successful TMD operations are achieved by deterring a TM attack, by destroying enemy missile systems or manufacturing capabilities, or by disrupting the enemy's missile operations through coordinated warning; air defense; fire support; counter air; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; strategic attack; interdiction; and a wide range of innovative passive measures. Linkages into the TMD Cell provide intelligence and targeting data, missile launch detection, an integrated battlespace picture, and terrain/cartographic data. Outputs from the Cell focus on the following primary functions:

• Provide Voice Warning of impending or actual missile launch to military and political assets, and collection, tracking, and counterforce systems.
• Warning or "tip-off" of missile launch over TDDS and TIBS to defensive C2 nodes, intelligence collection assets, and attack systems coordinators.
• Produce near real time target data to Joint and Combined attack and collection systems on missile launcher location (goal is 3-5 minutes with 300 meter CEP), egress route prediction, and probable hide sites with supporting infrastructure.

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Standing Operating Procedures

As TMD is frequently an ad hoc organization to an EAC with limited or no habitual training this SOP section is provided as a starting point for all EAC - TMD operations and staff coordination.

Flexibility is key to successful TMD operations, no single process of conducting operations can provide complete protection against a determined missile attack. A mix of passive and active counters to the total array of enemy TM systems is required. Such a mix must provide for the survivability of our combat forces, must minimize the impact on friendly combat operations, must create uncertainty in enemy's planning, and must deter or deny an enemy missile threat. Provisions should be made to provide a defense against the threat; TMD operations should be planned to achieve unity of effort with land, maritime, air, space, special operations forces, and other defense agencies. Current manning for the TMD Cell is primarily composed of Component system operators assembled around a core of theater staff representatives. As needed, Component operations and intelligence representatives will assist in cell functions. When activated and deployed this cell augments the EAC to facilitate TMD operations (Passive Defense, Active Defense, Attack Operations, and C2).

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Passive Defense.

Passive defense focuses on providing immediate warning of impending or actual missile launch to deployed forces and political targets within the EAC AOR. Flexibility and redundancy allow detection from both in and out-of-Theater systems. Similarly, Voice Warning of missile launch can originate from both in and out-of-Theater systems or (optimally) from the TMD Cell. Voice warning not only warns, but cues defensive assets and alerts attack and collection systems. A formatted broadcast provides the missile launch point, weapon characterization, azimuth, and impact risk area to deployed elements. Given the short flight time of TMs, it is imperative to disseminate warning information to as many critical nodes as possible, in the shortest amount of time. A UHF TACSAT based Missile Warning Net has emerged as the optimal solution. The critical nodes are designated based on EAC guidance and intent. Data Warning is broadcast over TIBS and TDDS networks from both in Theater and CONUS based detection systems to all capable receivers soon after the voice warning. This function provides the earliest detailed missile launch information required to execute Active Defense, collection and Attack Operations. EACs and component commanders are responsible for protecting forces against the effects of missile attack through:

• Operations Security (OPS). The communications security, signature reduction, and security aspects of OPS deny enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and identification of friendly targets.
• Deception. Deception misleads enemies by manipulating,
• distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. This can cause enemies to deplete their TM resources by attacking false targets through the use of decoys, missing intended targets , and denying them accurate battle damage assessments.
• Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and contributes to survivability of certain systems by limiting exposure to reconnaissance and targeting.

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Active Defense.

Active defense involves systems and procedures to disrupt or intercept TMs in flight to protect critical assets. Additionally, effective Active Defense requires a focused IPB for probable launch sites and targets, as well as wide-area launch surveillance of the AOR. A common view of the battlespace is required to facilitate Defense as well as support Warning and Attack operations functions. Within the theater AOR this is referred to as the Recognizable Air Picture (RAP) or Common Air Picture. As the names imply, the current capability is limited to integrating TIBS missile launch data with available radar and tracking systems displays broadcast and "shared" with designated users. Depending on available data inputs, the TMD Cell can expand this to include selected Land, Maritime, and SOF activities. This provides:

• Common situational awareness to defensive and offensive C2 nodes.
• Cueing to other available tracking systems to refine launch point, trajectory, and impact risk area.
• A fallback to the Voice Warning function.
• Voice and Data Warning from the TMD Cell and/or other detection systems locations links to available defensive assets. This provides initial launch warning and required intercept information. The TMD Cell simultaneously interfaces with the Area Air Defense Coordinator (AADC) or Fleet Air Defense Warfare Coordinator (ADWC) through collocation or voice/data link (depending on TMD Cell location) providing required information to facilitate C2 of these assets.

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Attack/Counterforce Operations.

Attack/Counterforce operations are intended to destroy and disrupt the TM system before, during, and/or after launch. theater dedicates a specific element (TMD Cell) to focus on the TM target set. Additionally, the concept includes efforts to re-task collection assets to track TM targets to aid formal target development as an Attack/Counterforce operations function. Using the incoming intelligence, operations, and detection system information; the cell performs analysis, prediction, detection, and target production functions. The TMD Cell places their priority on short dwell targets as this is the most difficult and time critical target to prosecute. The procedures and linkages, however, support preemptive and infrastructure targeting to facilitate long dwell target engagements. The specific procedures and types of links to the Component attack systems will vary with the location of the TMD Cell, available assets, ROE, and the EAC guidance for attack of TM targets. Whether preemptive or reactive, Attack/Counterforce operations support Component procedures for counterair, strategic attack, fire support, deep attack, strike warfare, and special operations, as well as "sensor-to-shooter" architectures. Systems used to support attack operations may include rotary and fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-surface and air-to-air operations, surface-to-surface fires, naval missile forces, SOF, antisubmarine forces, EW systems, and maneuver forces. Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive and developed intelligence.

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C2.

The theater concept for C2 of TMD uses existing joint and Service C2 systems to ensure integration with their operational functions and to optimize the use of scarce resources. The peculiar TMD Cell C2 capabilities support the principals of centralized planning, decentralized execution, and coordinated efforts by forces assigned TMD tasks. At no time does the TMD Cell abrogate decision-making, command, or control procedures employed by defensive or offensive C2 nodes. Rather, the TMD Cell and its associated architecture and procedures expedite the flow of information, provide a dedicated focus on the TMD mission, and provide a "translation" node between disparate Service systems. The C2 system facilitates rapid communication among intelligence assets, fusion and decision making facilities, detection and warning systems, and weapon systems. A summary of some of the hardware, hosted software, power requirements, and general capabilities are at enclosure. Effective C2 begins with the EAC's estimate of the situation, intent, objectives and concept of operations. Based on the EAC's guidance and priorities, TMD forces are assigned and missions tasked to appropriate Components. To ensure synergy of TMD efforts, C2 planning and execution should be continually coordinated among all EAC Components. Coordination and considerations for C2 of TMD must include both Joint and multi-national relationships for near-real-time response to the threat. The wide range of Component operations, diverse nature of TMD elements, ROE, and political/military exigencies require the flexibility to collocate with any of several execution nodes and link with many Component systems.

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References

• Joint Pub 3-01.5
• Joint Staff CONOPS for TMD

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Manning

Theater Missile Defense - To send feedback use this e-mail link Billet Feedback.

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Operational Tasks

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Tactical Tasks

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