At the same time, the shortcomings of the Pentomic design had become objects of almost universal complaint. Operational units were paying the price of not having adequately tested the new organization before changing the division designs. The Army clearly recognized that in the rush to be relevant to the atomic age it had jumped into a flawed design that wasn't working.
In January 1959, General Bruce C. Clarke, the Commanding General of CONARC, directed a new study titled "Modern Mobile Army 1965-70 (MOMAR I) to provide an objective for modernizing the army beyond five or six years in the future. He wanted a design capable of fighting nuclear or conventional wars anywhere in the world against a variety of foes. Tactical mobility, increased firepower, more armor-protected vehicles, and the ability to easily incorporate new weapons were to be the hallmarks of the new design. 42 The first draft of the MOMAR I study was completed by July 1959. It was widely coordinated, revised and submitted to a General Officers Board for review. General Clarke approved the study and sent it to the Department of the Army in February 1960.
General Clarke's influence was readily apparent in the finished study. The new design included several radical concepts. MOMAR I eliminated the corps echelon and had the field army directly control the divisions. The designs overwhelmingly emphasized mechanization. There would be only two types of divisions, heavy and medium, with all units completely mounted in organic vehicles. To provide rapid response forces, the study also envisioned using air transportable brigades instead of airborne divisions.
The MOMAR I divisions had five self-sustained combat commands. The commands were a hybrid of the regiments and combat commands of World War II that could be tailored to meet the needs of the particular mission. Commanders could assign elements of armor, mechanized or motorized infantry companies to the three task force headquarters of each combat command (appendix C-10).
The MOMAR I design was never tested. General Clyde D. Eddleman, Army Vice Chief of Staff, thought the design lacked the "simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility required by the Army for its diverse, worldwide tasks in the coming decade." 43 Other criticisms were even harsher. One officer wrote, "The entire organization could have been designed by reading the battle of St. Vith....all characteristic of Gen[eral] Clarke's experiences in World War II." 44
On December 16, 1960, General Eddleman directed the new CONARC commander, General Herbert B. Powell, to abandon MOMAR I. Still, while the study failed to come fruition, it represented a significant development in the Army's concept of land combat, foreshadowing a modern force of flexible tactical organizations not dependent on nuclear weapons.
The quest for more flexible conventional capability continued to drive the push for a new division design. Major changes in America's strategic outlook added momentum to this effort. The national military strategy had shifted from massive retaliation to flexible response. Massive retaliation was intended to deter rather than fight wars. Once the Soviet Union developed a substantial atomic capability, nuclear deterrence became useless in lesser confrontations, where neither side would risk general nuclear combat over regional issues. The new president, John F. Kennedy, believed as did the Army leadership, that the most likely future military confrontations would be in limited wars that did not bring the superpowers into direct conflict. The military needed to be able to respond "flexibly" to these threats. Flexible response placed a premium on ground forces that could be employed in a wide variety of contingencies. 45
In 1960 General Eddleman ordered CONARC to conduct a new division design study. While all divisions needed nuclear and conventional weapons, he wanted them tailored to adapt to different environments. They could not exceed 15,000 men and must be as similar as possible. Planners had until March 1, 1961 to submit their design. 46
General Eddleman's guidelines to CONARC represented the fruition of ideas he developed while serving as commander of the United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, where he was involved with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany's forces. The Germans adopted a building block approach to organization, the "Bankasten system." They used infantry and armored brigades to form divisions that were tailored for specific missions. General Eddleman came to believe that America's future army should also be composed of highly mobile, flexible building blocks. 47
In June 1960, General Eddleman sent three colonels from the Army War College he had originally tasked to review the MOMAR I study to CONARC. This handpicked team was charged with producing a new design initiative. In little more than three weeks they drafted the outline of a concept. CONARC briefed General Eddleman on Jannary 10, 1961 and then worked with the Command and General Staff College and the branch schools to refine the design. On April 4, 1961, CONARC briefed Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker on a plan titled Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD 65). On April 14 General Decker formally approved the concept.
Initially, the ROAD 65 study focused only on the reorganization of the infantry and armored divisions and creating a mechanized division, but on April 16 General Eddleman also directed that CONARC also relook the airborne division design. The divisions CONARC developed each had about 15,000 personnel. Eliminating the Pentomic battle groups, the new divisions looked like modern hybrids of the World War II designs. The new structures incorporated a common division base with a division headquarters, combat support assets and a divisional logistical support command. The predominant type of combat maneuver battalions added to the base determined the type of division (appendices C-11 to C-12). Armored divisions, for example, had six tank and five mechanized infantry battalions.
The ROAD-65 division's three maneuver brigades reflected the influence of the old armored division combat commands. The brigades did not have any assigned units. Planners intended for the brigades to serve as tactical headquarters, each capable of controlling the operations of two to five maneuver battalions. Brigade commanders could task organize the battalions to create combined arms task forces.
The proliferation of options for how the division could task organize its brigades and battalions was the most significant and controversial innovation in the new design. Lieutenant General Garrison Davidson, the First Army Commander, for example, argued that the division was "too flexible," unnecessarily abandoning traditional organizations like the old fixed infantry regiments. 48
Despite criticism, the Army implemented ROAD without testing the concept with a major experimental force. Senior leaders concluded experimentation wasn't needed because they were returning the division design to a more proven, conventional organization. They also believed that enhancing the division's ability to task organize was a prudent response to the Army's need for more flexible forces. The ROAD division reorganization put the Army firmly back on the track of making cumulative improvements on previous combat-tested designs.
A Fight from the Sky - 1962. The first ROAD divisions were activated in February 1962 and reorganization was complete by 1964. Before the first units had converted, however, a move was underway to establish a special variation of the ROAD division. After reviewing the Army's force design initiatives, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara concluded that they didn't exploit adequately the potential of aeronautical technology. He instructed General Decker, the Army Chief of Staff, to conduct a "bold new look" that was "divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies, and free from veto or dilution by conservative staff review." 49 The Secretary even suggested that the Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General Howze, and other air mobility proponents serve on the study team.
Less than a week after Secretary McNamara's directive, CONARC appointed General Howze as president of the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements (Howze) Board. The board, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, worked at a feverish pace, conducting forty field tests with troops from the 82d Airborne Division and the 6th Aviation Group (Provisional) that consumed over 11,000 flying hours. In addition, the board conducted extensive wargaming and operational research. 50
The Howze Board submitted its report on August 20, 1962. Its major recommendation was to develop an airmobile division. The design would follow the ROAD division model, though the airmobile division would have one third the number of vehicles. The division's mobility would come from its 459 aircraft (more than four times what was in the ROAD division), allowing it to airlift one third of its assault element simultaneously. In addition, the board also recommended forming air cavalry combat brigades and several other echelon above division aviation and airmobile units (appendix C-13).
The Howze Board's findings were highly controversial. Like the invention of the armored division in World War II, aviation units were a new, big investment. The Howze Board envisioned forming up to six airmobile divisions and the price tag loomed up to $7 billion. Army aviation had the potential of demanding a large share of defense modernization dollars.
In a forceful incursion into the Army organizational design process, the Air Force objected to the Howze board's recommendations. This opposition was not unexpected. Though there had been an air component in the division design since the 1920s, the Air Force wanted exclusive control of air assets when it became an independent service in 1947. The Air Force and Army began seriously debating the role of Army aviation in the division during the SKY CAV initiative in 1955. 51 In 1964 CONARC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) conducted a joint exercise called GOLD FIRE I to test an alternative to the airmobile design. The exercise employed a modified ROAD division supported by dedicated air assets, but without any Army fixed or rotary wing aviation support. 52
Even within the Army there were concerns about expanding the Army's aviation capabilities. Though the Defense Department had received some increased resources from President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, the Army's force structure had actually changed very little. Aviation requirements would inevitability compete with other programs and force structure needs.
Despite reservations, tests of the airmobile division began at Fort Benning, Georgia, with the activation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and a separate test and evaluation group in February 1963. While the test had top priority, competing demands for aviation assets and personnel from the Berlin Crisis, domestic disturbances, and Cuban contingency operations constantly frustrated the test planners. The full scale tests were finally concluded in October and November 1964.
After the tests, the 1st Cavalry Division was selected to form the first airmobile division. On July 1, 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division flag moved to Fort Benning, where it absorbed the personnel and equipment of the 2d Infantry Division and the 11th Air Assault Division. The next month the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the Army's first flying division, deployed to Vietnam and the test of combat. In Vietnam the division pioneered airmobile concepts and tactics that were employed throughout the war.
Lessons from Vietnam - 1972. Beginning in 1972 the Army tested another variation of the ROAD design, mixing the capabilities of the armor, airmobile and air cavalry units employed in Vietnam. The new Army Chief of Staff, General William Westmoreland, termed the concept triple capability (TRICAP). On May 5, 1971, the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas reorganized as a TRICAP experimental force to test the new organizational design (appendix C-14). 53
The experimental force, totaling fewer than 14,000 personnel, consisted of armored, airmobile and air cavalry combat brigades. The Modern Army Selected Systems Test, Evaluation, and Review (MASSTER) at Fort Hood evaluated the design. Field trials began in February 1972 and continued for three years.
The results of the tests were disappointing. The experiment concluded that the TRICAP division needed more tanks and less airmoblie infantry. It lacked the heavy combat power needed to fight on the NATO battlefield. This was a problem. In the drawdown after the Vietnam War, the Army eschewed forces that couldn't support its primary mission of NATO defense.
After the evaluation, the 1st Cavalry Division was reorganized with two armor and one air cavalry combat brigade. In March 1974, the Army reorganized the division again, making it a standard armored division. While the concept of a mixed capability force was finally abandoned, the initiative did have an enduring impact. It argued for expanding the role of army attack aviation as an important element in combined arms land warfare. In 1975 the air cavalry combat brigade became a separate formation. 54
Force Redesign and the Birth of TRADOC - 1975. In the mid-1970s a number of strategic factors caused the Army to relook the division design once again. The Vietnam War had cost the Army a generation of weapons modernization. The Post-Vietnam drawdown left the Army in the same hollow condition it had been after previous wars, even as the Warsaw Pact countries continued to modernize their ground forces. In addition, America's advantage in tactical nuclear weapons had proved illusionary. Growing concerns over accidental use, collateral damage and rapid nuclear escalation led to a series of constraints and safeguards that limited severely the flexibility of employing tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the 1973 Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and Israelis demonstrated the vastly increased lethality of modern conventional weapons. 55
On July 1, 1973, the Army established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the new command assumed all responsibility for force design. In 1975, TRADOC analysis of the Army division found current designs inadequate to meet the Warsaw Pact threat. In October 1975, General William E. DePuy, the TRADOC Commander, wrote General Frederick C. Weyand, the Army Chief of Staff, suggesting a new restructuring effort. In March 1976, the Department of the Army directed TRADOC to undertake a formal study, and on May 4, TRADOC formed the special Division Restructuring Study (DRS) Group. 56
On July 16, 1976, TRADOC briefed General Weyand on the pilot concept. Divisions would continue to have three brigades but each brigade would be substantially larger, with a mix of tank and mechanized infantry battalions supplemented by antitank guided missile companies. The division would also have more organic aviation support. Though calling for larger brigades overall, the division actually had less "foxhole" strength with smaller infantry squads and fewer tanks per platoon. Decreases would be compensated by more lethal weapons (appendix C-15). 57
The Army staff offered a mixed critique of the proposal. Reviewers also had strong reservations over the planned one-year test. They favored a longer four-year study and a slower restructuring pace to allow for the integration of new weapons into the redesigned divisions.
Despite their reservations, on January 24, 1977, Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers approved a one-year test by the 1st Cavalry Division called the Division Restructuring Evaluation (DRE). General Rogers was anxious to proceed with the modernization of the Army. He believed American conventional forces were playing "catch up ball" with the Warsaw Pact. His immediate priorities were to improve readiness, enhance the capability of forward deployed forces and improve quick reaction forces for contingency operations. 58 All these efforts could be facilitated by a rapid force redesign.
On July 1, 1977, General Donn Starry succeeded General DePuy as TRADOC commander. General Starry supported the effort to reorganize the heavy divisions but thought the DRE was moving too fast. By the end of 1977, General Starry's misgivings expanded into general dissatisfaction. The study had been done too quickly, with too little critical analysis and coordination.
General Starry insisted on extending the DRE. In September 1977, the Department of the Army approved extending the tests to October 1979. General Starry implemented a more deliberate and analytical approach. TRADOC created a Battlefield Development Plan to methodically assess the division's performance on each battlefield task and the contributions of weapons programs to support each task. General Starry also expanded the scope of analysis to look at the operational level above division. Division design, he argued, couldn't be separated from the broader operational issues.
The DRE ended in October 1978 and produced a number of specific recommendations. Overall, however, the evaluation's conclusions were ambivalent. The old ROAD TOE updated with modern weapons was better and more cost effective in offensive operations. On the other hand, the DRS TOE proved better on the defense. In the end, General Starry did not find that the design provided the quantum leap in conventional capability required to match the Soviet threat.
Shifts in national military strategy prompted General Starry to consider an expanded redesign effort. In conjunction with NATO, the United States had implemented a conventional force buildup to match the Warsaw Pact. To meet this objective the American Army needed new weapons, updated doctrine, and new organizations that could employ them.
In August 1978, while the DRE tests were still being conducted, General Starry launched an initiative called Division 86. In July 1979, the Department of the Army formally absorbed DRE into Division 86. Concurrently with the Division 86 redesign, the Army accelerated its campaign to modernize systems and rewrite doctrine. In particular, General Starry was determined to add momentum to the Army's ongoing doctrinal renaissance. His new AirLand Battle doctrine was not officially endorsed until after the approval of Division 86, but TRADOC developed the division to match the doctrine's new concepts. The two efforts nurtured each other. 59
Division 86 was the best orchestrated and most thorough division design effort since World War II. General Starry tasked the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to coordinate service school efforts and prepare the Division 86 TOEs and system requirements. School centers became proponent agencies tasked to conceptualize various functions within the design and report back by October 1979.
Task forces fleshed out design options which CAC then analyzed in varying combinations. Periodically, general officer workshops adjudicated disagreements and provided guidance and recommendations. By the October deadline TRADOC presented General Edward C. Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, an objective heavy division design. General Meyer approved the design in principle, clearing the path for further development.
The heavy division totaled about 20,000 personnel, a significant increase from the original ROAD design. Heavy Division 86 was designed to have flexibility and mobility and still have sufficiently heavy combat power to withstand the echeloned attack of the Warsaw Pact armies. On the surface, it appeared similar to the ROAD division, but with some important differences. For example, it included an air cavalry attack brigade as a fourth maneuver brigade (appendix C-16).
The logic behind the new design was clear. To fight and win on a conventional, high-intensity battlefield in Western Europe without relying on tactical nuclear weapons, field forces had to vastly increase the depth over which the enemy could be attacked. The Warsaw Pact had to be prevented from massing their overwhelming combat power and rolling over NATO's forward ground defenses. This would be achieved by synchronizing the capability of air forces and reorganized, more capable ground forces. Together the combination of air power and new Army weapons, doctrine and organizations would generate unprecedented land combat power.
On August 1, 1980, General Meyer approved the new heavy division. Division 86 became the first of four major organizational studies by TRADOC to develop an objective force for implementation by 1986. Besides Division 86, the studies (collectively referred to as the Army 86 Studies) looked at the corps, echelons above corps and a nonmechanized infantry division.
In particular, the Army 86 looked at transforming the corps. Planners envisioned expanding the corps' resources and operational tasks. This initiative was the most significant change in the relationship between corps and division since World War II, increasing the corps' warfighting role and ability to shape the battle for the divisions. 60
The inclusion of a nonmechanized infantry division in the study reflected another transition in the national military strategy. American national military strategy was broadening its focus again beyond central Europe. World events, specifically the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, highlighted to policy makers the need for more deployable, conventional forces capable of rapidly responding to a regional crisis.
On September 28, Generals Meyer and Starry developed a detailed concept for Infantry Division 86. It had to be able to conduct worldwide contingency operations as well as deploy rapidly to reinforce forward NATO forces. To do this the division would need increased mobility, flexibility and firepower. 61 General Meyer detailed two design constraints. The division would be capped at 14,000 soldiers and limited to equipment that could deploy in C-141 aircraft. The designers would have to depend on advanced technologies to enable these smaller divisions to accomplish their diverse and demanding missions.
TRADOC's initial proposal was complete by January 1980, but rejected because it failed to meet the design objectives. General Meyer also rejected two subsequent designs. They were too large, couldn't meet rapid deployment time lines and failed to put adequate combat power on the ground.
In August, General Meyer provided more detailed guidance. He wanted the design to have nine or ten battalions, two of which would be equipped with a protected anti-armor-assault system capable of defeating the Soviet T-72 tank. The remainder of the battalions would be mobile infantry.
In September 1980, TRADOC recommended a 17,773-man structure with eight motorized infantry battalions and two mobile protected gun battalions as the objective Infantry Division 86 design (appendix C-17). General Meyer was less than satisfied with the results and dismissed the infantry division component of the Army 86 studies.
Table of Contents
Prelude to Army XXI, Part 1
Prelude to Army XXI, Part 3