Shortly after becoming Chief of Staff, General Meyer convinced Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to forgo a plan to mechanize the 9th Infantry Division. Instead, General Meyer proposed that it could be redesigned and obtain many of the characteristics of a heavy division through innovative organization and new technology.62
On May 15, 1980, the Army commissioned an Army Science Board to study a high technology division. Army Science Boards are advisory bodies of respected experts from the private and public sector. They are periodically asked by the Army to review new concepts and technology. This board's charter was to determine how the effectiveness of the division could be increased by enhancing firepower, electronics and survivability, and improving strategic and tactical mobility. The board's summer-long analysis promoted the idea using the 9th Infantry Division as a high technology test bed (HTTB) for Infantry Division 86 operational and organizational concepts.
The Department of the Army established the HTTB in June 1980. The test bed (renamed the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA) in 1983) became a field operating agency of the Department of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with liaison elements fromTRADOC, testing agencies and the Army Materiel Command.
As late as July 1981, TRADOC and CAC viewed the 9th Infantry Division as a test of Infantry Division 86. General Meyer, however, looked on the HTTB to provide radical new concepts. In March 1981 he told Major General Howard F. Stone, the division commander, that the division had no obligation to be constrained by the Infantry Division 86 design. General Meyer wanted the HTTB to break from the traditional structured and methodical method of developing organizations, systems and doctrine.
On November 13, 1981, General Meyer approved the mission and operational concept for the test. The High Technology Light Division (HTLD) would consist of 16,000 soldiers transportable in 1,250 sorties. The number was to be further reduced by 1990. General Meyer set 1985 as the deadline for fielding, later changing this target date to 1986.
General Meyer directed the HTTB to design a division to fight primarily in the Middle East and secondarily as part of NATO. Reinforcing NATO was an addition to the original mission statement because the Army didn't believe it could justify developing an entirely new division that could not support its primary strategic mission. 63
The division found a number of obstacles in the path of conducting an effective evaluation. There was constant tension with TRADOC which had the traditional mission of developing and testing designs, and Forces Command (FORSCOM), which was responsible for maintaining trained and ready forces for deployment. The division drew from and competed for resources with both these major headquarters. For example, the division's first major exercise, LASER MACE, conducted in April-May 1983, cost the two commands $7.1 million.
The greatest impediment to testing the division was funding and procuring new equipment. Key systems which were to be the heart of the division's capabilities were not available. Without the objective systems, such as the armored gun, the division had to devise surrogates to use in field trials.
In June 1983, when General John A. Wickham became the new Army Chief of Staff, he faced a serious conundrum. While the 9th Infantry Division was developing innovative concepts and ideas, the Army was still no closer to a light infantry division design. In addition, full implementation of HTLD couldn't be realized until new weapons like the armored gun system were available in the 1990s. General Wickham decided to split-off the light division design into a new study. He directed ADEA to concentrate its efforts on a less ambitious effort, developing a motorized division of about 13,000 men.
The motorized division design developed included three ground maneuver brigades with a mix combined arms (heavy), combined arms (light) and light attack battalions. The division also included a cavalry brigade (air attack) with attack aviation, reconnaissance and combat support aviation (appendix C-18). 64
The certification test of the High Technology Motorized Division (HTMD), exercise LASERSTRIKE, took place in August 1984 at Yakima Firing Center. The exercise included over 20,000 soldiers and Marines as well as Air Force and Naval personnel.
In December 1984, General Wickham approved a 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) objective division design. The designers claimed the division was "fully capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world" and ready "to fight enemy armored forces upon arrival with great mobility and agility." 65 During the next four years the 9th Infantry (Motorized) Division continued to adjust the design, evolving into a force that could fill the gap between the heavy and light divisions.
By 1988, however, the motorized division concept was in trouble. The Army was finding it difficult to justify maintaining multiple types of infantry divisions. In addition, reduced procurement funding no longer supported developing the armored gun system, the centerpiece of the motorized design. Finally, the Army had to cut end strength in the tactical forces. The motorized capability was determined to be least essential. The Army reorganized the division and its employment as an experimental test unit ended. 66
An Army of Excellence - 1983. National strategy continued to suggest a need for the infantry division. Despite increases in defense funding at the end of President James E. Carter and the beginning of President Ronald Reagan's terms, the Army was still hollow because it had more missions than forces. In the 1980s the Army was straining to meet global commitments outlined by the national military strategy. Part of the problem was that the Heavy Division 86 was unaffordable both in terms of manpower and resources. 67 In addition, the strategic air and sea lift available to deploy the Army were woefully inadequate.
British combat operations in the Falkland Islands and the American experience during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada highlighted the utility of rapidly deployable light infantry. General Wickham believed that the solution to the Army's manning and strategic shortfalls was the immediate fielding of a 10,000-soldier light infantry division (LID). Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh Jr., agreed. He believed the Army's inability to deploy rapidly hurt its appeals for force structure and modernization. "Why modernize if you can't move it? ....In short, I agree with you [General Wickham], the Secretary declared, "Let's put together a division that can get there." 68
In August 1983, General Wickham directed TRADOC to conduct a feasibility study for Army redesign, and report back by October. 69 This became the official beginning of the Army of Excellence (AOE) study. The TRADOC study recommended first designing a LID. Next they would reduce the heavy force designs by cutting personnel and equipment. Finally, they would develop the corps and EAC designs for each theater. 70
General Wickham directed that the LID design be completed as quickly as possible. He wanted a division with nine maneuver battalions, deployable in 400-500 aircraft sorties and affordable within the Army's resource restraints. The overriding consideration was to reduce manpower. Of the fourteen design objectives, eight directly related to cutting strength. The Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity sponsored a series of workshops over the next seven weeks with representatives from TRADOC schools and centers and the major commands. The hurried design endeavor developed the operational concept simultaneous with force design. Planners worked furiously to ensure that one preceded the other, if only by days. 71
General Wickham approved an initial LID design on October 20, 1983 and a revised plan on November 10. To meet his requirements, the planners developed an organization specifically for contingency missions not involving heavy combat. They provided only enough support systems for the division to operate in a low intensity setting for 48 hours without external support. This allowed designers to significantly reduce logistics, fire support, antitank and survivability assets. Wherever possible, they replaced organic capabilities with a few trained cadre organized to accept corps augmentation. At less than 11,000 soldiers, the final design was a sparse, foot-mobile organization (appendix C-19).
The LID was the most controversial design initiative since the Pentomic division. Senior commanders in Korea and Europe questioned their need for light divisions. Others argued the real problem was that the Army didn't create an adequate support base at the corps level to support the austere light divisions. 72
Publicity and controversy surrounding the light division overshadowed another key initiative of the AOE study. While the AOE left the other division designs intact, it streamlined some functions, reduced redundancy and sustainability in the heavy divisions. The changes reduced heavy division strength by over 3,000 slots (appendices C-20 to C-22) and increased the division's dependency on the corps to shape the battle for its commitment. 73
The final designs clearly reflected the strategic realities of the 1980s. The demands of national strategy, manpower and budgetary constraints weighed heavily on the AOE study. The Army had to able to support worldwide contingencies within the force structure available. In the end, General Wickham ensured that the Army maintained a viable force while expanding its operational capabilities.
Divisions began to organize under the AOE TOEs within a year after the study's approval. Like ROAD, AOE was implemented without the employment of a major experimental force. In the case of the heavy division, there was little risk. The heavy design had just been exhaustively analyzed during the Army 86 studies and the new division didn't differ radically from the current structure.The LIDs had completely new designs, but each division underwent extensive field tests and unit certification exercises as they were organized.
Refocusing for Force XXI. On February 24, 1991, America's Army of Excellence entered its greatest test of battle during Operation DESERT STORM. The result was a resounding victory during a hundred-hour ground war. While the Army had been exploring some new force design initiatives in a project called AirLand Battle-Future, they were not pursued. Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono concluded that the Army had a "perfectly reasonable division" and he would not seek change for the sake of change. 74 Future modifications to the division designs would be disciplined and incremental, closely tied to the evolution of the Army's operational doctrine.
When General Gordon R. Sullivan replaced General Vuono as Chief of Staff, he found America's shifting national security environment was rapidly increasing the momentum for change. The collapse of the Soviet Union and soaring federal budget deficits generated a demand for rapid force reductions.
While forces shrank, the United States did not plan to retreat from its global responsibilities. The national military strategy called for a combination of strategic deterrence, forward deployed forces and the ability to respond to regional crisis. At the same time, the strategy established exacting standards for the employment of military forces. Forces would only be employed where clear cut objectives had been established. When military power was used, it would be applied with overwhelming force to ensure quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties. 75
In 1993, on the heels of a joint staff study that had already envisioned shrinking the Army further, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed a bottom-up review of the armed forces that determined that the United States could maintain a global presence, be prepared to engage in two major regional conflicts simultaneously, and still undertake additional overall force reductions. Clearly, in the future, the Army's task would be to retain a capability to support global missions with far fewer forces. The Army would have to relook the design of the operating force in light of the new strategic environment. 76
At the same time, the Army was beginning a major effort to harness any redesigned force with expanded technology. On January 22, 1993, Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan endorsed the concept of "digitizing" the divisions. Digitization involved linking combat elements with highspeed, sophisticated computers, enabling forces to share situational awareness and allowing commanders to distill battlefield information into rapid, accurate tactical decisions. The superior information supplied by digitization would be used by the Army to enhance its traditional imperatives of mobility, flexibility and firepower. 77
The Army Staff had the responsibility for jump starting the digitization effort. Major General Jay R. Garner, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development, organized two Digitization Special Tasks Forces (STF). The first met in the fall of 1993 and the second in the spring of 1994. The STFs helped focus the initiative and drafted a charter for an Army Digitization Office (ADO). The ADO, established on July 8, 1994 under Major General Joe W. Rigby, was responsible for synchronizing the Army material programs that were developing digital systems for future operational forces. Concurrently, an Army Science Board study developed recommendations for incorporating digitized capabilities into force design experimentation. 78
Marrying digitization and the Army's experimentation effort was the responsibility of TRADOC. Beginning in 1994, TRADOC Commander General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. initiated a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) supported by TRADOC's newly established Battle Laboratories (Battle Labs) to explore new requirements for the post-Cold War Army. The intent behind the AWEs was similar to the concept used by the HTLD. Experiments would be done with real soldiers, in real units, early in the design process, to provide immediate insights into future force requirements.
On March 8, 1994, General Sullivan formally initiated Force XXI. The term Force XXI would come to describe the over arching process to redesign both the institutional and operational Army for the 21st century. 79 TRADOC, under its new commander General William W. Hartzog, had a key task in the process, redesigning the tactical force.
Implicit in the redesign was that the Army's end strength would not increase. The Army had already announced that by 1996 it planned to reduce to 10 Divisions (1 air assault, 1 airborne, 2 light, 6 heavy). The new designs would have to be at about or below current strength. General Hartzog told planners to assume that the structure of the airborne, air assault and light division would remain largely unchanged. They would be improved through new technology as it became available. TRADOC's effort, therefore, centered on the redesign of the heavy division.
The revision of doctrine, force design and system development were to run concurrently. While the ADO focused on system integration, TRADOC developed a preliminary doctrine called Force XXI Operations and the branch school commandants established working groups to flesh out operational concepts for the new division design. 80 These results were presented in a series of general officer "How to Fight" seminars in the fall of 1995.
At the same time, TRADOC tasked CAC to develop and analyze a series of options for the new division design. CAC had already begun preliminary work on the division redesign in 1993. 81 This effort was greatly accelerated in 1995 and expanded to include analytical analysis and input from the branch schools.
CAC developed eleven wide-ranging force design options, including structures that had been looked at and rejected in previous studies and experiments. These organizations merited reconsideration in light of the changing strategic environment and the increases in mobility, flexibility and firepower provided by modern military technology.
Among the options considered was a mix of aviation, light infantry and armored brigades similar to the force tested previously in the TRICAP experiment. The study also looked at the concept of building divisions as needed out of independent fixed brigades, a concept first explored extensively during the Division 86 studies. 82
The results from analyzing the eleven options were briefed at TRADOC's general officer seminars. As a result of this effort, General Hartzog recommended to General Dennis J. Reimer, the new Army Chief of Staff, a hybrid heavy division design as the best option for further study and experimentation. This structure became the interim Force XXI division design.
The Force XXI interim division design was slightly smaller than the AGE division, totaling15,820 personnel. Modifications to the division included increased fire support to shape battlespace, expanded reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, greater consolidation of logistical support functions, and additional infantry to thicken the division's "foxhole" strength (appendix C-23). 83
The Army planned to test the new design through the AWEs. On February 14, 1995, the 2d Armored Division (later redesignated 4th Infantry Division) at Fort Hood, Texas was designated as the Experimental Force (EXFOR). For the AWE, the division came under the operational control of TRADOC. In addition, the Army staff and the other major commands were tasked to support the TRADOC effort. To help coordinate implementation, TRADOC established an Experimental Force Coordination Cell (ECC) at Fort Hood. 84
Fielding of new equipment became the first major milestone for the ECC and the EXFOR. The Army wanted to avoid the shortcomings of past experimental forces and have the kinds of equipment they planned to have in the future force in the experiment. The Department of Army accelerated fielding to the division scheduled new systems, such as the Paladin self-propelled howitzer. In addition, prototype systems, such as the applique, a set of digital software and hardware that could provide common computer links throughout a combat brigade, had to be designed, built and fielded on short order.
A preponderance of the equipment went to one brigade. After training, this brigade (augmented by a light task force) would conduct the Task Force XXI AWE at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California in 1997. The Army also planned follow-on division and corps level AWEs to complete the experimentation process. From these experiments and initiatives, the Army would build the foundation for a revolutionary new kind of land combat power--the digitized force of the 21st century.
The Army's Force XXI effort appears to have been well timed. In the past, the Army responded to, and in some cases anticipated, dramatic changes in the strategic setting and reshaped the force to face the challenge. Force XXI clearly followed in that tradition. Whether the innovations it produces will be as transitory as the Pentomic division or as enduring as the World War II "triangular"design will weigh on how well it reinvents the Army's process of organizational change.
In light of past efforts, the creation of the EXFOR was a prudent move. The Army has never been able to afford a permanent experimental force. In fact, there is probably no need for one. The necessity of experimental forces varies. The critical variable in the need for experimentation was how radical the design was from the current organization. The more radical the design change, the greater the need for experimentation.
Regardless of how exhaustive and extensive the level of experimentation, senior leaders must expect and anticipate that debate and controversy will accompany every design effort. In the past, successfully overcoming criticism has resulted not from cleverly packaging and marketing change, but from clearly articulating the rationale behind innovations and producing functional, effective designs.
In pursuing innovation, designers must be wary of the challenges of synchronizing force modernization and design. Implementation of force design changes without the available supporting technology uniformly failed. Synchronization has best been achieved by designing adaptive organizations that can assimilate to new technology as it becomes available.
Planners must be equally cautious in breaking the traditional cycle of methodically developing and fielding systems to meet the immediate needs of force redesign. Combat developments can be streamlined to coincide with force design. These efforts, however, are invariably resource intensive and compete with the routinized combat development process for support. Force designers must be disciplined and selective, balancing long term development needs with short term innovation.
Designers must also be watchful of the temptation to radically reduce manpower requirements through force redesign. The Army has always recognized that to develop a force structure that cannot be supported within the current end-strength results in a hollow army, incapable of fulfilling its role in the national military strategy. Division redesigns, however, that attempted to achieve substantial personnel savings by eliminating echelons of command or force capabilities without modernizing the force to compensate for these reductions have found any hope of savings illusionary.
Finally, designs must conform to shifts in the national military strategy. Yet, strategy and the allocation of resources frequently change faster than the force structure can adapt. The Army's traditional emphasis on increasing mobility, flexibility and firepower has proven generally sound. These characteristics have produced force structures that are highly adaptive to new strategic environments. Adaptive organizations have demonstrated much greater utility than forces built to fill specific narrow strategic niches. The great challenge for designers is to build organizations that meet strategic requirements, but are sufficiently flexible to adapt to change.
The requirements for successfully integrating change are complex and demanding. Charting the course to the future is not an easy task, but it is essential. While such efforts consume only a modicum of our national treasure, the importance of their labors are beyond measure. They are counted in the safety and security of the American nation and the lives of its soldiers.
Table of Contents
Prelude to Army XXI, Part 2
Endnotes