Index JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
PRAIRIE WARRIOR 2000 - FOR INSTRUCTIONAL USE ONLY


FROM: USCINCPAC

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

INFO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

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CSA WASHINGTON DC

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DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/NIDS/ DOCDIV

FOR TRAINING ONLY-PRAIRIE WARRIOR 00

OPER/PACIFIC STRIKE//

//MSGID022100HFEB00/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCPAC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/USCINCPACOM COMMANDERíS ASSESSMENT/

GENTEXT/SITUATION

1. (A) THE SITUATION IN PACIFICA IS DETERIORATING. SURRAN IS INTERVENING IN THAT NATIONíS CIVIL WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE REBEL FORCES. THIS FOLLOWS THE REBEL FORCE'S DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUGUEGARDO ON 1 JUL 99. THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE CURRENTLY IN COUNTRY (UNFORPAC) HAS NEITHER THE MANDATE NOR THE EQUIPMENT TO DETER ARMED AGGRESSION. UNFORPAC REMAINS IN POSITION ALONG THE UN ADJUDICATED "ZONE OF SEPARATION" NORTH OF MANILA. SURRANESE INTENTIONS ARE STILL UNCLEAR BUT THEY ARE LANDING MULTIPLE DIVISION-SIZE FORCES AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE PACIFICIA ARCHIPELAGO. LANDING SITES INCLUDE THE THE REBEL CONTROLLED NORTH SHORE OF LUZON IN VICINITY OF APARRI AND ISLANDS OF MINDANAO AND PALAWAN IN THE SOUTH.

(1) ESTIMATE THAT SURRAN CAN CONDUCT LIMITED AIR ATTACKS ON UNFORPAC AND PACIFICAN FORCES IMMEDIATELY.

(2) ESTIMATE THAT SURRAN CAN MOVE TO AND ATTACK UNFORPAC OR PACIFICAN FORCES WITH ONE DIVISION AND SUPPORTING AIR AND NAVAL FORCES BY 3 MAR.

(3) ESTIMATE THAT SURRAN CAN BUILD UP, MOVE AND ATTACK THROUGH UNFORPAC TOWARD MANILA WITH UP TO AN ARMY SIZE FORCE WITH SUPPORTING AIR AND NAVAL FORCES AND REFITTED AND TRAINED PRA FORCES BY 25 APRIL.

(4) ESTIMATE THAT THE SPM CAN CONTINUE TO CONDUCT LEVEL I AND II REAR AREA ATTACKS ON UNFORPAC AND PACIFICAN FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE. SURRANIAN SUPPORT CAN INCREASE THIS CAPABILITY TO LEVEL III THREAT BY 1 APR.

(B) A WEAKENED INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO FACED WITH GROWING SEPARATIST AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS. GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI) UNITS BASED IN NORTHERN SUMATRA HAVE DEFECTED, AND THE NEW NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, SUPPORTED BY SURRAN, HAS BECOME THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SUMATRA. THE NNM HAS STATED ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AS THE REUNITING WITH SURRAN AND REMOVAL OF CORRUPT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE AUSTRALIAN-LED, US SUPPORTED PEACEKEEPING FORCE OPERATING IN CENTRAL SUMATRA HAS BECOME A "PEACE ENFORCEMENT" EFFORT, OPERATING TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PREVENT NNM INCURSIONS.

(C) CONCURRENTLY, THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITY IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA HAS CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT OF RAMPANT ACTS OF PIRACY. THE PIRATES AND THEIR VESSELS HAVE BEEN FREQUENTLY PROVIDED SAFE HAVEN IN SURRAN AND NORTHERN SUMATRA. THE PIRATES ALSO ENJOY A KNOWN BUT UNVERIFIED FINANCIAL SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT WITH THE NNM. EASTLAND HAS EXPRESSED GROWING CONCERN OVER THE PIRACY SITUATION AND MAY INTERVENE IF THE PIRACY CONTINUES.

(D) SURRAN INTERVENTION IN PACIFICA AND CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE NNM IN INDONESIA HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDING THE CURRENT PACIFICA CRISIS INTO BROADER REGIONAL CONFLICT INVOLVING EASTLAND, THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND THE EAST SULU SEA RESOURCE AREA.

(E) EASTLAND REMAINS THE REGIONAL POWER AND GREATEST POTENTIAL THREAT TO LONG-TERM US INTERESTS IN THE REGION. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE CURRENT CRISIS, EASTLANDIC SUPPORT FOR THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF ITS SURROGATE STATES NORTH CHOSUN AND SURRAN, CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. EASTLAND HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED SURRANESE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RECOGNIZE THE SPM INSURGENT MOVEMENT IN PACIFICA, THE PRA IN NORTH LUZON, THE NNM IN INDONESIA AND HAS BEEN PROVIDING COVERT AID TO BOTH THE INSURGENTS AND REBEL FORCES THROUGH SURRAN FOR SOME TIME. EASTLAND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE REGIONAL COUNTRIES IN THE ABSENCE OF US AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSí RESOLVE TO ENSURE STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE REGION.

(F) THE CHOSUN SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY VOLATILE AND THE MOST DANGEROUS TO MID-TERM US INTERESTS IN THE REGION. ANY INDICATION OF A LACK OF RESOLVE IN DETERRING NORTH CHOSUN AGGRESSION MAY BE INTERPRETED BY THE NORTH CHOSUN REGIME AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION OR INITIATE AN ATTACK ON THE SOUTH. FROM A PACOM REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE, THE US COMMITMENT TO CHOSUN REMAINS OUR NUMBER ONE REGIONAL PRIORITY.

(G) CONCLUSIONS.

(1) US MUST CONTINUE TO ACT DECISIVELY IN THE REGION TO REASSURE ALLIES, STOP SURRAN AGGRESSION OR ADVENTURISM, AND DETER EASTLAND FROM ACTION. CURRENT LEVELS OF COMMITMENT TO CHOSUN SHOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

(2) SURRANESE REGIONAL AMBITIONS AND ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY. IMMEDIATE OUTSIDE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS NECESSARY TO COUNTER THIS THREAT AND SUSTAIN CURRENT GOVERNMENTS OF PACIFICA AND INDONESIA.

(3) LONG TERM VIABILITY OF THE CURRENT PACIFICAN GOVERNMENT IS DEPENDENT UPON REMOVAL OF SURRAN FORCES FROM PACIFICA AND TERMINATION OF THE CIVIL WAR.

(4) THE PACIFICAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ARE CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE SPM INSURGENCY IN THE LONG RUN WITH LIMITED, BUT SUSTAINED LOGISTICAL AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT.

(5) THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ARE ALSO CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NNM IN THE LONG RUN WITH LIMITED SUPPORT. THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF UNILATERALLY SECURING THE STRAITS OF MALACCA FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE.

GENTEXT/CURRENT ACTIONS

2. THEATER ASSESSMENT FOR A RANGE OF RESPONSE: RECOMMEND RESPONSE IN ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POWER.

A: DIPLOMATIC. SHOW INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE TO FORCE SURRAN TO CEASE ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA AND THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND PACIFICA, AND IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW MILITARY FORCES FROM PACIFICA.. REDUCE DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH SURRAN. MEET WITH REGIONAL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEADERS. WARN SURRAN AGAINST ANY ATTACKS ON US/MN FORCES. PUSH UN TOWARD HARSH RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE SR INVASION, WARN AGAINST ANY ACTION AGAINST UNFORPAC OR OTHER MN FORCES, AND ISSUE AN ULTIMATUM FOR SURRANíS WITHDRAWAL FROM PACIFICA. DISCUSS ACTIONS WITH EASTLAND; DETER THEIR INTERVENTION.

B. INFORMATIONAL. SANCTIONS ON C4I TECHNOLOGY. PROTECT FRIENDLY C4I ASSETS. OPEN DIALOGUE WITH PRESS. HEIGHTEN PUBLIC AWARENESS ON THREAT AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF PACRIM. INITIATE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IO CAMPAIGN TO DETER SR AGGRESSION, PROTECT FORCE DEPLOYMENT, AND STABILIZE PACIFICAN AND INDONESIAN GOVT. DETER ESCALATION TO USE OF WMD. GAIN FULL INSIGHT INTO ALL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS (HRO) ACTIVITIES IN PACIFICA.

C. MILITARY. EXECUTION OF FDO 2. IMMEDIATELY REGAIN SEA CONTROL OF STRAITS OF MALACCA; IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENT INDONESIAN AND PACIFICAN FORCES; PLAN DEPLOYMENT OF DETERRENT FORCE PACKAGE FOLLOWED BY DECISIVE FORCE PACKAGE; INTELLIGENCE MONITORING OF SURRANIAN FORCES IN NORTH LUZON AS WELL AS SURRANESE FORCES ENROUTE/EMBARKED. CONTINUE HN SUPPORT PLANNING FOR US MILITARY AND MN FORCES.

D. ECONOMIC. DISCONTINUE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO SURRAN. FREEZE SURRAN ASSETS WORLDWIDE. ENACT TRADE SANCTIONS. RESTRICT CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS.

GENTEXT/FORCES READILY AVAILABLE

3. IN-THEATER FORCES:

A. CINCPAC: FDO1: CINC ASSESSMENT TEAM; INTEL SUPPORT PACKAGE; THEATER SUPPORT COMMAND EARLY ENTRY MODULE.

B. ARMY: 1 BDE, 21 ID (L)(UNFORPAC), 1 CSG(-) PROVISIONAL.

C. SOF: 8 SFG(-), SOAR, AFSOC AND NSWU ELEMENTS, PSYOP PLANNING TEAM.

D. NAVY: CVBG STENNIS (EAST SULU SEA); ARG WASP (EAST SULU SEA); ARG KEARSARGE (EAST SULU SEA)

E. MARINE: 1 RLT (EMBARKED)(EAST SULU SEA)

F. AF: 2 FW (60 F-16) AT N+4); 2 BW (18 B-52H) AT N+4 (GUAM); 1 ACW (AWACS) AT N+1

G. UN FORCES: 3 INTERNATIONAL BDES (UNFORPAC).

GENTEXT/TIMEFRAME FOR FORCE COMMITMENT

4. MAJOR COMBATANT FORCES AVAILABILITY FOR:

A. STRAITS OF MALACCA: CURRENT USN ASSETS ARE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING THROUGH THE STRAITS. ANTICIPATE ADDITIONAL ARRIVING USN ASSETS CAN FIND AND SEIZE A MAJORITY OF PIRACY ASSETS WITHIN 20 DAYS TO ELIMINATE THE PIRACY THREAT IN THE STRAITS.

B. INDONESIA: CURRENT SF SUPPORT TO THE GOI AND AUSTRALIAN LED PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO IN INDONESIA WHILE THE MN MAIN EFFORT IS DIRECTED AGAINST SR ACTIONS IN PACIFICA. ADDITIONAL SOF, AF, AND ARMY FORCES WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED TO DEFEAT NNM IN THE LONG TERM.

C. PACIFICA -- LUZON-DEFENSE:

(1) 2 FEB-3 MAR: WITH THE PROXIMITY OF NAVAL AND MEF FORCES, INHERENT CAPABILITY OF UNFORPAC, SLOW BUILD-UP OF SURRANIAN FORCES, AND REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINING AND REFITTING OF PPF PRIOR TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, CURRENT IN-THEATER FORCES POSSESS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO PREVENT MAJOR SR/PPF VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE TO 3 MARCH.

(A) UNFORPAC CAN DEFEND AGAINST UP TO A LIGHT DIV FORCE. SURRAN REQUIRES 30 DAYS TO DEPLOY AND MOVE ONE DIV FROM THE NORTHERN COAST TO THE CEASEFIRE LINE. THEREFORE UNFORPAC RETAINS THIS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO 3 MARCH.

(B) PROXIMATE NAVAL AND MEF FORCES PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL JOINT DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST SURRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL FORCES THAT COULD SUPPORT ANY EARLY ATTACK OF UN, US, OR PACIFICAN FORCES.

(C) SPOD/APOD SECURITY: ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL OF FDO-2 AF CAPABILITIES AND TMD ASSETS BY 8 FEB PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SPOD AND APOD FORCE PROTECTION TO FACILITATE FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENT OF AF AND GROUND FORCES.

(2) 20 FEB - 30 MAR: ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL OF THE FDO-2 AF AND HEAVY BRIGADE ELEMENTS BY 20 FEB PROVIDES EXTENDED CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE ZOS CEASEFIRE LINE AND MANILA AGAINST ANTICIPATED ARRIVING SURRANIAN FORCES OUT TO 30 MAR.

(3) 30 MAR - INDEF: TPFDD SUPPORTABLE ARRIVAL OF USN, USMC, SOF, AND MAJOR AF ELEMENTS BETWEEN C+9 AND C+30 IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ARMY ACR, MECH DIV, AND AASLT DIV BY C+80 PROVIDE SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ASSETS ON LUZON INDEFINITELY AGAINST UP TO A TWO CORPS SIZED FORCE.

D. PACIFICA -- LUZON-OFFENSE:

(1) AIR AND NAVAL FORCES PROVIDE A CURRENT CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT LIMITED OFFENSIVE SPOILING ATTACKS TO PREEMPT OR RESPOND TO SURRANIAN OR PPF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS.

(2) TPFDD SUPPORTABLE ARRIVAL OF MAJOR AF ELEMENTS BETWEEN C+9 AND C+20 IN CONJUNCTION WITH USN, USMC, AND AN ARMY ACR, MECH DIV, AND AASLT DIV BY C+80 PROVIDE SUFFICIENT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL OR DESTRUCTION OF AN ARMY(+) SIZED SURRANIAN FORCE AND DEFEAT OF PPF FORCES.

E. PACIFICAN SOUTHERN ISLANDS: PACIFICAN FORCES WITH CURRENT US SOF ADVISORY ASSISTANCE ELEMENTS (FID) CAN DEFEAT CURRENT SPM THREAT. SHOULD SURRAN INCREASE SUPPORT TO SPM, PROXIMATE AND DEPLOYING US AIR, NAVAL, AND MARINE ASSETS CAN PROVIDE PACIFICAN FORCES AN INDEFINITE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY UNTIL THE MAIN THREAT ON LUZON IS DEFEATED.

GENTEXT/MAJOR CONSTRAINTS

5. FORCES IN THEATER ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR DECISIVE OFFENSIVE ACTION. DECISIVE GROUND OPERATIONS TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL OF SR FORCES AND ENSURE A SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR ACTION BY OTHER AGENCIES WILL REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT GROUND FORCE BUILDUP, REQUIRING AN 80-110 DAY BUILDUP PERIOD.